Risk Management Series

Building Design 
for Homeland 
Security 
Instructor Guide 
January 2004


FEMA 
E
 
1
5
5
 
E155/ January 2004

RISK MANAGEMENT SERIES 
Building Design for 
Homeland Security

PROVIDING PROTECTION TO PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS 
Instructor Guide 
www.fema.gov 
Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 
publication do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. Additionally, neither FEMA 
or any of its employees makes any warrantee, expressed or implied, or assumes any 
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any 
information, product, or process included in this publication. Users of information 
from this publication assume all liability arising from such use.


BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

BACKGROUND 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed the Building Design for 
Homeland Security Course (E155), to provide needed information on how to mitigate 
the effects of potential terrorist attacks. 
The purpose of E155 is to familiarize students with assessment methodologies 
available to identify the relative level of risk for various threats, including blast and 
chemical, biological, or radiological. The students will be introduced to FEMA 426 
and will be asked to provide cost-effective mitigation measures for a range of 
manmade hazards. The primary target audience for this course includes engineers, 
architects, and building officials.


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Principal Authors: 
Michael Chipley, UTD, Inc. 
Michael Kaminskas, UTD, Inc.


Contributors: 
Milagros Kennett, FEMA, Project Officer, Risk Management 
Series Publications 
Dan Bondroff, EMI Training Specialist 
Eric Letvin, Greenhorne & O�Mara, Inc., Consultant 
Project Manager 
Christopher Arnold, Building Systems Development, Inc. 
Dwight Johnson, All About Training Instruction System 
Designer 
Gina Wightman, All About Training Instruction System 
Designer 
Deb Daly, Greenhorne & O�Mara, Inc. 
Wanda Rizer, Greenhorne & O�Mara, Inc. 
Julie Liptak, Greenhorne & O�Mara, Inc. 
BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This course was prepared under contract to FEMA. It will be revised periodically, and 
comments and feedback to improve future editions are welcome. Please send 
comments and feedback by e-mail to riskmanagementseriespubs@dhs.go v 
BACKGROUND AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

AGENDA 
Day 1 

Instructor 
8:30 a.m. 
Unit I � Introduction and Course 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 

Overview 

10:00 a.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
10:15 a.m. 
Unit II � Asset Value Assessment 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
11:30 a.m. 
Lunch 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
12:30 p.m. 
Unit III � Threat/Hazard Assessment 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 
1:45 p.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
2:00 p.m. 
Unit IV � Vulnerability Assessment 
Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
3:45 p.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
4:00 p.m. 
Unit V � Risk Assessment/Risk 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 

Management 

4:45 p.m. 
Day 1 Wrap-up and Day 2 Forecast 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
5:00 p.m. 
Dinner 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 


AGENDA 

Day 2 

Instructor 
8:30 a.m. 
Day 1 Review and Day 2 Overview 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
8:45 a.m. 
Unit V � Risk Assessment/Risk 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 

Management (continued) 

9:15 a.m. 
Unit VI � Explosive Blast 
Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
10:15 a.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
10:30 a.m. 
Unit VII � Chemical, Biological, and 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 

Radiological Measures 

11:30 a.m. 
Lunch 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
12:30 p.m. 
Written Exam 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 


Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
1:00 p.m. 
Written Exam Review 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. 


Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
1:30 p.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
1:45 p.m. 
Unit VIII � Site and Layout Design 
Chris Arnold, FAIA 

Guidance 

3:30 p.m. 
Break 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
3:45 p.m. 
Unit VIII � Site and Layout Design 
Chris Arnold, FAIA 

Guidance (continued) 

4:30 p.m. 
Day 2 Wrap-up and Day 3 Forecast 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
5:00 p.m. 
Dinner 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 

AGENDA 
Day 3 
8:30 a.m. 
Day 2 Review and Day 3 Overview 
8:45 a.m. 
Unit IX � Building Design Guidance 
10:15 a.m. 
Break 
10:30 a.m. 
Unit IX � Building Design Guidance 

(continued) 
11:30 a.m. 
Lunch 
12:30 p.m. 
Unit X � Electronic Security Systems 
1:15 p.m. 
Break 
1:30 p.m. 
Unit XI � Finalization of Case Study 

Results [Goal is to brief building owner on 

prioritized recommendations and 

justifications for security work.] 
2:15 p.m. 
Break 
2:30 p.m. 
Unit XI � Presentation of Group Case 

Study Results and Discussion (continued) 

[Assumes 6 teams and 10 minutes per team 

to present and 5 minutes per team to 

discuss.] 
4:00 p.m. 
Unit XII � Course Wrap-up 
5:00 p.m. 
Adjourn 

Instructor 
Eric Letvin, Esq. Michael Kaminskas, P.E. Eric Letvin, Esq. Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
Eric Letvin, Esq. Eric Letvin, Esq. Eric Letvin, Esq. 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
Eric Letvin, Esq. 
Michael Chipley, Ph.D. Michael Kaminskas, P.E. 
Eric Letvin, Esq. Eric Letvin, Esq. 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview



U
n
i
t 
I 
COURSE TITLE 
Building Design for Homeland Security 



TIME 90 minutes 
UNIT TITLE 
Introduction and Course Overview 


OBJECTIVES 1. Describe the goal, objectives, and agenda for the course 
2.	Describe and find material in the course reference manual and 
student activity handout 
SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1. Welcome and Opening Remarks 
2. 2. Instructor Introductions 
3. 3. Administrative Information 
4. 4. Student Introductions 
5. 5. Course Overview 
6. 6. Course Materials 
7. 7. Activity: Become familiar with Case Study materials 

REFERENCES 1. Course Agenda 
1. 2. Course Goal and Objectives 
2. 3. EMI Evaluation Forms 
3. 4.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings 
4. 5. Student Manual, Unit I 
5. 6.	Case Study, Hazardville Information Company (HIC), for student 
activities 
6. 7. Unit I visuals 

REQUIREMENTS 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
1. 2. Instructor Guide 
2. 3. Student Manual (one per student) 
3. 4. Overhead projector or computer display unit 
4. 5. Unit I visuals 
5. 6. Chart paper, easel, and markers 

 Unit I 
UNIT I OUTLINE	Time Page 
I. Introduction and Course Overview	90 minutes IG I-3 
1. 1. Welcome and Opening Remarks	5 minutes IG I-3 
2. 2. Instructor Introductions	5 minutes IG I-3 
3. 3. Administrative Information	5 minutes IG I-3 
4. 4. Student Introductions	30 minutes IG I-3 
5. 5. Course Overview	15 minutes IG I-6 
6. 6. Course Materials	20 minutes IG I-8 
7. 7. Summary and Transition	10 minutes IG I-21 


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
. �	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to 
identify topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity:  The students will begin the familiarization with the Case Study 
materials. The Case Study is a complete risk assessment and analysis of mitigation 
options and strategies for a typical commercial office building located in a mixed urban-
suburban environment business park. The assessment will use the DoD Antiterrorism 
standards and the GSA Interagency Security Criteria to determine Levels of Protection 
and identify specific vulnerabilities. Mitigation options and strategies will use the 
concepts provided in FEMA 426 and other standard reference materials such as the RS 
Means Building Security: Strategy and Costs, NFPA 5000, and other FEMA publications 
related to emergency planning and disaster recovery. 
. �	Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-1 
VISUAL I-2 
Participant Introductions 
Name
Affiliation
Area of Concentration

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-2 
Welcome and Opening Remarks 
Welcome the students to the Building Design for Homeland Security Course. 
Introduce yourself, using: 
. �	Your name 
 �	A brief statement of background and experience 
 Make the necessary administrative announcements, including: 
. �	Housing, parking, and meals 
. �	Attendance, start/stop times, breaks 
. �	Restroom locations 
. �	Messages and emergencies 
. �	Fire exits 

Student Introductions 
Ask the students to introduce themselves, including: 
. �	Name 
. �	Affiliation, brief background and experience statement, including work in 
the course topic area if applicable 
. �	One reason they are attending the course 
. �	What they plan to do with what they learn 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-3 
Course Goal 
To enhance student 
understanding of the 
measures and technology 
available to reduce risk from 
terrorist attack.

FEMA 
U.S. AIR FORCE
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-3 
VISUAL I-4 
Course Objectives 
Participants will be able to: 
1. 1. Explain the basic components of the assessment methodology. 
2. 2. Appreciate the different assessment methodology approaches that can be used. 
3. 3. Perform an assessment for a building by identifying and prioritizing assets, threats, and vulnerabilities and calculating 
relative risk. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-4 
Course Goal 
The goal of this course is to enhance student understanding of the measures and 
technology available to reduce risk from terrorist attack. 
Included in this understanding is the process for assessing risk to focus upon which 
mitigation measures have the greatest applicability and benefit. The students will 
understand the design approaches to mitigate manmade hazards and comprehend the 
trade-offs needed to optimize various design requirements. 
Course Objectives 
The primary target audience for this course will be engineers, architects, and state and 
local government and building officials with engineering and architectural backgrounds 
involved in mitigation planning and design to protect people and property against 
manmade hazards. 
After attending the Building Design for Homeland Security course, participants should be 
able to: 
1. 1.	Explain the basic components of the assessment methodology � 
threat/hazard, asset value, vulnerability, and risk, as applied to site, layout, and building. 
2. 2.	Understand the different assessment methodology approaches being used 
by Federal agencies and comprehend which approach to use for a given organizational 
structure. 
3. 3.	Perform an assessment for a given building by identifying the assessment 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-5 
Course Objectives 
1. 4. Identify available mitigation measures applicable to the site and building envelope. 
2. 5. Understand the technology limitations and application details of mitigation measures for terrorist tactics and 
technological accidents. 
3. 6. Perform an assessment for a given building by identifying vulnerabilities using the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist in FEMA 426. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-5 
VISUAL I-6 
Course Objectives 
1. 7. Select applicable mitigation measures and prioritize them based upon the final assessment risk values. 
2. 8. Appreciate that designing a building to mitigate terrorist attacks can create conflicts with other design requirements. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-6 
components and prioritizing the asset � threat/hazard pairs by their relative risk to 
focus resources upon mitigation measures that reduce risk. 
Course Objectives 
1. 4.	Identify available mitigation measures either in-place or for new design and 
comprehend their applicability to a given situation. 
2. 5.	Understand the technology limitations and application details of mitigation 
measures for terrorist tactics and technological accidents involving explosive blast and 
agent release (chemical, biological, and radiological) to achieve a desired level of 
protection. 
3. 6.	Use the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 
and adjust the assessment relative risk based upon the identified vulnerabilities. 

Course Objectives 
1. 7.	Select applicable mitigation measures and prioritize them based upon the 
final assessment relative risk values and associated estimated risk reduction provided so 
as to focus limited resources, all for a given situation. 
2. 8.	Demonstrate that designing to mitigate building vulnerabilities against 
terrorist attacks has conflicts with other design requirements, resulting in trade-offs to 
achieve acceptable compliance and levels of performance among the differing regulations, 
codes, programs, operational requirements, and owner desires within the resources 
available. 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-7 
Course Overview � Day 1 
Course Overview 
This course is a full 3 days in length and includes 11 units of instruction. Most 
instruction blocks have an associated student activity using a Case Study to emphasize 
the concepts taught and apply what was just learned. 
A detailed schedule is located in your Student Manuals. This is Unit I � Introduction and 
Course Overview. It will review the other blocks of instruction and the course materials. 
For the rest of the first day, the course will introduce the components of risk and how to 
determine risk. Unit II � Asset Value Assessment will discuss how to identify assets � or 
things to be protected, and how to assign a relative value to them. 
Unit III will examine the Threat/Hazard Assessment process and identify the threats 
and hazards that could impact a building or site, review a Department of Defense 
methodology for defining threats, describe how threats and hazards may interact to 
increase damage, and providing numerical rating for the threat or hazard. 
Unit IV will cover a Vulnerability Assessment, including what constitutes 
vulnerability and how to identify vulnerabilities using the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist. 
Finally, the last Topic that will be covered on Day 1 is Unit V � Risk Assessment/Risk 
Management. Students will be taught what constitutes risk and how to determine a 
numerical value for risk and be introduced to the concept of the Design Basis Threat. 
This Unit will be completed on Day 2. 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-8 
Course Overview � Day 2 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-8 
At the end of each day, a short wrap-up session will be conducted to review the day�s 
key concepts and provide an opportunity for students to ask any remaining questions. 
Course Overview � Day 2 
Day 2 will start with a quick review of Day 1 and then an overview of Day 2. Then Unit 
V will be completed. 
At the completion of Unit V, students should have a firm grasp of risk and its 
components. They should know how to calculate a numeric value of risk based on its 
three components � asset value, threat rating, and vulnerability rating. 
Units VI and VII will provide students with an understanding of some of the weapons 
commonly used by terrorists. Unit VI will cover explosive blast and Unit VII will cover 
chemical, biological, and radiological or CBR weapons. 
No course would be complete without an exam � so there will be an open book short 
answer exam on Day 2. (Optional for VA Tech course.) 
After the exam, the course will begin to explore mitigation options for reducing the 
risk and impact of terrorist attacks against buildings. 
Unit VIII � Site and Layout Design Guidance will cover things you can do to mitigate 
terrorist attacks for the site � meaning from the property line up to the building. 
At the conclusion of Day 2, there will be another wrap-up session. 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-9 
Course Overview � Day 3 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-9 
VISUAL I-10 
Course Materials 
FEMA Publication 426 
Reference Manual 
to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-10 
Confirm that each student has a copy of these materials. 
Unit IX will explore mitigation options for the building envelope. 
Unit X will introduce the basic concepts of electronic security systems. 
As mentioned earlier � each block of instruction has an associated student activity using 
a Case Study to emphasize the concepts taught and apply what was just learned. In 
Unit XI, students will present the results of their work on the Case Study � highlighting 
their top three risks identified by the group, the vulnerabilities identified for these risks, 
and the top three mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and risk. 
Finally, Unit XI will summarize the key points from the course and answer any final 
questions. 
Course Materials 
FEMA Publication 426, Reference CD, Student Manual 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-11 
FEMA 426 Reference Manual 
Chapter 1 � Asset Value, Threat/Hazard, 
Vulnerability, and Risk
Chapter 2 � Site and Layout Design Guidance
Chapter 3 � Building Design Guidance
Chapter 4 � Explosive Blast
Chapter 5 � CBR Measures

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-11 
As you begin the following walk-through of  FEMA 426: 
. �	Point out that the students will be following FEMA 426 throughout the 
course and will use some sections heavily during exercises. The course visuals include 
FEMA 426 page references for easy reference. 
. �	Encourage them to flag key pages and passages with the provided Post-It� 
notes and highlighting. 

Ask them to open FEMA 426 and follow along as you preview the contents. 
FEMA 426 Reference Manual 
There are five chapters in the manual as listed here. This manual contains many how-to 
aspects based upon current information contained in FEMA, Department of Commerce, 
Department of Defense (including Army, Navy, and Air Force), Department of Justice, 
General Services Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention/National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and other 
publications. It is intended to provide an understanding of the current methodologies for 
assessing asset value threat/hazard, vulnerability, and risk, and the design considerations 
needed to improve protection of new and existing buildings and the people occupying 
them. As needed, this manual should be supplemented with more extensive technical 
resources, as well as the use of experts when necessary. 
Key concepts: 
. �	Design Basis Threat 
. �	Level of Protection 
. �	Layers of Defense 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-12 
FEMA 426 Reference Manual 
Appendix A � Acronyms
Appendix B � General Glossary
Appendix C � CBR Glossary 
Appendix D � Electronic Security Systems

Appendix E � Bibliography Appendix F � Associations and Organizations 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-12 
VISUAL I-13 
FEMA 426 � Chapter 1 
. � Asset Value Assessment 
. � Threat/Hazard Assessment 
. � Vulnerability Assessment 
. � Risk Assessment 
. � Risk Management 
. � Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-13 
FEMA 426 Appendices 
The manual also has six appendices to facilitate its use as a reference: 
. �	Appendix A � Acronyms 
. �	Appendix B � General Glossary 
. �	Appendix C � CBR Glossary 
. �	Appendix D � Electronic Security Systems 
. �	Appendix E � Bibliography 
. �	Appendix F � Associations and Organizations 

FEMA 426 - Chapter 1: Asset Value, Threat/ Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk 
Chapter 1 presents selected methodologies to integrate threat/hazard, asset criticality, 
and vulnerability assessment information using applications such as the FEMA 
HAZUS-MH Geographic Information System (GIS) application to overlay imagery and 
maps to show access points, blast stand-off, and other site and building information. 
The chapter also presents a risk matrix for the preparation of risk assessments. The 
topic areas of Chapter 1 are: 
. �	Asset Value Assessment 
. �	Threat/Hazard Assessment 
. �	Vulnerability Assessment 
. �	Risk Assessment 
. �	Risk Management 
. �	Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 

Finally, Chapter 1 provides an assessment checklist that compiles many best 
practices (based upon current technologies and scientific research) to consider during 
the 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
design of a new building or 
renovation of an existing building. 
Assessment Flow Chart 
The assessment flow chart 
illustrates the process you will 
follow in conducting the 
assessment. 
VISUAL I-14 
FEMA 426 - Chapter 2: Site 
Layout and Design Guidance 
Chapter 2 discusses architectural and engineering design considerations (mitigation 
measures), starting at the perimeter of the property line, and includes the orientation of 
the building on the site. Therefore, this chapter covers issues outside the building 
envelope. 
Chapter 2 also discusses the following site layout and design topics: 
. � Layout Design 
. � Siting 
. � Entry Control/Vehicle Access 
. � Signage 
. � Parking 
. � Loading Docks 
. � Physical Security Lighting 
. � Site Utilities 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-15 
FEMA 426 - Chapter 3: Building Design Guidance 
Chapter 3 provides the same considerations for the building � its envelope, systems, 
and interior layout. 
The topic areas in Chapter 3 include: 
. �	Architectural 
. �	Building Structural and Nonstructural Considerations 
. �	Building Envelope Considerations 
. �	Other Building Design Issues 
. �	Building Mitigation Measures 

VISUAL I-16 
FEMA 426 - Chapter 4: Explosive 
Blast 
Chapter 4 provides a discussion of blast theory to understand the dynamics of the blast 
pressure wave, the response of building components, and a consistent approach to define 
levels of protection. 
Some of the details you will address include: 
. �	Building Damage 
. �	Blast Effects and Predictions 
. �	Stand-off Distance 
. �	Progressive Collapse 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-17 
VISUAL I-18 
Summary 
FEMA 426 is intended for building sciences professionals.

