HAB REPP TOOL KIT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction to the Tool Kit

Purpose, scope, general guidance

Section I - Evaluating the ICP/ UAC/ Staging Area

Core Criteria for evaluation of ICP / UAC / Staging Area

Section II - Template tools

Points of Review (POR) Demonstration Criteria template

Planning Criteria Checklist

Section III - Preparation of the Planning Workshop

Facilitator’s Guide to the Modules

Slides to accompany the Modules

Scenario Injects / Criterion = Module List

Section IV - Modules

Module 1 = 1.a.1 Mobilization

Module 2 = 1.b.1 Facilities

Module 3 = 1.c.1 Direction and Control

Module 4 = 1.d.1 Communications Equipment

Module 5 = 1.e.1 Equipment and Supplies

Module 6 = 2.a.1 Emergency Worker (EW) Exposure Control

Module 7 = 2.b.1 Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for Plume Phase

Module 8 = 2.b.2 Radiological Assessment ... (Recommendations for use of KI)

Module 9 = 2.c.1 PADS for persons w/ Disabilities & Access/Functional needs

Module 10 = 3.a.1 Implement EW Exposure Control
Module 11 = 3.b.1 Implement KI Decision for Institutionalized ...

Module 12 = 3.c.1 Implement PAD for Disabilities ...

Module 12A = 3.c.2 Implement PADs for Schools

Module 13 = 3.d.1 Implement Traffic & Access Control (TAC)

Module 14 = 3.d.2 Impediments to Evacuation

Module 15 = 4.a.2 Plume Phase Field Team Management

Module 16 = 4.a.3 Plume Phase – Filed Teams Ambient Measurements

Module 17 = 5.a.1 Activate Alert & Notification

Module 18 = 5.a.3 Backup Alert & Notification

Module 19 = 5.a.4 FEMA approved exception areas

Module 20 = 5.b.1 Emergency Information and Instructions to public and media
PURPOSE

The purpose of the FEMA REPP HAB Exercise Tool Kit is to provide Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with several different “tools” which may be used to facilitate reviews of plans and procedures in advance of an HAB REPP exercise.

SCOPE

The Tool Kit may be used by OROs to assist in the review of plans and procedures, and determine that all HAB related criteria are addressed and are consistent with the REPP Manual and NUREG guidance where HAB is cited. OROs may find these tools helpful to planning and preparedness.

These tools are not intended to be used in Exercise Scenario or Extent of Play development. The use of any or all the tools presented in the Tool Kit is optional.

TOOLS in the TOOL KIT

The Tool Kit contains several different tools. Each begins with a description of how it may be used. The tools may be used separately or as a group of tools supporting various aspects of a planning workshop or a scenario-led discussion of response plans and/or procedures to be reviewed.

The HAB Plan Review Checklist contains the planning standards cited in the REP Manual Section II.C. The standards are presented in table format, and only standards that are pertinent to the HAB review are listed. It is an easy to use checklist.

The HAB Points of Review (POR) Demonstration Criteria Template is presented in Excel 2010. It features the 21 criteria in the REP Manual Section III where HAB is cited. The template may be used electronically with easy to use drop-down menus.

The Facilitator’s Guide describes how one may facilitate a scenario-based discussion or workshop to review plans and procedures for the 21 demonstration criteria. There are 21 Modules which accompany the Facilitator’s Guide, each depicting a specific criterion. There are related questions listed on each module which may be used to lead discussion of that particular criterion to identify whether the criterion is sufficiently addressed in the OROs plans and/or procedures. Each module has the same commencing scenario followed by injects that are designed to push the discussion/plan review to the HAB aspects of the particular criterion depicted. In this manner, a facilitator may use any
one or more of the modules, separately or together, and still have a fully developed scenario and injects to drive the discussion.

The Slides packet coincides with the Demonstration criteria. The scenario and inject packet were created separately so that facilitators may give the scenario and each appropriate inject(s) to the participants when the accompanying criterion is being reviewed. There is also a list of each module as numbered and which criterion it depicts, and it goes further to identify which inject accompanies which criteria / module.

Use of the Modules, slides, scenario/injects, and the Facilitator’s Guide, along with the POR Demonstration Criteria template, provides the framework to conduct a meaningful planning workshop or meeting with OROs. OROs may use the tools to conduct their own review of their plans.

EVALUATION

OROs have expressed concerns regarding how the HAB REPP exercise will be evaluated. These concerns are directed to the evaluation of the Incident Command Post (ICP), the Unified Area Command (UAC), and/or Staging Areas. To address these concerns, the HAB REPP Criteria for Evaluation of the ICP / UAC / Staging Area lists were created. No new evaluation criteria specific to HAB exercises are in the REP Manual.

Evaluations of the ICP/ UAC/ Staging Area are strictly focused on coordination and communication.

The REP Manual Part III page 31 (April 2012)cites: “The REP Program does not evaluate Incident Command Post tactical operations (e.g. law enforcement hostile action suppression techniques), only coordination among the incident command, the utility, and all appropriate OROs, pursuant to plans / procedures.”
List of Criteria for Evaluation of ICP/UAC/Staging Area

HAB REPP Exercises

Core Evaluation Criteria for ICP / UAC / Staging Area

This list was comprised based on discussions with NEI and NRC, and the FEMA HAB Committee regarding the development and evaluation of HAB exercises to address what will be evaluated at the ICP (Incident Command Post), UAC (Unified Area Command), and/or Staging Area. The REP Manual Part III page 31 (April 2012) cites “The REP program does not evaluate Incident Command Post tactical operations (e.g. Law Enforcement hostile action suppression techniques, etc.), only coordination among the incident command, the utility, and all appropriate OROs, pursuant to plans / procedures.”

Core Criteria The following REP Manual Criteria are the core criteria which may be used to evaluate OROs' ICP and/or UAC, or OROs' Staging Area when applicable based on Extent of Play, plans, and procedures, when supporting an HAB exercise:

1.a.1 - Alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities
1.c.1 - Direction and control
1.d.1 - Communications systems
1.e.1 - Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations
2.b.2* - Decision-making process (Criterion 2.b.2 may not be applicable to Staging Area evaluation)
3.a.1 - Issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers

* Criterion 2.b.2 may not be applicable to Staging Area evaluation

All REPP Manual Criteria pertinent to the ICP /UAC /Staging Area The following REP Manual Criteria may be used to evaluate OROs' ICP, UAC, and/or Staging Area when supporting an HAB exercise. Evaluation criteria will be selected based on ORO plans and procedures, and scenario / Extent of Play agreements made with the RAC Chair during pre-exercise planning meetings.

1.a.1 - Alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities
1.b.1 - Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response
1.c.1 - Direction and control
1.d.1 - Communications systems
# Traditional Response Resource Gap Analysis Tool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Response Role / Task</th>
<th># Needed to perform role/task</th>
<th># Needed from your ORO to staff the task</th>
<th># of staff traditionally assigned to the role / task who have other duties in an HAB (identify # and other duty)</th>
<th># of staff trained for this task coming from MOU / LOA (identify agency)</th>
<th>GAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Worker Exposure Control Team</td>
<td>10 (example)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2 - SWAT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations for Plume Phase teams</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation teams—public, and persons with disabilities, or access/functional needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheltering teams—public, and persons with disabilities, or access/functional needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of KI team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# HAB REPP

# RESPONDER RESOURCE GAP ANALYSIS TOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Response Role / Task</th>
<th># Needed to perform role/task</th>
<th># needed from your ORO to staff the task</th>
<th># of staff traditionally assigned to the role / task who have other duties in an HAB (identify # and other duty)</th>
<th># of staff trained for this task coming from MOU / LOA (identify agency)</th>
<th>GAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent dose projection team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiological assessment for Ingestion Exposure Pathway team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protective Actions for Schools team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic and Access Control team(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Measurements and Analyses team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laboratory Operations team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert and Notification team(s), including backup A&amp;N, and exception areas, if applicable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Response Role / Task</td>
<td># Needed to perform role/task</td>
<td># needed from your ORO to staff the task</td>
<td># of staff traditionally assigned to the role / task who have other duties in an HAB (identify # and other duty)</td>
<td># of staff trained for this task coming from MOU / LOA (identify agency)</td>
<td>GAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information / Media team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception Center team, monitoring and decon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decon team, including equipment and vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Care of Evacuees site support team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and treatment of contaminated injured persons – monitoring, decon, medical team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing the ICP, UAC, Staging Area(s) if indicated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Responders Resource Gap Analysis Tool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Response Role / Task</th>
<th># Needed to perform role/task</th>
<th># needed from your ORO to staff the task</th>
<th># of staff traditionally assigned to the role / task who have other duties in an HAB (identify # and other duty)</th>
<th># of staff trained for this task coming from MOU / LOA (identify agency)</th>
<th>GAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Set-up/maintaining team for ICP, facility/site establishment, IT technical support, communications support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and Supplies access / distribution / retrieval team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.e.1 - Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations

2.a.1 - Decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, is in place for emergency workers

2.b.2 - Decision-making process

2.c.1 - Protective action decisions

3.a.1 - Issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers

3.c.1 - Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs

3.d.1 - Appropriate traffic and access control established.

