Risk Management Series

Building Design 
for Homeland 
Security 
Student Manual 
January 2004


FEMA 
E
 
1
5
5
 
E155/ January 2004

RISK MANAGEMENT SERIES 
Building Design for 
Homeland Security

PROVIDING PROTECTION TO PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS 
Student Manual 
www.fema.gov 
Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 
publication do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. Additionally, neither FEMA 
or any of its employees makes any warrantee, expressed or implied, or assumes any 
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any 
information, product, or process included in this publication. Users of information 
from this publication assume all liability arising from such use.


BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

BACKGROUND 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed the Building Design for 
Homeland Security Course (E155), to provide needed information on how to mitigate 
the effects of potential terrorist attacks. 
The purpose of E155 is to familiarize students with assessment methodologies 
available to identify the relative level of risk for various threats, including blast and 
chemical, biological, or radiological. The students will be introduced to FEMA 426 
and will be asked to provide cost-effective mitigation measures for a range of 
manmade hazards. The primary target audience for this course includes engineers, 
architects, and building officials.


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Principal Authors: 
Michael Chipley, UTD, Inc. 
Michael Kaminskas, UTD, Inc.


Contributors: 
Milagros Kennett, FEMA, Project Officer, Risk Management 
Series Publications 
Dan Bondroff, EMI Training Specialist 
Eric Letvin, Greenhorne & O�Mara, Inc., Consultant 
Project Manager 
Christopher Arnold, Building Systems Development, Inc. 
Dwight Johnson, All About Training Instruction System 
Designer 
Gina Wightman, All About Training Instruction System 
Designer 
Deb Daly, Greenhorne & O�Mara, Inc. 
Wanda Rizer, Greenhorne & O�Mara, Inc. 
Julie Liptak, Greenhorne & O�Mara, Inc. 
BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This course was prepared under contract to FEMA. It will be revised periodically, and 
comments and feedback to improve future editions are welcome. Please send 
comments and feedback by e-mail to riskmanagementseriespubs@dhs.go v 
BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

AGENDA 
Day 1 

Instructor 
8:30 a.m. 
Unit I � Introduction and Course 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 

Overview 

10:00 a.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
10:15 a.m. 
Unit II � Asset Value Assessment 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
11:30 a.m. 
Lunch 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
12:30 p.m. 
Unit III � Threat/Hazard Assessment 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 
1:45 p.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
2:00 p.m. 
Unit IV � Vulnerability Assessment 
Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
3:45 p.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
4:00 p.m. 
Unit V � Risk Assessment/Risk 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 

Management 

4:45 p.m. 
Day 1 Wrap-up and Day 2 Forecast 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
5:00 p.m. 
Dinner 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 


AGENDA 

Day 2 

Instructor 
8:30 a.m. 
Day 1 Review and Day 2 Overview 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
8:45 a.m. 
Unit V � Risk Assessment/Risk 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 

Management (continued) 

9:15 a.m. 
Unit VI � Explosive Blast 
Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
10:15 a.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
10:30 a.m. 
Unit VII � Chemical, Biological, and 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 

Radiological Measures 

11:30 a.m. 
Lunch 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
12:30 p.m. 
Written Exam 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 


Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
1:00 p.m. 
Written Exam Review 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 


Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
1:30 p.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
1:45 p.m. 
Unit VIII � Site and Layout Design 
Chris Arnold, FAIA 

Guidance 

3:30 p.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
3:45 p.m. 
Unit VIII � Site and Layout Design 
Chris Arnold, FAIA 

Guidance (continued) 

4:30 p.m. 
Day 2 Wrap-up and Day 3 Forecast 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
5:00 p.m. 
Dinner 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 

AGENDA 
Day 3 
8:30 a.m. 
Day 2 Review and Day 3 Overview 
8:45 a.m. 
Unit IX � Building Design Guidance 
10:15 a.m. 
Break 
10:30 a.m. 
Unit IX � Building Design Guidance 

(continued) 
11:30 a.m. 
Lunch 
12:30 p.m. 
Unit X � Electronic Security Systems 
1:15 p.m. 
Break 
1:30 p.m. 
Unit XI � Finalization of Case Study 

Results [Goal is to brief building owner on 

prioritized recommendations and 

justifications for security work.] 
2:15 p.m. 
Break 
2:30 p.m. 
Unit XI � Presentation of Group Case 

Study Results and Discussion (continued) 

[Assumes 6 teams and 10 minutes per team 

to present and 5 minutes per team to 

discuss.] 
4:00 p.m. 
Unit XII � Course Wrap-up 
5:00 p.m. 
Adjourn 

Instructor 
Eric Letvin, Esq. Michael Kaminskas, P.E. Eric Letvin, Esq. Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
Eric Letvin, Esq. Eric Letvin, Esq. Eric Letvin, Esq. 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
Eric Letvin, Esq. Eric Letvin, Esq. 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview




U
n
i
t 
I 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
UNIT TITLE Introduction and Course Overview 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Describe the goal, objectives, and agenda for the course 
2.	Describe and find material in the course reference manual and 
student activity handout 
SCOPE	This unit will cover the following topics: 
1. 1. Welcome and Opening Remarks 
2. 2. Instructor Introductions 
3. 3. Administrative Information 
4. 4.	Student Introductions 
5. 5.	Course Overview 
6. 6.	Course Materials 
7. 7.	Activity: Become familiar with Case Study materials 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings 
2.	Case Study, Hazardville Information Company (HIC) 
This page intentionally left blank 
UNIT I CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:
HAZARDVILLE INFORMATION COMPANY (HIC)
CASE STUDY OVERVIEW

Requirements 
Turn to the Appendix A Case Study materials in the Student Manual and briefly peruse 
the document. Read the "familiarization" questions on the following worksheet, and as a 
group, complete the worksheet. Use only the Case Study data to answer worksheet 
questions.  Information has been limited in an effort to focus the activity. 
Question 
Answer 
Page # in Case 
Study 
1. What are the major 
transportation nodes in the 
surrounding area? 
A major interstate highway is located 
within 1/4 mile of the HIC 
Headquarters. 
A-3, A-28 � A-
30 

CSX Transportation and 


Norfolk-Southern Railway 


maintain a transportation 


corridor about 1/2 mile from HIC. 


There appear to be no 


restrictions on the material 


carried along these rail lines. 


Two airports are in the vicinity 


of HIC. One is a major 


international airport 


approximately 8 miles away. 


The other is a small, but busy 


general aviation airport 


approximately 2 miles away. 


Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 

Page # in Case 
Question 
Answer 
Study 
2. What life safety assets are 

A-16, A-17, A-27 
available, and what are their 


response times? 


3. Who are the building�s primary 

A-1, A-2 
occupants and visitors? 



Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
Question 
Answer 
Page # in Case 
Study 
4. What hazards may affect HIC? 

A-5, A-6, A-28 � A-
30 
5. What are the prevalent 
weather/wind conditions at HIC? 

A-6 
6. What are the critical functions of 
HIC? 

A-21 � 24 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 

Page # in Case 
Question 
Answer 
Study 
7. What are the components of 

A-12 � A-19 
HIC�s critical utility 


infrastructure? 


8. What are the components of 

A-11, A-12, A-16 
HIC�s critical building 


infrastructure? 



This page intentionally left blank 
Unit II: Asset Value Assessment


U
ni
t 
II 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
UNIT TITLE Asset Value Assessment 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Identify the assets of a building or site that can be 
affected by a threat or hazard 
1. 2.	Explain the components used to determine the value of an asset 
2. 3.	Determine the critical assets of a building or site 
3. 4.	Provide a numerical rating for the asset and justify the basis for the rating 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	The core functions and critical infrastructure listed on the threat-
vulnerability matrix. 
2. 2.	Various approaches to determine asset value � Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and Veterans 
Affairs. 
3. 3.	A rating scale and how to use it to determine an asset value. 
4. 4.	Activity: Identify the assets to consider in the case study and determine 
the asset value for each asset of interest. 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-10 to 1-14 
2.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
This page intentionally left blank UNIT II CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: ASSET 
VALUE RATINGS 
Asset value is the degree of debilitating impact that would be caused by the incapacity or 
destruction of a building�s assets. Page 1-13 of FEMA 426 provides an Asset Value Scale 
(Table 1-1) to quantify asset value, as well as definitions of the ratings. Table 1-2 on 
page 1-14 of FEMA 426 provides a format to summarize the value of the major categories 
of a building�s assets. 
Requirements 
Referring to the HIC Case Study, answer the following questions: 
Identifying Building Core Functions 
1. 1. What are HIC�s primary services or outputs? 
2. 2. What critical activities take place at HIC? 
3. 3. Who are the building�s primary occupants and visitors? 
4. 4. What inputs from external organizations are required for HIC�s success? 

Identifying Building Assets and Quantifying Asset Values 
Refer to Table 1-2 in FEMA 426 and use the descriptions of these asset categories in the 
HIC Case Study. Consider the questions on page 1-11 in FEMA 426 and rate HIC�s 
assets as: 
. � Very High (10) 
. � High (8-9) 
. � Medium High (7) 
. � Medium (5-6) 
. � Medium Low (4) 
. � Low (2-3) 
. � Very Low (1) 

HIC Critical Functions Asset Rating 
Asset 
Value 
Numeric Value 
Rationale 
1. Administrative 
Medium Low 
4 
Redundancy and staff 
skills that can be 
replaced. Senior 
managers and financial 
systems in the same 
area make the function 
a key area to protect. 
Low to medium 
economic cost to 
replace. 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians 
Medium 
5 
Staff skills that can be 
replaced, but require 
specialized expertise. 
Key equipment and 
resources may not be 
replaceable. High 
economic cost to 
replace. 
3. Loading 
Dock/Warehouse 




Asset 
Value 
Numeric Value 
Rationale 
4. Data Center 



5. Communications 



6. Security 



7. Housekeeping 




HIC Critical Infrastructure Asset Rating This page intentionally left blank 
Asset 
Value 
Numeric Value 
Rationale 
1. Site 



2. Architectural 



3. Structural Systems 



4. Envelope Systems 



5. Utility Systems 




Asset 
Value 
Numeric Value 
Rationale 
6. Mechanical Systems 



7. Plumbing and Gas 
Systems 



8. Electrical Systems 



9. Fire Alarm Systems 



10. IT/Communications 
Systems 




Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment


U
nit 
III 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
UNIT TITLE Threat/Hazard Assessment 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Identify the threats and hazards that may impact a building 
or site 
1. 2.	Define each threat and hazard using the Department of Defense 
methodology 
2. 3.	Provide a numerical rating for the threat or hazard and justify the basis for 
the rating 
3. 4.	Define the Design Basis Threat and Levels of Protection 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	From what offices is threat and hazard information available. 
2. 2.	The spectrum of event profiles for terrorism and technological hazards 
from FEMA 386-7. 
3. 3.	The five components used by DoD to define a threat and how it can be 
applied to the Homeland Security Advisory System. 
4. 4.	Various approaches to determine threat rating � Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and Veterans 
Affairs. 
5. 5.	A rating scale and how to use it to determine a threat rating. 
6. 6.	Activity: Identify the threats and hazards to consider in the Case Study. 
As an absolute minimum, consider explosive blast and agents (chemical, biological, and 
radiological). Determine the threat rating for the minimum threat/hazards. 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-1 to 1-18 
2.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
This page intentionally left blank UNIT III CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
THREAT/HAZARD RATINGS 
After assets that need to be protected are determined, an assessment is performed to 
identify the threats and hazards that could cause harm to the building and the inhabitants 
of the building. Hazards are categorized into two groups: natural and manmade. While 
natural hazards could logically be expected to affect the HIC, the Case Study only 
describes the threat from explosive blast and from chemical, biological, and/or radiological 
"agents." 
The result of this assessment is a "Threat Rating." The threat rating is a subjective 
judgment of a threat based on existence, capability, history, intentions, and targeting. The 
rating scale is a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 a very low probability of a terrorist attack and 10 
a very high probability. 
Requirements 
Refer to the HIC Case Study data and GIS portfolio and complete the following 
worksheets. Each student will interpret the HIC threat information and should have a 
number close to the value shown. Any function with key IT systems connected to the 
Internet should get high cyber values. Functions that are susceptible to blast should get 
high numbers. A CBR attack will impact the entire facility. 
HIC Critical Functions Threat Rating 
Function 
Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR 
Attack 
Rationale 
1. Administration 
6 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians 
5 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 

Function 
Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR 
Attack 
Rationale 





in the area. 
3. Loading 
Dock/Warehousing 





4. Data Center 





5. Communications 





6. Security 





7. Housekeeping 






HIC Infrastructure Threat Rating This page intentionally left blank 
Function 
Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR 
Attack 
Rationale 
1. Site 