Manmade hazards risk assessments use a 
"Design Basis Threat."
Site and building systems and infrastructure protection 

are provided by layers of defense. 
Multiple mitigation options and techniques.
Use cost-effective multihazard analysis and design.

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-18 
FEMA 426 - Chapter 5: CBR Measures 
Chapter 5 presents chemical, biological, and radiological measures that can be taken to 
mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce associated risks for these terrorist tactics. 
The concepts you should be familiar with at the end of the instruction include: 
. �	Evacuation 
. �	Sheltering in Place 
. �	Personal Protective Equipment 
. �	Filtering and Pressurization 
. �	Exhausting and Purging 

Summary 
. �	FEMA 426 is intended for building sciences professionals. 
. �	Manmade hazards risk assessments use a "Design Basis Threat" and 
"Levels of Protection" for manmade disaster and loads versus building codes for natural 
disaster and loads. 
. �	Site and building systems and infrastructure protection are provided by 
layers of defense. 
. �	Multiple mitigation options and techniques to deter, detect, deny, and 
devalue. 
. �	Use cost-effective multi-hazard analysis and design. 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-19 
Case Study Activities 
In small group settings, apply concepts introduced in the course. 
Become conversant with contents and organization of FEMA 426. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-19 
VISUAL I-20 
Unit I Case Study Activity 
Hazardville Information Company Case Study Overview


Requirements 
Briefly review HIC case study materials.
As a group, complete the worksheet.
Use only the case study data to answer worksheet 

questions. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-20 
VISUAL I-21 
HAZARDVILLE INFORMATION COMPANY (HIC) 
Case Study 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-21 
Case Study Activities 
Through case studies in small group settings, students will become conversant with the 
contents and organization of FEMA 426. 
. �	In small group settings, apply concepts introduced in the course 
. �	Become conversant with contents and organization of FEMA 426 

Unit Case Study Activity 
Requirements 
. �	Briefly review HIC Case Study materials (Appendix A of the Student 
Manual) 
. �	As a group, complete the worksheet 
. �	Use only the Case Study data to answer worksheet questions 

Introduction to the Case Study 
The Case Study activities throughout this course provide opportunities, in a small group 
setting, to apply concepts introduced in each unit. 
These activities will enable participants to become conversant with FEMA 426, 
Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. 
Participants will be able to use the document readily during the process of mitigating 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Divide participants into small groups of five to seven. 
Participants should work in these groups for the remainder of the small group sessions. 
Refer participants to the Unit I Case Study activity in the Student Manual. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist groups 
as needed. 
At the end of 20 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
potential damage from terrorist attacks against buildings. 
The activities are designed to "walk" participants through the same assessment and 
design steps using a Case Study involving a hypothetical building and associated data 
about the threat environment. 
Hazardville Information Company (HIC) 
The Hazardville Information Company (HIC) is a fictional entity created for this course 
(see Appendix A of the Student Manual). 
 .�	It is a composite of actual sites and buildings with actual systems typical of a 
number of commercial buildings. 
 .The Case Study mainly addresses threat information related to manmade hazards: 
. �	Explosive blast 
. �	Chemical, biological, and radiological agents 
. �	Armed attack 
 .�	Cyber attack 
 .Each section of the Case Study activity includes: 
. �	Examination of specific aspects of the Case Study data. 
. �	Assessment of data and application to the Case Study of concepts and 
processes addressed in the unit. 
. �	Completion of worksheets that demonstrate participant mastery of unit 
learning objectives. 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
General Requirements 
Each participant is responsible for 
completion of his or her own 
worksheets. 
In addition, the small groups will 
produce a completed worksheet for 
each unit�s activity and post it in a 
designated location. 
Group members are encouraged to 
discuss activity requirements and 
collaborate on completion of the 
worksheets. 
To facilitate this process, select a 
leader and a recorder. 
VISUAL I-22 
Hazardville Information Company 
Activity Requirements 
. �	Turn to Appendix A, the Case Study materials in the Student Manual and 
briefly peruse the document. 
. �	Read the "familiarization" questions on the following worksheet and, as a 
group, complete the worksheet. 
. �	Use only the Case Study data to answer worksheet questions. 

Take 20 minutes to complete this 
activity. Solutions will be 
reviewed in the plenary group. 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-23 
VISUAL I-24 
VISUAL I-25 
Hazardville Information Company 
The Hazardville Information Company supports approximately 1,000 users and 100 
applications as a primary data center and as a disaster recovery backup site. 
HIC has over 130 employees and approximately 80-100 employees are in the building 
at any given time 
Threats/Hazards 
. � Terrorism 
. � Intelligence 
. � Crime 

Note the site location, terrain, parking, and other commercial buildings around HIC. 
Threats/Hazards 
. � HazMat 
. � Natural Hazards 

Note the major interstate and rail lines near HIC. 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-26 
VISUAL I-27 
VISUAL I-28 
HIC Building Data 
. � Structural 
. � Mechanical 
. � Electrical 
. � IT 
. � Physical Security 

Note the parking lot, building entry and exit access points, loading docks, building 
functions, and building infrastructure. 
HIC Building Structure 
The Case Study will review the building structure and envelope to identify 
vulnerabilities and mitigation options. 
Note the percentage of glass on the exterior walls, overhangs, and type of construction. 
HIC Mechanical Systems 
The Case Study will review mechanical systems, plumbing, and piping to identify 
vulnerabilities and mitigation options. 
Note the exposed meters and ground level air intake. 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-29 
VISUAL I-30 
VISUAL I-31 
HIC Electrical Systems 
The Case Study will review primary electrical utilities and backup power to identify 
vulnerabilities and mitigation options. 
Note the exposed electrical transformers, critical utility entry points, and redundancies. 
HIC Physical Security 
The Case Study will review physical security systems, equipment, and procedures to 
identify vulnerabilities and mitigation options. 
Note the locations of sensors, lights, access points, and type of badges or card 
readers. 
HIC IT Systems 
The Case Study will review key IT systems to include the data center and 
communications to identify vulnerabilities and mitigation options. 
Note the type of flooring, penetrations, mixed cable and fiber, racks. 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-32 
VISUAL I-33 
Design Basis Threat 
Explosive Blast: Car Bomb 250 lb TNT equivalent. Truck Bomb 5,000 lb TNT equivalent (Murrah Federal Building class 
weapon) 
Chemical: Large quantity gasoline spill and toxic plume from the adjacent tank farm, small quantity (tanker truck and rail car size) 
spills of HazMat materials (chlorine) 
Biological: Anthrax delivered by mail or in packages, smallpox distributed by spray mechanism mounted on truck or aircraft in 
metropolitan area 
Radiological: Small "dirty" bomb detonation within the 10 mile radius of the HIC building 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-33 
VISUAL I-34 
Design Basis Threat 
Criminal Activity/Armed Attack: High powered rifle or handgun exterior shooting (sniper attack or direct assault on key staff, 
damage to infrastructure [e.g., transformers, chillers, etc.]) 
Cyber Attack: Focus on IT and building systems 
infrastructure (SCADA, alarms, etc.) accessible via 
Internet access 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-34 
HIC Emergency Response 
Determine the location, availability, and readiness condition of emergency response 
assets, and the state of training of building staff in their use. 
Note the location and type of protective equipment, safe haven or shelter in place 
options, and mass notification capability. 
Design Basis Threat 
. � Explosive Blast 
. � Chemical 
. � Biological 
. � Radiological ("dirty" bomb) 

Design Basis Threat 
. � Criminal Activity/Armed Attack 
. � Cyber Attack 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL I-35 
VISUAL I-36 
Summary 
FEMA Publication 426


Reference Manual 
to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit I-36 
Exam Questions #A18 and B17 Level of Protection and Layers of Defense 
The Case Study will use both the GSA and DoD Levels of Protection to evaluate 
vulnerabilities against and to develop mitigation options. 
A key design strategy and concept is "Layers of Defense". The elements of a layered 
system are: 
. � Deter 
. � Detect 
. � Deny 
. � Devalue 

Summary 
The objective of this course is to provide a comprehensive approach to reducing the 
physical damage to structural and non-structural components of buildings and related 
infrastructure, focusing on six specific types of facilities: 
. � Commercial office facilities 
. � Retail commercial facilities 
. � Light industrial and manufacturing 
. � Health care 
. � Local schools 
 � Higher education 
 Most importantly, the course provide participants with a solid foundation on: 
. � Design Basis Threat 
. � Levels of Protection 
. � Layers of Defense 

Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Transition 
In this course, you will learn how to perform a multi-hazard risk assessment of a building 
and become familiar with the key concepts of to protect buildings from manmade threats 
and hazards: 
. �	Asset Value 
. �	Design Basis Threat 
. �	Level of Protection 
. �	Layers of Defense 
. �	Vulnerability Assessment 
. �	Risk Assessment 
. �	Mitigation 

Using the approach and guidance provided in FEMA 426, the majority of building owners 
should be able to complete a risk assessment of their building in a few days and identify 
the primary vulnerabilities, mitigation options, and make informed decisions on the ability 
of their building to survive, recover, and operate should an attack or event occur. 
For the rest of the first day, the course will introduce the components of risk and how 
to determine risk. 
. �	Unit II � Asset Value Assessment 
. �	Unit III � Threat/Hazard Assessment 
. �	Unit IV � Vulnerability Assessment 
. �	Unit V � Risk Assessment/Risk Management 

Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview 
UNIT I CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:
HAZARDVILLE INFORMATION COMPANY (HIC)
CASE STUDY OVERVIEW

Requirements 
Turn to the Appendix A Case Study materials in the Student Manual and briefly peruse 
the document. Read the "familiarization" questions on the following worksheet, and as a 
group, complete the worksheet. Use only the Case Study data to answer worksheet 
questions. Information has been limited in an effort to focus the activity. 


Page # in 
Question 
Answer 
Case Study 
1. What are the major 
transportation nodes in the 
surrounding area? 
A major interstate highway is located 
within 1/4 mile of the HIC Headquarters. 
CSX Transportation and Norfolk-
Southern Railway maintain a 
transportation corridor about 1/2 mile 
from HIC. There appear to be no 
restrictions on the material carried 
A-3, A-28 � 
A-30 

along these rail lines. 


Two airports are in the vicinity of HIC. 
One is a major international airport 
approximately 8 miles away. The other is 
a small, but busy general aviation airport 
less than 2 miles away. 

2. What life safety assets 
are available, and what are 
their response times? 
� Wet pipe sprinkler system � 20 hand-
held dry chemical fire extinguishers 
A-16, A-17, 
A-27 

� Firestation 21/2 miles away. Seven 


others within 5 miles of the site.  


Response time: 8-10 minutes 


� Hospital ER 5 miles away 

3. Who are the building�s 
primary occupants and 
visitors? 
� HIC has over 130 employees and 
approximately 80 to 100 employees are in 
the building at any given time 
A-1, A-2 

� Fortune 500 companies 


� National and regional banks and 


credit unions 


� A major airline 


� Large prime defense contractors 


� Government agencies, including one 


classified client 


Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security 
Unit I: Introduction and Course Overview Unit II:  Asset Value Assessment 



4. What hazards may affect 
HIC? 
� Hazardous materials � Liquid fuels � Air 
traffic 
A-5, A-6, A-
28 � A-30 

� Natural disasters 


� Manmade disasters 

5. What are the prevalent 
weather/wind conditions at 
HIC? 
The prevailing weather pattern for the area 
in the summer and fall is from the south 
Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. Warm, 
A-6 

moist air brings thunderstorms and higher 
humidity. In the fall, cooler air from the 
north and west returns. Winter weather 


blasts across the state from the northern or 


central part of the continent. With no 
other weather activity, the prevailing wind 
is normally from the west-northwest. 

6. What are the critical 
� Computer/data processing 
A-21 � A-24 
functions of HIC? 
� Wired/wireless networking 


� Information Technology 


� Communications 

7. What are the components 
� Electrical systems 
A-12 � A-19 
of HIC�s critical utility 
� Mechanical systems 

infrastructure? 
� Gas supply 


� Communications systems 


� Emergency response systems 

8. What are the components 
� Parking 
A-11, A-12, 
of HIC�s critical building 
� Entryways 
A-16 
infrastructure? 
� Exits 


� Loading docks 

9. What personnel are key 
HIC has over 130 employees and 
A-2 
to the operation of HIC? 
approximately 80 to 100 employees are in 


the building at any given time. 





U
nit 
II 
COURSE TITLE 
Building Design for Homeland Security 



TIME 75 minutes 
UNIT TITLE 
Asset Value Assessment 


OBJECTIVES 1.	Identify the assets of a building or site that can be 
affected by a threat or hazard 
1. 2. Explain the components used to determine the value of an asset 
2. 3. Determine the critical assets of a building or site 
3. 4.	Provide a numerical rating for the asset and justify the basis for the rating 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	The core functions and critical infrastructure listed on the threat-
vulnerability matrix. 
2. 2.	Various approaches to determine asset value � Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and Veterans 
Affairs. 
3. 3. A rating scale and how to use it to determine an asset value. 
4. 4.	Activity: Identify the assets to consider in the Case Study and determine 
the asset value for each asset of interest. 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-10 to 1-14 
1. 2. Student Manual, Unit II 
2. 3. Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
3. 4. Unit II visuals 

REQUIREMENTS 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
1. 2. Instructor Guide 
2. 3. Student Manual (one per student) 
3. 4. Overhead projector or computer display unit 
4. 5. Unit II visuals 
5. 6. Chart paper, easel, and markers 

 Unit II 
UNIT II OUTLINE	Time Page 
II. Asset Value Assessment	 75 minutes IG II-1 
1. 1.	Identification of Core Functions and Critical 10 minutes IG II-5 
Infrastructure 
2. 2.	Asset Value Rating Approaches 10 minutes IG II-6 
3. 3.	Asset Value Rating Approach for Student Activity 10 minutes IG II-9 
4. 4.	Application of Selected Asset Value Rating Approach 10 minutes IG II-10 
5. 5.	Activity: Asset Value Ratings 35 minutes IG II-10 


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
. �	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to 
identify topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity:  The Instructor will discuss the generic core functions and critical 
infrastructure associated with the Case Study building as listed on the threat-vulnerability 
matrix. The Instructor will walk through the examples, describing the asset in relation to 
the Case Study and applying the asset value rating approach. The students will then 
apply these techniques (asset identification and asset value rating) to the Case Study to 
identify and rate the assets found in the Case Study.  The students will have to quickly 
review/scan the mission statement, building data, building structure, mechanical systems, 
electrical systems, physical security, information systems, and communications to have a 
sense of the value of the asset to the Hazardville Information Company. 
. �	Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL II-1 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit II, Asset Value Assessment. This section will describe how to perform an 
asset value assessment (the first step in the assessment process), to identify people and 
asset values. Key to this process is interviewing stakeholders including owners, facility 
staff and tenants. 
VISUAL II-2 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, the student should be able to: 
1. 1.	Identify the assets of a building or site that can be affected by a threat or 
hazard. 
2. 2.	Explain the components used to determine the value of an asset. 
3. 3.	Determine the critical assets of a building or site. 
4. 4.	Provide a numerical rating for the asset and justify the basis for the rating. 

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL II-3 
VISUAL II-4 
Exam Questions #A1 and B2 
Assessment Flow Chart 
Reviewing the Assessment Flow Chart, the first step in the risk assessment process is 
to determine asset value. 
An asset is anything you want to protect because of its value, its need to maintain 
business continuity, and/or its difficulty in replacing within a required timeline. 
People and Asset Value 
Understanding asset criticality is comparable to strategic planning in that the building 
owner should understand the mission of the organization, the resources that are used to 
perform that mission, how those resources interface with one another to achieve goals, 
and how the organization would cope or maintain business continuity if the asset(s) were 
lost. 
In general terms, asset value can be considered the economic replacement cost for 
infrastructure and equipment. 
People are a building�s most critical asset. 
Unit II: Asset Value Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL II-5 
Exam Questions #A2 and B1 
VISUAL II-6 
Identification of a Building�s Assets 
Identifying a building�s critical assets is accomplished in a two-step process. 
Step 1: Define and understand a building�s core functions and processes. 
Step 2: Identify site and building infrastructure and systems: 
. �	Critical components/assets 
. �	Critical information systems and data 
. �	Life safety systems and safe haven areas 
. �	Security areas 

Asset Value 
The objective in the initial step is to determine the core functions for the building that will 
enable it to continue to operate or provide services after an attack. This focuses the 
assessment team on the key areas of the building. Factors include: 
. �	What are the primary services? 
. �	What critical activities take place at the building? 
 �	Who are the building�s occupants and visitors? 
 To help evaluate and rank critical infrastructure, consider the following factors: 
. �	Injuries or deaths related to critical infrastructure damage 
. �	Effect on core functions 
. �	Existence of backups, systems redundancy 
. �	Availability of replacements 
. �	Critical support lifelines 
. �	Critical or sensitive information 

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL II-7 
Quantifying Asset Value 
After a building�s assets requiring protection has been identified, they are assigned a 
value. The asset value is the degree of debilitating impact that would be caused by the 
incapacity or destruction of the building�s assets. 
FEMA Publication 426 uses a combination of a seven-level linguistic scale and a ten-
point numeric scale. 
. �	Very High � Loss or damage of the asset would have exceptionally grave 
consequences, such as extensive loss of life, widespread severe injuries, or total loss of 
primary services, core processes, and functions. 
. �	High - Loss or damage of the asset would have grave consequences, such 
as loss of life, severe injuries, and loss of primary services. 
. �	Medium High � Loss or damage of the asset would have serious 
consequences, such as serious injuries, or impairment of core processes and functions for 
an extended period of time. 
. �	Medium � Loss or damage of the asset would have moderate to serious 
consequences. 
. �	Medium Low � Loss or damage of the asset would have moderate 
consequences, such as minor injuries, or minor impairment of core functions and 
processes. 
. �	Low � Loss or damage of the asset would have minor consequences or 
impact. 
. �	Very Low � Loss or damage of the asset would have negligible 
consequences or impact. 