3.d.2 - Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved

4.a.2* - Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information

5.a.1 - Primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner

5.a.3 - Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time

5.a.4 - Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes

5.b.1 - Provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner

* Criterion 4.a.2 (Field Team Management) as pertaining to the ICP evaluation indicates a need for coordination between field teams and the ICP/UAC (per the REP Program Manual page III-49), therefore may be evaluated under Direct and Control (Criterion 1.c.1).
INTRODUCTION

The HAB Plan Review Checklist was developed as a tool for FEMA REP staff to identify HAB-specific planning criteria to assure that each is included in ORO response plans. The checklist can be used by state and local agencies responsible for the development of response plans to assure that issues impacting Hostile Action-Based scenarios are addressed. By using the checklist, OROs can assure that response plans address each criterion and that the elements meet the intent of the criterion listed. The Plan Review Checklist is a reflection of the planning guidance provided in the REP Program Manual. The information contained in the template is taken directly from the REP Program Manual, is formatted for ease of use, and is a reflection of the existing planning guidelines. This document is offered as a an aid to response planners, and its use is completely at their discretion.

Below are a few key points of interest for use of the Plan Review Checklist:

• The worksheet addresses a specific Program Planning criterion which is stated, and notes the applicable HAB related plan elements.
• To the right of the plan elements, are columns which will allow the planner to note which responding agency (ORO) is responsible for addressing the issue in their plan, and where the elements are addressed in the agency’s response plan.
• In the right column of the worksheet, comments may be added.

We hope that the HAB Plan Review Checklist will be of aid to agencies in their preparation for HAB related exercises and incidents.
## Part II.C, A.1.a

Each plan shall identify the state, local, federal, and private sector organizations (including utilities), that are intended to be part of the overall response organization for Emergency Planning Zones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Standard</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>HAB Plan Elements</th>
<th>Responsible ORO</th>
<th>Location in Plan</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part II.C, A.1.a</td>
<td>Each plan shall identify the state, local, federal, and private sector organizations (including utilities), that are intended to be part of the overall response organization for Emergency Planning Zones.</td>
<td>Describe all Federal, State, local, tribal, and private-sector organizations comprising the overall ORO. Tribal governments submit their own plans/procedures or may choose to be included as part of the state plans/procedures within which the tribal land falls. Identify the principal response organizations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### HAB Plan Review Checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Standard</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>HAB Plan Elements</th>
<th>Responsible ORO</th>
<th>Location in Plan</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part II.C, C.6</td>
<td>Each organization shall make provisions to enable onsite response support from OROs in an HAB incident as needed.</td>
<td>Include provisions to allow ORO law enforcement and other initial first responders prompt access to the NPP site.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Include provisions for coordination between in-bound response resources and evacuation efforts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Identify any mutual aid agreements for alternate personnel to supplement local resources (See also Criterion A.3).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Address radiological training requirements for the primary and alternate personnel, including just-in-time training.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Include procedures for activating qualified alternate personnel.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### HAB Plan Review Checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Standard</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>HAB Plan Elements</th>
<th>Responsible ORO</th>
<th>Location in Plan</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part II.C, E.1</td>
<td>Each organization shall establish procedures that describe mutually agreeable bases for notification of the response organizations consistent with the emergency classification and action level scheme set forth in [NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1] Appendix 1. These procedures shall include means for verification of messages. The specific details of verification need not be included in the plan.</td>
<td>Initial notification from the licensee to a designated offsite 24-hour warning point (e.g., fire or police department dispatch, 911 emergency center). Offsite plans/procedures indicate the location of the warning point and the method of notification and backup (e.g., commercial telephone, dedicated telephone, fax machine, or pager). If the initial notification from the licensee to the warning point is over a non-secure system, the criterion requires message verification (e.g., via a return call). If the primary means of notification from the licensee to the warning point is on a dedicated system (i.e., one capable of being used only by a known, limited number of organizations), OROs may choose whether to verify receipt of notification. Initial notification to licensee and the ORO when a notification originates from an entity other than the licensee. The plans/procedures identify the points of contact for the licensee and ORO, method of notification and backup, and method of verifying notification.</td>
<td>ORO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Page 4 of 10
### HAB Plan Review Checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Standard</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>HAB Plan Elements</th>
<th>Responsible ORO</th>
<th>Location in Plan</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part II.C, E.1, Cont.</td>
<td>Subsequent notifications from the licensee and/or ORO to other offsite organizations. The plans/procedures may call for subsequent notifications to locations other than the warning point or other designated entities. For example, after the EOC is operational, the plans/procedures may state that all further notifications are made directly to the EOC rather than to the warning point.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II.C, F.1.c</td>
<td>Provision for communications, as needed, with Federal emergency response organizations.</td>
<td>The system(s) available for communicating with Federal response organizations (e.g., ordinary commercial telephone, dedicated telephone lines, or radio nets). The primary system and at least one backup system.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II.C, G.4.a</td>
<td>Each principal organization shall designate a spokesperson who should have access to all necessary information.</td>
<td>Identify who, by title/position, will serve as the main PIO for the organization and where the PIO will be located. If media interaction is planned for more than one location, a main PIO is designated for each location.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Standard</td>
<td>Criterion</td>
<td>HAB Plan Elements</td>
<td>Responsible ORO</td>
<td>Location in Plan</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II.C, G.4.a, Cont.</td>
<td>Describe how the PIO will obtain access to information about the emergency and the organizations’ response efforts, gather and verify such information, and coordinate /communicate with the appropriate personnel for approval in advance of disseminating any information to the public and/or the media.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If the PIO will be operating at a location remote from the EOC, describe:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who, by title/position, will be the main point of contact in the EOC for exchanging information with the PIO; and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>what physical means (e.g., telephone, fax, or computer network) will be used for communicating information between the EOC and the PIO.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Include procedures for authorizing release of information and, in particular, for control and release of sensitive information.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each State and local organization shall establish a capability for implementing protective measures on the basis of Protective Action Guides and other criteria. This shall be consistent with the recommendations of the EPA regarding exposure resulting from passage of radioactive airborne plumes, (EPA-400-R-92-0001) and with those of DHEW (HHS)/FDA regarding radioactive contamination of human food and animal feeds as published in the Federal Register of August 13, 1998 (63 FR43402).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Standard</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>HAB Plan Elements</th>
<th>Responsible ORO</th>
<th>Location in Plan</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part II.C, J.9</td>
<td>Each State and local organization shall establish a capability for implementing protective measures on the basis of Protective Action Guides and other criteria. This shall be consistent with the recommendations of the EPA regarding exposure resulting from passage of radioactive airborne plumes, (EPA-400-R-92-0001) and with those of DHEW (HHS)/FDA regarding radioactive contamination of human food and animal feeds as published in the Federal Register of August 13, 1998 (63 FR43402).</td>
<td>The organization’s procedures for making PADs and implementing protective actions based upon PAGs that are consistent with EPS recommendations. The process followed to ensure coordination of PADs with all appropriate jurisdictions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II.C, J.10.g</td>
<td>Means of Relocation</td>
<td>Means for controlling traffic to assure a safe and efficient evacuation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Procedures for implementing alternate evacuation routes, if warranted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation resources, including drivers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The methods for determining the number of persons without private transportation, per planning area.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Designated pickup points for persons without private transportation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Standard</td>
<td>Criterion</td>
<td>HAB Plan Elements</td>
<td>Responsible ORO</td>
<td>Location in Plan</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Part II.C, K.3.a  | Each organization shall make provision for 24-hour-per-day capability to determine the doses received by emergency personnel involved in any nuclear accident, including volunteers. Each organization shall make provisions for distribution of dosimeters, both self-reading and permanent record devices. | Methods or options for emergency worker exposure control, to include exposure from inhalation.  
Dose limits for emergency workers.  
Types and quantities of dosimeters and dosimeter chargers available per location and the number of emergency workers needing dosimetry devices.  
Process for reading PRDs and any early reading of PRDs (e.g., when an emergency worker’s task assignment is completed or as otherwise specified).  
Specific dosimetry instructions, including when, where, and to whom individuals return their dosimetry devices.  
Dosimetry storage locations.  
Distribution of dosimetry to all emergency workers and, when permitted, members of the public needing access to the restricted area.  
Proper documentation of authorization to exceed administrative dose limits. | | | |
### HAB Plan Review Checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Standard</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>HAB Plan Elements</th>
<th>Responsible ORO</th>
<th>Location in Plan</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Part II.C, N.1.b** | General Emergency. For this scenario variation the following conditions shall apply:  
  i) The licensee is required to demonstrate the ability to respond to a no/minimal radiological release scenario at least once within the eight-year exercise cycle. State, Tribal and local response organizations have the option, and are encouraged, to participate jointly in this demonstration.  
  ii) When planning for a joint no/minimal radiological release exercise, affected State, Tribal and local jurisdictions, the licensee, and FEMA will identify offsite capabilities that may still need to be evaluated and agree upon appropriate alternative evaluation methods to satisfy FEMA’s biennial criteria requirements. Alternative evaluation methods that could be considered during the extent of play negotiations include expansion of the exercise scenario, out of sequence activities, plan reviews, staff assistance visits or other means as described in FEMA guidance. | All major elements of the plans/procedures will be tested at minimum at the frequency specified by the REP Program Manual, Exhibit III-2. Scenarios for exercises will be varied from exercise to exercise and include all required scenario variations during the exercise cycle. | | | |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Standard</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>HAB Plan Elements</th>
<th>Responsible ORO</th>
<th>Location in Plan</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iii) If the offsite organizations elect not to participate in the licensee’s required minimal or no-release exercise, they will still be obligated to meet the exercise requirements as specified in 44 CFR § 350.9.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HAB REPP PLAN REVIEW WORKSHOP