Function 
Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR 
Attack 
Rationale 
2. Architectural 





3. Structural 





4. Envelope Systems 





5. Utility Systems 





6. Mechanical Systems 





7. Plumbing and Gas 
Systems 





8. Electrical Systems 





9. Fire Alarm Systems 






Function 
Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR 
Attack 
Rationale 
10. IT/Communications 
Systems 






Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment


U
nit 
IV 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
UNIT TITLE Vulnerability Assessment 
OBJECTIVES 1. Explain what constitutes a vulnerability 
1. 2.	Identify vulnerabilities using the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist 
2. 3.	Understand that an identified vulnerability may indicate that an asset is 
vulnerable to more than one threat or hazard and that mitigation measures may reduce 
vulnerability to one or more threats or hazards 
3. 4.	Provide a numerical rating for the vulnerability and justify the basis for the 
rating 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Review types of vulnerabilities, especially single-point vulnerabilities and 
tactics possible under threats/hazards for which there are no mitigation measures. 
2. 2.	Various approaches and considerations to determine vulnerabilities � 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, 
and Veterans Affairs. 
3. 3.	A rating scale and how to use it to determine a vulnerability rating. 
4. 4.	Activity: Identify the vulnerabilities present in the Case Study. As an 
absolute minimum, consider threats/hazards associated with explosive blast and agents 
(chemical, biological, and radiological). Determine the vulnerability rating for each asset � 
threat/hazard pairs of interest. 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings, Chapter 1 
2. 	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
This page intentionally left blank UNIT IV CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
VULNERABILITY RATING 
Vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor or, in a non-terrorist 
threat environment, make an asset susceptible to hazard damage. Vulnerabilities may 
include: 
. �	Critical functions or systems that lack redundancy and if damaged would 
result in immediate organization disruption or loss of capability ("Single-Point 
Vulnerability") 
. �	Redundant systems feeding into a single critical node 
. �	Critical components of redundant systems collocated 
. �	Inadequate capacity or endurance in post-attack environment 

Vulnerability rating requires identifying and rating the vulnerability of each asset-threat 
pair. In-depth vulnerability assessment of a building evaluates specific design and 
architectural features and identifies all vulnerabilities of the building functions and building 
systems. 
Requirement 
For an example of how a specific asset is assessed, answer the following questions and 
record relevant observations on the following table regarding the HIC site and building. 
Determine what, if any, vulnerability exists: 
Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
1.16 
Does adjacent surface 
parking on site maintain a 
minimum stand-off distance? 
The specific stand-off distance 
needed is based upon the design 
basis threat bomb size and the 
building construction. For initial 
screening, consider using 25 
meters (82 feet) as a minimum, 
with more distance needed for 
There is no adjacent 
parking per se, but 
there is one parking lot 
or area that any tenant 
or visitor to the office 
park can use. Stand-off 
distance to the front 


unreinforced masonry or wooden 
walls. Reference: GSA PBS-100 
parking lot is less than 
the 82 feet screening 
value. Cars or trucks 



can drive up to the 
loading dock in the 



rear. 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
1.19 
Do site landscaping and 
street furniture provide 
hiding places? 
Minimize concealment 
opportunities by keeping landscape 
plantings (hedges, shrubbery, and 
large plants with heavy ground 
cover) and street furniture (bus 
shelters, benches, trash receptacles, 
mailboxes, newspaper vending 
machines) away from the building 
to permit observation of intruders 
and prevent hiding of packages. If 
mail or express boxes are used, the 
size of the openings should be 
restricted to prohibit the insertion 
of packages. Reference: GSA PBS-
100 

2.15 
Are critical assets (people, 
activities, building systems 
and components) located 
close to any main entrance, 
vehicle circulation, parking, 
maintenance area, loading 
dock, or interior parking? 
Are the critical building 
systems and components 
hardened? 
Critical building components 
include: emergency generator, 
including fuel systems, day tank, 
fire sprinkler, and water supply; 
normal fuel storage; main 
switchgear; telephone distribution 
and main switchgear; fire pumps; 
building control centers; 
uninterruptible power supply 
(UPS) systems controlling critical 
functions; main refrigeration and 
ventilation systems if critical to 
building operation; elevator 
machinery and controls; shafts for 
stairs, elevators, and utilities; and 
critical distribution feeders for 
emergency power. Evacuation and 
rescue require emergency systems 
to remain operational during a 
disaster and they should be located 
away from attack locations. 
Primary and back-up systems 
should be separated to reduce the 
risk of both being impacted by a 
single incident if collocated. 
Utility systems should be located 
at least 50 feet from loading docks, 
front entrances, and parking areas. 
One way to harden critical building 
systems and components is to 
enclose them within hardened 
walls, floors, and ceilings. Do not 
place them near high risk areas 
where they can receive collateral 
damage. Reference: GSA PBS-100 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 




2.16 
Are high value or critical 
assets located as far into the 
interior of the building as 
possible and separated from 
the public areas of the 
building? 
Critical assets, such as people and 
activities, are more vulnerable to 
hazards when on an exterior 
building wall or adjacent to 
uncontrolled public areas inside the 
building. Reference: GSA PBS-100 

4.2 
Is there less than 40 percent 
fenestration openings per 
structural bay? Is the 
window system design on 
the exterior fa�ade balanced 
to mitigate the hazardous 
effects of flying glazing 
following an explosive event? 
(glazing, frames, anchorage to 
supporting walls, etc.) 
The performance of the glass will 
similarly depend on the materials. 
Glazing may be single pane or 
double pane, monolithic or 
laminated, annealed, heat 
strengthened, or fully tempered. 
The percent fenestration is a 
balance between protection level, 
cost, the architectural look of the 
building within its surroundings, 
and building codes. One goal is to 
keep fenestration to below 40 
percent of the building envelope 
vertical surface area, but the 
process must balance differing 
requirements. A blast engineer may 
prefer no windows; an architect 
may favor window curtain walls; 
building codes require so much 
fenestration per square footage of 
floor area; fire codes require a 
prescribed window opening area if 
the window is a designated escape 
route; and the building owner has 
cost concerns. Ideally, an owner 
would want 100 percent of the 
glazed area to provide the design 
protection level against the 
postulated explosive threat (design 
basis threat � weapon size at the 
expected standoff distance). 
However, economics and geometry 
may allow 80 percent to 90 percent 
due to the statistical differences in 
the manufacturing process for glass 
or 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


the angle of incidence of the blast 



wave upon upper story windows 



(4th floor and higher). 



Reference: GSA PBS-100 


HIC Critical Functions Vulnerability 
Rating Requirement 
Refer to the HIC Case Study and rate the vulnerability of the following asset-
threat/hazard pairs. 
Function 
Cyber Attack 
Armed Attack 
Vehicle Bomb 
CBR Attack 
1. Administration 
8 
8 
10 
8 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians 
8 
8 
8 
8 
3. Loading Dock/ 
Warehousing 




4. Data Center 




5. Communications 




6. Security 




7. Housekeeping 





HIC Infrastructure Vulnerability Rating 
Refer to the HIC Case Study and rate the vulnerability of the following asset-
threat/hazard pairs. 
Function 
Cyber Attack 
Armed Attack 
Vehicle Bomb 
CBR Attack 
1. Site 




2. Architectural 




3. Structural Systems 




4. Envelope Systems 




5. Utility Systems 




6. Mechanical Systems 




7. Plumbing and Gas 
Systems 




8. Electrical Systems 




9. Fire Alarm Systems 




10. IT/Communications 
Systems 





Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management


U
ni
t 
V 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
UNIT TITLE Risk Assessment/Risk Management 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Explain what constitutes risk 
1. 2.	Evaluate risk using the Threat-Vulnerability Matrix to capture assessment 
information 
2. 3.	Provide a numerical rating for risk and justify the basis for the rating 
3. 4.	Identify top risks for asset � threat/hazard pairs that should receive 
measures to mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce risk 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Definition of risk and the various components to determine a risk rating. 
2. 2.	The FEMA 426 approach to determining risk. 
3. 3.	A rating scale and how to use it to determine a risk rating. One or more 
specific examples will be used to focus students on the following activity. 
4. 4.	The relationships between high risk, the need for mitigation measures, and 
the need to identify a Design Basis Threat and Level of Protection. 
5. 5.	Activity: Determine the risk rating for the asset � threat/hazard pairs of 
interest. Identify the top three risk ratings for the Case Study.  

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 1 
2.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
This page intentionally left blank UNIT V CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: RISK 
RATING 
One approach to conducting a risk assessment is to assemble the results of the asset 
value assessment, the threat assessment, and the vulnerability assessment, and 
determine a numeric value of risk for each asset-threat/hazard pair using the following 
formula: 
Risk = Asset Value x Threat Rating x Vulnerability Rating 
Requirement 
Use the following tables to summarize the HIC asset, threat, and vulnerability 
assessments conducted in the previous three unit activities. Then use the formula above 
to determine the risk rating for each asset-threat/hazard pair identified under Critical 
Functions and under Critical Infrastructure. Using Figure 1-13 of FEMA 426, make a 
determination of the available risk management options. 
Critical Functions 
Function 
Cyber Attack 
Armed Attack 
Vehicle Bomb 
CBR Attack 
1. Administration Risk 
Rating 
192 
96 
192 
128 
Asset Value 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Threat Rating 
6 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
8 
8 
8 
8 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians Risk Rating 
200 
120 
240 
160 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
5 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
8 
8 
8 
8 
3. Loading Dock/ 
Warehouse Risk Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 





Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk 
Management 4. Data Center 
Risk Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




5. Communications Risk 
Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




6. Security Risk Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




7. Housekeeping Risk 
Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 





Critical Infrastructure This page intentionally left blank 
Infrastructure 
Cyber Attack 
Armed Attack 
Vehicle Bomb 
CBR Attack 
1. Site Risk Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




2. Architectural Risk 
Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




3. Structural Systems 
Risk Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 





Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk 
Management Infrastructure 
Cyber Attack 
Armed Attack 
Vehicle Bomb 
CBR Attack 
4. Envelope Systems Risk 
Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




5. Utility Systems Risk 
Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




6. Mechanical Systems 
Risk Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




7. Plumbing and Gas 
Systems Risk Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




8. Electrical Systems Risk 
Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




9. Fire Alarm Systems 
Risk Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 




10. IT/Communications 
Systems Risk Rating 




Asset Value 




Threat Rating 




Vulnerability Rating 





Unit VI: Explosive Blast


U
nit 
VI 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
UNIT TITLE Explosive Blast 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Explain the basic physics involved during an explosive blast 
event, whether by terrorism or technological accident 
1. 2.	Explain building damage and personnel injury resulting from the blast 
effects upon a building 
2. 3.	Perform an initial prediction of blast loading and effects based upon 
incident pressure 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Time-pressure regions of a blast event and how these change with distance 
from the blast 
2. 2.	Difference between incident pressure and reflected pressure 
3. 3.	Differences between peak pressure and peak impulse and how these 
differences affect building components 
4. 4.	Building damage and personal injuries generated by blast wave effects 
5. 5.	Levels of protection used by the Department of Defense and the General 
Services Administration 
6. 6.	The nominal range-to-effect chart [minimum stand-off in feet versus 
weapon yield in pounds of TNT-equivalent] for an identified level of damage or injury 
7. 7.	The benefits of stand-off distance 
8. 8.	Approaches to predicting blast loads and effects, including one using 
incident pressure 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings 
2.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
This page intentionally left blank 
UNIT VI CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
EXPLOSIVES ENVIRONMENT AND STAND-OFF DISTANCE AND THE 
EFFECTS 
OF BLAST

The requirements in this Unit�s activity are intended to provide a check on learning 
about explosive blast. 
Requirement 
1. 1.	In the empty cells in the table below, identify whether the adjacent 
description defines incident pressure or reflected pressure. 
 .2.	Refer to Figure 4-5 in FEMA 426 (page 4-11) to answer the following questions 
regarding the explosives environment: 
. �	What is the minimum stand-off distance from a 100-pound bomb 
explosion to eliminate the danger of glass breakage and severe wounds (without fragment 
retention film)? 
. �	 What damage will be sustained at 400 feet from a 5,000-pound bomb 
explosion? 
 .3.	Refer to Figure 4-10 and Table 4-3 in FEMA 426 (pages 4-17 and 4-19, 
respectively) to answer the following questions regarding the explosives environment. 
. �	What is the minimum stand-off required to limit the incident pressure to 
under 0.5 psi for a 100-pound bomb?  
. � What incident pressure would be expected at 500 feet from a 500-pound bomb 
and what is the approximate damage? 