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL II-8 
VISUAL II-9 
Note: The Asset Value under the Administration and Engineering functions is highlighted. 
A medium value rating (5) is assigned for the Administrative function threat as they are a 
small part of the total organization. A medium Asset Value was assigned for the 
Engineering Function threat pairs. A high Asset Value rating (8) was assigned for the 
Engineering Function threat pairs as they account for over half of the organization. 
Asset Value Notional Example 
The key assets for this a notional example by system are listed and an asset value rating is 
entered into the site critical functions matrix. 
HVAC mechanical systems in most buildings will likely be medium high (7). 
Critical Functions Matrix 
List functions down the left side and threats across the top. 
In general, the asset value for a given function is the same for all threats and the matrix 
helps to identify the primary functions in a quantitative form. The functions matrix is 
people oriented and is subjective, but the completed matrix should provide a guide to 
vulnerabilities and risks. An organization with few administrative staff but a large 
engineering group is used in this example. 
Note the value is the same for all threat pairs to reflect the people and organization 
impact losses that could occur should the asset be lost. 
Unit II: Asset Value Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL II-10 
Note: The Asset Value rating under the Site and Structural Systems is highlighted. A 
medium low Asset Value rating (4) would be an initial value for the site infrastructure 
threat pairs because the site has a well defined and protected perimeter, but the site can be 
impacted by guns and bombs and economic replacement costs will be acceptable. A high 
Asset Value rating (8) would be an initial value for the Structural System threat pairs 
since it is multi-story and subject to progressive collapse and cannot be replaced. 
VISUAL II-11 
Critical Infrastructure Matrix 
List Infrastructure down the left side and threats across the top. 
In general, the asset value for a given infrastructure asset is the same for all threats and is 
usually the economic cost of replacement. The value can be changed to reflect intangibles 
such as duration of loss, loss of production capability, etc. For this example, a building is 
on a site with a controlled perimeter fence and adequate stand-off distance. The structure 
is multistory and a single building houses all functions. 
Note that the value is the same for all threat pairs to reflect the economic and 
organization impact losses that could occur over time should the asset be lost. 
Summary 
. �	Identify a building�s Core Functions and Critical Infrastructure 
. �	Assign a building�s assets or resources a value 
. �	Insert values into the Critical Site Functional matrix and the Critical Site 
Infrastructure System matrix 

Unit II: Asset Value Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL II-12 
Refer participants to FEMA 426 and the Unit II Case Study activity in the Student 
Manual. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist groups 
as needed. 
At the end of 25 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. Keep in 
mind that there are no incorrect answers. It is more important to be able to clearly 
explain and support the underlying rationale for the values that have been assigned. 
Student Activity 
Asset value is the degree of debilitating impact that would be caused by the 
incapacity or destruction of a building�s assets. 
. �	Page 1-13 of FEMA 426 provides an Asset Value Scale (Table 1-1) to 
quantify asset value, as well as definitions of the ratings. 
. �	Table 1-2 on page 1-14 of FEMA 426 

provides a format to summarize the 
value of the major categories of a 
building�s assets. 
Activity Requirements 
�	Working in previously assigned small groups, refer to the HIC Case Study and answer 
the worksheet questions. 
Take 25 minutes to complete this activity. Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
TRANSITION 
Unit III will cover a Threat/Hazard Assessment and Unit IV will cover 
Vulnerability Assessment. 
UNIT II CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: ASSET VALUE RATINGS 
Asset value is the degree of debilitating impact that would be caused by the incapacity or 
destruction of a building�s assets. Page 1-13 of FEMA 426 provides an Asset Value Scale 
(Table 1-1) to quantify asset value, as well as definitions of the ratings. Table 1-2 on 
page 1-14 of FEMA 426 provides a format to summarize the value of the major categories 
of a building�s assets. 
Requirements 
Referring to the HIC Case Study, answer the following questions: 
Identifying Building Core Functions 
1. What are HIC�s primary services or outputs? 
I T services support for private and government organizations. HIC supports 
over 1,000 
users and over 100 applications to include field technicians and help desk. 
2. What critical activities take place at HIC? 
Computer-based data processing, storage, and disaster recovery. 
3. Who are the building�s occupants and visitors? 
HIC employees and clients; business park neighbors are a mix of government and 
commercial organizations. Front parking area is unrestricted. 
4. What inputs from external organizations are required for HIC�s success? 
Utilities and communications supplies/vendors; hardware and software 
applications 
vendors; client data and support 
Identifying Building Assets and Quantifying Asset Values 
Refer to Table 1-2 in FEMA 426 and use the descriptions of these asset categories in 
the HIC Case Study. Consider the questions on page 1-11 in FEMA 426 and rate 
HIC�s assets as: 
. � Very High (10) 
. � High (8-9) 
. � Medium High (7) 
. � Medium (5-6) 
. � Medium Low (4) 
. � Low (2-3) 
. � Very Low (1) 

HIC Critical Functions Asset Rating HIC Critical Infrastructure Asset Rating 
Asset 
Value 
Numeric Value 
Rationale 
1. Administrative 
Medium Low 
4 
Redundancy and staff 
skills that can be 
replaced. Senior 
managers and financial 
systems in the same 
area make the function 
a key area to protect. 
Low to medium 
economic cost to 
replace. 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians 
Medium 
5 
Staff skills that can be 
replaced, but require 
specialized expertise. 
Key equipment and 
resources may not be 
replaceable. High 
economic cost to 
replace. 
3. Loading 
Dock/Warehouse 
Medium 
5 
Single point of entry 
into the interior and 
through which all 
major shipping and 
receiving occurs. Low 
to medium economic 
cost to replace. 
4. Data Center 
Very High 
10 
Primary function and 
organizational critical. 
Many key staff and 
critical equipment. 
Very high economic 
cost to replace. 
5. Communications 
High 
8 
Primary function and 
organizational critical. 
A few key staff and 
critical equipment. 
High economic cost to 
replace. 
6. Security 
Medium High 
7 
Access and 
monitoring systems, 
security records and 
location make the 
function critical to the 
organization. Key 
staff. Low to medium 




economic cost to 



replace. 
7. Housekeeping 
Very Low 
1 
Easily replaced, no 



critical skills or 



equipment. 

Asset 
Value 
Numeric Value 
Rationale 
1. Site 
Medium 
5 
No defined perimeter 
that HIC can control 
or segregate. Open 
sight lines and straight 
line vehicle 
approaches. Building 
owner does not own 
the site on which the 
building is located, but 
the location is critical 
to access and support 
to clients. 
2. Architectural 
Medium 
5 
Signage and business 
office information 
couple the building to 
other park tenants 
(geographically 
clustered, centralized. 
$10 to $20 per square 
foot lease cost. 
3. Structural Systems 
Medium 
5 
Two-story building 
probably is not going 
to experience 
progressive collapse, 
but over 50 percent of 
exterior is glazing. $10 
to $20 per square foot 
lease cost. 
4. Envelope Systems 
Medium 
5 
Fairly tight envelope, 
newer construction, 
CBR agents not likely 
to penetrate into 
interior through wall 
cracks or roof gaps 
without longer time. 

5. Utility Systems 
Medium 
5 
Well protected and 
buried, but single 
lines. 
6. Mechanical Systems 
Medium High 
7 
Single HVAC system 
supports multiple 
HVAC AHUs and 
interior spaces. High 
economic cost to 
replace. Loss of 
business revenue. 
7. Plumbing and Gas 
Systems 
Medium 
5 
Wet pipe sprinkler 
system only means of 
fire protection. 
8. Electrical Systems 
Medium High 
7 
Single-point 
vulnerability and 
organizational critical. 
High economic cost to 
replace. Loss of 
business revenue. 
9. Fire Alarm Systems 
Medium 
5 
Wet pipe sprinkler 
system only means of 
fire protection. 
10. IT/Communications 
Systems 
Very High 
10 
Single-point 
vulnerability and 
organizational critical. 
High economic cost to 
replace. Loss of 
business revenue. 

Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment



U
nit 
III 
COURSE TITLE 
Building Design for Homeland Security 



TIME 75 minutes 
UNIT TITLE 
Threat/Hazard Assessment 


OBJECTIVES 1. Identify the threats and hazards that may impact a building or site 
1. 2.	Define each threat and hazard using the Department of Defense 
methodology 
2. 3.	Provide a numerical rating for the threat or hazard and justify the basis for 
the rating 
3. 4. Define the Design Basis Threat and Levels of Protection 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1. From what offices is threat and hazard information available. 
2. 2.	The spectrum of event profiles for terrorism and technological hazards 
from FEMA 386-7. 
3. 3.	The five components used by DoD to define a threat and how it can be 
applied to the Homeland Security Advisory System. 
4. 4.	Various approaches to determine threat rating � Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and Veterans 
Affairs. 
5. 5. A rating scale and how to use it to determine a threat rating. 
6. 6.	Activity: Identify the threats and hazards to consider in the Case Study. 
As an absolute minimum, consider explosive blast and agents (chemical, biological, and 
radiological). Determine the threat rating for the minimum threat/hazards. 

REFERENCES 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-1 to 1-18 
Student Manual, Unit III Case Study � Hazardville 
Information Company Unit III visuals 
REQUIREMENTS 
1. 
2. 
FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
Instructor Guide 

 Unit III 
1. 3.	Student Manual (one per student) 
2. 4.	Overhead projector or computer display unit 
3. 5.	Unit III visuals 
4. 6.	Chart paper, easel, and markers 


UNIT III OUTLINE	Time Page 
III. Threat/Hazard Assessment	75 minutes IG III-1 
1. 1.	Threats and Hazards 10 minutes IG III-5 
2. 2.	Components of a Threat Description 5 minutes IG III-7 
3. 3.	Threat Rating Approaches 10 minutes IG III-8 
4. 4.	FEMA 426 Threat Rating Approach for Student Activity 10 minutes IG 
III-13 
5. 5.	Application of Selected Threat Rating Approach 10 minutes IG III-13 
Example 
6. 6.	Activity: Threat/Hazard Rating 30 minutes IG III-15 


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
�	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to identify 
topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic content, 
and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
The Instructor will begin this unit with a brief discussion of terrorism and 
technological hazards worldwide and within the United States. The probability of 
natural hazards and how they are considered during design will be compared to the 
probability of manmade hazards, both terrorism and technological accidents. This 
sets the stage for identifying where to get information about threats and hazards. 
Next, the Instructor will use FEMA 386-7 to describe the spectrum of tactics or 
events that can occur. This leads into the five components used to define a threat 
(or hazard) and one interpretation of the Homeland Security Advisory System. 
Various threat and vulnerability rating systems will be discussed to understand the 
different methodologies and their applicability to different situations. A simplified 
threat rating approach will be presented that can be used during a design charette for 
new construction or major renovation. This FEMA 426 approach forms the basis of 
the Unit III student activity. 
 Unit III 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity: The Instructor will use one threat/hazard example from the Case 
Study to focus students on the student activity. The Instructor will walk through the 
example, describing the threat and the threat rating approach. 

The students will then apply these techniques (threat identification, threat 
description, and threat rating) to the Case Study to identify and rate the threat from 
explosive blast and agents (chemical, biological, and radiological). Note that these 
event profiles can result from terrorism or technological hazards. 
Remind the students that they were exposed to the Case Study during the Unit I 
Introduction and Course Overview. They will have to read the Threat Analysis and 
Hazard Analysis portions that will cover primarily explosive blast and agents, rather 
than looking at all potential threats/hazards within the timeframe available. A review 
of the GIS portfolio will also be recommended for gaining threat and hazard 
information. 
�	Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 
Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL III-1 
The students will apply these techniques (threat identification, threat description, and 
threat rating) to the Case Study to identify and rate the threat from explosive blast and 
agents (chemical, biological, and radiological). Note that these event profiles can result 
from terrorism or technological hazards. 
VISUAL III-2 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit III Threat Hazard Assessment. The unit starts with a brief discussion of 
terrorism and technological hazards worldwide and within the United States. The 
probability of natural hazards and how they are considered during design will be 
compared to the probability of manmade hazards, both terrorism and technological 
accidents. 
The five components used to define a threat (or hazard) and one interpretation of the 
Homeland Security Advisory System are used to illustrate how assessment analysis can 
be coupled with increasing threat levels. 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Identify the threats and hazards that may impact a building or site. 
2. 2.	Define each threat and hazard using the FEMA 426 methodology. 
3. 3.	Provide a numerical rating for the threat or hazard and justify the basis for 
the rating. 
4. 4.	Define the Design Basis Threat, Levels of Protection, and Layers of 
Defense. 

Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL III-3 
VISUAL III- 4 
VISUAL III- 5 
Assessment Flow Chart 
Reviewing the Assessment Flow Chart, the Threat Assessment is the next step in the risk 
assessment process. 
Nature of the Threat 
With enhanced migration of terrorist groups from conflict-ridden countries, the formation 
of extensive international terrorist infrastructures and the increased reach of terrorist 
groups, terrorism has become a global concern. 
Nature of the Threat 
Terrorism and physical attacks on buildings have continued to increase in the past decade. 
The geographical isolation of the United States is not a sufficient barrier to prevent an 
attack on U.S. cities and citizens. These data from the Department of State 
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 
demonstrate the far reaching incidents and diverse natures and targets of recent terrorist 
attacks. 
Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL III-6 
VISUAL III-7 
Hazard 
Hazard -A source of 
potential danger or 
adverse condition. 

� Natural Hazards 
are naturally-
occurring events 
such as floods, 
earthquakes, tornadoes, 
tsunami, coastal storms, 
landslides, hurricanes, 
and wildfires. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-7 
VISUAL III-8 
CBR Terrorist Incidents Since 1970 
CBR attacks have been used since ancient times and, in the past 20 years, over 50 attacks 
have occurred. CBR attacks require the right weather, population, and dispersion to be 
effective. Recent attacks have had limited effectiveness or have been conducted on a 
relatively small scale. Future attacks with Weapons of Mass Destruction could occur on a 
regional or global scale. 
Hazard 
. �	Hazard -A source of potential danger or adverse condition.  
. �	Natural Hazards are naturally-occurring events such as floods, 
earthquakes, tornadoes, tsunami, coastal storms, landslides, hurricanes, and wildfires. A 
natural event is a hazard when it has the potential to harm people or property. (FEMA 
386-2, Understanding Your Risks). The risks of natural hazards may be increased or 
decreased as a result of human activity. 

Threat/Manmade Hazard 
. �	Technological Accidents are incidents that can arise from human 
activities such as manufacturing, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous materials. 
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that technological emergencies are accidental and 
that their consequences are unintended. 
. �	Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the 

Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives. (28 
CFR, Section 0.85) 
VISUAL III-9 
Identify Each Threat/Hazard 
�	Table 1-3 in FEMA 426 (page 1-17) 
outlines the broad spectrum of terrorist threats and technological hazards. Some of the 
items are listed here. 
�	While we can think of terrorist tactics and technological hazards (such as HazMat 
releases), a runaway truck crashing into a power line, a storage tank, or a telephone 
pedestal can be equally detrimental. Similarly, surveillance of a company�s operations 
may divulge company trade secrets that are detrimental to the economic bottom line. 
VISUAL III-10 
Define Each Threat/Hazard 
Part of the understanding of each hazard or threat is to walk through these five threat 
analysis factors as laid out by the Department of Homeland Security to define the threat 
in regard to the aggressors or perpetrators that may want to cause harm. 
First, what groups or organizations exist/are known? Do they have capability among 
themselves or is that capability readily obtainable locally? Do they have a history of 
terrorist acts and what are their tactics? What are the intentions of the aggressors against 
the government, commercial enterprises, industrial sectors, or individuals? Finally, has it 
been determined that targeting (planning a tactic or seeking vulnerabilities) is actually 
occurring or being discussed? 
Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL III-11 
Determine Threat Level for Each Hazard 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-11 
VISUAL III-12 
Threat Sources 
Identify Threat Statements
Identify Area Threats
Identify Facility-Specific Threats 
Identify Potential Threat 

Element Attributes 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-12 
Exam Questions #A3 and B4 
Note: For technological hazards, it is also important to gather information from the local 
fire department and hazardous materials (HazMat) unit, Local Emergency Planning 
Committee (LEPC), and State Emergency Response Commission (SERC). LEPC and For 
technological hazards, these same questions take a different perspective. Does anything 
that can be a hazard (or be attacked causing collateral damage) exist within a given distance 
of the building in question? 
Determine Threat Level for Each Hazard 
Applying the factors to make terrorist threat predictions is shown here. As each factor 
(existence, capability, history, intention, and targeting) is confirmed, the potential threat 
increases. 
It shows how the threat analysis factors information about one or more terrorist 
groups as interpreted by the local intelligence community can be used to determine a 
threat level. However, some people may prefer the simple High, Medium, and Low 
ratings. 
Threat Sources 
A manmade threat/hazard analysis requires coordination with security and intelligence 
organizations that understand the locality, the region, and the Nation. These 
organizations include the police department (whose jurisdiction includes the building or 
site), the local state police office, and the local office of the FBI. In many areas of the 
country, there are threat coordinating committees, including FBI Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces, that facilitate the sharing of information.  
Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
SERC are local and state organizations established under a U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) program. They identify critical facilities in vulnerable zones and generate 
emergency management plans. Additionally, most fire departments understand which 
industries in the local area handle the most combustible materials and the HazMat unit 
understands who handles materials that could have a negative impact upon people and the 
environment. In many jurisdictions, the HazMat unit is part of the fire department. 
VISUAL III-13 
Critical Functions 
Function 
Cyber attack 
Armed attack 
(single gunman) 
Vehicle 
bomb 
CBR 
attack 
Administration 




Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
8 
4 
3 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 




Engineering 




Asset Value 
8 
8 
8 
8 
Threat Rating 
8 
5 
6 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 





BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-13 
Note: The Threat Rating values for the Administration and Engineering functions are 
highlighted. The ratings run from low to high for each threat pair that are derived from the 
site-specific threat analysis and the values shown are to illustrate a typical analysis. 
Critical Functions 
After each threat/hazard has been identified and defined, the threat level for each 
threat/hazard must be defined. The threat rating is a subjective judgment of a terrorist 
threat based on existence, capability, history, intentions, and targeting. 
It is a snapshot in time, and can be influenced by many factors, but the given threat value 
will typically be the same for each function (going down the columns). Organizations that 
are dispersed in a campus environment may have variation. 
On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 is a very low probability and 10 is a very high probability of a 
terrorist attack. 
Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL III-14 
Critical Infrastructure 
Function 
Cyber attack 
Armed attack 
(single gunman) 
Vehicle 
bomb 
CBR 
attack 
Site 




Asset Value 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Threat Rating 
4 
4 
3 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 




Structural Systems 




Asset Value 
8 
8 
8 
8 
Threat Rating 
3 
4 
3 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 





BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-14 
VISUAL III-15 
Note: Facility designers need to have the size and type of bomb, vehicle, gun, CBR, or 
other threat tactics, weapons, or tools identified in order to provide an appropriate level 
of protection. 
There are several methodologies and assessment techniques that can be used. Historically, 
the U.S. military methodology (with a focus on explosive effects, CBR, and personnel 
protection) has been used extensively for military installations and other national 
infrastructure assets. 
Critical Infrastructure 
The site Critical Infrastructure matrix lists Infrastructure down the left side and threats 
across the top. 
The threat rating under the Structural Systems is highlighted. A medium threat rating (3) 
was assigned under cyber attack, armed attack (4), and vehicle bomb (3); and a low 
threat rating was assigned under CBR attack (2). 
Design Basis Threat 
Having applied a systems engineering evaluation process to determine a building�s critical 
functions, infrastructure, and having an understanding of the aggressors� likely weapons 
and attack delivery mode, the next step in the process of quantifying a building�s risk 
assessment is determining the "Design Basis Threat." 
After review of the preliminary information bout the building functions, infrastructure 
and threats, senior management should establish the "Design Basis Threat" and select 
the desired "Level of Protection". 
Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
. �	The Department of State (DOS) adopted or co-developed many of the 
same blast and CBR design criteria as DoD and GSA. 
. �	The GSA further developed criteria for federal buildings as a result of the 
attack on the Murrah Federal Building. 
. �	The Department of Commerce (DOC) Critical Infrastructure Assurance 
Office (CIAO) established an assessment framework, which focused on information 
technology infrastructure. 

VISUAL III-16 
Level of Protection (1) 
Layers of Defense Elements 
. � Deter 
. � Detect 
. � Deny 
. � Devalue 

The strategy of Layers of Defense 
uses the elements and Levels of 
Protection to develop mitigation 
options to counter or defeat the 

tactics, weapons, and effects of 
an attack defined by the Design 
Basis Threat.

Reference: Page 1-9, FEMA 426 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-16 
Exam Questions #A17 and B18 
VISUAL III-17 
Levels of 
Protection (2) 

Table 1-6, page 1-26, FEMA 426 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-17 
Levels of Protection 
Layers of Defense elements 
. �	Deter 
. �	Detect 
. �	Deny 
. �	Devalue 

Levels of Protection 
This table � extracted from the U.S. Department of Justice�s Vulnerability Assessment of 
Federal Facilities (1995) � presents a series of security measures for typical sizes and 
types of sites, in addition to a transferable example of appropriate security measures for 
typical locations and occupancies. 
Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL III-18 
Levels of Protection (3) 
DoD Minimum 
Antiterrorism (AT) 
Standards for New 
Buildings

Table 4-1, page 4-9 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-18 
VISUAL III-19 
Level of Protection (4) 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-19 
VISUAL III-20 
Level of Protection (5) 
UFC 4-010-01 APPENDIX B DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR NEW AND EXISTING 
BUILDINGS 
Standard 13 
Mailrooms 
Standard 14 
Roof Access 
Standard 15 
Overhead Mounted Architectural Features 
Standard 16 
Air Intakes 
Standard 17 
Mailroom Ventilation 
Standard 18 
Emergency Air Distribution Shutoff 
Standard 19 
Utility Distribution and Installation 
Standard 20 
Equipment Bracing 
Standard 21 
Under Building Access 
Standard 22 
Mass Notification 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-20 
DoD Minimum Antiterrorism (AT) Standards for New Buildings 
In contrast to the GSA security levels and criteria, the DoD correlates levels of 
protection with potential damage and expected injuries.  
Levels of Protection 
DoD Antiterrorism Standards 1-12. 
Highlight Standards 1, 2, and 4, and refer to the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist questions for blast evaluation. 
Each standard has text for each Level of Protection that describes the Design Basis 
Threat and mitigation options or recommendations. 
Levels of Protection 
DoD Antiterrorism Standards 13 � 22. 
Highlight Standards 17, 18, and 19, and impacts on HVAC. 
Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL III-21 
Summary 
Process 
. � Identify each threat/hazard 
. � Define each threat/hazard 
. � Determine threat level for each threat/hazard 

Threat Assessment Specialist Tasks Critical Infrastructure and Critical Function Matrix Determine the "Design Basis Threat" 
Select the "Level of Protection" 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-21 
VISUAL III-22 
Unit III Case Study Activity 
Asset Value Ratings 
Background 
Hazards categories: natural and manmade 
HIC case study threat: explosive blast and chemical, biological, and/or radiological agents 
Result of assessment: "Threat Rating," a subjective judgment of a threat


Requirements 
Refer to HIC case study data and GIS portfolio
Complete worksheet tables:

. � HIC Critical Functions Threat Rating 
. � HIC Infrastructure Threat Rating 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit III-22 
Refer participants to FEMA 426 and the Unit III Case Study activity in the Student 
Manual. 
Summary 
The process for developing threat assessments: 
. �	Identify each threat/hazard 
. �	Define each threat/hazard 
. �	Determine threat level for each threat/hazard 

Use Federal, state, or local law enforcement to help determine threat ratings. 
Complete the Critical Infrastructure and Critical Function Matrices. 
Establish the Design Basis Threat. 
Select the Level of Protection (using DoD standards). 
Use Layers of Defense strategy to mitigate attack and develop mitigation options. 
Student Activity 
After assets that need to be protected are determined, an assessment is performed to 
identify the threats and hazards that could cause harm to the building and the 
inhabitants of the building. 
Hazards are categorized into two groups: 
. �	Natural 
 �	Manmade 
 While natural hazards could logically be expected to affect the HIC, the Case 
Study describes the threat from: 
. �	Explosive blast 
. �	Chemical, biological, and/or radiological "agents" 

Unit III: Threat/Hazard Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist groups 
as needed. 
At the end of 20 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
. �	Cyber attack 
 �	Armed attack 
 The result of this assessment is a "Threat Rating." The threat rating is a subjective 
judgment of a threat based on: 
. �	Existence 
. �	Capability 
. �	History 
. �	Intentions 
. � Targeting The rating scale is a scale of 1 to 10: 
. �	1 is a very low probability of a terrorist attack 
. �	10 a very high probability. 

Activity Requirements 
Working in small groups, refer to the HIC Case Study and GIS portfolio, and complete 
the worksheet tables for: 
. �	HIC Critical Functions 
. �	HIC Infrastructure 

Take 20 minutes to complete this activity. Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
Transition 
Unit IV will cover a Vulnerability Assessment and Unit V will cover Risk 
Assessment/Risk Management. 
UNIT III CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: THREAT/HAZARD RATING 
After assets that need to be protected are determined, an assessment is performed to 
identify the threats and hazards that could cause harm to the building and the inhabitants 
of the building. Hazards are categorized into two groups: natural and manmade. While 
natural hazards could logically be expected to affect the HIC, the Case Study only 
describes the threat from explosive blast and from chemical, biological, and/or 
radiological "agents." 
The result of this assessment is a "Threat Rating." The threat rating is a subjective 
judgment of a threat based on existence, capability, history, intentions, and targeting. The 
rating scale is a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 a very low probability of a terrorist attack and 10 
a very high probability. 
Requirements 
Refer to the HIC Case Study data and GIS portfolio and complete the following 
worksheets.  Each student will interpret the HIC threat information and should have a 
number close to the value shown. Any function with key IT systems connected to the 
Internet should get high cyber values. Functions that are susceptible to blast should get 
high numbers. A CBR attack will impact the entire facility. 
HIC Critical Functions Threat Rating 
Function 
Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR 
Attack 
Rationale 
1. Administration 
6 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with the 
capability, 
intentions, and 
targeting 
expertise are 
known to be in 
the area. 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians 
5 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with the 
capability, 
intentions, and 
targeting 
expertise are 
known to be in 
the area. 

3. Loading Dock/ 
Warehousing 
5 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with the 
capability, 
intentions, and 
targeting 
expertise are 
known to be in 
the area. 
4. Data Center 
9 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with the 
capability, 
intentions, and 
targeting 
expertise are 
known to be in 
the area. 
5. Communications 
5 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with the 
capability, 
intentions, and 
targeting 
expertise are 
known to be in 
the area. 
6. Security 
5 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with the 
capability, 
intentions, and 
targeting 
expertise are 
known to be in 
the area. 
7. Housekeeping 
2 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with the 
capability, 
intentions, and 
targeting 
expertise are 
known to be in 
the area. 

HIC Infrastructure Threat Rating 
Function 
Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR Attack 
Rationale 
1. Site 
1 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 
2. Architectural 
1 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 
3. Structural 
1 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 
4. Envelope Systems 
1 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 

5. Utility Systems 
3 
5 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 
6. Mechanical 
Systems 
3 
5 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 
7. Plumbing and Gas 
Systems 
2 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 
8. Electrical Systems 
3 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 
9. Fire Alarm 
Systems 
2 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 






and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 
10. IT/ 
Communications 
Systems 
10 
3 
6 
4 
Local and 
international 
groups with 
the 
capability, 
intentions, 
and targeting 
expertise are 
known to be 
in the area. 

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment





U
nit 
IV 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 105 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Vulnerability Assessment 
OBJECTIVES 
1. 1.	Explain what constitutes a vulnerability 
2. 2.	Identify vulnerabilities using the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist 
3. 3.	Understand that an identified vulnerability may indicate that an asset is 
vulnerable to more than one threat or hazard and that mitigation measures may reduce 
vulnerability to one or more threats or hazards 
4. 4.	Provide a numerical rating for the vulnerability and justify the basis for the 
rating 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Review types of vulnerabilities, especially single-point vulnerabilities and 
tactics possible under threats/hazards for which there are no mitigation measures. 
2. 2.	Various approaches and considerations to determine vulnerabilities � 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, 
and Veterans Affairs. 
3. 3.	A rating scale and how to use it to determine a vulnerability rating. One or 
more specific examples will be used to focus students on the following activity. 
4. 4.	Activity: Identify the vulnerabilities present in the Case Study. As an 
absolute minimum, consider threats/hazards associated with explosive blast and agents 
(chemical, biological, and radiological). Determine the vulnerability rating for each asset � 
threat/hazard pairs of interest. 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 1 
1. 2.	Student Manual, Unit IV 
2. 3.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
3. 4.	Unit IV visuals 

 Unit IV 
REQUIREMENTS 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
1. 2.	Instructor Guide 
2. 3.	Student Manual (one per student) 
3. 4.	Overhead projector or computer display unit 
4. 5.	Unit IV visuals 
5. 6.	Chart paper, easel, and markers 


UNIT IV OUTLINE	Time Page 
IV. Vulnerability Assessment	105 minutes IG IV-
1 
1. 1.	Identification of Vulnerabilities 10 minutes IG IV-6 
2. 2.	Vulnerability Rating Approaches 15 minutes IG IV-7 
3. 3.	Vulnerability Rating Approach for Student Activity 10 minutes IG IV-14 
4. 4.	Application of Selected Vulnerability Rating Approach 25 minutes IG IV-
15 Examples 
5. 5.	Activity: Vulnerability Rating 45 minutes IG IV-21 



PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
�	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to identify 
topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic content, 
and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
The Instructor will discuss generic vulnerabilities found in a building and how tactics 
possible under threats/hazards can be used against a building. In essence, the students 
will 
see the terrorist�s thought process used to select a tactic against a target. Conversely, 
the 
students will also be presented vulnerabilities that exist for many tactics. Similar to 
the 
ratings presented in Units II and III, various approaches to determine vulnerability 
will be 
presented. 
One or more specific examples will be used to focus students on the associated 
student activity. The Instructor will walk through the examples, describing the 
vulnerability in relation to the Case Study and applying the vulnerability rating 
approach. The students will be introduced to use of the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist (Table 1-22 of FEMA 426) during this Unit. Use of the 
checklist will be reemphasized in Units VIII and IX covering Chapters 2 and 3, 
respectively, of FEMA 426. Note that the vulnerability rating at 
 Unit IV 
this point in the assessment process is a rapid screening approach. It provides an 
initial vulnerability rating based upon mitigation measures already in place against the 
threat/hazard tactic. It is derived from the interview process with the building 
management and staff to focus the actual vulnerability assessment to be performed 
later. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity: The students will apply the vulnerability identification (or lack 
of mitigation measures) and vulnerability rating to the Case Study to identify and rate the 
vulnerabilities found in the Case Study for each asset � threat/hazard pair. The students 
will quickly review/scan the building data, physical security, building structure, electrical 
systems, mechanical systems information systems, communications, emergency 
response, and geographic information system (GIS) portfolio to have a sense of the 
vulnerabilities at the Hazardville Information Company. The Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist should also be used to capture the sense of potential vulnerabilities 
and mitigation measures. 
. �	Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-1 
VISUAL IV-2 
Vulnerability 
Any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor or, in a non-terrorist threat environment, make an asset susceptible to 
hazard damage 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-2 
VISUAL IV-3 
Unit Objectives 
Explain what constitutes a vulnerability. 
Identify vulnerabilities using the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist. 
Understand that an identified vulnerability may indicate that an asset: 
. � is vulnerable to more than one threat or hazard; 
. �	and that mitigation measures may reduce vulnerability to one or more threats or hazards. 

Provide a numerical rating for the vulnerability and justify the basis for the rating. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-3 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit IV Vulnerability Assessment. In this unit, we will review types of 
vulnerabilities, approaches, and considerations to determine vulnerabilities, review a rating 
scale, and use the FEMA 426 Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Table 1-
22) to evaluate the vulnerability against a level of protection standard. 
Vulnerability 
The definition of vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor 
or, in a non-terrorist threat environment, make an asset susceptible to hazard damage. 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Explain what constitutes a vulnerability. 
2. 2.	Identify vulnerabilities using the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist. 
3. 3.	Understand that an identified vulnerability may indicate that an asset 

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-4 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Identify site and building systems design issues Evaluate design issues against type and level of threat Determine level of 
protection sought for each mitigation 
measure against each threat 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-4 
VISUAL IV-5 is vulnerable to more than one threat or hazard, and that mitigation 
measures may reduce vulnerability to one or more threats or hazards. 
4.	Provide a numerical rating for the vulnerability and justify the basis for the rating. 
Vulnerability Assessment in this context has three components: 
. �	Identify site and building systems design issues 
. �	Evaluate design issues against type and level of threat 
 �	Determine level of protection sought for each mitigation measure against 
each threat. 
 Vulnerability assessments occur at different scales, including: 
. �	State 
. �	Regional 
. �	Site 
. �	Building 

Assessment Flow Chart 
Reviewing the Assessment Flow Chart, the vulnerability assessment is the next step in 
the risk assessment process.  
In the prior steps, assets and their respective values were assigned, the threat was 
analyzed, a Design Basis Threat was established, and a Level of Protection was selected. 
The next step is conduct the vulnerability assessment, which is an in-depth analysis of 
the building functions, systems, and site characteristics to identify building 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-6 
Identifying Vulnerabilities 
Multidisciplinary Team 
. � Engineers 
. � Architects 
. � Security specialists 
. � Subject matter experts 
. � Outside experts if necessary 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-6 
VISUAL IV-7 
Vulnerability Assessment Preparation 
Coordinate with the building stakeholders: 
. � Site and Building Plans 
. � Utilities 
. � Emergency Plans (shelter, evacuation) 
. � Interview schedules 
. � Escorts for building access 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-7 
weaknesses and lack of redundancy, and determine mitigations or corrective actions that 
can be designed or implemented to reduce the vulnerabilities. 
Identifying Vulnerabilities 
Assessing a building�s vulnerabilities requires a multidisciplinary team. It should not be 
conducted solely by an engineer or by a security specialist. Only a balanced team can 
have an understanding of the identified aggressors or threat/hazards and how they can 
affect the building�s critical functions and infrastructure. Team members include: 
. � Engineers 
. � Architects 
. � Security specialists 
. � Subject matter experts 
. � Outside experts if necessary 

Tailor the team to the individual project. 
Vulnerability Assessment Preparation 
After assembling a team, the assessment process starts with a detailed planning and 
information collection of the site. If possible, the information should be gathered in a GIS 
format. Types of coordination with the building stakeholders include: 
. � Site and Building Plans 
. � Utilities 
. � Emergency Plans (shelter, evacuation) 
. � Interview schedules 
. � Escorts for building access 