FACILITATOR GUIDE

PURPOSE:

The HAB REPP Plan Review Workshop Tool Kit contains Modules and templates to be used to facilitate ORO plan reviews. Its use is optional for FEMA Region personnel and/or for OROs.

The Modules and other “tools” in the Tool Kit will provide a framework for FEMA Region personnel to engage OROs in a scenario-driven discussion of HAB-specific REPP Manual Planning and Demonstration Criteria Points of Review. OROs’ radiological response plan reviews, specific to an HAB incident, are to be completed and submitted 120 days in advance of the scheduled HAB REPP Exercise at the NPP.

OVERVIEW:

In responding to an HAB incident at an NPP, OROs will likely be challenged with additional, unique, and potentially competing demands on dedicated radiological emergency response resources. Using the Tool Kit, a workshop or meeting facilitator may lead OROs in a discussion to consider those unique challenges by presenting the HAB scenario and injects in the accompanying Modules. Each Module asks the participants to discuss how they would respond and direct their resources in consideration of a particular specific REPP Manual HAB criterion. The participating OROs may then compare points raised in the discussion with their respective response plans, and finally conduct a cross-walk of the OROs response plans to the HAB specific-criteria in the REPP Manual.

In this cross-walk step, the participating OROs will be directed by the Facilitator to use the Demonstration Criteria Points of Review Template for ease of viewing the specific REPP Manual criterion, and filling in boxes to indicate whether the point was reviewed in the plan or procedures and/or if editing or enhancements were to be made to the response plan. In this manner, OROs may be assisted to review their own response plans more efficiently in consideration of an emergency response to an HAB incident, and determine if and in what detail those plans need to be modified, edited, or enhanced in line with REPP Manual HAB criteria guidance, prior to the scheduled HAB Exercise with the NPP.

For example, the scenario may relate that the NPP gate was breached by someone crashing a truck through it and firing upon NPP security personnel. The Facilitator may guide the OROs to discuss their response to that scenario as it relates to Alert Notification duties in their own plans and compare to the criteria listed in the REPP Manual relative to Alert Notification. The discussion may reveal gaps in the response plans, which may then be appropriately edited or enhanced.

Next, the Facilitator announces a pre-scripted INJECT to guide the OROs to discuss another HAB REPP Demonstration criterion. This can be done for as many or as few Criteria the group may want or have time to address during the workshop or meeting.
ELEMENTS:

The Modules with their scenario and injects set forth a framework for the Facilitator to use to keep the goal of plan review headed in the right direction, and keep participants on topic for the criterion being examined. Tools and documents used to facilitate the review are:

- The Facilitator’s Guide (this document)
- 21 Modules – One for each HAB Demonstration Criterion
- The scenario and injects / module to criteria lists
- Power Point slides with REP Manual cited Criteria
- HAB Planning Checklist Tool
- HAB Points of Review (POR) Demonstration Criteria template

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:

Facilitators presenting a workshop or meeting to conduct HAB REP plan reviews with OROs, should have certain key reference materials handy during the workshop / meeting:

- The RPM
- Supp 3
- Supp 4
- 44 CFR
- NIMS Handbook

VENUE SELECTION, TIMING, and CAPABILITY:

In determining where to host the workshop or meeting, consider the availability of nearby accommodations, ease of access, available parking, nearby food choices, and conference room space which will accommodate the number of attendees as well as the technical needs of presenting the workshop tools.

Consideration should also be given to the time of day, day of week, and any other calendar considerations (i.e. holidays, religious considerations, etc.).

Well in advance, send invitations to heads of OROs. Announce these details along with duration, directions, and specific requirements (i.e. bring radiological response plans).

If directing the OROs to bring plans, ensure that if they will arrive with electronic versions, there is sufficient internet access, technical and electrical support capability.
STAFFING the WORKSHOP

The FEMA Regional Host will need to consider the number of persons who will be needed for various roles to move the workshop forward. Those positions include:

- Lead Facilitator
- Co-presenters (Site Specialists, ORO and/or licensee leadership on current plan review)
- Documentarian
- AV and IT personnel

CHECKLIST for WORKSHOP READINESS:

To be successful as a plan facilitation tool and to stimulate candid thoughtful discussion, it is suggested that the Facilitator break out the attendees into 3 Teams: ICP (Incident Command Post), EOC (Emergency Operations Center), and UAC (Unified Area Command). Each Team should take notes during their discussions and make a presentation of their results at various times during the workshop. Some items to prepare in advance:

- Room set up
- Microphone(s)
- Laptops/Projectors for displaying Facilitator’s power point slides and documentarian notes
- Flip Charts
- Paper and pens
- Diagrams/Maps of the NPP site and surrounding area
- Packets of Injects, one per Team
- Trash bins, other equipment/supplies as needed

INTRODUCTION TO THE WORKSHOP

The workshop may begin with the Facilitator leading a discussion to review what progress has been made thus far on HAB REP plan reviews and readiness for the HAB Exercise.

The Facilitator will instruct the participants in the use of the modules, planning templates and tools. Determine if the participants have brought along their response plans and are hoping to edit the plans during the workshop. The Facilitator should review all documents that are in the participants’ packages that should be given to them on arrival.

The Facilitator will review the modules and criteria to be reviewed during the particular workshop or meeting. As noted earlier, each Module depicts a scenario and inject(s) that will drive discussion of a particular demonstration criteria from the REP Manual. After clarifying any questions from the attendees, the Facilitator reads the scenario and all appropriate injects that are listed in the module being utilized. The discussion is facilitated by the questions posed in the module which also appear on
the POR Demonstration Criteria Template. It is recommended that the template be completed as the discussion evolves and questions are answered.

**USING THE MODULES W/ SCENARIO AND INJECTs**

The Modules have directions for the Facilitator at all key points where the Facilitator needs to move the discussion.

*All Directions to the Facilitator are in BLUE lettering.*

All information in the Scenario and in the Injects are presented in *italicized black BOLD letters.* However, the word **INJECT** is highlighted in red lettering to flag the Facilitator that it is time to read another piece of the scenario to keep the discussion moving along to the next Point of Review.

The Scenario and INJECTs should NOT be given to the Teams until immediately after the Facilitator has read the Scenario and/or Inject. Each Inject and the Scenario are on individual pages of hard copy so that each Team receives a copy once it is read, so it shouldn’t need to be re-read by the Facilitator.

Once the Facilitator hands the Scenario or Inject to the Teams, the Facilitator directs the Teams to discuss the specific REPP Manual Criterion and the Demonstration Criteria Points of Review template tool. The Facilitator announces the amount of time they will have to discuss and record their results in the form of notes so their Team leader can make a short presentation of their results at the end of the discussion time.