Definition 
Type of Pressure 
Characterized by an almost instantaneous rise 

from atmospheric pressure to peak 

overpressure. 

When it impinges on a structure that is not 

parallel to the direction of the wave�s travel, 

the pressure wave is reflected and reinforced. 


This page intentionally left blank 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Measures


Uni
t 
VII 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
UNIT TITLE Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Explain the five possible protective actions for a building 
and its occupants 
1. 2.	Compare filtration and collection mechanisms and applicability to the 
particles present in chemical, biological, and radiological agents 
2. 3.	Explain the key issues with CBR detection 
3. 4.	Identify the indications of CBR contamination 

SCOPE	This unit will cover the following topics: 
1. 1.	Five protective actions for a building and its occupants: evacuation; 
sheltering in place; personal protective equipment; air filtration and pressurization; and 
exhausting and purging 
2. 2.	Air filtration and cleaning principles and its application 
3. 3.	CBR detection technology currently available 
4. 4.	Indications of CBR contamination that do not use technology 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 5-1 to 5-36 
1. 2.	FEMA 426, Appendix C, Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Glossary 
2. 3.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 

This page intentionally left blank 
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security 
UNIT VII CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) CONSIDERATIONS 
The requirements in this Unit�s activity are intended to provide a check on learning about 
the nature of chemical, biological, and radiological agents. 
Requirement 
1.	Review the HIC case study and name the prevalent CBR threat(s) to the HIC. 
Refer to Table 5-1 on page 5-12 of FEMA 426 and answer the following questions: 
1. 2.	What size filtration unit (MERV) is required to filter out 75 percent of 
Legionella and dust particulates (1 to 3 microns) inside the HIC? 
2. 3.	What range of MERV is required to remove 85 percent of smoke particles 
greater than 0.3 micron in size? 
3. 4.	What mitigation measure can be used in the HVAC systems to destroy 
bacteria and viruses? 

This page intentionally left blank 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance



Unit 
VIII 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
UNIT TITLE Site and Layout Design Guidance 
OBJECTIVES 
1. 1.	Explain the concerns of land use as applied to threats and hazards due to 
terrorism and technological accidents 
2. 2.	Identify site planning concerns that can create, reduce, or eliminate 
vulnerabilities and understand the concept of "Layers of Defense" 
3. 3.	Compare the pros and cons of barrier mitigation measures that increase 
stand-off or create controlled access zones 
4. 4.	Identify the positive and negative aspects of mitigation approaches for 
entry control and vehicle access, signage, parking, loading docks, lighting, and site utilities 
5. 5.	Explain the basic concepts of Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design (CPTED) and its applicability to building security against terrorism 
6. 6.	Apply these concepts to an existing site or building and identify mitigation 
measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities 

SCOPE	This unit will cover the following topics: 
1. 1.	Land use considerations both outside and inside the property line 
2. 2.	Site planning issues to include site design, layout and form, vehicular and 
pedestrian circulation, and landscape and urban design 
3. 3.	Creating stand-off distance using perimeter controls, non-exclusive zones, 
and exclusive zones along with the design concepts and technology to consider 
4. 4.	Design considerations and mitigation measures for building security 

REFERENCES 1. Course Goal and Objectives 
1. 2.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings Chapter 2 
2. 3.	Unit VIII Visuals 

This page intentionally left blank UNIT VIII CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: SITE 
AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment.  The checklist includes 
questions that determine if critical systems will continue to function to enhance 
deterrence, detection, denial, and damage limitation, and emergency systems function 
during a threat or hazard situation. 
Requirement 
Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most knowledgeable and 
qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the HIC case study 
and to the GIS portfolio to determine answers to the questions. Then review results to 
identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures. 
1. 1.	Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist which address site and layout. 
2. 2.	Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the site 
risk rating determined in Unit V Case Study Activity and, based on this detailed analysis, 
decide if the rating is accurate. 
3. 3.	Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from 
the site and layout perspective. 
4. 4.	Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the 
recommended mitigation measures. 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
1.1 
What major structures 
surround the facility (site 
or building(s))? What 
critical infrastructure, 
government, military, or 
recreation facilities are in 
the local area that impact 
transportation, utilities, 
and collateral damage 
(attack at this facility 
impacting the other major 
structures or attack on the 
major structures impacting 
this facility)? 
Critical infrastructure to 
consider includes: 
Telecommunications 
infrastructure Facilities for 
broadcast TV, cable TV; cellular 
networks; newspaper offices, 
production, and distribution; 
radio stations; satellite base 
stations; telephone trunking and 
switching stations, including 
critical cable routes and major 
rights-of-way Electric power 
systems Power plants, especially 
nuclear facilities; transmission 
and distribution system 
components; fuel distribution, 
delivery, and storage 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Gas and oil facilities 



Hazardous material facilities, 



oil/gas pipelines, and storage 



facilities 



Banking and finance 



institutions 



Financial institutions (banks, 



credit unions) and the business 



district; note schedule 



business/financial district may 



follow; armored car services 



Transportation networks 



Airports: carriers, flight paths, 



and airport layout; location of air 



traffic control towers, runways, 



passenger terminals, and parking 



areas 



Bus Stations: 



Pipelines: oil; gas 



Trains/Subways: rails and lines, 



railheads/rail yards, 



interchanges, tunnels, and 



cargo/passenger terminals; note 



hazardous material transported 



Traffic: interstate 



highways/roads/tunnels/ bridges 



carrying large volumes; points of 



congestion; note time of day and 



day of week 



Trucking: hazardous materials 



cargo loading/unloading 



facilities; truck terminals, weigh 



stations, and rest areas 



Waterways: dams; levees; berths 



and ports for cruise ships, ferries, 



roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and 



container ships; international 



(foreign) flagged vessels (and 



cargo) 



Water supply systems 



Pipelines and process/treatment 



facilities, dams for water 



collection; wastewater treatment 



Government services 



Federal/state/local government 



offices � post offices, law 



enforcement stations, fire/rescue, 



town/city hall, local 



mayor�s/governor�s residences, 



judicial offices and courts, 



military installations (include 



type-active, Reserves, National 



Guard) 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Emergency services 



Backup facilities, 



communications centers, 



Emergency Operations Centers 



(EOCs), fire/Emergency Medical 



Service (EMS) facilities, 



Emergency Medical Centers 



(EMCs), law enforcement 



facilities 



The following are not critical 



infrastructure, but have 



collateral damage potential to 



consider: 



Agricultural facilities: 



chemical distribution, storage, 



and application sites; crop 



spraying services; farms and 



ranches; food processing, 



storage, and distribution 
facilities 



Commercial/manufacturing/in 



d-ustrial facilities:  apartment 



buildings; business/corporate 



centers; chemical plants 



(especially those with Section 



302 Extremely Hazardous 



Substances); factories; fuel 



production, distribution, and 



storage facilities; hotels and 



convention centers; industrial 



plants; raw material production, 



distribution, and storage 



facilities; research facilities and 



laboratories; shipping, 



warehousing, transfer, and 



logistical centers 



Events and attractions: 



festivals and celebrations; open-



air markets; parades; rallies, 



demonstrations, and marches; 



religious services; scenic tours; 



theme parks 



Health care system 



components: family planning 



clinics; health department 



offices; hospitals; radiological 



material and medical waste 



transportation, storage, and 



disposal; research facilities and 



laboratories, walk-in clinics 



Political or symbolically 



significant sites: embassies, 



consulates, landmarks, 



monuments, political party and 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


special interest groups offices, 
religious sites Public/private 
institutions: academic 
institutions, cultural centers, 
libraries, museums, research 
facilities and laboratories, 
schools Recreation facilities: 
auditoriums, casinos, concert 
halls and pavilions, parks, 
restaurants and clubs (frequented 
by potential target populations), 
sports arenas, stadiums, theaters, 
malls, and special interest group 
facilities; note congestion date 
and times for shopping centers 
References:  FEMA 386-7, 
FEMA SLG 101, DOJ 
NCJ181200 

1.2 
Does the terrain place the 
building in a depression or 
low area? 
Depressions or low areas can trap 
heavy vapors, inhibit natural 
decontamination by prevailing 
winds, and reduce the 
effectiveness of in-place 
sheltering. Reference: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide 

1.3 
In dense, urban areas, does 
curb lane parking place 
uncontrolled parked 
vehicles unacceptably close 
to a building in public 
rights-of-way? 
Where distance from the building 
to the nearest curb provides 
insufficient setback, restrict 
parking in the curb lane. For 
typical city streets, this may 
require negotiating to close the 
curb lane. Setback is common 
terminology for the distance 
between a building and its 
associated roadway or parking. It 
is analogous to stand-off between 
a vehicle bomb and the building. 
The benefit per foot of increased 
stand-off between a potential 
vehicle bomb and a building is 
very high when close to a 
building and decreases rapidly as 
the distance increases. Note that 
the July 1, 1994, Americans 
with Disabilities Act Standards 
for Accessible Design states that 
required handicapped parking 
shall be located on the shortest 
accessible route of travel from 
adjacent parking to an accessible 
entrance. 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

1.4 
Is a perimeter fence or 
other types of barrier 
controls in place? 
The intent is to channel 
pedestrian traffic onto a site with 
multiple buildings through 
known access control points. For 
a single building, the intent is to 
have a single visitor entrance. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

1.5 
What are the site access 
points to the site or 
building? 
The goal is to have at least two 
access points � one for passenger 
vehicles and one for delivery 
trucks due to the different 
procedures needed for each. 
Having two access points also 
helps if one of the access points 
becomes unusable, then traffic 
can be routed through the other 
access point. Reference: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide 

1.6 
Is vehicle traffic separated 
from pedestrian traffic on 
the site? 
Pedestrian access should not be 
endangered by car traffic. 
Pedestrian access, especially 
from public transportation, 
should not cross vehicle traffic if 
possible. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 and FEMA 386-7 

1.7 
Is there vehicle and 
pedestrian access control at 
the perimeter of the site? 
Vehicle and pedestrian access 
control and inspection should 
occur as far from facilities as 
possible (preferably at the site 
perimeter) with the ability to 
regulate the flow of people and 
vehicles one at a time. Control 
on-site parking with 
identification checks, security 
personnel, and access control 
systems. Reference: FEMA 386-7 

1.8 
Is there space for 
inspection at the curb line 
or outside the protected 
perimeter? What is the 
minimum distance from the 
inspection location to the 
building? 
Design features for the vehicular 
inspection point include: vehicle 
arrest devices that prevent 
vehicles from leaving the 
vehicular inspection area and 
prevent tailgating. If screening 
space cannot be provided, 
consider other design features 
such as: hardening and 
alternative location for vehicle 
search/ inspection. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
1.9 
Is there any potential 
access to the site or 
building through utility 
paths or water runoff? 
Eliminate potential site access 
through utility tunnels, 
corridors, manholes, stormwater 
runoff culverts, etc. Ensure 
covers to these access points are 
secured. Reference: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 
1.10 
What are the existing types 
of vehicle anti-ram devices 
for the site or building? Are 
these devices at the 
property boundary or at 
the building? 
Passive barriers include bollards, 
walls, hardened fences (steel 
cable interlaced), trenches, 
ponds/basins, concrete planters, 
street furniture, plantings, trees, 
sculptures, and fountains. Active 
barriers include pop-up bollards, 
swing arm gates, and rotating 
plates and drums, etc. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 

1.11 
What is the anti-ram buffer 
zone stand-off distance 
from the building to 
unscreened vehicles or 
parking? 
If the recommended distance for 
the postulated threat is not 
available, consider reducing the 
stand-off required through 
structural hardening or 
manufacturing additional stand-
off through barriers and parking 
restrictions. Also consider 
relocation of vulnerable functions 
within the building or to a more 
hazard-resistant building. More 
stand-off should be used for 
unscreened vehicles than for 
screened vehicles that are 
searched. Reference: GSA PBS 
P-100 

1.12 
Are perimeter barriers 
capable of stopping 
vehicles? Will the vehicle 
barriers at the perimeter 
and building maintain 
access for emergency 
responders, including large 
fire apparatus? 
Anti-ram protection may be 
provided by adequately designed: 
bollards, street furniture, 
sculpture, landscaping, walls, 
and fences. The anti-ram 
protection must be able to stop 
the threat vehicle size (weight) at 
the speed attainable by that 
vehicle at impact. If the anti-ram 
protection cannot absorb the 
desired kinetic energy, consider 
adding speed controls 
(serpentines or speed bumps) to 
limit the speed at impact. If the 
resultant speed is still too great, 
the anti-ram protection should be 
improved. Reference: Military 
Handbook 1013/14 and GSA 
PBS P-100 

