

National Dam Safety Program Technical Seminar | 2024

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- As a US Army Corps of Engineers Infrastructure Leader (1980-2019):
  - Owner and Self Regulator of +3,000 Infrastructure Systems
  - Changed culture from Standards to Risk Informed Decision-Making
  - Career Geotechnical Professional
- As Private Consultant (2018today)
  - Sort of The Same Thing for Clients in Industry and Government



#### Pulpit Rock, Norway

(2,000 feet above the fiords of Norway)

My Risky Background in Dam Safety

#### **Discussion Topics**

01

CONTEXT FOR DAM SAFETY IN THE UNITED STATES 02

WHAT CONSTITUTES
A STATE-OF-THE ART
DAM SAFETY
PROGRAM?

03

LESSONS OF WHAT NOT TO DO

04

LESSONS ON WHAT WORKS WELL




### **CONTEXT FOR** DAM SAFETY IN THE UNITED STATES

LESSONS FROM
MODERN DAM
SAFETY PROGRAMS

#### Let's look at some date

+91,000 dams Average Age = 61 years 6% federally regulated 70% state regulated



1. Flood control 2. Navigation 3. Hydropower 4. Water Supply 5. Environmental

### Public Utility Federal ■ State Private Local Other

#### **Dam Owners**

- Common Law Legal System,
   Owners are Ultimately
   Responsible for Safety:
- Federal Owners Lead the Industry
- Some Owners are also Self Regulated
- Wide Range of Sophistication
- Decision Makers





US Bureau of Reclamation
Dam Safety

US Army Corps of Engineers Risk Management Center




Tennessee Valley Authority
Dam Safety



Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Dam Safety

#### **Federal Leaders**

- Very Similar Policies and Approaches to Risk Assessment &
   Management
- Comprise Most of the Large, Complex and Risky Dams in United States
- TVA, USACE, and USBR are self-regulated Owners, FERC only is regulator
- Collectively, they have more experts in risk analysis and management than the entire US Industry
- All are senior, registered professionals that have 25-40 years experience.
- They are the leaders in Dam Safety and Risk Informed
   Decision Making



#### Dam Regulators

- States Primary
   Regulator but Vary
   Considerably Some
   Embracing Risk
- FERC and Large
   Federal Owners Have
   Identical Regulatory
   Framework Based on
   Risk
- Some Dams are not Regulated

#### USSD

- Official ICOLD Member
- Focused on Technical Issues

#### ASDSO

- Represents/Focuses on States
- Primary Advocacy

#### NHA

- Focused on Hydropower
- Strong Advocacy & Influence

#### CEATI

Focused on Research & Owners

#### Others

 ASCE, DFI, AEG - Focused on Individual Disciplines and Technical Specialties

### Non-Governmental Organizations

#### Help Guide the State of the Practice

- Much Overlap Between NGOs But Not Coordination
- Most Provide Training and Collaboration
- Common Membership of Federal, Academia, and Industry Experts

#### Universities **National** Private Academy Institutes, of Science **NDSRB** & Engr. **Federal Laboratories** & Facilities

# Academia and Dam Safety

Some Collaboration, Not Much – Mostly Competitive


With Each Other

Little Central Funding from Government

Minor Focus on Dam Curricula and Risk in Universities

Federal Agencies of USBR and USACE Fund Most...

Decreased Funding of Science Agencies in United States




# Industry & Dam Safety

- Very Few New Dams Being Built in USA,
   Most Construction is Rehabilitations.
- Most Engineering support focused on Assessments/Regulatory Compliance
- Not much collaboration between Industry Partners: Competition
- Risk Expertise in Government >> Industry
- Decision Influencers




### Traditional Dam Safety Program Focus (1968-2000)

- Compliance withDesign Standards as aMeasure of Safety
- Inspection and Monitoring for Performance Concerns
- Safety Assured by Regulation



#### **Traditional View of Infrastructure Safety**




Focused on How We Built Them, Not How They'll Perform (not integrated systems – think New Orleans)

Focused Compliance with Design Standards as a Measure of Safety, Assured by Regulation

# This is what following standards only has resulted in...

- Huge Variation in Risk
- Over and Under Investment in Risk Management
- Wrong Priorities
- Poor Understanding
- o Dynamics!



One Size Doesn't Fit All!