The Facilitator may then move around the room to each Team and assist them in the use of the template tool, clarify any REPP Manual Criteria intent, answer questions, so forth.

**ROLE OF DOCUMENTARIAN**

The Documentarian is the Facilitator’s key collaborator. The Documentarian keeps the Facilitator on time as scheduled in the workshop agenda. This will ensure that discussions keep moving forward.

The Documentarian records the results that each Team presents in their brief-outs after each Criteria discussion. In this way, the work that the participants are doing is captured and is available to be reviewed at the end of the workshop. It may then be shared in Workshop/Meeting Minutes or in the completed POR template with comments. OROs may need these notes in order to return to their respective OROs and edit, enhance, or amend their Radiological Emergency Response Plans for FEMA review prior to the scheduled HAB REPP Exercise at the NPP.

The Documentarian should have the ability to project onto an overhead screen or wall, the computer screen on which he/she is recording results while results are being recorded. This is most beneficial for the Teams to view the results as they are being recorded so that verbiage can be developed and agreed to, then afterward, included in response plans.
**NEXT STEPS**

At the conclusion, the Facilitator conducts a brief summary of the work that was accomplished by reviewing the Documentarian’s record and/or the POR template. The Facilitator should then solicit from the group any additional points that had not been captured.

It is equally important at this time for the Facilitator to solicit feedback on the Modules and tools so they may be continually improved.

Discussing NEXT STEPS is vital. One workshop or meeting is unlikely to cover all the Points of Review for the ORO Response Plan Reviews to be complete. More likely, a series of meetings will need to be convened.

It is important that the Facilitator at this time, acknowledge and congratulate the group for the work accomplished, AND remind them that more work still needs to be done. The Facilitator should REMIND the group of the date for the scheduled exercise, and the 120 day pre-exercise FEMA plan review submission date. The Facilitator may then ask the group for recommendations on how they continue the Plan review process, in order to meet these time frames.

**Contact Information**

The group will need to know Contact information for future meeting information, review questions, additional comments. The Facilitator should be prepared by having the contact information ready, both on the overhead power point slide, as well as on hard copy so the participants have that as part of their package when they leave.

**THANK THE HOST**

The Facilitator should remember to formally close by thanking the host, the Facilitator’s assistants, and the participants for their investment of time and expertise.
REP/HAB Plan-Ex 2012
Module 1:
Sub-Element 1.a-Mobilization

Criterion 1.a.1 - OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
Module 2: Sub-Element 1.b-Facilities

Criterion 1.b.1 - Facilities are sufficient to support emergency response.
Module 3: Sub-Element 1.c-Direction and Control

Criterion 1.c.1 - Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.
Module 4: Sub-Element 1.d-Comm. Equipment

Criterion 1.d.1 - At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.
Module 5: 
Sub Element 1.e-Equipment and Supplies

Criterion 1.e.1 - Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.
Module 6:
Sub-Element 2.a
Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 2.a.1 - OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.
Module 7:
Sub-Element 2.b-Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions During Plume Phase

Criterion 2.b.1 - Appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions.
Module 8:  
Sub-Element 2.b-Recommendations for use of KI

Criterion 2.b.2 - A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).
Module 9: Sub-Element 2.c-Protective Actions for Persons With Disabilities

Criterion 2.c.1 - Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.
Module 10: Sub-Element 3.a-Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 3.a.1 - The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers.
Module 11:
Sub-Element 3.b-Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the General Public

Criterion 3.b.1 - KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI for the general public and institutionalized individuals be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals is maintained.
Module 12: Sub-Element 3.c-Protective Actions for Persons With Disabilities

Criterion 3.c.1 - Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.
Module 12-A:
Sub-Element 3.c: Protective Actions for Persons With Disabilities

Criterion 3.c.2 - OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools.
Module 13: Sub-Element 3.d-Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d.1 - Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.
Module 14:
Sub-Element 3.d-Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d.2 - Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
Criterion 4.a.2 - Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterized the release and to control radiation exposure.
Module 16:
Sub-Element 4.a-Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.3 - Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.
Module 17: Sub-Element 5.a-Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.1 - Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include, as a minimum, the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance.
Module 18: Sub-Element 5.a-Backup and Alert Notification

Criterion 5.a.3 - Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.
Module 19: Sub-Element 5.a-FEMA Approved Exception Areas

Criterion 5.a.4 - Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.
Module 20: Sub-Element 5.b-Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Criterion 5.b.1 - OROs provide accurate emergency information and instruction to the public and the news media in a timely manner.
Scenario and Injects

HAB REP PLANEX 2012

The following scenario and injects were created as examples of HAB events which may direct a plan review discussion of the criteria in the REPP Manual where HAB is noted.

The listed injects with the initiating HAB scenario may be used in concert with the Modules, or one may opt to edit these injects to create a more site-specific scenario or inject package.

There is a Module = Criterion List which follows the Scenario and Inject itemization, which list identifies each Module and the REPP Manual Criterion citation being reviewed.

These Injects and the Module = Criteria List are presented as a part of the HAB TOOL KIT and as such are completely optional for use to facilitate plan reviews.

Scenario / INJECT (mod.1):

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT (mod.2): An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT (mod. 3): There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT (mod.4): The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT (mod.5): This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT (mod.6): There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.
Inject (mod.7): The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.

INJECT (mod.8): Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

INJECT (mod.9): It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

INJECT (mod.10): EWS are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

INJECT (mod.11): Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of Ki for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

INJECT (mod.12): There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

INJECT (mod.12-A): The school district has made a determination to implement a protective action decision to hold an early dismissal.

INJECT (mod.13): The traffic and access control routinely established for an NPP emergency response is being impacted because of the HAB event, causing lots of discussion in the ICP on how to handle the unique circumstances. Changes in routes must be made. Maps are being examined.

INJECT (mod.14): One two-lane road that could be used to evacuate is blocked by a train that was stopped as it was entering the plume phase.

INJECT (mod.15): Field teams are assembled and need to be deployed.

INJECT (mod.16): Field teams have ambient radiation measures to report.

INJECT (mod.17): An instructional message to the population in the plume EPZ must be made.

INJECT (mod.18): It is being reported to the incident Command Post that the primary alert system has partially failed; a small area within the Plume EPZ did not receive the alert or the subsequent message.

INJECT (mod.19): The FEMA approved exception area needs to receive the alert and notification.

INJECT (mod.20): A media center, or JIC, is being established to draft messages and respond to media inquiries / requests for information. The media is asking for information regarding the HAB incident, seeking more detail and interviews with law enforcement officials for live media segments.
MODULES = CRITERION LIST

Module 1 = 1.a.1 Mobilization
Module 2 = 1.b.1 Facilities
Module 3 = 1.c.1 Direction and Control
Module 4 = 1.d.1 Communications Equipment
Module 5 = 1.e.1 Equipment and Supplies
Module 6 = 2.a.1 Emergency Worker (EW) Exposure Control
Module 7 = 2.b.1 Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for Plume Phase
Module 8 = 2.b.2 Radiological Assessment … (Recommendations for use of KI)
Module 9 = 2.c.1 PADS for persons w/ Disabilities & Access/Functional needs
Module 10 = 3.a.1 Implement EW Exposure Control
Module 11 = 3.b.1 Implement KI Decision for Institutionalized …
Module 12 = 3.c.1 Implement PAD for Disabilities …
Module 12A=3.c.2 Implement PADs for Schools
Module 13 = 3.d.1 Implement Traffic & Access Control (TAC)
Module 14 = 3.d.2 Impediments to Evacuation
Module 15 = 4.a.2 Plume Phase Field Team Management
Module 16 = 4.a.3 Plume Phase – Filed Teams Ambient Measurements
Module 17 = 5.a.1 Activate Alert & Notification
Module 18 = 5.a.3 Backup Alert & Notification
Module 19 = 5.a.4 FEMA approved exception areas
Module 20 = 5.b.1 Emergency Information and Instructions to public and media
Module for HAB REPP Plan EX

(Module 1)

Sub-Element 1.a - MOBILIZATION

Criterion 1.a.1 Alert, Notify, and Mobilize Emergency Personnel and Activate Facilities

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 1.a.1 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 1.a.1. listed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario requires, at minimum, a police response to the NPP for a crime in progress, a potentially violent scene, and consider how does this impact all the departments / agencies responding?