1.13 
Does site circulation 
The intent is to use site 
circulation to minimize vehicle 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

prevent high-speed 
approaches by vehicles? 
speeds and eliminate direct 
approaches to structures. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

1.14 
Are there offsetting vehicle 
entrances from the 
direction of a vehicle�s 
approach to force a 
reduction of speed? 
Single or double 90-degree turns 
effectively reduce vehicle 
approach speed. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

1.15 
Is there a minimum setback 
distance between the 
building and parked 
vehicles? 
Adjacent public parking should 
be directed to more distant or 
better-protected areas, segregated 
from employee parking and away 
from the building. Some 
publications use the term setback 
in lieu of the term stand-off. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

1.16 
Does adjacent surface 
parking on-site maintain a 
minimum stand-off 
distance? 
The specific stand-off distance 
needed is based upon the design 
basis threat bomb size and the 
building construction. For initial 
screening, consider using 25 
meters (82 feet) as a minimum 
with more distance needed for 
unreinforced masonry or wooden 
walls. Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

1.17 
Do stand-alone, above 
ground parking garages 
provide adequate visibility 
across as well as into and 
out of the parking garage? 
Pedestrian paths should be 
planned to concentrate activity to 
the extent possible. Limiting 
vehicular entry/exits to a 
minimum number of locations is 
beneficial. Stair tower and 
elevator lobby design shall be as 
open as code permits. Stair 
and/or elevator waiting areas 
should be as open to the exterior 
and/or the parking areas as 
possible and well lighted. 
Impact-resistant, laminated glass 
for stair towers and elevators is a 
way to provide visual openness. 
Potential hiding places below 
stairs should be closed off; 
nooks and crannies should be 
avoided, and dead-end parking 
areas should be eliminated. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

1.18 
Are garage or service area 
Control internal building 
parking, underground parking 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

entrances for employee-
permitted vehicles 
protected by suitable anti-
ram devices? Coordinate 
this protection with other 
anti-ram devices, such as 
on the perimeter or 
property boundary to 
avoid duplication of 
arresting capability. 
garages, and access to service 
areas and loading docks in this 
manner with proper access 
control or eliminate the parking 
altogether. The anti-ram device 
must be capable of arresting a 
vehicle of the designated threat 
size at the speed attainable at the 
location. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 

1.19 
Do site landscaping and 
street furniture provide 
hiding places? 
Minimize concealment 
opportunities by keeping 
landscape plantings (hedges, 
shrubbery, and large plants with 
heavy ground cover) and street 
furniture (bus shelters, benches, 
trash receptacles, mailboxes, 
newspaper vending machines) 
away from the building to permit 
observation of intruders and 
prevent hiding of packages. If 
mail or express boxes are used, 
the size of the openings should 
be restricted to prohibit the 
insertion of packages. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 

1.20 
Is the site lighting adequate 
from a security perspective 
in roadway access and 
parking areas? 
Security protection can be 
successfully addressed through 
adequate lighting. The type and 
design of lighting, including 
illumination levels, is critical. 
Illuminating Engineering Society 
of North America (IESNA) 
guidelines can be used. The site 
lighting should be coordinated 
with the CCTV system. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

1.21 
Are line-of-sight 
perspectives from outside 
the secured boundary to 
the building and on the 
property along pedestrian 
and vehicle routes 
integrated with landscaping 
and green space? 
The goal is to prevent the 
observation of critical assets by 
persons outside the secure 
boundary of the site. For 
individual buildings in an urban 
environment, this could mean 
appropriate window treatments or 
no windows for portions of the 
building. 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Once on the site, the concern is 
to ensure observation by a 
general workforce aware of any 
pedestrians and vehicles outside 
normal circulation routes or 
attempting to approach the 
building unobserved. Reference: 
USAF Installation Force 
Protection Guide 

1.22 
Do signs provide control of 
vehicles and people? 
The signage should be simple 
and have the necessary level of 
clarity. However, signs that 
identify sensitive areas should 
generally not be provided. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

1.23 
Are all existing fire 
hydrants on the site 
accessible? 
Just as vehicle access points to 
the site must be able to transit 
emergency vehicles, so too must 
the emergency vehicles have 
access to the buildings and, in 
the case of fire trucks, the fire 
hydrants. Thus, security 
considerations must 
accommodate emergency 
response requirements. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

2 
Architectural 


2.1 
Does the site and 
architectural design 
incorporate strategies from 
a Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental 
Design (CPTED) 
perspective? 
The focus of CPTED is on 
creating defensible space by 
employing: 1. Natural access 
controls: Design streets, 
sidewalks, and building 
entrances to clearly indicate 
public routes and direct people 
away from private/restricted areas 
Discourage access to private areas 
with structural elements and 
limit access (no cut-through 
streets) Loading zones should be 
separate from public parking 2. 
Natural surveillance: Design 
that maximizes visibility of 
people, parking areas, and 
building entrances: doors and 
windows that look out on to 
streets and parking areas 
Shrubbery under 2 feet in height 
for visibility Lower branches of 
existing trees kept at least 10 feet 
off ground Pedestrian-friendly 
sidewalks 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


and streets to control pedestrian 
and vehicle circulation Adequate 
nighttime lighting, especially at 
exterior doorways 3. Territorial 
reinforcement: Design that 
defines property lines Design 
that distinguishes 
private/restricted spaces from 
public spaces using separation, 
landscape plantings; pavement 
designs (pathway and roadway 
placement); gateway treatments 
at lobbies, corridors, and door 
placement; walls, barriers, 
signage, lighting, and "CPTED" 
fences "Traffic-calming" devices 
for vehicle speed control 4. 
Target hardening: Prohibit 
entry or access: window locks, 
deadbolts for doors, interior door 
hinges Access control (building 
and employee/visitor parking) 
and intrusion detection systems 
5. Closed circuit television 
cameras: Prevent crime and 
influence positive behavior, while 
enhancing the intended uses of space. 
In other words, design that 
eliminates or reduces criminal 
behavior and at the same time 
encourages people to "keep an eye 
out" for each other. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7 

2.2 
Is it a mixed-tenant 
building? 
Separate high-risk tenants from 
low-risk tenants and from 
publicly accessible areas. Mixed 
uses may be accommodated 
through such means as separating 
entryways, controlling access, 
and hardening shared partitions, 
as well as through special 
security operational 
countermeasures. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

2.3 
Are pedestrian paths 
planned to concentrate 
activity to aid in detection? 
Site planning and landscape 
design can provide natural 
surveillance by concentrating 
pedestrian activity, limiting 
entrances/exits, and eliminating 
concealment opportunities. Also, 
prevent pedestrian access to 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


parking areas other than via 
established entrances. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100. 

2.4 
Are there trash receptacles 
and mailboxes in close 
proximity to the building 
that can be used to hide 
explosive devices? 
The size of the trash receptacles 
and mailbox openings should be 
restricted to prohibit insertion of 
packages. Street furniture, such 
as newspaper vending machines, 
should be kept sufficient distance 
(10 meters or 33 feet) from the 
building, or brought inside to a 
secure area. References: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide, DoD Minimum 
Antiterrorism Standards for 
Buildings 

5 
Utility Systems 


5.1 
What is the source of 
domestic water? (utility, 
municipal, wells, lake, 
river, storage tank) Is there 
a secure alternate drinking 
water supply? 
Domestic water is critical for 
continued building operation. 
Although bottled water can 
satisfy requirements for drinking 
water and minimal sanitation, 
domestic water meets many other 
needs � flushing toilets, building 
heating and cooling system 
operation, cooling of emergency 
generators, humidification, etc. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 
5.2 
Are there multiple entry 
points for the water 
supply? 
If the building or site has only 
one source of water entering at 
one location, the entry point 
should be secure. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 
5.3 
Is the incoming water 
supply in a secure 
location? 
Ensure that only authorized 
personnel have access to the 
water supply and its 
components. Reference: FEMA 
386-7 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 
5.4 
Does the building or site 
have storage capacity for 
domestic water? How 
many gallons and how long 
will it allow operations to 
continue? 
Operational facilities will require 
reliance on adequate domestic 
water supply. Storage capacity 
can meet short-term needs and 
use water trucks to replenish for 
extended outages. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities. 
Unknown without a more 
detailed assessment. 
5.5 
What is the source of water 
for the fire suppression 
system? (local utility 
company lines, storage 
tanks with 
The fire suppression system 
water may be supplied from the 
domestic water or it may have a 
separate source, separate storage, 
or nonpotable alternate sources. 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

utility company backup, 
lake, or river) Are there 
alternate water supplies for 
fire suppression? 
For a site with multiple 
buildings, the concern is that the 
supply should be adequate to 
fight the worst case situation 
according to the fire codes. 
Recent major construction may 
change that requirement. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 

5.6 
Is the fire suppression 
system adequate, code-
compliant, and protected 
(secure location)? 
Standpipes, water supply control 
valves, and other system 
components should be secure or 
supervised. Reference: FEMA 
386-7 

5.7 
Do the sprinkler/standpipe 
interior controls (risers) 
have fire- and blast-
resistant separation? Are 
the sprinkler and standpipe 
connections adequate and 
redundant? Are there fire 
hydrant and water supply 
connections near the 
sprinkler/standpipe 
connections? 
The incoming fire protection 
water line should be encased, 
buried, or located 50 feet from 
high risk areas. The interior 
mains should be looped and 
sectionalized. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 
5.8 
Are there redundant fire 
water pumps (e.g., one 
electric, one diesel)? Are 
the pumps located apart 
from each other? 
Collocating fire water pumps 
puts them at risk for a single 
incident to disable the fire 
suppression system. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-
7 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 
5.9 
Are sewer systems 
accessible? Are they 
protected or secured? 
Sanitary and stormwater sewers 
should be protected from 
unauthorized access. The main 
concerns are backup or flooding 
into the building, causing a 
health risk, shorting out 
electrical equipment, and loss of 
building use. Reference:  
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 
5.10 
What fuel supplies do the 
building rely upon for 
critical operation? 
Typically, natural gas, propane, 
or fuel oil are required for 
continued operation. 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

5.11 
How much fuel is stored on 
the site or at the building 
and how long can this 
quantity support critical 
operations? How is it 
stored? How is it secured? 
Fuel storage protection is 
essential for continued operation. 
Main fuel storage should be 
located away from loading 
docks, entrances, and parking. 
Access should be restricted and 
protected (e.g., locks on caps and 
seals). References:  GSA PBS-
P100 and Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

5.12 
Where is the fuel supply 
obtained? How is it 
delivered? 
The supply of fuel is dependent 
on the reliability of the supplier. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

5.13 
Are there alternate sources 
of fuel? Can alternate fuels 
be used? 
Critical functions may be served 
by alternate methods if normal 
fuel supply is interrupted. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

5.14 
What is the normal source 
of electrical service for the 
site or building? 
Utilities are the general source 
unless co-generation or a private 
energy provider is available. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

5.15 
Is there a redundant 
electrical service source? 
Can the site or buildings be 
fed from more than one 
utility substation? 
The utility may have only one 
source of power from a single 
substation. There may be only 
single feeders from the main 
substation. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 
5.16 
How may service entry 
points does the site or 
building have for 
electricity? 
Electrical supply at one location 
creates a vulnerable situation 
unless an alternate source is 
available. Ensure disconnecting 
requirements according to NFPA 
70 (National Fire Protection 
Association, National Electric 
Code) are met for multiple 
service entrances. Reference: 
Physical Security 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

5.17 
Is the incoming electric 
service to the building 
secure? 
Typically, the service entrance is 
a locked room, inaccessible to 
the public. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 
5.18 
What provisions for 
emergency power exist? 
What systems receive 
emergency power and have 
capacity requirements been 
tested? Is the emergency 
power co-located with the 
commercial electric service? 
Is there an exterior 
connection for emergency 
power? 
Besides installed generators to 
supply emergency power, 
portable generators or rental 
generators available under 
emergency contract can be 
quickly connected to a building 
with an exterior quick disconnect 
already installed. Testing under 
actual loading and operational 
conditions ensures the critical 
systems requiring emergency 
power receive it with a high 
assurance of reliability. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

5.19 
By what means does the 
main telephone and data 
communications interface 
the site or building? 
Typically communication ducts 
or other conduits are available. 
Overhead service is more 
identifiable and vulnerable 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