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-8 
Note: For additional information on HAZUSMH, refer the student to www.HAZUS.org. 
Another important resource is Geospatial One-Stop (www.geo-one-stop.gov), a one-stop 
source of geospatial information from across the nation. Geospatial information allows 
decisions to be viewed in a community context (e.g., showing the geographic components 
of buildings, lifelines, hazards, etc.). 
VISUAL IV-9 
Assessment GIS Portfolio 
A technique to organize required information is to develop an Assessment GIS Portfolio. 
The portfolio is designed to support vulnerability and risk assessments through 
identification of critical infrastructure and nodes within the surrounding area. The data 
sets are a combination of commercial and government (FEMA � HAZUS-MH, USGS, 
state, and local data) imagery interpretation, as well as open source transportation, utility, 
and political boundaries. Portfolios are tailored to each individual site, but they usually 
consist of the following elements. 
This displays a satellite image of the region with state boundaries delineated. This map 
provides a general overview for user�s initial orientation to a site. 
The next series of slides shows how GIS can be used to support threat analysis and 
vulnerability assessments. 
10-Mile Radius 
This map displays infrastructure and features within a 10-mile radius that could have an 
impact on the site. Features mapped include utilities, major transportation networks, first 
responders, and government facilities. 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-10 
VISUAL IV-11 
VISUAL IV-12 
Regional Transportation 
The regional transportation map can be used for planning evacuation routes and 
identifying single-point nodes such as bridges and tunnels. 
Metro Center Imagery 
Imagery provides users with satellite imagery of the region surrounding a site. 
Commercial, industrial, and residential areas can easily be differentiated, as well as rural 
and urban areas. This map can be used for an overview of the surrounding area and for 
determining if collateral damage is a significant risk. 
Site Emergency Response 
This map displays first responders and hospitals near a site and can be used to 
estimate response times during an emergency. 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-13 
Site Public/Government Buildings 
This map shows the location of government and public buildings in the region, including 
government facilities, schools, and churches. Government buildings potentially could be 
the target of terrorist operations. Therefore, the possibility of collateral damage should be 
considered for sites in close proximity. Additionally, some churches and schools may be 
designated community shelters and resources during emergencies. 
VISUAL IV-14 
Site HazMat 
This map displays hazardous 
materials 
(HazMat) sites tracked by various 
EPA 
databases. They include large HazMat 
sites 
such as refineries and chemical plants, 
but 
also include smaller sites with small 
quantities of chemicals such as 
schools and 
dry cleaners. Some sites that contain 
very 
small amounts of HazMat are filtered 
out 
Prevailing wind direction from the 
National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 
(NOAA) Climatic Data Center is 
shown to 
help evaluate the vulnerabilities from 
surrounding hazards that can be used 
by a 
terrorist as a 
weapon. VISUAL IV-15 
Site Local Transportation Network 
The local transportation map 
provides greater resolution of 
transportation routes in the local area 
surrounding a site. It can be used for 
planning evacuation routes and 
alternate routes during for an 
emergency. It also shows proximity 
to routes that could potentially be 
used for carrying hazardous 
materials. 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-16 
Site Principal Buildings by Use 
This map provides a quick overview of the primary use of principal buildings 
surrounding a site. It is useful when conducting threat assessments to help identify 
potential surrounding terrorist targets and the likelihood of collateral damage. 
VISUAL IV-17 
Site Perimeter Imagery 
Site imagery gives a view of the site and allows assessors to analyze the layout of the site, 
including site entry points and building separation. The imagery can also be integrated 
with building plans to provide important information for implementing mitigation 
measures and making other security decisions. 
VISUAL IV-18 
Site Truck Bomb 
Displays the potential effects of a vehicle bomb assuming a nominal building structure. It 
is an estimation based on range-to-effects charts and is useful for analyzing vehicular flow 
and stand-off issues. The results of more accurate site-specific blast analysis can also be 
used to replace the nominal estimations. 
This is an example of the potential blast effects associated with a truck bomb. 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-19 
Site Car Bomb 
This is an example of the potential blast effects associated with a car bomb. 
VISUAL IV-20 
Options to Reduce Vulnerability 
After identifying and collecting information on the site, the multidisciplinary team follows 
the nine steps listed here: 
1. 1.	Define Site Functions 
2. 2.	Identify Critical Systems 
3. 3.	Evaluate Facility System Interactions 
4. 4.	Determine Common System Vulnerabilities 
5. 5.	Physically Locate Components and Lines 
6. 6.	Identify Critical Components and Nodes 
7. 7.	Assess Critical Nodes Versus Threats 
8. 8.	Determine Survivability Enhancements (and Options) 
9. 9.	Document Entire Analysis Process 

This process is explained in more 
detail in FEMA 452, "Methodology 
for Preparing Threat Assessments 
For Commercial Buildings." For this 
course, this is an overview of what a 
more detailed on-site assessment 
should accomplish. As part of the 
Case Study, this process will be led 
by the instructor and the students 
will identify the vulnerabilities and 
mitigation options. 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-21 
VISUAL IV-22 
Exam Questions #A4 and B3 
Single-Point Vulnerabilities are critical functions or systems that lack redundancy and, if 
damaged by an attack, would result in immediate organization disruption or loss of 
capability. 
Facility System Interactions 
Every building or facility can be attacked and damaged or destroyed as illustrated in the 
flow chart. 
A terrorist selects the weapon and tactic that will destroy the building or infrastructure 
target. 
At a site with multiple buildings, Tables 1-6 through 1-16 in FEMA 426 can be used to 
rank order these buildings and thus to determine which buildings require more in-depth 
analysis. 
Single-Point Vulnerabilities (SPVs) 
The function and infrastructure analysis will identify the geographic distribution within 
the building and interdependencies between critical assets. Ideally, the functions should 
have geographic dispersion as well as a recovery site or alternate work location. However, 
some critical building functions and infrastructure do not have a backup, or will be found 
collocated. This design creates what is called a Single-Point Vulnerability. 
Identification and protection of these Single-Point Vulnerabilities is a key aspect of the 
assessment process. 
This chart provides examples of this concept: 
1. 1.	No Redundancy 
2. 2.	Redundant Systems Feed Into Single Critical Node 
3. 3.	Critical Components of Redundant Systems Collocated 
4. 4.	Inadequate Capacity or Endurance in Post-Attack Environment 

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-23 
Functional Analysis SPVs 
There are both Functional Analysis SPVs and Infrastructure SPVs. 
Functional Analysis SPVs are depicted in this chart. This figure shows an example of a 
building that has numerous critical functions and infrastructure collocated, which creates a 
single-point vulnerability. 
VISUAL IV-24 
Infrastructure Analysis SPVs 
Typical infrastructure SPVs are depicted here: 
. �	Air intakes at ground level 
. �	Ground level drive through drop-off atrium with no anti-vehicle barrier 
. �	Single primary electrical service 
. �	Single telecom switch room in parking garage 

Many commercial buildings have collocated electrical, mechanical, and telecom rooms that 
share a common central distribution core or chase. 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-25 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
Compiles best practices from many sources 
Includes questions that determine if critical systems will continue to function during an emergency or threat event 
Organized into 13 sections 
. � Each section should be assigned to a 
knowledgeable individual

. � Results of all sections should be integrated into a master vulnerability assessment 
. � Compatible with CSI Master Format standard to facilitate cost estimates 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-25 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist is based on a checklist developed by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The checklist can be used as a screening tool for 
preliminary design vulnerability assessment. In addition to examining design issues that 
affect vulnerability, the checklist includes questions that determine if critical systems 
continue to function in order to enhance deterrence, detection, denial, and damage 
limitation, and to ensure that emergency systems function during a threat or hazard 
situation. 
VISUAL IV-26 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
Site
Architectural
Structural Systems
Building Envelope

Electrical Systems Fire Alarm Systems Communications and IT 
Systems Equipment OperationsUtility Systems and Maintenance 
Mechanical Systems Security Systems
(HVAC and CBR)
Plumbing and Gas Security Master Plan

Systems 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-26 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
FEMA 426 provides the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Table 1-22), 
which compiles many best practices based on technologies and scientific research to 
consider during the design of a new building or renovation of an existing building, and help 
guide the multidisciplinary team through the vulnerability analysis. It allows a consistent 
security evaluation of designs at various levels. 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
To conduct a vulnerability assessment of a building or preliminary design, each section of 
the checklist should be assigned to an engineer, architect, or subject matter expert who is 
knowledgeable and qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-27 
VISUAL IV-28 
VISUAL IV-29 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
Each assessor should consider the questions and guidance provided to help identify 
vulnerabilities and document results in the observations column. Not all possible 
questions are in the checklist, but it provides a good basis to guide the assessment. 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
Notice that the checklist leads assessment team members to see the same critical 
functions or infrastructure from different perspectives. 
For example, here a parking lot is analyzed by questions from both the site and building 
envelope sections. 
This cross analysis is one of the strengths of the methodology. 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
In this example, the same feature, a loading dock, is addressed by different sections. 
The location of the trash dumpster, building overhang, and exposed loading dock columns 
make this area susceptible to significant blast damage. 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-30 
VISUAL IV-31 
VISUAL IV-37 
Vulnerability Rating 
Very High � One or more major weaknesses have been identified that make the asset extremely susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. 
High -One or more significant weaknesses have been identified that make the asset highly susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. 
Medium High � An important weakness has been identified that makes the asset very susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. 
Medium � A weakness has been identified that makes the asset fairly susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. 
Medium Low � A weakness has been identified that makes the asset somewhat susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. 
Low � A minor weakness has been identified that slightly increases the susceptibility of the asset to an aggressor or hazard. 
Very Low � No weaknesses exist. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-32 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
In this example, the same feature, an air intake, is addressed by questions from three 
sections: #1 � Site; #3 � Structural Systems; #6 � Mechanical Systems.  
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
Section 5 of the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist addresses Utility 
Systems. The results of Utility Systems vulnerability assessments and the other 12 
categories provide a basis for determining vulnerability ratings for the facility. 
Vulnerability Rating 
The results of the 13 assessment sections should be integrated into a master vulnerability 
assessment in order to provide the basis for determining vulnerability rating numeric 
values. 
In the rating scale of 1 to 10, 1 means very low or no weaknesses exist, and 10 means one 
or more major weaknesses exist to make an asset extremely susceptible to an aggressor. 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-33 
Critical Functions 
Function 
Cyber attack 
Armed attack 
(single gunman) 
Vehicle 
bomb 
CBR 
attack 
Administration 




Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
8 
4 
3 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 
7 
7 
9 
9 
Engineering 




Asset Value 
8 
8 
8 
8 
Threat Rating 
8 
5 
6 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 
2 
4 
8 
9 

Extracted from Table 1-20, page 1-38 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-33 
. �	Very High � One or more major weaknesses have been identified that 
make the asset extremely susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. 
. �	High � One or more significant weaknesses have been identified that make 
the asset highly susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. 
. �	Medium High � An important weakness has been identified that makes 
the asset very susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. 
. �	Medium � A weakness has been identified that makes the asset fairly 
susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. 
. �	Medium Low � A weakness has been identified that makes the asset 
somewhat susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. 
. �	Low � A minor weakness has been identified that slightly increases the 
susceptibility of the asset to an aggressor or hazard. 
. �	Very Low � No weaknesses exist. 

Critical Functions Matrix 
The Vulnerability Rating is entered into the same site critical functions matrix and the site 
critical infrastructure matrix that we saw in Units II and III. 
The site Critical Functions matrix lists functions down the left side and threats across 
the top. 
The Vulnerability Rating under the Engineering Function and Threat Pairs functions 
is highlighted. A medium and 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
The Vulnerability Rating is subjective and the assessor has to take into account how 
important the asset is to the overall mission, how well it is protected or how quickly it 
can be replaced, and what tactics and weapons are effective against the asset. 
VISUAL IV-34 
Critical Infrastructure 
Function 
Cyber attack 
Armed attack 
(single gunman) 
Vehicle 
bomb 
CBR 
attack 
Site 




Asset Value 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Threat Rating 
4 
4 
3 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 
3 
5 
9 
9 
Structural Systems 




Asset Value 
8 
8 
8 
8 
Threat Rating 
3 
4 
3 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 
2 
4 
8 
9 

Extracted from Table 1-21, page 1-39 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-34 
VISUAL IV-35 
Summary 
Step-by-Step Analysis Process: 
. � Expertly performed by experienced personnel 
. � Determines critical systems 
. � Identifies vulnerabilities 
. � Focuses survivability mitigation measures on critical areas 
. � Essential component of Critical Infrastructure and Critical Function Matrices 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-35 
high Vulnerability Rating (5) was assigned to the Administration Function threat pairs to 
illustrate an exposed function near exterior walls and entrances. A range of ratings was 
assigned for the Engineering Function threat pairs to illustrate a function that is typically 
in the interior core, but shares common HVAC systems and is likely within a blast 
damage zone. 
Critical Infrastructure Matrix 
The site Critical Infrastructure matrix lists Infrastructure down the left side and threats 
across the top. 
The Vulnerability Rating under the Site and Structural Systems is highlighted. A range of 
Vulnerability Rating values from medium to high were assigned for the Site Infrastructure 
threat pairs to illustrate the first layer of defense and aerial extent that can be affected. A 
range of Vulnerability Rating values from medium to high were assigned for the Structural 
System threat pairs to illustrate impact on the structure in the second layer of defense. 
Summary 
. �	Identify core functions and Critical Infrastructure 
. �	Assign a building�s assets or resources a value 
. �	Apply ranking to the Critical Site Functional matrix and the Critical Site 
Infrastructure System Matrix 

Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IV-36 
Unit IV Case Study Activity 
Vulnerability Rating 
Background Vulnerability: any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor or, in a non-terrorist threat environment, make an asset susceptible to hazard 
damage 
Requirements: Vulnerability Rating Approach 
Use rating scale of 1 (very low or no weakness) to 
10 (one or major weaknesses)

Refer to HIC case study and rate the vulnerability of asset-threat/hazard pairs: 
. � HIC Critical Functions 
. � HIC Infrastructure 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IV-36 
Refer participants to the Unit IV Case Study activity in the Student Manual. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist groups 
as needed. 
At the end of the working sessions, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
Student Activity 
Vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor or, in a non-
terrorist threat environment, make an asset susceptible to hazard damage. 
DISCUSSION QUESTION 
Determine what if any vulnerability exists in the building design? 
Suggested Responses: 
. �	Critical functions or systems that lack redundancy and if damaged would 
result in immediate organization disruption or loss of capability ("Single-Point 
Vulnerability"). 
. �	Redundant systems feeding into a single critical node. 
. �	Critical components of redundant systems collocated. 
. �	Inadequate capacity or endurance in post-attack environment. 

Vulnerability rating requires identifying and rating the vulnerability of each asset-threat 
pair. 
In-depth vulnerability assessment of a building evaluates specific design and 
architectural features and identifies all vulnerabilities of the building functions and 
building systems. 
Activity Requirements: Selected Building Systems Example 
�	Working in small groups, answer the worksheet questions and record relevant 
observations regarding the HIC Building Systems. 
Unit IV: Vulnerability Assessment 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
�	Also determine what, if any, vulnerability exists. 
Take 15 minutes to complete this part of the activity. 
Vulnerability Rating Approach 
Using a rating scale of 1 to 10, 1 means very low or no weaknesses exist, and 10 means 
one or more major weaknesses exist to make an asset extremely susceptible. 
In a Vulnerability Assessment rating, vulnerability is rated by assessing available 
information to identify the most obvious areas of vulnerability that need to be assessed 
in depth as is illustrated in the building systems example. 
Activity Requirements: HIC Critical Functions and Infrastructure 
Vulnerability Ratings 
Continue working in small groups. 
Refer to the HIC Case Study and rate the vulnerability of the asset-threat/hazard pairs 
for: 
. �	HIC Critical Functions 
. �	HIC Infrastructure 

Students take 20 minutes to complete the Site, Architectural and Envelope ratings of the 
Critical Infrastructure matrix.  Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
Transition 
Unit V will cover Risk Assessment/ Risk Management. Unit VI will cover Explosive 
Blast. 
UNIT IV CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: VULNERABILITY RATING 
Vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor or, in a non-
terrorist threat environment, make an asset susceptible to hazard damage. 
Vulnerabilities may include: 
. �	Critical functions or systems that lack redundancy and if damaged would 
result in immediate organization disruption or loss of capability ("Single-Point 
Vulnerability") 
. �	Redundant systems feeding into a single critical node 
. �	Critical components of redundant systems collocated 
. �	Inadequate capacity or endurance in post-attack environment 

Vulnerability rating requires identifying and rating the vulnerability of each asset-threat 
pair. In-depth vulnerability assessment of a building evaluates specific design and 
architectural features and identifies all vulnerabilities of the building functions and building 
systems. 
Requirement 
For an example of how a specific asset is assessed, answer the following questions and 
record relevant observations on the following table regarding the HIC site and building. 
Determine what, if any. vulnerability exists: 
Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
1.16 
Does adjacent surface 
parking on site maintain a 
minimum stand-off 
distance? 
The specific stand-off distance 
needed is based upon the design 
basis threat bomb size and the 
building construction. For initial 
screening, consider using 25 
meters (82 feet) as a minimum, 
with more distance needed for 
There is no adjacent 
parking per se, but 
there is one parking 
lot or area that any 
tenant or visitor to 
the office park can 
use. Stand-off 
distance to 


unreinforced masonry or wooden 
walls. 
the front parking lot 
is less than the 82 
feet 


Reference: GSA PBS-100 
screening value. Cars 
or trucks can drive up 
to the loading dock in 
the rear. 
1.19 
Do site landscaping and 
street furniture provide 
hiding places? 
Minimize concealment 
opportunities by keeping landscape 
plantings (hedges, shrubbery, and 
large plants with heavy ground 
There is no street 
furniture shown for 
this building. The 
landscaping shown is 


cover) and street furniture (bus 
shelters, benches, trash receptacles, 
grass and trees are 
mature/tall enough so 


mailboxes, newspaper vending 
that a package cannot 


machines) away from the building 
be hidden at the base. 


to permit observation of intruders 
The hedge along the 


and prevent hiding of packages. 
building drip line 
may 


If mail or express boxes are used, 
conceal a package, if 
allowed to get taller 


the size of the openings should be 
or denser. There is 



restricted to prohibit the insertion 
of packages. Reference: GSA PBS-
100 
no mail or express 
box and there is no 
slot in the glass main 
entrance door. Due to 



the size of the 



building columns, a 
package could be 
overlooked. 
2.15 
Are critical assets (people, 
activities, building systems 
and components) located 
close to any main entrance, 
vehicle circulation, parking, 
maintenance area, loading 
dock, or interior parking? 
Are the critical building 
systems and components 
hardened? 
Critical building components 
include: emergency generator, 
including fuel systems, day tank, 
fire sprinkler, and water supply; 
normal fuel storage; main 
switchgear; telephone distribution 
and main switchgear; fire pumps; 
building control centers; 
uninterruptible power supply 
(UPS) systems controlling critical 
functions; main refrigeration and 
ventilation systems if critical to 
building operation; elevator 
machinery and controls; shafts for 
stairs, elevators, and utilities; and 
critical distribution feeders for 
This building is not 
large enough to 
maintain separation 
distances. Attack 
from the front of the 
building primarily 
impacts office space. 
Attack from the rear 
affects critical utilities 
and, through the 
loading dock area, the 
heart of the company 
� the computer center. 
No critical 
components are 
hardened as seen 


emergency power. Evacuation and 
rescue require emergency systems 
to remain operational during a 
disaster and they should be located 
away from attack locations. 
Primary and back-up systems 
should be separated to reduce the 
risk of both being impacted by a 
single incident if collocated. 
Utility systems should be located 
at least 50 feet from loading docks, 
front entrances, and parking areas. 
by the natural gas and 
electric service to the 
building. The UPS, 
mechanical and 
electrical room, and 
the diesel generator 
can be affected by a 
single bomb less than 
50 feet from all these 
areas or taken out by 
a single wayward 
truck. 