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- Who has the authority to receive notification of this event in your department or agency, and how does this get verified / authenticated?
- Who in your department is authorized to contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel?
- Due to the need for your agency / department to respond to a crime in progress at the NPP, how does this impact the alert, notification, or mobilization authorities?
- How will this scenario impact resource mobilization, and are your plans and/or resources flexible enough to allow for a response on multiple levels – radiological emergency and criminal matter in progress?
- Will you activate and be able to staff an emergency facility, such as an ICP for 24 hour operations?
- Which of the OROs has the ability and the authority to receive and/or initiate notifications to the NPP?
- Who in your department /agency has the authority to ask for additional personnel resources?
- Which ORO is authorized to request support from Tribal (if applicable)? Local /municipal? State? Federal?
- Are the resources available identified in an MOU/ MOA and documented on your mobilization list?
- Do your plans and procedures identify notification and activation methods in the event that there may be no communication available from the site?

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?

Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
Module for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 1.b – FACILITIES

(Module 2)

Criterion 1.b.1 Facilities are sufficient to support emergency response.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP's cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT (mod.2): An Incident Command Post is established

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 1.b.1. Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 1.b.1. displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario requires an immediate and a longer term response, since this crime scene will take some time. With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- Are the facilities identified in your plans able to support emergency operations?
- Do the identified facilities have the following:
  - Adequate space
  - Appropriate / adequate furnishings
  - Effective lighting
  - Adequate restrooms
  - Functional ventilation
Backup power
Alternate facility(s), if required
- Are provisions in place to allow law enforcement and initial responders prompt access to the NPP site?
- Are provisions for coordination in place for in-bound response resources AND evacuation efforts?
- What MOUs are there for alternate personnel to supplement local resources?
- What procedures are there for activating qualified alternate personnel?
- What radiological training requirements have been satisfied for the primary and alternate personnel, including Just-in-Time training?
- What provisions have been identified within plans and procedures for the use of the Mobile Command Post type of facility(s)?
- Have Staging Area requirements, operational capabilities, assignments within the ORO department / agency been addressed?

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point? Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
Module for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 1.c – DIRECTION AND CONTROL

(Module 3)

Criterion 1.c.1  Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT (mod.3): There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion1.c.1  Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 1.c.1. displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario dictates that multiple OROs will need to respond immediately and over the longer term.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- Do the OROs’ leaders have the capability of maintaining control in their overall response to the emergency? Consider obstacles that may interfere with control.
  - Are there functional and periodic briefings planned for?
  - How will coordination with other OROs be accomplished?
Will the leaders be able to insure completion of requirements and requests?

- Do the OROs leaders have the ability to prioritize
  a) resource taskings,
  b) in accordance with MOUs,
  c) resources identified through LOA/MOUs must be on the ORO’s mobilization list?

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area? “

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
MODULE for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 1.d –COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

(Module 4)

Criterion 1.d.1 At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT (mod.4): The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion1.d.1 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 1.d.1. displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that a communication plan for this type of event may already be in place, but if not, needs to be considered and created. Consider obstacles to communication devices being effective; practicality of using these and/or other communication
Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- In the emergency facility(s) do the OROs have:
  - A primary communication system?
  - At least one backup communication system?
  - Is the communication system(s) functional at all times, places?
- Are the communication systems:
  - Maintained and tested on a recurring basis (throughout the assessment period)?
  - Available to all operators?
- Are periodic communications systems test results and corrective actions maintained on a real time basis?
- Are established communications systems for facilities and field units capable of receiving and transmitting exercise messages?
- Is there at least one (1) communication system that is independent of the other commercial telephone system for (a) all facilities, (b) FMTs, and (c) Incident Command?
- Are the OROs capable of managing the communications system to ensure that all message traffic is handled w/o delay?
- Has the ORO ensured that a coordinated link exists for (a) fixed facilities, and (b) Medical support facilities?

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
MODULE for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 1.e – EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS

(Module 5)

Criterion 1.e.1 Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (Ki) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT (mod.5): This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion1.e.1 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 1.e.1. displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that a checklist of everything you need by way of equipment and supplies will be very helpful at this time, AND you will probably need supplies and equipment that will not routinely be a part of your NPP response, so what are those items and do you
have them in sufficient supply? With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- Equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility’s assigned role in the OROs emergency response plans. Maps and displays are encouraged. Thoughts?
- Non-facility based operations - Are equipment and supplies sufficient and consistent with the assigned operational role?
- Where traffic and access control personnel are deployed; Vehicles, barriers, traffic cones, signs? Are they available; if so, where?
- Do the OOs have the capability to maintain inventories of Ki sufficient for use by:
  - Emergency workers
  - Institutionalized individuals (as indicated in capacity lists for facilities)
  - General Public (includes transients) as stipulated in the plans/procedures (w/in Plume Pathway EPZ)
- OROs must make provisions to have Ki available to specialized response teams such as:
  - Civil support teams
  - Special Weapons and Tactics Teams
  - Urban Search and Rescue
  - Bomb Squads
  - HAZMAT
  - Other ancillary groups
- ORO plans/procedures must include:
  - Forms to be used documenting emergency workers ingestion of Ki
  - Mechanism for identifying workers who decline Ki in advance
  - Considerations for placement of emergency workers who decline Ki in advance
- OROs quantities of dosimetry and Ki are available at storage areas:
  - Confirmed by physical inspection
  - Documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise
  - Provided in the ALC submission and/or verified during an SAV
- Available supplies of Ki must:
  - Be within expiration date indicated on bottles or blister pack
  - Alternatively, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State Lab indicating the Ki supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards
- For all dispatched emergency workers there are sufficient quantities of:
  - Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry
  - Permanent record dosimetry
  - Dosimeter chargers
- OROs must make provisions to make dosimetry available to specialized response teams such as:
Civil Support Teams
SWAT
USAR Teams
Bomb Squads
HAZMAT
Other ancillary groups as identified in plans/procedures

- Do direct reading dosimetry allow for an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the OROs plans/procedures?
- Direct reading dosimeters must be zeroed, or operationally checked prior to issuance.
- Dosimeters must be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced when necessary.
- Civil Defense Victoreen Model 138s (CD V-138s) (0-200 mR) due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems must be:
  Inspected quarterly
  Replaced as needed
  Leakage testing verified during the exercise
  Through documentation submitted in the ALC, &/or through an SAV
- Operational checks and testing of electrical docimeters must:
  Be in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions
  Verified during Exercise
  Through documentation submitted in the ALC &/or an SAV
- All monitoring instruments must be inspected, inventoried, operationally checked before each use, and calibrated in accordance with manufacturers recommendations
- Unmodified CDV-700 series and other instruments w/out manufacturer’s recommendations must be calibrated annually.
- Modified CDV-700 instruments must b calibrated in accordance w/ modification manufacturer.
- A label indicating such calibration must be on each instrument, or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means.
- Instruments being used to measure activity must have a sticker affixed to the sides indicating effective range of readings
- For FMTs, instruments must be capable of
  Measuring gamma exposure
  Detecting beta radiation
  Detecting activity on air sampling collection media
  Consistent w/ intended use of the instrument and the OROs plan
  Appropriate radioactive check source must be used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1 R/hr.) and for high-range instruments when available
  If a source is not available for a high-range instrument, a procedure must exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high-range instrument can make useful readings.
- For portal monitors:
OROs must set up and operationally check the monitor(s) 
Monitors must conform to standards set forth in FEMA-REP-21 (March 1995), or in accordance w/ manufacturer recommendations.

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area? “

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
Criterion 2.a.1 OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of Ki, is in place for emergency workers (EWs) including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or Protective Action Guides.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

**Scenario / INJECT:**

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

**INJECT:** An Incident Command Post is established.

**INJECT:** There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

**INJECT:** The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

**INJECT:** This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

**INJECT (mod.6):** There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.
Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 2.a.1 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 2.a.1 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that ORO responders will have an increased potential for exposure, so exposure control methods need to be ready. Consider that responders will be dealing with the facts that there are two subjects still running around, and the potential for an explosive device in the “suspicious package” as well as in the briefcases they were seen carrying. With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- OROs are required to have:
  The capability to assess & control radiation exposure received by EWs
  Have a decision chain in place as specified in plans/procedures
  Ability to authorize EWs exposure limits to be exceeded for specific reasons
  Pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into account TEDE or organ specific limits) identified in the OROs plans/procedures

- Identify by title & org. the ORO authorized to send EWs into the Plume Pathway EPZ. Demonstrate the capability to comply with EW exposure limits based on plans

- Identify by title & org. the ORO authorized to make decisions re authorization of exposure limits in excess of pre-authorized levels, AND the number of workers receiving radiation doses above pre-authorized levels.
  Include providing Ki and dosimetry in a timely manner to EWs dispatched onsite to support plant incident assessment and mitigating actions in accordance with respective plans/procedures

- Have ORO plans & procedures addressed planning for sufficient quantities of dosimetry and Ki for augmented resources, including methods for estimating the number of potential responders needing supplies and equipment loss due to consumption, malfunction, and/or misplacement?