5.20 
Are there multiple or 
redundant locations for the 
telephone and 
communication service? 
Secure locations of 
communications wiring entry to 
the site or building are required. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site 
assessment. 
5.21 
Does the fire alarm system 
require communication 
with external sources? By 
what method is the alarm 
signal sent to the 
Typically, the local fire 
department responds to an alarm 
that sounds at the station or is 
transmitted over phone lines by 
an auto dialer. An intermediary 
control center 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

responding agency: 
telephone, radio, etc? Is 
there an intermediary alarm 
monitoring center? 
for fire, security, and/or building 
system alarms may receive the 
initial notification at an on-site 
or off-site location. This center 
may then determine the necessary 
response and inform the 
responding agency. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 

5.22 
Are utility lifelines 
aboveground, underground, 
or direct buried? 
Utility lifelines (water, power, 
communications, etc.) can be 
protected by concealing, burying, 
or encasing. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7 


Unit IX:  Building Design Guidance



U
nit 
IX 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
UNIT TITLE Building Design Guidance 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Explain architectural considerations to mitigate impacts 
from blast effects and transmission of chemical, biological, 
and radiological agents from exterior and interior incidents 
1. 2.	Identify key elements of building structural and non-structural systems for 
mitigation of blast effects 
2. 3.	Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical system, 
electrical system, fire protection system, and communication system mitigation measures, 
including synergies and conflicts 
3. 4.	Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual design 
and identify mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Architectural considerations, including building configuration, space design, 
and special situations 
2. 2.	Building structural and nonstructural considerations with emphasis on 
progressive collapse, loads and stresses, and good engineering practices 
3. 3.	Design issues for the building envelope, including wall design, window 
design, door design, and roof system design with approaches to define levels of protection 
4. 4.	Mechanical system design issues, including interfacing with operational 
procedures, emergency plans, and training 
5. 5.	Other building systems design consideration for electrical, fire protection, 
communications, electronic security, entry control, and physical security that mitigate the 
effects of a threat or hazard 
6. 6.	Do an Activity that encompasses identified high risk pairs (asset � 
threat/hazard) in the threat-vulnerability matrix developed for the Case Study and select 
mitigation measures that reduce vulnerability and associated risk from the building 
perspective 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 3-1 to 3-46 
and 3-48 to 3-52; Checklist at end of Chapter 1 
1. 2.	FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate 
Terrorist Attacks 
2. 3.	 FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components in 
Architectural Design 
3. 4.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 

UNIT IX CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE 
In this Unit, the emphasis will be upon providing a balanced building envelope that is a 
defensive layer against the terrorist tactic of interest and avoiding situations where one 
incident affects more than one building system. The Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a screening tool for preliminary 
building design vulnerability assessment. 
Requirement 
Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most knowledgeable and 
qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the HIC Case Study 
and to the vulnerability portfolio to determine answers to the questions.  Then review 
results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures. 
1. 1.	Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist that address building design. 
2. 2.	Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the risk 
ratings determined in Unit V Case Study Activity and, based on this more detailed 
analysis, decide if the rating is accurate. 
3. 3.	Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from 
building design. 
4. 4.	Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the 
recommended mitigation measures. 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
2.5 
Do entrances avoid 
significant queuing? 
If queuing will occur within the 
building footprint, the area 
should be enclosed in blast-
resistant construction. If queuing 
is expected outside the building, 
a rain cover should be provided. 
For manpower and equipment 
requirements, collocate or 
combine staff and visitor 
entrances. Reference:  GSA PBS-
P100 

2.6 
Does security screening 
cover all public and 
private areas? Are public 
and private 
Retail activities should be 
prohibited in non-secured areas. 
However, the Public Building 
Cooperative Use Act of 1976 
encourages retail and mixed uses 
to create open and inviting 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

activities separated? Are 
public toilets, service 
spaces, or access to stairs 
or elevators located in any 
non-secure areas, including 
the queuing area before 
screening at the public 
entrance? 
buildings. Consider separating 
entryways, controlling access, 
hardening shared partitions, and 
special security operational 
countermeasures. References:  
GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7 

2.7 
Is access control provided 
through main entrance 
points for employees and 
visitors? (lobby 
receptionist, sign-in, staff 
escorts, issue of visitor 
badges, checking forms of 
personal identification, 
electronic access control 
systems) 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

2.8 
Is access to private and 
public space or restricted 
area space clearly defined 
through the design of the 
space, signage, use of 
electronic security devices, 
etc.? 
Finishes and signage should be 
designed for visual simplicity. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

2.9 
Is access to elevators 
distinguished as to those 
that are designated only 
for employees and 
visitors? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

2.10 
Do public and employee 
entrances include space for 
possible future installation 
of access 
These include walk-through metal 
detectors and x-ray devices, 
identification check, electronic 
access card, search stations, and 
turnstiles. 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

control and screening 
equipment? 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

2.11 
Do foyers have reinforced 
concrete walls and offset 
interior and exterior doors 
from each other? 
Consider for exterior entrances to 
the building or to access critical 
areas within the building if 
explosive blast hazard must be 
mitigated. Reference: U.S. Army 
TM 5-853 

2.12 
Do doors and walls along 
the line of security 
screening meet 
requirements of UL752 
"Standard for Safety: 
Bullet-Resisting 
Equipment"? 
If the postulated threat in 
designing entrance access control 
includes rifles, pistols, or 
shotguns, then the screening area 
should have bullet-resistance to 
protect security personnel and 
uninvolved bystanders. Glass, if 
present, should also be bullet-
resistant. Reference:  GSA PBS-
P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.13 
Do circulation routes have 
unobstructed views of 
people approaching 
controlled access points? 
This applies to building entrances 
and to critical areas within the 
building. References: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide and DoD UFC 4-010-01 

2.14 
Is roof access limited to 
authorized personnel by 
means of locking 
mechanisms? 
References:  GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.15 
Are critical assets (people, 
activities, building 
systems and components) 
located close to any main 
entrance, vehicle 
circulation, parking, 
maintenance area, loading 
dock, or interior parking? 
Are the critical building 
systems and components 
hardened? 
Critical building components 
include: Emergency generator 
including fuel systems, day tank, 
fire sprinkler, and water supply; 
Normal fuel storage; Main 
switchgear; Telephone 
distribution and main switchgear; 
Fire pumps; Building control 
centers; Uninterruptible Power 
Supply (UPS) systems 
controlling critical functions; 
Main refrigeration and ventilation 
systems if critical to building 
operation; Elevator machinery and 
controls; Shafts for stairs, 
elevators, and utilities; Critical 
distribution feeders for emergency 
power. Evacuation and rescue 
require emergency systems to 
remain operational during a 
disaster and they should 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


be located away from attack 
locations. Primary and backup 
systems should be separated to 
reduce the risk of both being 
impacted by a single incident if 
collocated.  Utility systems 
should be located at least 50 feet 
from loading docks, front 
entrances, and parking areas. One 
way to harden critical building 
systems and components is to 
enclose them within hardened 
walls, floors, and ceilings. Do 
not place them near high-risk 
areas where they can receive 
collateral damage. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

2.16 
Are high-value or critical 
assets located as far into 
the interior of the building 
as possible and separated 
from the public areas of 
the building? 
Critical assets, such as people and 
activities, are more vulnerable to 
hazards when on an exterior 
building wall or adjacent to 
uncontrolled public areas inside 
the building. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

2.17 
Is high visitor activity 
away from critical assets? 
High-risk activities should also 
be separated from low-risk 
activities. Also, visitor activities 
should be separated from daily 
activities. Reference: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide 

2.18 
Are critical assets located 
in spaces that are occupied 
24 hours per day? Are 
assets located in areas 
where they are visible to 
more than one person? 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.19 
Are loading docks and 
receiving and shipping 
areas separated in any 
direction from utility 
rooms, utility mains, and 
service entrances including 
electrical, telephone/data, 
fire detection/alarm 
systems, fire suppression 
water 
Loading docks should be 
designed to keep vehicles from 
driving into or parking under the 
building. If loading docks are in 
close proximity to critical 
equipment, consider hardening 
the equipment and service against 
explosive blast. Consider a 50-
foot separation distance in all 
directions. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

mains, cooling and heating 
mains, etc.? 


2.20 
Are mailrooms located 
away from building main 
entrances, areas containing 
critical services, utilities, 
distribution systems, and 
important assets? Is the 
mailroom located near the 
loading dock? 
The mailroom should be located 
at the perimeter of the building 
with an outside wall or window 
designed for pressure relief. By 
separating the mailroom and the 
loading dock, the collateral 
damage of an incident at one has 
less impact upon the other. 
However, this may be the 
preferred mailroom location. Off-
site screening stations or a 
separate delivery processing 
building on site may be cost-
effective, particularly if several 
buildings may share one 
mailroom. A separate delivery 
processing building reduces risk 
and simplifies protection 
measures. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 

2.21 
Does the mailroom have 
adequate space available 
for equipment to examine 
incoming packages and for 
an explosive disposal 
container? 
Screening of all deliveries to the 
building, including U.S. mail, 
commercial package delivery 
services, delivery of office 
supplies, etc. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

2.22 
Are areas of refuge 
identified, with special 
consideration given to 
egress? 
Areas of refuge can be safe 
havens, shelters, or protected 
spaces for use during specified 
hazards. Reference: FEMA 386-7 

2.23 
Are stairwells required for 
emergency egress located 
as remotely as possible 
from high-risk areas where 
blast events might occur? 
Are stairways maintained 
with positive pressure or 
are there other smoke 
control systems? 
Consider designing stairs so that 
they discharge into other than 
lobbies, parking, or loading areas. 
Maintaining positive pressure 
from a clean source of air (may 
require special filtering) aids in 
egress by keeping smoke, heat, 
toxic fumes, etc. out of the 
stairway. Pressurize exit stairways 
in accordance with the National 
Model Building Code. 
References:  GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment . 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
2.24 
Are enclosures for 
emergency egress hardened 
to limit the extent of 
debris that might 
otherwise impede safe 
passage and reduce the 
flow of evacuees? 
Egress pathways should be 
hardened and discharge into safe 
areas. Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.25 
Do interior barriers 
differentiate level of 
security within a building? 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 

2.26 
Are emergency systems 
located away from high-
risk areas? 
The intent is to keep the 
emergency systems out of harm�s 
way, such that one incident takes 
out all capability � both the 
regular systems and their 
backups. Reference: FEMA 386-7 

2.27 
Is interior glazing near 
high-threat areas 
minimized? Is interior 
glazing in other areas 
shatter resistant? 
Interior glazing should be 
minimized where a threat exists 
and should be avoided in 
enclosures of critical functions 
next to high-risk areas. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.28 
Are ceiling and lighting 
systems designed to 
remain in place during 
hazard events? 
When an explosive blast shatters 
a window, the blast wave enters 
the interior space, putting 
structural and nonstructural 
building components under loads 
not considered in standard 
building codes. It has been shown 
that connection criteria for these 
systems in high seismic activity 
areas resulted in much less falling 
debris that could injure building 
occupants. Mount all overhead 
utilities and other fixtures 
weighing 14 kilograms (31 
pounds) or more to minimize the 
likelihood that they will fall and 
injure building occupants. Design 
all equipment mountings to resist 
forces of 0.5 times the equipment 
weight in any direction and 1.5 
times the equipment weight in 
the downward direction. This 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


standard does not preclude the 
need to design equipment 
mountings for forces required by 
other criteria, such as seismic 
standards. Reference: DoD 
Minimum Antiterrorism 
Standards for Buildings 

3 
Structural Systems 


3.1 
What type of 
construction? What type 
of concrete & reinforcing 
steel? What type of steel? 
What type of foundation? 
The type of construction provides 
an indication of the robustness to 
abnormal loading and load 
reversals. A reinforced concrete 
moment-resisting frame provides 
greater ductility and redundancy 
than a flat-slab or flat-plate 
construction. The ductility of 
steel frame with metal deck 
depends on the connection details 
and pre-tensioned or post-
tensioned construction provides 
little capacity for abnormal 
loading patterns and load 
reversals. The resistance of load-
bearing wall structures varies to a 
great extent, depending on 
whether the walls are reinforced 
or un-reinforced. A rapid 
screening process developed by 
FEMA for assessing structural 
hazards identifies the following 
types of construction with a 
structural score ranging from 1.0 
to 8.5. A higher score indicates a 
greater capacity to sustain load 
reversals. Wood buildings of all 
types - 4.5 to 8.5 Steel moment-
resisting frames -3.5 to 4.5 
Braced steel frames - 2.5 to 3.0 
Light metal buildings - 5.5 to 
6.5 Steel frames with cast-in-
place concrete shear walls - 3.5 to 
4.5 Steel frames with 
unreinforced masonry infill walls 
- 1.5 to 3.0 Concrete moment-
resisting frames - 2.0 to 4.0 
Concrete shear wall buildings -
3.0 to 4.0 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Concrete frames with 
unreinforced masonry infill walls 
- 1.5 to 3.0 Tilt-up buildings - 
2.0 to 3.5 Precast concrete frame 
buildings -1.5 to 2.5 Reinforced 
masonry - 3.0 to 4.0 
Unreinforced masonry - 1.0 to 
2.5 References: FEMA 154 and 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 

3.2 
Do the reinforced concrete 
structures contain 
symmetric steel 
reinforcement (positive 
and negative faces) in all 
floor slabs, roof slabs, 
walls, beams and girders 
that may be subjected to 
rebound, uplift and 
suction pressures? Do the 
lap splices fully develop 
the capacity of the 
reinforcement? Are lap 
splices and other 
discontinuities staggered? 
Do the connections 
possess ductile details? Is 
special shear 
reinforcement, including 
ties and stirrups, available 
to allow large post-elastic 
behavior? 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
3.3 
Are the steel frame 
connections moment 
connections? Is the 
column spacing minimized 
so that reasonably sized 
members will resist the 
design loads and increase 
the redundancy of the 
system? 
A practical upper level for 
column spacing is generally 30 
feet. Unless there is an overriding 
architectural requirement, a 
practical limit for floor-to-floor 
heights is generally less than or 
equal to 16 feet. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

What are the floor-to-floor 
heights? 