One way to harden critical building 
systems and components is to 
enclose them within hardened 



walls, floors, and ceilings. Do not 
place them near high risk areas 
where they can receive collateral 
damage. Reference: GSA PBS-100 

2.16 
Are high value or critical 
assets located as far into the 
interior of the building as 
possible and separated from 
the public areas of the 
building? 
Critical assets, such as people and 
activities, are more vulnerable to 
hazards when on an exterior 
building wall or adjacent to 
uncontrolled public areas inside the 
building. Reference: GSA PBS-100 
People are located 
along the exterior 
wall at the front of 
the building. The 
secure space has the 
best interior space 
location � not on an 
exterior wall, as does 
the conference room. 




The office space acts 



as the buffer between 



the critical functions 



in the back and the 



public area of the 



building at the main 



entrance. 
4.2 
Is there less than 40 percent 
fenestration openings per 
structural bay? 
The performance of the glass will 
similarly depend on the materials. 
Glazing may be single pane or 
double pane, monolithic or 
Windows are only 
used in the office 
space area of the 
building. While 

Is the window system 
laminated, annealed, heat 
strengthened, or fully tempered. 
dimensions are not 
given, it looks like 
the 

design on the exterior fa�ade 
balanced to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying 
glazing following an 
explosive event? 
The percent fenestration is a 
balance between protection level, 
cost, the architectural look of the 
building within its surroundings, 
and building codes. One goal is to 
glass is at least 40 
percent of the wall 
area between building 
structural columns. 
The window system 
is a standard 

(glazing, frames, anchorage 
to supporting walls, etc.) 
keep fenestration to below 40 
percent of the building envelope 
vertical surface area, but the 
commercial 
installation and thus, 
the glass, framing, 


process must balance differing 
and anchorage are 


requirements. A blast engineer may 
expected to be 


prefer no windows; an architect 
insufficient for the 


may favor window curtain walls; 
design basis threat at 


building codes require so much 
the available stand-


fenestration per square footage of 
off. One benefit is 


floor area; fire codes require a 
that there are 


prescribed window opening area if 
windows only on two 


the window is a designated escape 
sides of the building. 


route; and the building owner has 



cost concerns. 



Ideally, an owner would want 100 



percent of the glazed area to 



provide the design protection level 



against the postulated explosive 



threat (design basis threat � 



weapon size at the expected stand



off distance). However, economics 



and geometry may allow 80 



percent to 90 percent due to the 



statistical differences in the 



manufacturing process for glass or 



the angle of incidence of the blast 



wave upon upper story windows 



(4th floor and higher). 



Reference: GSA PBS-100 


HIC Critical Functions Vulnerability 
Rating Requirement 
Refer to the HIC Case Study and rate the vulnerability of the following asset-
threat/hazard pairs. 
Function 
Cyber Attack 
Armed Attack 
Vehicle Bomb 
CBR Attack 
1. Administration 
8 
8 
8 
8 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians 
8 
8 
8 
8 
3. Loading Dock/ 
Warehousing 
2 
3 
8 
8 
4. Data Center 
9 
3 
8 
8 
5. Communications 
8 
3 
8 
8 
6. Security 
3 
3 
8 
8 
7. Housekeeping 
1 
1 
8 
8 

HIC Infrastructure Vulnerability Rating 
Refer to the HIC Case Study and rate the vulnerability of the following asset-
threat/hazard pairs. 
Function 
Cyber Attack 
Armed Attack 
Vehicle Bomb 
CBR Attack 
1. Site 
3 
8 
8 
8 
2. Architectural 
3 
8 
8 
4 
3. Structural Systems 
3 
8 
8 
3 
4. Envelope Systems 
3 
8 
8 
3 
5. Utility Systems 
5 
7 
6 
3 
6. Mechanical Systems 
5 
7 
8 
7 
7. Plumbing and Gas 
Systems 
3 
8 
8 
5 






8. Electrical Systems 
5 
7 
8 
5 
9. Fire Alarm Systems 
3 
3 
8 
3 
10. IT/Communications 
Systems 
10 
8 
8 
6 

Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management





U
ni
t 
V 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 75 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Risk Assessment/Risk Management 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Explain what constitutes risk 
1. 2.	Evaluate risk using the Threat-Vulnerability Matrix to capture assessment 
information 
2. 3.	Provide a numerical rating for risk and justify the basis for the rating 
3. 4.	Identify top risks for asset � threat/hazard pairs that should receive 
measures to mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce risk 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Definition of risk and the various components to determine a risk rating. 
2. 2.	The FEMA 426 approach to determining risk. 
3. 3.	A rating scale and how to use it to determine a risk rating. One or more 
specific examples will be used to focus students on the following activity. 
4. 4.	The relationships between high risk, the need for mitigation measures, and 
the need to identify a Design Basis Threat and Level of Protection. 
5. 5.	Activity: Determine the risk rating for the asset � threat/hazard pairs of 
interest. Identify the top three risk ratings for the Case Study.  

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 1 
1. 2.	Student Manual, Unit V 
2. 3.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
3. 4.	Unit V visuals 

REQUIREMENTS 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
1. 2.	Instructor Guide 
2. 3.	Student Manual (one per student) 
3. 4.	Overhead projector or computer display unit 

Unit V 
1. 5.	Unit V visuals 
2. 6.	Chart paper, easel, and markers 


UNIT V OUTLINE	Time Page 
V. 	Risk Assessment/Risk Management 75 minutes IG V-1 
1. 1.	Introduction and Unit Overview 5 minutes IG V-4 
2. 2.	Risk Rating Approaches 5 minutes IG V-6 
3. 3.	Risk Rating Approach for Student Activity 15 minutes IG V-8 
4. 4.	Application of Selected Risk Rating Approach Examples 15 minutes IG V-
8 
5. 5.	Design Basis Threat and Level of Protection 15 minutes IG V-9 
6. 6.	Activity: Risk Rating 20 minutes IG V-12 


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
�	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to identify 
topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic content, 
and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
The Instructor will begin this unit with a brief discussion of terrorism and 
technological hazards worldwide and within the United States. The probability of 
natural hazards and how they are considered during design will be compared to the 
probability of manmade hazards, both terrorism and technological accidents. This 
sets the stage for identifying where to get information about threats and hazards. 
Next, the Instructor will use FEMA 386-7 to describe the spectrum of tactics or 
events that 
can occur. This leads into the five components used to define a threat (or hazard) and 
one 
interpretation of the Homeland Security Advisory System. 
Various threat and vulnerability rating systems will be discussed to understand the 
different methodologies and their applicability to different situations. A simplified 
threat rating approach will be presented that can be used for new construction or 
major renovation. This FEMA 426 approach forms the basis of the Unit V student 
activity. 
The Instructor will use one threat/hazard example from the Case Study to focus 
students on the student activity. The Instructor will walk through the example, 
describing the threat and the threat rating approach. 
Unit V 
The students will then apply these techniques (threat identification, threat 
description, and threat rating) to the Case Study to identify and rate the threat from 
explosive blast and agents (chemical, biological, and radiological). Note that these 
event profiles can result from terrorism or technological hazards. 
The Instructor will define risk by its components and the different approaches used 
to determine risk. One or more examples will be used to show the students how to 
determine and evaluate the risk rating for each asset � threat/hazard pair in the threat-
vulnerability matrix. The Instructor will also discuss the relationship between an 
identified high risk asset 
� threat/hazard pair and the need for mitigation measures to reduce that risk by 
reducing the vulnerability rating. Finally, the value of providing a Design Basis Threat 
and Desired Level of Protection will be presented. The Design Basis Threat and 
Desired Level of Protection are needed to allow designers to build the building to 
withstand the threats. Without the Design Basis Threat or Level of Protection, the 
building owner would have to provide specific building material specifications to the 
designer to achieve the Level of Protection for the perceived threat or the designer 
must provide an educated guess to the building owner for his/her acceptance or 
rejection. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity: The student activity is primarily a math exercise in multiplying 
threat, asset value, and vulnerability ratings to determine the risk rating and then compare 
it against the risk rating scale. The top three risks should receive additional emphasis 
during an actual vulnerability assessment to validate the risk by identifying vulnerabilities 
and as an input to select mitigation measures. 
. �	Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 

Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL V-1 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit V Risk Assessment/Risk Management. The Unit will provide a definition of 
risk and the various components to determine a risk rating, review various approaches to 
determine risk, review a rating scale, and demonstrate how to use the scale to determine a 
risk rating.  
VISUAL V-2 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Explain what constitutes risk. 
2. 2.	Evaluate risk using the Threat-Vulnerability Matrix to capture assessment 
information. 
3. 3.	Provide a numerical rating for risk and justify the basis for the rating. 
4. 4.	Identify top risks for asset � threat/hazard pairs that should receive 
measures to mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce risk. 

Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL V-3 
VISUAL V-4 
VISUAL V-5 
Definition of Risk 
Risk is a combination of: 
. � The probability that an event will occur, and 
. � The consequences of its occurrence 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit V-5 
Risk Management 
Risk management incorporates an understanding of the vulnerability of assets to the 
consequences of threats and hazards. The objective is to reduce the vulnerability of 
assets through mitigation actions. 
Assessment Flow Chart 
Reviewing the Assessment Flow Chart, the determination of quantitative values for the 
risk assessment is the next step in the risk assessment process. 
Risk 
Risk can be defined as the potential for a loss or damage to an asset. It takes into account 
the value of an asset, the threats or hazards that potentially impact the asset, and the 
vulnerability of the asset to the threat or hazard. 
Values can be assigned to these three components of risk to provide a risk rating. 
Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL V-6 
VISUAL V-7 
Exam Questions #A5 and B5 
Quantifying Risk 
There are at least four steps or required tasks in the risk assessment process. A 
determination of the Asset Value, Threat Rating Value, Vulnerability Rating Value, 
and identifying or recommending appropriate mitigation measures to reduce the risk. 
Determining the relative risk of threat against asset justifies the use of limited 
resources to reduce the greatest risk and focuses the mitigation measures needed. 
An Approach to Quantifying Risk 
The risk assessment analyzes the threat, asset value, and vulnerability to ascertain the 
level of risk for each critical asset against each applicable threat. 
An understanding of risk levels enables the owner of assets to prioritize and implement 
appropriate mitigation measures, paying particular attention to high consequence 
threats, to achieve the desired level of protection. 
A simplified approach to quantifying risk is shown here. Values can be assigned to asset 
value/criticality (see Tables 1-2, 1-9, and 110, FEMA 426), the threat or hazard, and 
Vulnerability of the asset to the threats, and numerical scores can be determined that 
depict relative risk of these assets to manmade hazards. 
Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL V-8 
Critical Functions 
Function 
Administration 
Cyber attack 
280 
Armed attack 
(single gunman) 
140 
Vehicle 
bomb 135 
CBR 
attack 90 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
8 
4 
3 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 
Engineering 
7 128 
7 160 
9 384 
9 144 
Asset Value 
8 
8 
8 
8 
Threat Rating 
8 
5 
6 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 
2 
4 
8 
9 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit V-8 
VISUAL V-9 
Critical Infrastructure 
Function Site 
Cyber attack 
48 
Armed attack 
(single gunman) 
80 
Vehicle 
bomb 108 
CBR 
attack 72 
Asset Value 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Threat Rating 
4 
4 
3 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 
Structural Systems 
3 24 
5 32 
9 240 
9 16 
Asset Value 
8 
8 
8 
8 
Threat Rating 
3 
4 
3 
2 
Vulnerability Rating 
2 
4 
8 
9 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit V-9 
Critical Functions Matrix 
This analysis completes the site critical functions matrix and the site critical infrastructure 
matrix that we saw in Units II, III, and IV. 
The risk formula is applied and the numeric values color coded as discussed on the 
previous slide. The color code helps visualize the functions and infrastructure that are 
vulnerable and the scale helps to identify those areas for in-depth mitigation measures 
analysis. 
The risk ratings under the Administration and Engineering and functions are 
highlighted. The numeric values result in Medium and High risk ratings for the 
Functions threat pairs. 
Critical Infrastructure Matrix 
The risk ratings under the Site and Structural Systems are highlighted. The numeric values 
result in Low to Medium risk ratings for the Infrastructure threat pairs. 
Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL V-10 
Risk 
Assessment 
Results

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit V-10 
VISUAL V-11 
Exam Questions #A7 and B8 
VISUAL V-12 
Risk Assessment Results 
The process is continued for all the threat � asset pairs. This is a nominal example of a 
completed risk table. 
The risk assessment results in a prioritized list of risks (i.e., threat-asset-vulnerability 
combinations) that can be used to select safeguards to reduce vulnerabilities (and risk) and 
create a certain level of protection. 
Selecting Mitigation Measures 
In every design and renovation project, the owner ultimately has three choices when 
addressing the risk posed by terrorism. They can: 
1. 1. Do nothing and accept the risk (no cost).
2. 2. Perform a risk assessment and manage the risk by installing reasonable 
mitigation measures (some cost). 
3. 3. Harden the building against all threats to achieve the least amount of risk 
(greatest cost). 

Mitigation Measures 
After determining how specific threats potentially impact an asset (and occupants), the 
architect and building engineer can work with security and risk specialists to identify 
mitigation measures to reduce risk. Because it is not possible to completely eliminate risk, 
it is important to determine what level of protection is desirable, and the options for 
achieving this level through risk management. 
Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL V-13 
Measures to Reduce Risk 
Higher risk hazards require mitigation measures to reduce risk. Mitigation measures are 
conceived by the design professional and are best incorporated into the building 
architecture, building systems, and operational parameters, with consideration for life-
cycle costs. 
In some cases, mitigation measures to enhance security may be in conflict with other 
design intentions. VISUAL V-14 
Achieving Building Security 
The assessment provides concepts for integrating land use planning, landscape 
architecture, site planning, and other strategies to mitigate the Design Basis Threats as 
identified in the risk assessment. Integrating security measures into design and/or 
maintenance of buildings presents the asset owner with multiple opportunities of 
achieving a balance among many objectives such as reducing risk; facilitating proper 
building function; aesthetics and matching architecture; hardening of physical structures 
beyond required building codes and standards; and maximizing use of non-structural 
systems. 
Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL V-15 
Process Review 
. � Calculate the relative risk for each threat against each asset 
. �	Identify the high risk areas 
. �	Identify Mitigation Options to reduce the risk 

VISUAL V-16 
Summary 
. �	Risk Definition 
. �	Critical Function and Critical Infrastructure Matrix 
. �	Numerical and color coded risk scale 
. �	Identify Mitigation Options 

Unit V: Risk Assessment/Risk Management 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL V-17 
Refer participants to the Unit V Case Study activity in the Student Manual. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist groups 
as needed. 
At the end of 20 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
Student Activity 
One approach to conducting a risk assessment is to assemble the results of the asset 
value assessment, the threat assessment, and the vulnerability assessment, and determine 
a numeric value of risk for each asset-threat/hazard pair using the following formula: 
Risk = Asset Value x Threat Rating x Vulnerability Rating 
Activity Requirements 
Working in small groups, use the worksheet tables to summarize the HIC asset, threat and 
vulnerability assessments conducted in the previous three unit activities. 
Then use the risk formula to determine the risk rating for each asset-threat/hazard pair 
identified under Critical Functions and under Critical Infrastructure. 
Take 20 minutes to complete this activity. Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
Transition 
Unit VI will cover Explosive Blast. Unit VII will cover CBR Measures. 
UNIT V CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: RISK RATING 
One approach to conducting a risk assessment is to assemble the results of the asset 
value assessment, the threat assessment, and the vulnerability assessment, and 
determine a numeric value of risk for each asset-threat/hazard pair using the following 
formula: 
Risk = Asset Value x Threat Rating x Vulnerability Rating 
Requirement 
Use the following tables to summarize the HIC asset, threat, and vulnerability 
assessments conducted in the previous three unit activities. Then use the formula above 
to determine the risk rating for each asset-threat/hazard pair identified under Critical 
Functions and under Critical Infrastructure. Using Figure 1-13 of FEMA 426, make a 
determination of the available risk management options. 
Critical Functions 
Function 
Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR Attack 
1. Administration Risk 
Rating 
192 
96 
192 
128 
Asset Value 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Threat Rating 
6 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
8 
8 
8 
8 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians Risk Rating 
200 
120 
240 
160 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
5 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
8 
8 
8 
8 
3. Loading Dock/ 
Warehouse Risk Rating 
50 
45 
240 
160 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
5 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
2 
3 
8 
8 
4. Data Center Risk Rating 
810 
90 
480 
320 
Asset Value 
10 
10 
10 
10 
Threat Rating 
9 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
9 
3 
8 
8 