- Have OROs plans addressed how to obtain additional dosimetry and Ki; who is responsible for procurement, stockpiling, and storage; and maintenance of sufficient quantities of appropriate dosimetry devices issued?

- Have OROs plans described where and how dosimetry and Ki will be distributed, and where and how EWs will be trained on uts use, including Just-in-Time training.

- As appropriate, OROs must demonstrate the capability to:
  Make decisions on the distribution and administration of Ki as a protective measure for EWs based on plans / procedure, or,
  Projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAGs for Ki administration.

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?” If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
Criterion 2.b.1 Appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

**Scenario / INJECT:**

*Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.*

**INJECT:** An Incident Command Post is established.

**INJECT:** There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

**INJECT:** The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

**INJECT:** This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

**INJECT:** There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.
*Inject (mod. 7): The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.*

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 2.b.1. Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 2.b.1 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that the odds have increased that the EWs may be exposed, and since the package detonated outdoors, there may be a plume. With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- OROs are required to have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs.
- OROs must demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means described in plans/procedures to develop PARs for decision makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee as well as field monitoring data, if available.
- The ORO must consider any release and meteorological data provided by the licensee.
- The ORO must demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections
  
  The need for assessments to support the PARs must be appropriate to the event
  
  In ALL cases, calculation of projected must be demonstrated
  
  Projected doses must be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared.
  
  PARs must be promptly transmitted to decision makers in a pre-arranged format
  
  **In HAB incidents, the threat posed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response, and the effect of the evacuation on the response effort that create a higher than normal risk from general population evacuation, needs to be considered.**
  
- When the licensee and ORO projected doses differ by more than a factor of 10, the licensee and ORO must determine the source of difference by:
  
  Discussing input data and assumptions
  
  Using different models
  
  Exploring possible reasons
  
  Resolution of these differences must be incorporated into the PARs if timely and appropriate
  
  OROs must demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise associated PARs.

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”
“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
Criterion 2.b.2 A decision making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including recommendations for the use of Ki, if ORO policy).

(In Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.
**Inject**: The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.

**Inject (mod.8)**: Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 2.b.2 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 2.b.2 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that the odds have increased that the EWs may be exposed, and since the package detonated outdoors, there may be a plume. An evacuation may be impractical due to the HAB event. The decision makers must be able to demonstrate many capabilities to include assessing the current conditions, anticipating the ongoing threat to the public, how the hostile action may be interfering with routine evacuation protocols, and access to additional resources.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- Who by title & org. makes Protective Action Decisions (PADs)?
- OROs must have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs
- OROs must demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the incident
  - Based on info from the licensee
  - Assessment of plant status and potential / actual releases
  - Other available information related to the incident
  - Input from appropriate ORO authorities (i.e. ICP)
  - PARs from the utility and ORO staff
- Subsequent or alternate PAD may be appropriate if various conditions pose undue risk to an evacuation (e.g. HAB incident, weather, release timing, magnitude)
  - Evacuation may disrupt the efforts to respond to a hostile action
- OROs must demonstrate the ability to obtain supplemental resources (e.g. mutual aid) necessary to implement a PAD if local law enforcement, fir services, HAZMAT, EMS are utilized to augment response to the NPP site or other key infrastructure.
- Dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on:
  - Subsequent dose projections
  - Field monitoring data
  - Information on plant conditions
- Incident Command must provide input regarding consideration for subsequent PARs based on the magnitude of the ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions.
- Decision makers must demonstrate the capability to change protective actions based on the combination of all above factors.
Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
MODULE for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 2.c.1. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISIONS FOR PROTECTION OF PERSONS W/ DISABILITIES AND ACCESS/FUNCTIONAL NEEDS

(Module 9)

Criterion 2.C.1. Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.
**Inject:** The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.

**INJECT:** Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

**INJECT (mod.9):** It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 2.c.1 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 2.c.1 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that there are institutionalized persons and school children in the EPZ who must be considered. There may be a plume with dose projections in excess of the lower end of the PAGs. An evacuation may be impractical due to the HAB event. Is there a public school liaison in communication w/ the ICP, EOC, or UAC to weigh in?

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- Are decisions coordinated /communicated with the Incident Command where evacuation(s) are being considered in areas where the doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the PAGs.
- OROs must consider the use of Ki where institutionalized population cannot be evacuated.
- OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public schools/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students.
- OROs must demonstrate that contact can be made with public schools/districts during the exercise.
- OROs and/or officials of public schools systems/districts must demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students.
- Does the decision-making process include any pre-planned strategy(s) for protective actions for that ECL?
  - Are the students still at the school?
  - Are the students at their home(s)?
  - Are the students en route to school / home?

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
MODULE for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

(Module 10)

Criterion 3.a.1 – The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, Ki and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency Workers (EWs) periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of Ki to EWs.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs
to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.

**Inject:** The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.

**INJECT:** Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

**INJECT:** It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

**INJECT (mod.10):** EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 3.a.1  Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 3.a.1 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that Emergency Workers are being sent into the NPP and there are exposure considerations. Dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- Who by Title and org. makes the decision to dispatch EWs?
- When (what circumstances) will EWs be dispatched?
- Who by Title and org. will brief EWs on use of dosimetry, including:
  - Zeroing direct reading dosimeters
  - Checking direct-reading dosimeters periodically during the emergency response (e.g. every 15 – 20 minutes)
  - Recording the readings on exposure records
  - Proper use of permanent record dosimeters
  - Where and to whom to return dosimeters at the conclusion of the emergency or mission
- What are the administrative reporting limits, and have they been pre-established at levels low enough to consider subsequent calculation of TEDE?
- Who by Title and org. will determine whether to replace an EW who has been exposed
  - How is that determined
- Just-in-Time training is conducted by which organization and by whom?
  - How documented
- Does each EW have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in OROs plans/procedures?
EWs must demonstrate procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.

- OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish Ki distribution to EWs consistent with decisions made.

  OROs must have capability to develop and maintain lists of EWs who have ingested Ki
  Documentation must show date(s) / time(s) that Ki ingestion occurred
  OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using Ki for those advised to take it
  EWs must demonstrate basic knowledge of procedures on using Ki

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
MODULE for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 3.b– Implementation of Ki Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the General Public

(Module 11)

Criterion 3.b.1 – Ki and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of Ki for the general public and institutionalized persons be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of Ki for institutionalized persons is maintained.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.
**Inject:** The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.

**INJECT:** Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

**INJECT:** It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

**INJECT:** EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

**INJECT (mod.11):** Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of Ki for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 3.b.1 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 3.b.1 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that Ki recommendations for the public and those institutionalized persons in the nearby jail be implemented.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- OROs must demonstrate the capability to make Ki available to institutionalized persons, and where provided for in their plans/procedures, to members of the general public.
- OROs must demonstrate capability to accomplish distribution of Ki consistent with decisions
- OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists on institutionalized persons who have ingested Ki, including date(s) & time(s) they were instructed to ingest Ki.
- OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using Ki for those advised to take it.

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
MODULE for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Persons w/ Disabilities and Access / Functional Needs

(Module 12)

Criterion 3.c.1 – Protective action decisions are implemented for persons w/ disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools w/in areas subject to protective actions.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.
**Inject:** The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.

**INJECT:** Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

**INJECT:** It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

**INJECT:** EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

**INJECT:** Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of Ki for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

**INJECT (mod.12):** There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 3.c.1 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 3.c.1 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that there are possibly many patients and residents of the nursing home who may not be ambulatory. The hospital has exercised and stood up Incident Command internally often, as they must twice per year for accreditation. OROs - Have you exercised with them? Is there a hospital liaison in the ICP, or designated to be available?

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (provide PARs & Emergency Info, instructions to) persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including
  - Hospital / medical facilities
  - Nursing homes
  - Correctional facilities
  - Mobility impaired persons
  - Transportation-dependent persons

- OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs in accordance with plans/procedures.

- Contact with persons w/ disabilities and access/functional needs and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the extent of play.

  Some contact with transportation providers must be actual, as negotiated in the extent of play.
All actual and simulated contacts must be logged

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
Criterion 3.c.2 – OROs / School officials implement protective actions for schools.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.