#### Some Limitations to Consistency of Standards Based Loading Conditions


- Frequency of events not considered
  - Non-equality between loading conditions at a dam:
    - PMF frequency =1/500,000
    - MCE frequency = 1/5,000
  - Non-equality between dams in a portfolio
    - PMF frequency = 1/1,000,000
    - PMF frequency = 1/1,000





#### Some Limitations in Deterministic Stability Approach

- Likelihood of failure not fully considered
  - Meet or don't meet guidelines/criteria
  - $\Box$  For F.S = 1.4
    - Dam A Probability of failure = 1/5,000
    - Dam B Probability of failure = 1/250





#### Some Limitations in Hazard Potential Classifications Approach

#### All high hazard structures require the same guidelines/criteria

Dam A – Estimated loss of life = 1

Dam B – Estimated loss of life = 10,000



#### Misconception About Standards and Dam Safety...


- Meeting standards = Safe (no failure)
- Meeting standards = Acceptable performance
- Meeting standards = No uncertainty
- Meeting standards = No more thinking required





#### Risk Informed View of Infrastructure Safety

Risk = f(Hazard, Performance, Consequences)



Modern Infrastructure Program: Focused on People, Performance, and Risks

#### Modern Dam Safety Program Focus (since 2000)

- Understand How Things Can
   Fail and the Risk Associated
- Risk Informed Decisions
- Sharing Responsibilities ViaImproved Communication
- Governance: People, Process,& Policy




#### Why is a Strong Risk Framework Necessary?

#### Integration is Credibility:


- Dam Systems and the Environments they exist in are Complex and Dynamic
- Problems that You Can Understand are Problems That Can Be Solved
- Clear Relationships Within Governance: Policies, Processes, and People/Organizations

#### Built for the Long Haul


- Enduring Across Multiple Generations
- Adaptable to Evolving Practice, Science, Data, and Research









Relying on limit states and standards as a decision basis has resulted in this....




### State of the Art Advancements In Geotechnical Design

When Did Major
Advancements in Our
Profession Occur?





Reference: Bryant Robbins and Scott Shewbridge, USACE



"I'd rather be approximately right than precisely wrong."

J.M. Keynes

### **Uncertainty Paradox**

 Engineers Believe Decision Makers Demand Precision and certainty so We DOUBLE DOWN on what we know (and ignore the rest)




# Telling Instead of Showing


Lessons on What Doesn't Work Well


"Houston, Texas recorded the largest Rainfall on record within the continental United States. Over 60 inches of precipitation in 48 hours. That's when the gage broke."

an H&H friend of mine...



The Volume of Water that Fell on Houston During Hurricane Harvey





# Understanding How Things Can Fail and the Consequences

Lessons on What Works Well



Challenger Explosion, 1986

#### Standards Based Understanding of Risk

$$FS_{GS} = 1.0$$
  
Based on lab data, specific loading

Is it safe?


How confident are you?

What should you do?



#### Improving the Understanding of Risk

6. What follows initiation?




1. Recognize Initiation Is one part of failure Continuum

4. Consider past performance




#### Quantitative Understanding of Risk



#### **Lessons: System Effects**


- Identify Inter-Relationships
- Simplifying Assumptions Appropriate
- Quantify When Appropriate






#### **Lessons: Human Factors**

- Complex Interactions Can Increase Risk and Uncertainty
- > Errors, Biases Are Real
- Understand the External Influences on your Project
- ➢ Good Governance Mitigates Most **Human Factors**





### Lessons: Extreme Events

- Probabilistic
   Methods Important
   to Decision Making,
   Particularly in
   Urbanized Areas
- Extreme Events Happen!
- Pay Attention to Gate Reliability



2020 Fires, San Francisco, California Billion Dollar Disasters



#### **Lessons: Independent Peer Review**

#### **Change Practice**

The "no fail" branch in some event trees can transition to failure in other failure modes

Avoidance and Consideration of Large Damage States can transfer risk within a system.

#### **Sustain Practice**

Independent Review and Challenge of Past Assessments is Necessary

Considerations of Systems and Human Factors Is Consistent with (and already a part of) Risk Informed Practice

#### Something to think about...



Reference: Ignacio Escuder-Bueno & Eric Halpin (2016): Overcoming failure in infrastructure risk governance implementation: large dams journey, Journal of Risk Research



# Why is Risk Embraced in Concept But Not in Practice?



National Dam Safety Program Technical Seminar