5. Communications Risk 
Rating 
320 
72 
384 
256 
Asset Value 
8 
8 
8 
8 
Threat Rating 
5 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
8 
3 
8 
8 
6. Security Risk Rating 
105 
63 
336 
224 
Asset Value 
7 
7 
7 
7 
Threat Rating 
5 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
3 
3 
8 
8 
7. Housekeeping Risk 
Rating 
2 
3 
48 
32 
Asset Value 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Threat Rating 
2 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
1 
1 
8 
8 

Critical Infrastructure 
Infrastructure 
Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR Attack 
1. Site Risk Rating 
15 
120 
240 
160 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
1 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
3 
8 
8 
8 
2. Architectural Risk 
Rating 
15 
120 
240 
80 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
1 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
3 
8 
8 
4 
3. Structural Systems Risk 
Rating 
15 
120 
240 
60 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
1 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
3 
8 
8 
3 
4. Envelope Systems Risk 
Rating 
15 
120 
240 
60 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
1 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
3 
8 
8 
3 

5. Utility Systems Risk 
Rating 
75 
175 
180 
60 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
3 
5 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
5 
7 
6 
3 
6. Mechanical Systems 
Risk Rating 
105 
245 
336 
196 
Asset Value 
7 
7 
7 
7 
Threat Rating 
3 
5 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
5 
7 
8 
7 
7. Plumbing and Gas 
Systems Risk Rating 
30 
120 
240 
100 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
2 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
3 
8 
8 
5 
8. Electrical Systems Risk 
Rating 
105 
147 
336 
140 
Asset Value 
7 
7 
7 
7 
Threat Rating 
3 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
5 
7 
8 
5 
9. Fire Alarm Systems 
Risk Rating 
30 
45 
240 
60 
Asset Value 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Threat Rating 
2 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
3 
3 
8 
3 
10. IT/Communications 
Systems Risk Rating 
1,000 
240 
480 
240 
Asset Value 
10 
10 
10 
10 
Threat Rating 
10 
3 
6 
4 
Vulnerability Rating 
10 
8 
8 
6 

Unit VI: Explosive Blast




U
nit 
VI 
COURSE TITLE 
Building Design for Homeland Security 



TIME 60 minutes 
UNIT TITLE 
Explosive Blast 


OBJECTIVES 1.	Explain the basic physics involved during an explosive blast 
event, whether by terrorism or technological accident 
1. 2.	Explain building damage and personnel injury resulting from the blast 
effects upon a building 
2. 3.	Perform an initial prediction of blast loading and effects based upon 
incident pressure 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Time-pressure regions of a blast event and how these change with distance 
from the blast 
2. 2. Difference between incident pressure and reflected pressure 
3. 3.	Differences between peak pressure and peak impulse and how these 
differences affect building components 
4. 4.	Building damage and personal injuries generated by blast wave effects 
5. 5.	Levels of protection used by the Department of Defense and the General 
Services Administration 
6. 6.	The nominal range-to-effect chart [minimum stand-off in feet versus 
weapon yield in pounds of TNT-equivalent] for an identified level of damage or injury 
7. 7. The benefits of stand-off distance 
8. 8.	Approaches to predicting blast loads and effects, including one using 
incident pressure 

Unit VI 
REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 4-1 to 4-20 
1. 2.	Student Manual, Unit VI 
2. 3.	Case Study, Hazardville Information Company (HIC), for student 
activities 
3. 4.	Unit VI visuals 

REQUIREMENTS 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
1. 2.	Instructor Guide 
2. 3.	Student Manual (one per student) 
3. 4.	Overhead projector or computer display unit 
4. 5.	Unit VI visuals 
5. 6.	Chart paper, easel, and markers 


UNIT VI OUTLINE	Time Page 
VI. Explosive Blast	60 minutes IG VI-
1 
1. 1.	Introduction and Unit Overview 5 minutes IG VI-4 
2. 2.	Blast Characteristics and Their Interaction with Buildings 15 minutes IG 
VI-4 
3. 3.	Types of Building Damage and Personal Injuries Caused 10 minutes IG 
VI-11 by Blast Effects 
4. 4.	Levels of Protection Used by Federal Agencies 5 minutes IG VI-15 
5. 5.	The Nominal Range-to-Effect Chart and Benefits of Stand-5 minutes IG 
VI-16 off 
6. 6.	Predicting Blast Loads and Effects 5 minutes IG VI-20 
7. 7.	Activity: Stand-off Distance and the Effects of Blast 15 minutes IG VI-24 


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
. �	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to 
identify topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 

 Unit VI 
. �	Activity: The students will begin have an instructor led exercise to use the 
range-to-effects chart, select a Level of Protection, and use the effects charts to evaluate 
stand-off distances. 
. �	Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 

Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VI-1	Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit VI Explosive Blast. Note 
that we are covering pages 4-1 to 4-
20 in FEMA 426 during this unit. 
In the previous units, we 
determined the various initial 
ratings during the assessment 
process. 
In this unit, we will examine how 
explosive blast impacts buildings 
and people to better understand the 
design recommendations presented 
in later units. 
VISUAL VI-2	Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be 
able to: 
1. 1.	Explain the basic physics involved during an explosive blast event, 
whether by terrorism or technological accident. 
2. 2.	Explain building damage and personnel injury resulting from the blast 
effects upon a building. 
3. 3.	Perform an initial prediction of blast loading and effects based upon 
incident pressure. 

VISUAL VI-3	Explosive Blast 
There are a number of similarities 
between blast loading and building 
response with earthquake or high wind 
loading and response, but also 
significant differences. 
Blast loads are high amplitude, low 
duration (milliseconds) events that 
create an air pressure wave that acts 
over the entire building envelope. 
Earthquake loads are usually low 
amplitude,Many of the mitigation options for seismic long duration (seconds) events that areand 
hurricane retrofit such as moment transferred through the foundation. High 
Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
connections and elimination of progressive winds are dynamic and typically affect the 
collapse, laminated glass, and strengthened envelope. architectural elements mitigate many 
explosive blast vulnerabilities. Blast loadings decay as a cube root of 
distance; therefore, the key concept in 
blast is: 
STAND-OFF IS YOUR BEST 
DEFENSE, EVERY FOOT 
COUNTS! 
VISUAL VI-4	Blast Loading Factors Explosive 
properties type - is it a high explosive 
or low-order explosive?  
Is it specifically designed for the 
purpose military grade explosive 
(C4, landmine, etc.) or a 
combination of generally available 
materials (ANFO, black powder)? 
The energy output of explosives can 
be related by TNT equivalency. TNT 
equivalency is usually considered to 
be the relative pressure achieved by 
the explosive compared to TNT 
(trinitrotoluene). Pressure equivalency 
can generally range from 0.14 to 1.7. 
Aside from TNT equivalency, the 
larger the quantity of an explosive, 
the higher the pressures and the 
larger the impulse. 
VISUAL VI-5	Typical Incident Pressure Waveform 
Typical Incident Pressure Waveform	The explosive detonation generates a 
bubble of air moving at supersonic 
speed from the bomb location. 
About one-third of the explosive 
material contributes to the 
detonation. 
As it reaches a point in space, such as 
a person or building, the pressure goes 
rapidly from atmospheric to peak 
pressure in very little 
Figure 4-3:  Typical Impulse Waveform, page 4-4 
time. The pressure at this point decays 
rapidly 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VI-5 
as the supersonic bubble moves on, its pressure 
reducing exponentially as the surface Exam 
Questions #A8 and B6 area of the bubble increases 
� expending energy over an ever increasing area. The 
Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
There is also a TNT equivalency based upon pressure also drops off due to the 
completion impulse and that ranges from 0.5 to 1.8. If of the chemical reaction of the 
explosive the pressure TNT equivalency is above 1.0, mixture (burning of the remaining 
two-thirds this means the explosive achieves a higher of the material). If the explosion 
occurs within pressure (pressure equivalency) than TNT. If a confined space, the gases 
generated by the the impulse TNT equivalency is above 1.0, burning of the explosive 
are contained and then the explosive has a longer push keep the pressure elevated over a 
longer (impulse equivalency) than TNT. period of time. [Indicate a longer tail off of the 
positive phase to illustrate the confined 
space 
. �	Peak pressure rapid millisecond rise variation.] Design is typically based 
on 
. �	High positive pressure loading drops off positive pressures. 
. �	Negative pressure creates suction on the structure The negative phase of the 
blast wave is the ambient air rushing in behind the blast wave to return to a stable 
pressure. While the negative phase has much less energy than the positive phase, it can 
hit the structure at the most inopportune moment in its vibration, resulting in unexpected 
consequences � increased damage or having windows blow OUT of the 

building rather than into it. Design is 
based on positive pressure. 
VISUAL VI-6	Reflected Pressure versus Angle of 
Incident 
Reflected Pressure/Angle of Incidence	When the blast wave strikes an 
immovable surface the wave reflects 
off the surface resulting in an increase 
in pressure. This reflected pressure 
actually causes the damage to the 
building. A very high reflected 
pressure may punch a hole in a wall 
or cause a column to fail, while a low 
reflected pressure will try to push 
over the whole building. 
The worst case is when the direction of 
travel 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VI-6 
for the blast wave is 
perpendicular to the surface of 
the structure and the incident 
pressure is very high. The 
Coefficient of Reflection can be 
from 12 to 13 for high incident 
pressures in this case. 
By keeping the incident pressure low 
(by limiting the size of the explosive, 
maintaining a large distance between 
the explosive and the building, or 
both) the reflected pressure can be 
Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
kept low. Keeping the 
Coefficient of Reflection below 
2.5 by keeping the peak incident 
pressure below 5 psi (pounds per 
square inch) is a desirable goal. 
VISUAL VI-7	Incident and Reflected Pressure 
When the incident pressure wave 
impinges on a structure that is not 
parallel to the direction of the wave�s 
travel, it is reflected and reinforced. 
The reflected pressure is always 
greater than the incident pressure at 
the same distance from the explosion, 
and varies with the incident angle. 
VISUAL VI-8	Typical Blast Impulse Waveform 
Typical Blast Impulse Waveform	Another consideration is the impulse of 
the 
blast wave, which is the integration of 
the 
peak incident pressure (both positive 
phase 
and negative phase) at the point in 
question 
over time.

A general rule of thumb is that brittle 
materials respond to peak incident 
pressure and are less affected by 
impulse. Ductile materials, on the 
other hand, respond more to 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VI-8 
impulse (the total push) rather 
than peak incident pressure (the 
maximum hit). 
Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VI-9 Blast Loading Factors 
Location Relative to Structure: 
Stand-off distance is your best friend. 
The larger the distance between the 
explosive and the structure, the lower 
the incident pressure and the lower 
the resultant reflective pressure. We 
will investigate this in more detail 
later. 
As we have already seen, the 
reflection angle at which the blast 
wave strikes the structure also affects 
the value of reflected pressure. The 
ground is also a reflection surface to 
consider. If the bomb is placed close 
to the ground, the ground reflection 
adds a small amount of incident 
pressure to the situation. If the bomb 
is elevated (a more difficult task), the 
ground reflection can become 
significant, but the reflection off the 
building surface diminishes. 
Identifying the worst case situation 
begins by finding the closest 
approach (stand-off distance) 
between the explosive and the 
building and then considering the 
angle of reflection. Or put another 
way -- place the explosive directly 
perpendicular to the largest face of 
the building, with the explosive 
centered upon the building�s face as 
close as you can get. That is normally 
the worst case situation. 
Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VI-10	Blast Compared to Natural Hazards 
(1) 
Compared to other hazards 
(earthquake, winds, and floods), high 
order explosive attack has unique 
variances: 
. �	Compared to wind, explosive blast pressure is much higher, but also of 
much shorter duration and, thus, lower impulse. 
. �	High explosives generate high pressures but the impulse lasts for a 
relatively short duration (in the range of milliseconds). 
. �	Low-order explosives generate less pressure, but the impulse lasts longer 
than high explosive (in the range of milliseconds). 
. �	Wind has a very low incident pressure, but pushes for a very long time (in 
the range of seconds or longer). 
. �	A nuclear blast or millions of pounds of high explosives would generate 
high pressures AND long duration impulse. 

VISUAL VI-11	Blast Compared to Natural Hazards 
(2) 
Explosive blast tends to cause 
localized damage compared to other 
hazards that may destroy the 
whole building. 
. �	The first building surface struck will get the greatest pressures, and expect 
it to receive the greatest damage.  The blast may break a building component by punching 
through it (window or wall) or shearing it (column). 
. �	The other side of the building, due to its greater distance from the 
explosion, will see lower pressures, unless there are nearby buildings that will reflect the 
blast wave back to the building in question. 
. �	Reflections can increase damage to the building, but are hard to quantify. 
. �	Greater mass has usually been the design 

Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
of choice to protect against 
explosive 
blast. The inertia of the mass slows 
the 
structural reactions to the point that 
the 
impulse is over before the building 
tends 
to move. 
�	Conversely, additional mass is 
usually undesirable during an 
earthquake due to the long duration, 
low frequency forces that can get 
the mass moving. Earthquake design 
usually concentrates on lighter 
structures with great ductility and 
additional reinforcement at weak 
points. 
VISUAL VI-12	Factors Contributing to Building 
Damage 
Certain prediction of damage to 
buildings and people during an 
explosive event is beyond the scope 
of the reference manual. There are too 
many variables that would have to be 
considered and modeling would take 
many months for analysis by 
supercomputer. Thus, as in standard 
building design, we use approaches 
with safety factors that provide 
adequate first approximations to 
estimate response based upon the: 
. �	The amount of explosive usually expressed as TNT equivalent weight. 
. �	The stand-off distance between the explosive and the building or person. 
 �	Assumptions about building characteristics 
 � the exterior envelope construction (walls and windows) and the framing or load-
bearing system used. 
. �	The building characteristics provide insight into weaknesses and allow 
general predictions about how the building will respond. 

Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VI-13	Types of Building Damage 
. �	The air blast, especially from explosions close to the building, results in 
component failure of walls, windows, columns, and beams/girders. 
. �	The pressures experienced by the building can far exceed the building�s 
original design and can occur in directions that were not part of the original design. 
. �	Once the exterior envelope is breached, the blast wave causes additional 
structural and non-structural damage inside the building. 

Exam Questions #A9 and B10	� Collapse, which is covered in 
more detail in Chapter 3 of 
FEMA 426, is a primary cause of 
death and injury in an explosive 
blast. 
. �	Localized collapse may have a load-bearing wall, or portion thereof, on one 
side of the building fall to the ground or a single column fails and the surrounding floors 
fall with it. 
. �	Progressive collapse is more disastrous as a single component failure, like a 
wall or column, results in the failure of more walls and columns so that more of the 
building falls to the ground than what the explosive initially affected. 

VISUAL VI-14	Blast Pressure Effects 
Frame 1
Blast Pressure Effects 
. �	The air blast strikes the exterior wall, the weakest component will fail first 
� usually the windows, which saves the walls and columns, but causes much non-
structural damage inside the building. 
. �	Note that unreinforced masonry walls can be weaker than windows. 
. �	If the explosive is close enough, the walls can fail and one or more columns 
can fail 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VI-14 
in addition to the windows. 
�	Based upon the reflection angle, one 
can 
Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
expect the lowest or lower floors 
(1 to 3) to receive the greatest 
damage. 
�	If the blast wave strikes the whole 
surface of the exposed side 
simultaneously, this is called a 
laminar situation, and breaching 
(puncture) of walls and failure of 
columns is less likely. 
VISUAL VI-15	Blast Pressure Effects 
Frame 2 
Blast Pressure Effects �	Once the blast wave enters the 
building, it is trapped and more air 
enters the building, further 
increasing the pressure. Structural 
components like flooring and shear 
walls now are moving in directions 
for which they were not designed. 
�	Floor failure can result in three 
effects: 1) the raining down of 
concrete chunks causing injury and 
possibly death; 2) the whole floor 
gives way and pancakes
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VI-15 
downward with obviously more 
serious consequences; or 3) if flat 
slab construction was used (the 
floors act as the beams in the 
framing system), the floors can 
disconnect from the columns. 
VISUAL VI-16	Blast Pressure Effects 
Frame 3
Blast Pressure Effects 
. �	The blast wave continues to engulf the building. Any building component 
that traps the blast wave, like an overhanging roof, can expect increased damage, based 
upon how it is constructed and attached. 
. �	The roof and sides parallel to the blast wave movement will see incident 
pressure only, which should result in little or no damage.