Infect: The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.
**INJECT**: Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

**INJECT**: It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

**INJECT**: EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

**INJECT**: Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of Ki for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

**INJECT**: There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

**INJECT(mod 12-A)**: The school district has made a determination to implement a protective action decision to hold an early dismissal.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 3.c.2 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 3.c.2 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that school officials are taking protective actions for the school students. It is important that OROs know what actions are being taken and the actions are communicated and coordinated.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- School systems must demonstrate the ability to implement PADs for students. Public schools, private schools, kindergartens, preschools, and licensed day care centers
- Each school system within the 10 mile EPZ must demonstrate implementation of Protective Actions.
- At least one school per affected system must participate in the demonstration.
- Cancelling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering in place must be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed.
- If evacuation is implemented, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools, may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.
- Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by plans / procedures must be verified.
- Officials of the school system(s) must demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely info to OROs on the status of protective actions for use in messages to parents, the general public and the media.
- If a school facility has emergency plans as a condition of licensing, those plans may be submitted to FEMA review in place of demonstration or interview, pursuant to the OROs plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent of Play agreement.
- All activities must be based on the OROs plans/ procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent of play agreement.

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
Criterion 3.d.1 – Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.

Inject: The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.
**INJECT:** Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

**INJECT:** It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

**INJECT:** EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

**INJECT:** Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of KI for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

**INJECT:** There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

**INJECT:** The school district has made a determination to implement a protective action decision to hold an early dismissal.

**INJECT (mod.13):** The traffic and access control routinely established for an NPP emergency response is being impacted because of the HAB event, causing lots of discussion in the ICP on how to handle the unique circumstances. Changes in routes must be made. Maps are being examined.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 3.d.1 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 3.d.1 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that there are changes needing to be made to the routine traffic and access control.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- Who has the responsibility (by title and org.) for establishing traffic and/or access control points (TCP/ACPs)?
- OROs must demonstrate the capability to select, establish, staff appropriate TCP/ACPs that are consistent with current conditions & PADs in a timely manner.
- OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.
- Traffic and access control staff must demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities including:
  - Verification of EW identification
  - Access authorization to affected areas (per extent of play agreement)
- Where OROs lack authority necessary to control access to certain types of traffic – Rail, Water, Air

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’/agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
MODULE for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 3.d – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

(Module 14)

Criterion 3.d.2 – Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.

Inject: The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.
**INJECT:** Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

**INJECT:** It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

**INJECT:** EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

**INJECT:** Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of Ki for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

**INJECT:** There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

**INJECT:** The school district has made a determination to implement a protective action decision to hold an early dismissal.

**INJECT:** The traffic and access control routinely established for an NPP emergency response is being impacted because of the HAB event, causing lots of discussion in the ICP on how to handle the unique circumstances. Changes in routes must be made. Maps are being examined.

**INJECT (mod.14):** One two-lane road that could be used to evacuate is blocked by a train that was stopped as it was entering the plume phase.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 3.d.2  Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 3.d.2 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that something is blocking a road that may be an alternate road used to evacuate.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify & take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation.

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
MODULE for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

(Module 15)

Criterion 4.a.2 – Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT :

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.

INJECT: The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.
INJECT: Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

INJECT: It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

INJECT: EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

INJECT: Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of Ki for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

INJECT: There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

INJECT: The school district has made a determination to implement a protective action decision to hold an early dismissal.

INJECT: The traffic and access control routinely established for an NPP emergency response is being impacted because of the HAB event, causing lots of discussion in the ICP on how to handle the unique circumstances. Changes in routes must be made. Maps are being examined.

INJECT: One two-lane road that could be used to evacuate is blocked by a train that was stopped as it was entering the plume phase.

INJECT (mod.15): Field teams are assembled and need to be deployed.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 4.a.2 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 4.a.2 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that decisions must be made regarding deployment of field teams, keeping in mind that there is a HAB incident ongoing.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- Who, by title and org., briefs the field monitoring team(s) prior to deployment? What topics are covered
- Who by title and org. controls the movement of the field team? Determines sample locations
- What approach is used to select appropriate same locations? Pre-designated sampling points Plume traverse (while maintaining specified exposure limits)
- Which agency’s field monitoring teams (ORO’s, licensee’s, other) are assigned the responsibility of obtaining maximum radiation readings in the downwind areas?
- If the ORO teams have this responsibility, what special exposure control mechanisms are used to control exposure and/or dose?
- During an HAB incident, the Field Team management must keep the Incident Command informed of field monitoring teams’ activities and locations.

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
CRITERION 4.a.3 – Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radiiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in plans/procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.
Inject: The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.

Inject: Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

Inject: It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

Inject: EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

Inject: Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of Ki for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

Inject: There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

Inject: The school district has made a determination to implement a protective action decision to hold an early dismissal.

Inject: The traffic and access control routinely established for an NPP emergency response is being impacted because of the HAB event, causing lots of discussion in the ICP on how to handle the unique circumstances. Changes in routes must be made. Maps are being examined.

Inject: One two-lane road that could be used to evacuate is blocked by a train that was stopped as it was entering the plume phase.

Inject: Field teams are assembled and need to be deployed.

Inject (mod.16): Field teams have ambient radiation measures to report.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 4.a.3 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 4.a.3 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that field teams are reporting ambient radiation measurement data.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- Two or more FBTs must demonstrate the capability to make & report measures of ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment team, or other appropriate authority.
- FMTs must demonstrate the capability to obtain an air sample for measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates, and to provide the appropriate authority with field data pertaining to the measurement.
  
  If the samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the authority must consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples.
- OROs must share in a timely manner with all other appropriate OROs:
  
  All methodology, including contamination control
  
  Instrumentation
  
  Preparation of samples
  
  Chain of custody form(s) for transfer to laboratory(s)
- OROs must use Federal resources identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Annex and other resources.

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
MODULE for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

(Module 17)

Criterion 5.a.1 – Activations associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include, as a minimum, the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.
Inject: The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.

Infect: Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

Inject: It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

Infect: EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

Infect: Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of KI for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

Infect: There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

Infect: The school district has made a determination to implement a protective action decision to hold an early dismissal.

Infect: The traffic and access control routinely established for an NPP emergency response is being impacted because of the HAB event, causing lots of discussion in the ICP on how to handle the unique circumstances. Changes in routes must be made. Maps are being examined.

Infect: One two-lane road that could be used to evacuate is blocked by a train that was stopped as it was entering the plume phase.

Infect: Field teams are assembled and need to be deployed.

Infect: Field teams have ambient radiation measures to report.

Inject (mod.17): An instructional message to the population in the plume EPZ must be made.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 5.a.1 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 5.a.1 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that there is a need at this point to activate the alert and notification system.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:
- OROs must demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an instructional message to populated areas (permanent & transient) throughout the 10 mile plume EPZ.
- OROs must complete system activation for primary alert/notification and disseminate information/instructions in a timely manner (“Timely” = with a sense of emergency and without due delay)
- Procedures to broadcast the message must be fully demonstrated up to the point of transmission.
- Verify the capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24 hour basis.
  - Verify through interview w/ appropriate personnel from the primary notification system
  - Verify provisions for backup power or an alternate station
- Initial message must at a minimum include the following elements:
  - Identification of the ORO responsible and the official w/ authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message
  - Identification of the commercial NPP and a statement that an emergency exists there
  - Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g. brochures, calendars &/or information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency
  - A closing statement asking that the affected population and the potentially affected population stay tuned for additional information, or that the population tune to another station for additional information.
- OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements)
  - At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated
- ORO plans & procedures that describe methods of notification to the licensee.
- How has the possibility of sensitive information content in messages between the ORO and the licensee been identified?
- Have ORO plans and procedures identified the ability to insure that all appropriate parties required to take immediate actions are notified and what communication pathway(s) were used?
- Do ORO plans & procedures define the method and provisions if law enforcement responds to a HAB incident that has the potential to involve an NPP?
- Do ORO plans and procedures include a notification process that works in all directions? (not just from the utility/licensee to NRC and OROs)
- Do ORO plans and procedures define procedures for verifying the information and initiating notifications from alternate entities (JTTF, Fusion Centers, 911, EMAs, local law enforcement)?
- What is the process used to notify all applicable OROs once the 24-hour warning point, or other designated entity, has received and verified the initial notification?
- Are communication protocols in place that will insure during HAB incidents that communications are designed to ensure effective and timely communications take place between command level elements and , where appropriate, tactical response elements?
Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
Criterion 5.a.3 – Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

**Scenario / INJECT:**

*Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.*

**INJECT:** An Incident Command Post is established.

**INJECT:** There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

**INJECT:** The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

**INJECT:** This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

**INJECT:** There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.

**Inject:** The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.
**INJECT:** Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

**INJECT:** It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

**INJECT:** EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

**INJECT:** Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of KI for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

**INJECT:** There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

**INJECT:** The school district has made a determination to implement a protective action decision to hold an early dismissal.