3.4 
Are critical elements 
vulnerable to failure? 
The priority for upgrades should 
be based on the relative 
importance of structural or non-
structural elements that are 
essential to mitigating the extent 
of collapse and minimizing 
injury and damage. Primary 
Structural Elements provide the 
essential parts of the building�s 
resistance to catastrophic blast 
loads and progressive collapse. 
These include columns, girders, 
roof beams, and the main lateral 
resistance system. Secondary 
Structural Elements consist of all 
other load bearing members, such 
as floor beams, slabs, etc. 
Primary Nonstructural Elements 
consist of elements (including 
their attachments) which are 
essential for life safety systems 
or elements which can cause 
substantial injury if failure 
occurs, including ceilings or 
heavy suspended mechanical 
units. Secondary Nonstructural 
Elements consist of all elements 
not covered in primary 
nonstructural elements, such as 
partitions, furniture, and light 
fixtures. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
3.5 
Will the structure suffer 
an unacceptable level of 
damage resulting from the 
postulated threat (blast 
loading or weapon 
impact)? 
The extent of damage to the 
structure and exterior wall 
systems from the bomb threat 
may be related to a protection 
level. The following is for new 
buildings: Level of Protection 
Below Antiterrorism Standards � 
Severe damage. 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Frame collapse/massive 



destruction. Little left standing. 



Doors and windows fail and 



result in lethal hazards. Majority 



of personnel suffer fatalities. 



Very Low Level Protection � 



Heavy damage. Onset of 



structural collapse. Major 



deformation of primary and 



secondary structural members, 



but progressive collapse is 



unlikely. Collapse of non-



structural elements. Glazing will 



break and is likely to be 
propelled 



into the building, resulting in 



serious glazing fragment injuries, 



but fragments will be reduced. 



Doors may be propelled into 



rooms, presenting serious 



hazards. Majority of personnel 



suffer serious injuries. There are 



likely to be a limited number (10 



percent to 25 percent) of 



fatalities. 



Low Level of Protection � 



Moderate damage, unrepairable. 



Major deformation of non-



structural elements and secondary 



structural members and minor 



deformation of primary structural 



members, but progressive 



collapse is unlikely. Glazing will 



break, but fall within 1 meter of 



the wall or otherwise not present 



a significant fragment hazard. 



Doors may fail, but they will 



rebound out of their frames, 



presenting minimal hazards. 



Majority of personnel suffer 



significant injuries. There may be 



a few (<10 percent) fatalities. 



Medium Level Protection � 



Minor damage, repairable. Minor 



deformations of non-structural 



elements and secondary structural 



members and no permanent 



deformation in primary structural 



members. Glazing will break, but 



will remain in the window frame. 



Doors will stay in frames, but 
will 



not be reusable. Some minor 


Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


injuries, but fatalities are 
unlikely. 



High Level Protection � 
Minimal 



damage, repairable. No 



permanent deformation of 



primary and secondary structural 



members or non-structural 



elements. Glazing will not break. 



Doors will be reusable. Only 



superficial injuries are likely. 



Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 

3.6 
Is the structure vulnerable 
to progressive collapse? Is 
the building capable of 
sustaining the removal of a 
column for one floor 
above grade at the building 
perimeter without 
progressive collapse? In 
the event of an internal 
explosion in an 
uncontrolled public 
ground floor area does the 
design prevent progressive 
collapse due to the loss of 
one primary column? Do 
architectural or structural 
features provide a 
minimum 6-inch standoff 
to the internal columns 
(primary vertical load 
carrying members)? Are 
the columns in the 
Design to mitigate progressive 
collapse is an independent 
analysis to determine a system�s 
ability to resist structural 
collapse upon the loss of a major 
structural element or the system�s 
ability to resist the loss of a 
major structural element. Design 
to mitigate progressive collapse 
may be based on the methods 
outlined in ASCE 7-98 (now 7-
02). Designers may apply static 
and/or dynamic methods of 
analysis to meet this requirement 
and ultimate load capacities may 
be assumed in the analyses. 
Combine structural upgrades for 
retrofits to existing buildings, 
such as seismic and progressive 
collapse, into a single project due 
to the economic synergies and 
other cross benefits. Existing 
facilities may be retrofitted to 
withstand the design level threat 
or to accept the loss of a column 
for one floor above grade at the 
building perimeter without 
progressive collapse. Note that 
collapse of floors or roof must 
not be permitted. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

unscreened internal spaces 



designed for an unbraced 



length equal to two floors, 



or three floors where there 



are two levels of parking? 



3.7 
Are there adequate 
redundant load paths in 
the structure? 
Special consideration should be 
given to materials that have 
inherent ductility and that are 
better able to respond to load 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


reversals, such as cast in place 



reinforced concrete, reinforced 



masonry, and steel construction. 



Careful detailing is required for 



material such as pre-stressed 
concrete, pre-cast concrete, and 



masonry to adequately respond to 



the design loads. Primary vertical 



load carrying members should be 



protected where parking is inside 



a facility and the building 
superstructure is supported by the 



parking structure. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

3.8 
Are there transfer girders 
supported by columns 
within unscreened public 
spaces or at the exterior of 
the building? 
Transfer girders allow 
discontinuities in columns 
between the roof and foundation. 
This design has inherent 
difficulty in transferring load to 
redundant paths upon loss of a 
column or 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


the girder. Transfer beams and 



girders that, if lost, may cause 
progressive collapse are highly 



discouraged. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

3.9 
What is the grouting and 
reinforcement of masonry 
(brick and/or concrete 
masonry unit (CMU)) 
exterior walls? 
Avoid unreinforced masonry 
exterior walls. Reinforcement can 
run the range of light to heavy, 
depending upon the stand-off 
distance available and postulated 
design threat. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


Reference: GSA PBS-P100 



recommends fully grouted and 
reinforced CMU construction 



where CMU is selected. 



Reference: DoD Minimum 
Antiterrorism 



Standards for Buildings states 
"Unreinforced masonry walls are 
prohibited for the exterior walls 
of new buildings. A minimum of 
0.05 percent vertical 
reinforcement with a maximum 



spacing of 1,200 mm (48 in) will 
be provided. For existing 
buildings, implement mitigating 
measures to provide an equivalent 
level of protection." [This is light 




reinforcement and based upon the 
recommended stand-off distance 
for the situation.] 

3.10 
Will the loading dock 
design limit damage to 
adjacent areas and vent 
explosive force to the 
exterior of the building? 
Design the floor of the loading 
dock for blast resistance if the 
area below is occupied or contains 
critical utilities. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

3.11 
Are mailrooms, where 
packages are received and 
opened for inspection, and 
unscreened retail spaces 
designed to mitigate the 
effects of a blast on 
primary vertical or lateral 
bracing members? 
Where mailrooms and unscreened 
retail spaces are located in 
occupied areas or adjacent to 
critical utilities, walls, ceilings, 
and floors, they should be blast-
and fragment- resistant. Methods 
to facilitate the venting of 
explosive forces and gases from 
the interior spaces to the outside 
of the structure may include 
blow-out panels and window 
system designs that provide 
protection from blast pressure 
applied to the outside, but that 
readily fail and vent if exposed to 
blast pressure on the inside. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

4 
Building Envelope 

4.1 
What is the designed or 
estimated protection level 
of the exterior walls 
against the postulated 
explosive threat? 
The performance of the fa�ade 
varies to a great extent on the 
materials. Different construction 
includes brick or stone with block 
backup, steel stud walls, precast 
panels, or curtain wall with glass, 
stone, or metal panel elements. 
Shear walls that are essential to 
the lateral and vertical load 
bearing system and that also 
function as exterior walls should 
be considered primary structures 
and should resist the actual blast 
loads predicted from the threats 
specified. Where exterior walls are 
not designed for the full design 
loads, special consideration 
should be given to construction 
types that reduce the potential for 
injury. Reference: GSA PBS-P100 






4.2 
Is there less than 40 % 
fenestration openings per 
structural bay? Is the 
window system design on 
the exterior fa�ade 
balanced to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying 
glazing following an 
explosive event? (glazing, 
frames, anchorage to 
supporting walls, etc.) Do 
the glazing systems with a 
1/2-inch (3/4-inch better) 
bite contain an application 
of structural silicone? Is 
the glazing laminated or is 
it protected with an anti-
shatter (fragment 
retention) film? If an anti-
shatter film is used, is it a 
minimum of a 7-mil thick 
film, or specially 
manufactured 4mil thick 
film? 
The performance of the glass will 
similarly depend on the materials. 
Glazing may be single pane or 
double pane, monolithic or 
laminated, annealed, heat 
strengthened or fully tempered. 
The percent fenestration is a 
balance between protection level, 
cost, the architectural look of the 
building within its surroundings, 
and building codes. One goal is 
to keep fenestration to below 40 
percent of the building envelope 
vertical surface area, but the 
process must balance differing 
requirements. A blast engineer 
may prefer no windows; an 
architect may favor window 
curtain walls; building codes 
require so much fenestration per 
square footage of floor area; fire 
codes require a prescribed window 
opening area if the window is a 
designated escape route; and the 
building owner has cost concerns. 
Ideally, an owner would want 100 
percent of the glazed area to 
provide the design protection 
level against the postulated 
explosive threat (design basis 
threat� weapon size at the 
expected stand-off distance). 
However, economics and 
geometry may allow 80 percent to 
90 percent due to the statistical 
differences in the manufacturing 
process for glass or the angle of 
incidence of the blast wave upon 
upper story windows (4th floor 
and higher). Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

4.3 
Do the walls, anchorage, 
and window framing fully 
develop the capacity of 
the glazing material 
selected? Are the walls 
capable of withstanding 
the dynamic reactions 
from the 
Government produced and 
sponsored computer programs 
coupled with test data and 
recognized dynamic structural 
analysis techniques may be used 
to determine whether the glazing 
either survives the specified 
threats or the post damage 
performance of the glazing 
protects the occupants. A 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


windows? Will the 
anchorage remain attached 
to the walls of the building 
during an explosive event 
without failure? Is the 
fa�ade connected to back-
up block or to the 
structural frame? Are non-
bearing masonry walls 
reinforced? 
breakage probability no higher 
than 750 breaks per 1,000 may be 
used when calculating loads to 
frames and anchorage. The intent 
is to ensure the building envelope 
provides relatively equal 
protection against the postulated 
explosive threat for the walls and 
window systems for the safety of 
the occupants, especially in 
rooms with exterior walls. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

4.4 
Does the building contain 
ballistic glazing? Does the 
ballistic glazing meet the 
requirements of UL 752 
Bullet-Resistant Glazing? 
Does the building contain 
security-glazing? 
Glass-clad polycarbonate or 
laminated polycarbonate are two 
types of acceptable glazing 
material. If windows are upgraded 
to bullet-resistant, burglar-
resistant, or forced entry-resistant, 
ensure that doors, ceilings, and 
floors, as applicable, can resist 
the same for the areas of concern. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Does the security-glazing 
meet the requirements of 
ASTM F1233 or UL 972, 



Burglary Resistant 
Glazing Material? 