**INJECT:** The traffic and access control routinely established for an NPP emergency response is being impacted because of the HAB event, causing lots of discussion in the ICP on how to handle the unique circumstances. Changes in routes must be made. Maps are being examined.

**INJECT:** One two-lane road that could be used to evacuate is blocked by a train that was stopped as it was entering the plume phase.

**INJECT:** Field teams are assembled and need to be deployed.

**INJECT:** Field teams have ambient radiation measures to report.

**INJECT:** An instructional message to the population in the plume EPZ must be made.

**INJECT (mod.18):** It is being reported to the incident Command Post that the primary alert system has partially failed; a small area within the Plume EPZ did not receive the alert or the subsequent message.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 5.a.3 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 5.a.3 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that there is a need at this point to activate the backup alert and notification system.

With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- OROs must demonstrate backup means of alert and notification.
- Are backup alert and notification procedures in place that would implement alert/notification in multiple stages such that the population closest to the NPP (e.g. within 2 miles) are notified first?
- Do OROs and operators follow the recommendation of FEMA and the NRC that they attempt to establish backup that will reach those in the plume exposure EPZ within a reasonable time of the failure of the primary alert and notification system?
  Recommended goal of 45 minutes
- The backup alert message, at a minimum includes:
  A statement that an emergency exists at the plant, and
  Instructions regarding where to obtain additional information
- If backup route alerting is demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated.

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
Criterion 5.a.4  Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be on route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.
Inject: The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.

INJECT: Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

INJECT: It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

INJECT: EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

INJECT: Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of Ki for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

INJECT: There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

INJECT: The school district has made a determination to implement a protective action decision to hold an early dismissal.

INJECT: The traffic and access control routinely established for an NPP emergency response is being impacted because of the HAB event, causing lots of discussion in the ICP on how to handle the unique circumstances. Changes in routes must be made. Maps are being examined.

INJECT: One two-lane road that could be used to evacuate is blocked by a train that was stopped as it was entering the plume phase.

INJECT: Field teams are assembled and need to be deployed.

INJECT: Field teams have ambient radiation measures to report.

INJECT: An instructional message to the population in the plume EPZ must be made.

INJECT: It is being reported to the incident Command Post that the primary alert system has partially failed; a small area within the Plume EPZ did not receive the alert or the subsequent message.

INJECT (mod. 19): The FEMA approved exception area needs to receive the alert and notification

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 5.a.4 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 5.a.4 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that there is a need at this point to identify any or all FEMA approved exception areas and conduct primary alerting and notification there.
With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- OROs with FEMA approved exception areas, 5 – 10 miles from the NPP, must demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception areas.
  Notifications are to be timely (recommended goal of 45 minutes)
- The exception area alert message must at a minimum include:
  A statement that an emergency exists at the NPP, and
  Instructions regarding where to obtain additional information
- For exception area alerting, at least one (1) route must be demonstrated and evaluated.

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.
Module for HAB REPP PLAN EX

Sub-Element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and Media

(Module 20)

Criterion 5.b.1  OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

(Recommended - POWER POINT SLIDE presented depicting the Criterion)

Scenario / INJECT:

Unknown persons operating a HumVee at a high rate of speed have crashed through the NPP outer fence. Two of the HumVee occupants remain in the HumVee injured and unconscious, while two other subjects have fled on foot. All subjects were firing weapons, possibly AK 47, and the two subjects who fled on foot fired their weapons in the direction of responding NPP Security personnel; no Security personnel were reported to have been injured. Last known direction – both subjects were headed toward the west side of the Protected Area double fence and were carrying what appeared to be briefcases. The two fleeing subjects were described as possible males wearing blue uniforms that appear to resemble the NPP’s cleaning staff uniforms.

INJECT: An Incident Command Post is established.

INJECT: There are at least 3 OROs departments/agencies immediately responding to this incident, not including the internal NPP Security force, and others will likely be en route soon.

INJECT: The primary communication system typically is mobile radio. However, the radios can and are frequently monitored by media and members of the public, so the decision is made to use cellphones for all “clear communication” and radios on an encrypted band for all other more routine information.

INJECT: This situation is evolving and still unstable as the two subjects with suitcases have still not been found. The possibility that this could result in a release, though remote at this time, has to be considered. In the ICP, checklists are being reviewed so that everyone knows what is and is not readily accessible.

INJECT: There is a report from inside the NPP that a suspicious package is in an area just outside the Containment Building. Everyone internal is in Shelter in Place mode so no one knows who it belongs to or how it got there. A potential for a release is still remote, however ORO emergency workers (EWs) need to be sent in to the area.

Inject: The package has detonated resulting in a small blast. No one injured. Damage is reported to the external containment building; unknown how extensive the damage is. A radical group has contacted the media to claim responsibility and alleges the IED contained radiological material.
**INJECT:** Decision makers are weighing options re the general public - evacuation challenges due to the HAB event.

**INJECT:** It is a school day, and it is 1 hour before schools will be released for the day. As well, there is a county jail that holds 100 prisoners within 2 miles of the NPP.

**INJECT:** EWs are being dispatched into the NPP and dose projections are in excess of the lower end of the PAGs.

**INJECT:** Based on the dose projections and weather conditions which are indicating strong winds, Decision makers have determined to recommend use of KI for the general public and institutionalized persons. There is a nearby jail with capacity for 100 prisoners.

**INJECT:** There is a hospital campus within 2 miles where there is an acute care 100 bed hospital and a nursing home with licensed capacity for 40 residents.

**INJECT:** The school district has made a determination to implement a protective action decision to hold an early dismissal.

**INJECT:** The traffic and access control routinely established for an NPP emergency response is being impacted because of the HAB event, causing lots of discussion in the ICP on how to handle the unique circumstances. Changes in routes must be made. Maps are being examined.

**INJECT:** One two-lane road that could be used to evacuate is blocked by a train that was stopped as it was entering the plume phase.

**INJECT:** Field teams are assembled and need to be deployed.

**INJECT:** Field teams have ambient radiation measures to report.

**INJECT:** An instructional message to the population in the plume EPZ must be made.

**INJECT:** It is being reported to the incident Command Post that the primary alert system has partially failed; a small area within the Plume EPZ did not receive the alert or the subsequent message.

**INJECT:** The FEMA approved exception area needs to receive the alert and notification.

**INJECT (mod 20):** A media center, or JIC, is being established to draft messages and respond to media inquiries / requests for information. The media is asking for information regarding the HAB incident, seeking more detail and interviews with law enforcement officials for live media segments.

Facilitator - Direct the participants to the HAB Points of Review Demonstration Criteria Template for Criterion 5.b.1 Show power point slide, if available, with Criterion 5.b.1 displayed.

Ask the teams to consider that the scenario indicates that there is a need to centralize media messages and inquiries re the HAB incident, as well as for public safety concerns.
With that in mind, discuss the following questions in your Team break out groups:

Questions on the HAB POR Demonstration Criteria Template tool:

- What facility is designated as the media center?
  Can news be disseminated from other locations?
  How are subsequent EAS messages and “Special News Broadcasts” handled?
- Who by title and org. is designated as the spokesperson(s) for the facility?
  Do local governments send representatives to the facility?
- How are messages coordinated with all appropriate staff, organizations, and OROs?
- Who by title and org. is responsible for the Public Inquiry Hot Line?
  Where is the hot line located?
  What are the approved sources of information available to the hot line staff?
- Is public information required to be available in non-English languages at this event location?
- HAB considerations: The dissemination of information dealing with specific aspects of NPP security capabilities, actual or perceived adversarial (terrorist) force or threat, and tactical law enforcement response must be coordinated / communicated with appropriate security authorities (e.g., law enforcement and NPP security agencies).
- Have OROs established a process to coordinate the timely sharing and release of public information with the FBI and law enforcement during an HAB incident?
- Identify who has the role & responsibility as defined in the ORO plans and procedures to release public information in an HAB incident.
- What guidelines have been established to determine what information is withheld for security reasons and what information is released to protect the public?

Facilitator – Ask the participants, “Considering all of these aspects, when reviewing your departments’ / agencies’ emergency response plans, are the plans sufficient on each point?”

“Do you need to make edits, amendments, enhancements in any area?”

If yes, discuss verbiage that may be added or edited in the plans which might better meet the intent of the HAB-specific criterion.