Do the window assemblies 



containing forced entry 
resistant glazing (excluding 
the glazing) meet the 
requirements of ASTM F 
588? 


4.5 
Do non-window openings, 
such as mechanical vents 
and exposed plenums, 
provide the same level of 
protection required for the 
exterior wall? 
In-filling of blast over-pressures 
must be considered through non-
window openings such that 
structural members and all 
mechanical system mountings 
and attachments should resist 
these interior fill pressures. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



These non-window openings 



should also be as secure as the 



rest of the building envelope 



against forced entry. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

6 
Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR) 
6.1 
Where are the air intakes 
and exhaust louvers for 
the building? (low, high, or 
midpoint of the building 
structure) Are the intakes 
and exhausts accessible to 
the public? 
Air intakes should be located on 
the roof or as high as possible. 
Otherwise secure within CPTED-
compliant fencing or enclosure. 
The fencing or enclosure should 
have a sloped roof to prevent the 
throwing of anything into the 
enclosure near the intakes. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states 
that air intakes should be on the 
fourth floor or higher and, on 
buildings with three floors or 
less, they should be on the roof 
or as high as practical. Locating 
intakes high on a wall is preferred 
over a roof location. Reference: 
DoD UFC 4-010-01 states that, 
for all new inhabited buildings 
covered by this document, all air 
intakes should be located at least 
3 meters (10 feet) above the 
ground. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
states: "An extension height of 12 
feet (3.7 m) will place the intake 
out of reach of individuals 
without some assistance. Also, 
the entrance to the intake should 
be covered with a sloped metal 
mesh to reduce the threat of 
objects being tossed into the 
intake. A minimum slope of 45� 
is generally adequate. Extension 
height should be increased where 
existing platforms or building 
features (i.e., loading docks, 
retaining walls) might provide 
access to the outdoor air intakes". 
Reference: LBNL PUB-51959: 
Exhausts are also a concer n 
during an outdoor release, 
especially if exhaust fans are not 
in continuous operation, due to 
wind effects and chimney effects 
(air movement due to differential 
temperature). 


6.2 
Is roof access limited to 
authorized personnel by 
means of locking 
mechanisms? Is access to 
mechanical areas similarly 
controlled? 
Roofs are like entrances to the 
building and are like mechanical 
rooms when HVAC is installed. 
Adjacent structures or 
landscaping should not allow 
access to the roof. References: 
GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH 
Pub 2002-139, and LBNL Pub 
51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.3 
Are there multiple air 
intake locations? 
Single air intakes may feed 
several air handling units. 
Indicate if the air intakes are 
localized or separated. Installing 
low-leakage dampers is one way 
to provide the system separation 
when necessary. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment 
for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 

6.4 
What are the types of air 
filtration? Include the 
efficiency and number of 
filter modules for each of 
the main air handling 
systems. Is there any 
collective protection for 
chemical, biological, and 
radiological contamination 
designed into the 
building? 
MERV � Minimum Efficiency 
Reporting Value HEPA � High 
Efficiency Particulate Air 
Activated charcoal for gases 
Ultraviolet C for biologicals 
Consider mix of approaches for 
optimum protection and cost-
effectiveness. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 

6.5 
Is there space for larger 
filter assemblies on 
critical air handling 
systems? 
Air handling units serving 
critical functions during 
continued operation may be 
retrofitted to provide enhanced 
protection during emergencies. 
However, upgraded filtration may 
have negative effects upon the 
overall air handling system 
operation, such as increased 
pressure drop. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.6 
Are there provisions for 
air monitors or sensors 
for 
Duct mounted sensors are usually 
found in limited cases in 
laboratory areas. Sensors 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


chemical or biological 
agents? 
generally have a limited spectrum 
of high reliability and are costly. 
Many different technologies are 
undergoing research to provide 
capability. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 

6.7 
By what method are air 
intakes and exhausts 
closed when not 
operational? 
Motorized (low-leakage, fast-
acting) dampers are the preferred 
method for closure with fail-safe 
to the closed position so as to 
support in-place sheltering. 
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.8 
How are air handling 
systems zoned? What 
areas and functions do 
each of the primary air 
handling systems serve? 
Understanding the critical areas of 
the building that must continue 
functioning focuses security and 
hazard mitigation measures. 
Applying HVAC zones that 
isolate lobbies, mailrooms, 
loading docks, and other entry 
and storage areas from the rest of 
the building HVAC zones and 
maintaining negative pressure 
within these areas will contain 
CBR releases. Identify common 
return systems that service more 
than one zone, effectively making 
a large single zone. Conversely, 
emergency egress routes should 
receive positive pressurization to 
ensure contamination does not 
hinder egress. Consider filtering 
of the pressurization air. 
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.9 
Are there large central air 
handling units or are there 
multiple units serving 
separate zones? 
Independent units can continue to 
operate if damage occurs to 
limited areas of the building. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

6.10 
Are there any 
redundancies in the air 
handling system? Can 
critical areas be served 
from other units if 
Redundancy reduces the security 
measures required compared to a 
non-redundant situation. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


a major system is 
disabled? 


6.11 
Is the air supply to critical 
areas compartmentalized? 
Similarly, are the critical 
areas or the building as a 
whole, considered tight 
with little or no inleakage? 
During chemical, biological, and 
radiological situations, the intent 
is to either keep the 
contamination localized in the 
critical area or prevent its entry 
into other critical, non-critical, or 
public areas. Systems can be 
cross-connected through building 
openings (doorways, ceilings, 
partial wall), ductwork leakage, or 
pressure differences in air 
handling system. In standard 
practice, there is almost always 
some air carried between 
ventilation zones by pressure 
imbalances, due to elevator piston 
action, chimney effect, and wind 
effects. Smoke testing of the air 
supply to critical areas may be 
necessary. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.12 
Are supply, return, and 
exhaust air systems for 
critical areas secure? Are 
all supply and return 
ducts completely 
connected to their grilles 
and registers and secure? 
Is the return air not 
ducted? 
The air systems to critical areas 
should be inaccessible to the 
public, especially if the ductwork 
runs through the public areas of 
the building. It is also more 
secure to have a ducted air 
handling system versus sharing 
hallways and plenums above drop 
ceilings for return air. Non-ducted 
systems provide greater 
opportunity for introducing 
contaminants. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.13 
What is the method of 
temperature and humidity 
control? Is it localized or 
centralized? 
Central systems can range from 
monitoring only to full control. 
Local control may be available to 
override central operation. Of 
greatest concern are systems 
needed before, during, and after 
an incident that may be 
unavailable due to temperature 
and humidity exceeding 
operational limits (e.g., main 
telephone switch room). 
Reference: DOC CIAO 




Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 

6.14 
Where are the building 
automation control centers 
and cabinets located? Are 
they in secure areas? How 
is the control wiring 
routed? 
Access to any component of the 
building automation and control 
system could compromise the 
functioning of the system, 
increasing vulnerability to a 
hazard or precluding their proper 
operation during a hazard 
incident. The HVAC and exhaust 
system controls should be in a 
secure area that allows rapid 
shutdown or other activation 
based upon location and type of 
attack. References: FEMA 386-7, 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.15 
Does the control of air 
handling systems support 
plans for sheltering in 
place or other protective 
approach? 
The micro-meteorological effects 
of buildings and terrain can alter 
travel and duration of chemical 
agents and hazardous material 
releases. Shielding in the form of 
sheltering in place can protect 
people and property from harmful 
effects. To support in-place 
sheltering, the air handling 
systems require the ability for 
authorized personnel to rapidly 
turn off all systems. However, if 
the system is properly filtered, 
then keeping the system operating 
will provide protection as long as 
the air handling system does not 
distribute an internal release to 
other portions of the building. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.16 
Are there any smoke 
evacuation systems 
installed? Does it have 
purge capability? 
For an internal blast, a smoke 
removal system may be essential, 
particularly in large, open spaces. 
The equipment should be located 
away from high-risk areas, the 
system controls and wiring 
should be protected, and it should 
be connected to emergency power. 
This exhaust capability can be 
built into areas with significant 
risk on internal events, such as 




lobbies, loading docks, and 
mailrooms. Consider filtering of 
the exhaust to capture CBR 
contaminants. References: GSA 
PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139, and LBNL Pub 51959 

6.17 
Where is roof-mounted 
equipment located on the 
roof? (near perimeter, at 
center of roof) 
Roof-mounted equipment should 
be kept away from the building 
perimeter. Reference: U.S. Army 
TM 5-853 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.18 
Are fire dampers installed 
at all fire barriers? Are all 
dampers functional and 
seal well when closed? 
All dampers (fire, smoke, outdoor 
air, return air, bypass) must be 
functional for proper protection 
within the building during an 
incident. Reference: CDC/NIOSH 
Pub 2002-139 

6.19 
Do fire walls and fire 
doors maintain their 
integrity? 
The tightness of the building 
(both exterior, by weatherization 
to seal cracks around doors and 
windows, and internal, by zone 
ducting, fire walls, fire stops, and 
fire doors) provides energy 
conservation benefits and 
functional benefits during a CBR 
incident. Reference: LBNL Pub 
51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.20 
Do elevators have recall 
capability and elevator 
emergency message 
capability? 
Although a life-safety code and 
fire response requirement, the 
control of elevators also has 
benefit during a CBR incident. 
The elevators generate a piston 
effect, causing pressure 
differentials in the elevator shaft 
and associated floors that can 
force contamination to flow up or 
down. Reference: LBNL Pub 
51959 

6.21 
Is access to building 
information restricted? 
Information on building 
operations, schematics, 
procedures, plans, and 
specifications should be strictly 
controlled and available only to 
authorized personnel. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 






6.22 
Does the HVAC 
maintenance staff have the 
proper training, procedures, 
and preventive maintenance 
schedule to ensure CBR 
equipment is functional? 
Functional equipment must 
interface with operational 
procedures in an emergency plan 
to ensure the equipment is 
properly operated to provide the 
protection desired. The HVAC 
system can be operated in 
different ways, depending upon 
an external or internal release and 
where in the building an internal 
release occurs. Thus maintenance 
and security staff must have the 
training to properly operate the 
HVAC system under different 
circumstances, even if the 
procedure is to turn off all air 
movement equipment. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7 
Plumbing and Gas Systems 

7.1 

What is the method of 
water distribution? 
Central shaft locations for 
piping are more vulnerable than 
multiple riser locations. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.2 

What is the method of gas 
distribution? (heating, 
cooking, medical, process) 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.3 

Is there redundancy to the 
main piping distribution? 
Looping of piping and use of 
section valves provide 
redundancies in the event 
sections of the system are 
damaged. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.4 

What is the method of 
heating domestic water? 
What fuel(s) is used? 
Single source of hot water with 
one fuel source is more 
vulnerable than multiple 
sources and multiple fuel types. 
Domestic hot water availability 
is an operational concern for 
many building occupancies. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

7.5 
Where are gas storage tanks 
located? (heating, cooking, 
medical, process) How are 
they piped to the 
distribution system? (above 
or below ground) 
The concern is that the tanks 
and piping could be vulnerable 
to a moving vehicle or a bomb 
blast either directly or by 
collateral damage due to 
proximity to a higher-risk area. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.6 
Are there reserve supplies 
of critical gases? 
Localized gas cylinders could 
be available in the event of 
damage to the central tank 
system. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8 

Electrical Systems 


8.1 

Are there any 
transformers or 
switchgears located 
outside the building or 
accessible from the 
building exterior? Are 
they vulnerable to public 
access? Are they 
secured? 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

8.2 

What is the extent of the 
external building lighting 
in utility and service 
areas and at normal 
entryways used by the 
building occupants? 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.3 

How are the electrical 
rooms secured and where 
are they located relative 
to other higher risk areas, 
starting with the main 
electrical distribution 
room at the service 
entrance? 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 





8.4 
Are critical electrical 
systems co-located with 
other building systems? 
Are critical electrical 
systems located in areas 
outside of secured 
electrical areas? Is security 
system wiring located 
separately from electrical 
and other service systems? 
Collocation concerns include 
rooms, ceilings, raceways, 
conduits, panels, and risers. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

8.5 
How are electrical 
distribution panels serving 
branch circuits secured or 
are they in secure 
locations? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.6 
Does emergency backup 
power exist for all areas 
within the building or for 
critical areas only? How is 
the emergency power 
distributed? Is the 
emergency power system 
independent from the 
normal electrical service, 
particularly in critical 
areas? 
There should be no single critical 
node that allows both the normal 
electrical service and the 
emergency backup power to be 
affected by a single incident. 
Automatic transfer switches and 
interconnecting switchgear are the 
initial concerns. Emergency and 
normal electrical equipment 
should be installed separately, at 
different locations, and as far 
apart as possible. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

8.7 
How is the primary 
electrical system wiring 
distributed? Is it co-
located with other major 
utilities? 
Central utility shafts may be 
subject to damage, especially if 
there is only one for the building. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


Is there redundancy of 
distribution to critical 
areas? 


9 
Fire Alarm Systems 


9.1 
Is the building fire alarm 
system centralized or 
localized? How are alarms 
annunciated, both locally 
and centrally? Are critical 
documents and control 
systems located in a 
secure yet accessible 
location? 
Fire alarm systems must first 
warn building occupants to 
evacuate for life safety. Then they 
must inform the responding 
agency to dispatch fire equipment 
and personnel. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 

9.2 
Where are the fire alarm 
panels located? Do they 
allow access to 
unauthorized personnel? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

9.3 
Is the fire alarm system 
stand-alone or integrated 
with other functions such 
as security and 
environmental or building 
management systems? 
What is the interface? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

9.4 
Do key fire alarm system 
components have fire- and 
blast-resistant separation? 
This is especially necessary for 
the fire command center or fire 
alarm control center. The concern 
is to similarly protect critical 
components as described in Items 
2.19, 5.7, and 10.3. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
9.5 
Is there redundant off-
premises fire alarm 
reporting? 
Fire alarms can ring at a fire 
station, at an intermediary alarm 
monitoring center, or autodial 




someone else. See Items 5.21 and 
10.5. 

10 
Communications and IT Systems 

10.1 
Where is the main 
telephone distribution 
room and where is it in 
relation to higher risk 
areas? Is the main 
telephone distribution 
room secure? 
One can expect to find voice, 
data, signal, and alarm systems to 
be routed through the main 
telephone distribution room. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 

10.2 
Does the telephone 
system have an UPS 
(uninterruptible power 
supply)? What is its type, 
power rating, operational 
duration under load, and 
location? (battery, on-line, 
filtered) 
Many telephone systems are now 
computerized and need a UPS to 
ensure reliability during power 
fluctuations. The UPS is also 
needed to await any emergency 
power coming on line or allow 
orderly shutdown. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.3 
Where are communication 
systems wiring closets 
located? (voice, data, 
signal, alarm) Are they co-
located with other 
utilities? Are they in 
secure areas? 
Concern is to have separation 
distance from other utilities and 
higher-risk areas to avoid 
collateral damage. Security 
approaches on the closets include 
door alarms, closed circuit 
television, swipe cards, or other 
logging notifications to ensure 
only authorized personnel have 
access to these closets. Reference: 
FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.4 
How is communications 
system wiring distributed? 
(secure chases and risers, 
accessible public areas) 
The intent is to prevent tampering 
with the systems. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.5 
Are there redundant 
communications systems 
available? 
Critical areas should be supplied 
with multiple or redundant means 
of communications. Power outage 
phones can provide redundancy 




as they connect directly to the 
local commercial telephone 
switch off site and not through 
the building telephone switch in 
the main telephone distribution 
room. A base radio 
communication system with 
antenna can be installed in 
stairwells, and portable sets 
distributed to floors. References: 
GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7 

10.6 
Where are the main 
distribution facility, data 
centers, routers, firewalls, 
and servers located and are 
they secure? Where are the 
secondary and/or 
intermediate distribution 
facilities and are they 
secure? 
Concern is collateral damage from 
manmade hazards and redundancy 
of critical functions. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 

10.7 
What type and where are 
the WAN (wide area 
network) connections? 
Critical facilities should have two 
Minimum-Points-of-Presence 
(MPOPs) where the telephone 
company�s outside cable 
terminates inside the building. It 
is functionally a service entrance 
connection that demarcates where 
the telephone company�s property 
stops and the building owner�s 
property begins. The MPOPs 
should not be collocated and they 
should connect to different 
telephone company central offices 
so that the loss of one cable or 
central office does not reduce 
capability. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.8 
What type, power rating, 
and location of the UPS 
(uninterruptible power 
supply)? (battery, on-line, 
filtered) 
Consider that UPS should be 
found at all computerized points 
from the main distribution 
facility to individual data closets 
and at critical personal 
computers/terminals. 



Are the UPS also 
connected to emergency 
power? 
Critical LAN sections should also 
be on backup power. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 

10.9 
What type of LAN (local 
area network) cabling and 
physical topology is used? 
(Category (Cat) 5, Gigabit 
Ethernet, Ethernet, Token 
Ring) 
The physical topology of a 
network is the way in which the 
cables and computers are 
connected to each other. The main 
types of physical topologies are: 
Bus (single radial where any 
damage on the bus affects the 
whole system, but especially all 
portions downstream) Star 
(several computes are connected 
to a hub and many hubs can be in 
the network � the hubs can be 
critical nodes, but the other hubs 
continue to function if one fails) 
Ring (a bus with a continuous 
connection - least used, but can 
tolerate some damage because if 
the ring fails at a single point it 
can be rerouted much like a 
looped electric or water system) 
The configuration and the 
availability of surplus cable or 
spare capacity on individual 
cables can reduce vulnerability to 
hazard incidents. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.10 
For installed radio/wireless 
systems, what are their 
types and where are they 
located? (RF (radio 
frequency), HF (high 
frequency), VHF (very 
high frequency), MW 
(medium wave) 
Depending upon the function of 
the wireless system, it could be 
susceptible to accidental or 
intended jamming or collateral 
damage. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.11 
Do the IT (Information 
Technology � computer) 
systems meet 
requirements of 
confidentiality, integrity, 
Ensure access to terminals and 
equipment for authorized 
personnel only and ensure system 
up-time to meet operational 
needs. Reference: DOC CIAO 



and availability? 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 

10.12 
Where is the disaster 
recovery/mirroring site? 
A site with suitable equipment 
that allows continuation of 
operations or that mirrors 
(operates in parallel to) the 
existing operation is beneficial if 
equipment is lost during a natural 
or manmade disaster. The need is 
based upon the criticality of the 
operation and how quickly 
replacement equipment can be put 
in place and operated. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 

10.13 
Where is the back-up 
tape/file storage site and 
what is the type of safe 
environment? (safe, vault, 
underground) Is there 
redundant refrigeration in 
the site? 
If equipment is lost, data are 
most likely lost, too. Backups are 
needed to continue operations at 
the disaster recovery site or when 
equipment can be delivered and 
installed. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.14 
Are there any SATCOM 
(satellite communications) 
links? (location, power, 
UPS, emergency power, 
spare capacity/capability) 
SATCOM links can serve as 
redundant communications for 
voice and data if configured to 
support required capability after a 
hazard incident. Reference: DOC 
CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.15 
Is there a mass notification 
system that reaches all 
building occupants? 
(public address, pager, cell 
phone, computer override, 
etc.) Will one or more of 
these systems be 
operational under hazard 
conditions? (UPS, 
emergency power) 
Depending upon building size, a 
mass notification system will 
provide warning and alert 
information, along with actions 
to take before and after an 
incident if there is redundancy 
and power. Reference: DoD UFC 
4-010-01 


10.16 
Do control centers and 
their designated alternate 
locations have equivalent 
or reduced capability for 
voice, data, mass 
notification, etc.? 
(emergency operations, 
security, fire alarms, 
building automation) Do 
the alternate locations also 
have access to backup 
systems, including 
emergency power? 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

11 
Equipment Operations and Maintenance 

11.1 
Are there composite 
drawings indicating 
location and capacities of 
major systems and are 
they current? (electrical, 
mechanical, and fire 
protection; and date of last 
update) Do updated 
O&M (operation and 
maintenance) manuals 
exist? 
Within critical infrastructure 
protection at the building level, 
the current configuration and 
capacity of all critical systems 
must be understood to ensure 
they meet emergency needs. 
Manuals must also be current to 
ensure operations and 
maintenance keeps these systems 
properly functioning. The system 
must function during an 
emergency unless directly affected 
by the hazard incident. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.2 
Have critical air systems 
been rebalanced? If so, 
when and how often? 
Although the system may 
function, it must be tested 
periodically to ensure it is 
performing as designed. 
Balancing is also critical after 
initial construction to set 
equipment to proper performance 
per the design. Rebalancing may 
only occur during renovation. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.3 
Is air pressurization 
monitored regularly? 
Some areas require positive or 
negative pressure to function 
properly. Pressurization is critical 
in a hazardous environment or 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



emergency situation. Measuring 
pressure drop across filters is an 
indication when filters should be 
changed, but also may indicate 
that low pressures are developing 
downstream and could result in 
loss of expected protection. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 

11.4 
Does the building have a 
policy or procedure for 
periodic recommissioning 
of major M/E/P 
(Mechanical/Electrical/Plu 
mbing) systems? 
Recommissioning involves 
testing and balancing of systems 
to ascertain their capability to 
perform as described. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.5 
Is there an adequate 
operations and 
maintenance program 
including training of 
facilities management 
staff? 
If O&M of critical systems is 
done with in-house personnel, 
management must know what 
needs to be done and the 
workforce must have the 
necessary training to ensure 
systems reliability. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.6 
What maintenance and 
service agreements exist 
for M/E/P systems? 
When an in-house facility 
maintenance work force does not 
exist or does not have the 
capability to perform the work, 
maintenance and service contracts 
are the alternative to ensure 
critical systems will work under 
all conditions. The facility 
management staff requires the 
same knowledge to oversee these 
contracts as if the work was being 
done by in-house personnel. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.7 
Are backup power 
systems periodically 
tested under load? 
Loading should be at or above 
maximum connected load to 
ensure available capacity and 
automatic sensors should be 
tested at least once per year. 
Periodically (once a year as a 
minimum) check the duration of 
capacity of backup systems by 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



running them for the expected 
emergency duration or estimating 
operational duration through fuel 
consumption, water 
consumption, or voltage loss. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 

11.8 
Is stairway and exit sign 
lighting operational? 
The maintenance program for 
stairway and exit sign lighting 
(all egress lighting) should 
ensure functioning under normal 
and emergency power conditions. 
Expect building codes to be 
updated as emergency egress 
lighting is moved from upper 
walls and over doorways to floor 
level as heat and smoke drive 
occupants to crawl along the 
floor to get out of the building. 
Signs and lights mounted high 
have limited or no benefit when 
obscured. Reference: FEMA 386-
7 

13 
Security Master Plan 


13.1 
Does a written security 
plan exist for this site or 
building? When was the 
initial security plan 
written and last revised? 
Who is responsible for 
preparing and reviewing 
the security plan? 
The development and 
implementation of a security 
master plan provides a roadmap 
that outlines the strategic 
direction and vision, operational, 
managerial, and technological 
mission, goals, and objectives of 
the organization�s security 
program. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 

13.2 
Has the security plan been 
communicated and 
disseminated to key 
management personnel and 
departments? 
The security plan should be part 
of the building design so that the 
construction or renovation of the 
structure integrates with the 
security procedures to be used 
during daily operations. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.3 
Has the security plan been 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 


benchmarked or compared 
against related 
organizations and 
operational entities? 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
assessment. 
13.4 
Has the security plan ever 
been tested and evaluated 
from a cost-benefit and 
operational efficiency and 
effectiveness perspective? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.5 
Does it define mission, 
vision, short-long term 
security program goals and 
objectives? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.6 
Are threats, 
vulnerabilities, risks 
adequately defined and 
security countermeasures 
addressed and prioritized 
relevant to their criticality 
and probability of 
occurrence? 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.7 
Has a security 
implementation schedule 
been established to 
address recommended 
security solutions? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.8 
Have security operating 
and capital budgets been 
addressed, approved and 
established to support the 
plan? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.9 
What regulatory or 
industry 
guidelines/standards were 
followed in the 
preparation of the security 
plan? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.10 
Does the security plan 
address existing security 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 


conditions from an 
administrative, 
operational, managerial 
and technical security 
systems perspective? 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
assessment. 
13.11 
Does the security plan 
address the protection of 
people, property, assets, 
and information? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.12 
Does the security plan 
address the following 
major components: access 
control, surveillance, 
response, building 
hardening and protection 
against biological, 
chemical, radiological and 
cyber-network attacks? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.13 
Has the level of risk been 
identified and 
communicated in the 
security plan through the 
performance of a physical 
security assessment? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.14 
When was the last 
security assessment 
performed? Who 
performed the security 
risk assessment? 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.15 
Were the following areas 
of security analysis 
addressed in the security 
master plan: Asset 
Analysis: Does the 
security plan identify and 
prioritize the assets to be 
protected in accordance to 
their location, control, 
current value, and 
This process is the input to the 
building design and what 
mit