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VI-16 
�	Once the blast wave has passed 
the building, the far side (opposite 
the side first experiencing the blast 
wave) will see increased pressure 
as a slight vacuum forms and the 
ambient air rushes back in to 
Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
most effective way to reduce injuries 
during explosive blast is harden the 
glass 
and window frame system and/or 
reduce 
the amount of glass. 
VISUAL VI-19 Murrah Federal Building (1) 
The Murrah Federal Building is 
typical of many commercial 
properties in the current inventory. 
The bomb was designed as a shape 
charge and detonated in the drop-off 
area, destroying two primary columns 
and causing the spandrel beam to 
rotate. The floors above failed in 
progressive collapse and the blast 
wave penetrated deeply into the 
interior. 
VISUAL VI-20 Murrah Federal Building (2) 
The majority of deaths were 
caused by the collapsing 
structure. 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES 
Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
glass is the weakest component of 
the 
building envelope. Conversely, the 
columns, whether concrete or steel, 
are 
usually the strongest components of 
the 
building envelope. [A workable rule 
of 
thumb is that steel columns require 
about 
twice the stand-off distance 
compared to 
concrete columns for the same 
weapon 
yield.] 
�	Ask what the threshold of concrete 
column failure stand-off distance is 
for a 300pound bomb? 
ANSWER: Approximately 25 feet. 
VISUAL VI-25	Comparison of Stand-off 
The Murrah Federal Building and 
Khobar Towers blasts vividly 
illustrate the response of a building to 
a blast event. 
The Murrah Federal Building had less 
than 20 feet of stand-off and was not 
designed to prevent progressive 
collapse. 
Khobar Towers was designed using 
British code to prevent progressive 
collapse and had approximately 80 
feet of stand-off distance. 
Notice the size of the weapons. The 
Murrah Federal Building was 
unsalvageable and demolished, while 
Khobar Towers only lost the front 
fa�ade and was quickly restored and 
placed back into service. 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES INSTRUCTOR NOTES 
VISUAL VI-28 
Cost Versus Stand-off 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VI-28 
CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Cost versus Stand-off 
. �	As in any design for new construction or renovation, there are trade-offs 
that must be considered. While increasing the distance between the closest approaches of 
a vehicle bomb to the building is highly desirable, it is not without a cost. 
. �	The increased distance means more land is needed, which may require 
considerable time and expense to acquire. The increased land also means a larger perimeter 
boundary that then requires more perimeter fencing, landscaping, vehicle barriers, lighting, 
closed-circuit television, etc. Thus, while the increased stand-off allows a less expensive 
building to be constructed, there are other costs that must be considered in the overall 
project. 
. �	Where stand-off distance cannot be increased, building hardening is usually 
necessary to achieve the same level of protection against the Design Basis Threat weapon 
yield. As the stand-off distance decreases, the cost of hardening significantly increases 
because the building must now withstand damage that it would not experience at higher 
standoff. 
. �	Consider progressive collapse. At large stand-off distance, the design of 
the building framing and columns should meet basic design to prevent progressive 
collapse. This would be for the loss of one column, for example. At smaller stand-off 
distances, the columns may require additional hardening to prevent the failure of more 
than one column during an explosive blast event. 

Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VI-29	Blast Load Predictions 
. �	The first step in designing a building for explosive blast is to understand 
the pressures and impulses the building may experience during the potential blast event. If 
reflections are a concern, then high-level software, such as Computational Fluid 
Dynamics, may be in order. As a first effort, simpler software, such as ATBLAST and 
CONWEP, can give a prediction of incident blast loading values and a prediction for 
reflected pressure and impulse using simplifying assumptions. 
. �	Pressure versus distance (Figure 4-10 in FEMA 426, page 4-17) is 
another method for predicting the incident pressure as shown in the next slide. 

VISUAL VI-30	Pressure versus Distance 
Pressure �	Figure 4-10 breaks the blast load 
estimate into the essential 
elements of weapon yield
versus 
or explosive weight in TNT 
equivalent on
Distance	the x-axis and stand-off distance 
on the y-axis to give an incident 
pressure value that a building can 
experience. 
�	Note that the x-axis is logarithmic 
and the y-axis is linear. If both axes 
were 
logarithmic as used on the range-to-
effect 
Figure 4-10: Incident Overpressure Measured in Pounds Per Sq. Inch, 
as a Function of Stand-Off Distance and Net Explosive Weight, page 4-17, FEMA 426 chart presented earlier, the curves of this 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VI-30 
chart would be straight lines. In 
other 
words, on a log-log scale of 
explosive Direct students� attention to Figure 4-10, weight and stand-off distance, a 
straight page 4-17 of FEMA 426 line indicates a pressure relationship (not 
impulse). 
�	Ask what stand-off distance is 
required for a 300-pound bomb to 
keep the incident pressure at 1.0 psi 
or lower. 
ANSWER:  Approximately 250 feet. 

Incident 
Level of Protection 
Pressure (psi) 
High 
1.2 
Medium 
1.9 
Low 
2.3 
Very Low 
3.5 
Below AT Standards 
> 3.5 

CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Summary 
. �	You now have an understanding of the basic physics involved during an 
explosive blast event. 
. �	You can now explain building damage and injury to people resulting from 
the blast effects upon a building and injury to people in the open. 
. �	You can perform an initial prediction of blast loading and effects based 
upon incident pressure using a nominal range-to-effect chart or the incident pressure 
charts. 

Student Activity 
This activity provides a check on 
learning about explosive blast.  
Activity Requirements 
Working in small groups, refer to 
FEMA 426 and complete the 
worksheet questions. 
After 15 minutes, solutions will be 
reviewed in plenary group. 
Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security 
Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES 
VISUAL VI-33 
VISUAL VI-34 
Refer participants to FEMA 426 and the Unit VI Case Study activity in the Student 
Manual. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist 
groups as needed. 
At the end of 15 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
Unit VI: Explosive Blast 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Transition 
Unit VII will cover CBR measures 
and introduce the basic science needed 
to understand building protection 
against chemical, biological, and 
radiological agents, and complete the 
assessment and analysis units. Unit 
VIII will begin the process of 
reviewing the site, layout, and 
building design guidance and 
evaluation of mitigation options. 
UNIT VI CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:  STAND-
OFF DISTANCE AND THE EFFECTS OF BLAST 
The requirements in this Unit�s activity are intended to provide a check on learning about 
explosive blast. 
Requirement 
1. 1.	In the empty cells in the table below, identify whether the adjacent 
description defines incident pressure or reflected pressure. 
 .2.	Refer to Figure 4-5 in FEMA 426 (page 4-11) to answer the following questions 
regarding the explosives environment: 
. �	What is the minimum stand-off distance from a 100-pound bomb 
explosion to eliminate the danger of glass breakage and severe wounds (without fragment 
retention film)? 400 feet 
. �	What damage will be sustained at 400 feet from a 5,000-pound bomb 
explosion? Wall fragment injuries or injuries to personnel in the open 
 .3.	Refer to Figure 4-10 and Table 4-3 (pages 4-17 and 4-19, respectively) in 
FEMA 426 to answer the following questions regarding the explosives environment. 
. �	What is the minimum stand-off required to limit the incident pressure to 
under 0.5 psi for a 100-pound bomb?  Approximately 325 feet 
. �	What incident pressure would be expected at 500 feet from a 500-pound 
bomb and what is the approximate damage? Approximately 0.75 psi, minor damage to 
some buildings 

Definition 
Type of Pressure 
Characterized by an almost instantaneous rise 
Incident pressure 
from atmospheric pressure to peak 

overpressure. 

When it impinges on a structure that is not 
Reflective Pressure 
parallel to the direction of the wave�s travel, the 

pressure wave is reflected and reinforced. 


Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures




Uni
t 
VII 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 60 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Explain the five possible protective actions for a building 
and its occupants 
1. 2.	Compare filtration and collection mechanisms and applicability to the 
particles present in chemical, biological, and radiological agents 
2. 3.	Explain the key issues with CBR detection 
3. 4.	Identify the indications of CBR contamination 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Five protective actions for a building and its occupants: evacuation; 
sheltering in place; personal protective equipment; air filtration and pressurization; and 
exhausting and purging 
2. 2.	Air filtration and cleaning principles and its application 
3. 3.	CBR detection technology currently available 
4. 4.	Indications of CBR contamination that do not use technology 

REFERENCES The following sources will provide information used in this Unit: 
1. 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings, pages 5-1 to 5-36 
2. 2.	Appendix C, Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Glossary 
3. 3.	Student Manual, Unit VII 
4. 4.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
5. 5.	Unit VII visuals 

REQUIREMENTS 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
1. 2.	Instructor Guide 
2. 3.	Student Manual (one per student) 
3. 4.	Overhead projector or computer display unit 
4. 5.	Unit VII visuals 
5. 6.	Chart paper, easel, and markers 

Unit VII 
UNIT VII OUTLINE	Time Page 
VII. CBR Measures	60 minutes IG 
VII-4 
1. 1.	Protective Actions for Buildings and Occupants 15 minutes IG VII-4 
2. 2.	CBR Detection and Technology 15 minutes IG VII-16 
3. 3.	Air Filtration and Cleaning Principles and Technology 20 minutes IG VII-
23 
4. 4.	Activity: CBR Considerations 10 minutes IG VII-32 


WRITTEN EXAM	1 hour 
Exam	30 minutes 
Feedback	30 minutes


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
 �	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to 
identify topics that may focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
 As with Unit VI, the Instructor for this unit will present the characteristics of 
CBR agents and how a building can be operated or built to reduce the effects of these 
agents. The principles of air filtration and cleaning and how to apply this equipment are 
issues to cover in building design. Similarly, the current technology for detecting CBR 
agents is another building design and operation issue. Finally, the Instructor covers non-
technology indications of CBR contamination. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-1 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY



Unit VII Chemical, Biological, andRadiological 
(CBR)Measures 
VISUAL VII-2 
Unit Objectives 
Explain the five possible protective actions for a building and its occupants. 
Compare filtration and collection mechanisms and 
applicability to the particles present in chemical, 
biological, and radiological agents.

Explain the key issues with CBR detection. 
Identify the indicators of CBR contamination. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-2 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit VII CBR Measures. In this Unit, CBR protective measures and actions to 
safeguard the occupants of a building from CBR threats are presented. The Unit is based 
largely on CDC/NIOSH and DoD guidance. 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this Unit, the participant should be able to: 
1. 1.	Explain the five possible protective actions for a building and its 
occupants. 
2. 2.	Compare filtration and collection mechanisms and applicability to the 
particles present in chemical, biological, and radiological agents. 
3. 3.	Explain the key issues with CBR detection. 
4. 4.	Identify the indications of CBR contamination. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-3 
Unit VII: CBR Measures 
Units I-V discussed Assessments � Risk. 
Units VI and VII explain Blast and CBR Weapons and effects. 
Units VIII and IX demonstrate techniques for site layout and building design to counter or mitigate manmade threats. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-3 
VISUAL VII-4 
CBR Measures: An Overview 
FEMA 426, Chapter 5 is based on best practices for safeguarding building occupants from CBR threats. This module is organized 
into four sections : 
. � Protective Actions for Buildings and Occupants 
. � Air Filtration and Cleaning Principles and Technology 
. � CBR Detection and Technology 
. � Non-Technology CBR Contamination Indications 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-4 
CBR Measures 
This unit is based on guidance from the CDC/NIOSH and the DoD and presents 
protective measures and actions to safeguard the occupants of a building from CBR 
threats. Evacuation, sheltering in place, personal protective equipment, air filtration and 
pressurization, and exhausting and purging will be discussed, as well as CBR detection. 
Additionally, CBR design mitigation measures are discussed in Chapter 3 of FEMA 426 
and Appendix C of FEMA 426 contains a glossary of CBR terms and a summary of CBR 
agent characteristics. 
Recent terrorist events have increased interest in the vulnerability of buildings to CBR 
threats. Of particular concern are building HVAC systems, because they can become an 
entry point and distribution system for airborne hazardous contaminants. Even without 
special protective systems, buildings can provide protection in varying degrees against 
airborne hazards that originate outdoors. 
CBR Measures: FEMA 426 Chapter 5 Overview 
This Unit draws on the latest research from CDC/NIOSH to present the best practices 
for detecting CBR agents, and safeguarding building occupants from the effects of CBR 
contamination. The FEMA 426 chapter on CBR provides an overview on CBR 
Detection and Current Technology; and Indicators of CBR Contamination, Evacuation, 
Sheltering in Place, Air Filtration and Pressurization, and Exhausting and Purging. 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-5 
CBR Terrorist Incidents Since 1970 
VISUAL VII-6 
What is the CBR Threat? 
POTENTIAL IMPACT


PROBABILITY/LIKELIHOOD 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-6 
VISUAL VII-7 
Why Would Terrorists Use CBR? 
. � Available and relatively easy to manufacture 
. � Large amounts not needed in an enclosed space 
. � Difficult to recognize 
. � Easily spread over large areas 
. � Strong psychological impact 
. � Overwhelms resources 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-7 
CBR Terrorist Incidents Since 1970 
CBR attacks have been used since ancient times and, in the past 20 years, over 50 attacks 
have occurred. CBR attacks require the right weather, population, and dispersion to be 
effective.  Recent attacks have had limited effectiveness or have been conducted on a 
relatively small scale. Future attacks with Weapons of Mass Destruction could occur on a 
regional or global scale. 
What is the CBR Threat? 
A fundamental question, What is the CBR threat today? This slide shows the 
relationship between the probability or likelihood of threats, and their potential 
impacts. 
Why Would Terrorists Use CBR? 
. �	Available and relatively easy to manufacture 
. �	Large amounts not needed in an enclosed space 
. �	Difficult to recognize 
. �	Easily spread over large areas 
. �	Strong psychological impact 
. �	Overwhelms resources 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-8 
CBR Sources 
. � Laboratory/commercial 
. � Industrial facilities 
 .� Foreign military sources 
. �	At least 25 countries possess 
chemical agents or weapons

. �	10 countries are suspected to 
possess biological agents or 
weapons

. � Medical/university research facilities 
. � Nuclear facilities 
. � Home production 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-8 
VISUAL VII-9 
Limitations of CBR Materials 
. � Effective dissemination is difficult. 
. � Delayed effects can detract from impact. 
. � Counterproductive to terrorists� support. 
. � Potentially hazardous to the terrorist. 
. � Development and use require skill. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
CBR Sources 
There are many potential sources of chemical and biological agents, including laboratory 
and commercial production, and home production in those cases involving low 
concentrations, and impure and inexpensive materials. Other sources include: 
. � Industrial facilities 
. � Foreign military sources 
. � Medical/university research facilities 
. � Nuclear facilities 

The next series of slides will examine in more detail the properties of chemical and 
biological agents, with implications for building design. 
Limitations of CBR Materials 
. � Effective dissemination is difficult. 
. � Delayed effects can detract from impact. 
. � Counterproductive to terrorists� support. 
. � Potentially hazardous to the terrorist. 
. � Development and use require skill. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-10 
Chemical Agents:
Characteristics and Behavior

. � Generally liquid (when containerized) 
. � Normally disseminated as aerosol or gas 
. � Present both a respiratory and skin contact hazard 
. � May be detectable by the senses (especially smell) 
. � Influenced by weather conditions 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
VISUAL VII-11 
Classes of Chemical Agents 
Chemical Agents: Characteristics and Behavior 
Classes of Chemical Agents 
Chemical agents are classified as either lethal or incapacitating and "riot control," 
according to their intended use. For the purposes of this presentation, the emphasis has 
been placed on lethal agents as a consequence of their greater capacity for terrorist 
mischief. 
. �	Lethal: These have been subdivided into two categories: industrial 
materials used or considered as chemical warfare agents, and chemical warfare agents, 
which have little or no other purpose beyond their intended use as weapons of mass 
destruction on the battlefield. 
. �	Incapacitating and Riot Control: Incapacitating and riot control agents 
are not considered as primary terrorist threats, due primarily to their relatively short 
duration of effects and minimal toxicity. Therefore, they are not discussed in detail in this 
unit. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-12 
VISUAL VII-13 
Note: At this point, reinforce the following point �as we collectively examine and 
identify opportunities to improve building safety from CBR, it is important to understand 
the characteristics of CBR, and their potential consequences for the public, and first 
responders�. detailed information on the properties of these agents can be found in 
Appendix C of FEMA 426. 
Industrial Chemicals 
This chart lists four industrial chemicals that were previously used as chemical warfare 
agents. These chemicals are used in the sanitation industry, the plastics industry, and the 
pesticide industry. All of these agents are generally respiratory agents and can be 
protected against by effective respiratory protection (i.e., self-contained breathing 
apparatus (SCBA)), although skin contact with concentrated material may cause chemical 
burns. They are all exceedingly volatile and dissipate rapidly outdoors. 
Comparative Toxicity 
This is a graphical comparison of the approximate lethalities of some chemical agents. 
They are based relative to Chlorine in terms of respiratory toxicity. If we use Chlorine 
as a baseline (1.0 on the graph): 
. �	Phosgene (CG) is about 6 times more toxic 
. �	Hydrogen Cyanide (AC) is about 7 times more toxic 
. �	Parathion, an insecticide ingredient, is about 12 times more toxic 
. �	Mustard (H) is about 13 times more toxic 
. �	Sarin (GB) is about 200 times more toxic 
. �	VX is about 600 times more toxic 

For skin toxicity, less than a pinhead of mustard agent is required to achieve a small 
blister. Less than a pinhead of VX can be lethal. 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-14 
Exam Questions #A15 and B15 
VISUAL VII-15 
Chemical Agents Key Points 
. � Chemical agents are supertoxic 
. � Relative toxicity: industrial chemicals < mustard < nerve 
. � Normal states are as a liquid or a vapor 
. � Inhalation hazard is of greatest concern 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-15 
How Much Sarin Does it Take? 
We have all heard of Sarin, among the most lethal of chemical agents. It is both odorless 
and colorless in pure form. 
These numbers are the Lethal Doses 50 (LD50) amounts for 1 minute of exposure to 
Sarin liquid. This means that in a 60-second period, it would take approximately 26 
gallons of Sarin to kill 50 percent of the people in a domed stadium, 5 cups of Sarin to kill 
50 percent of the people in a movie theater, only about 1/4 cup of Sarin to kill 50 percent 
of the people in an auditorium, and the equivalent of a shot glass to kill 50 percent of the 
people in a 50-100 person conference room. 
Chemical Agents Key Points 
. �	Chemical agents are supertoxic: These agents were deliberately developed 
to cause injury or death to individuals. 
. �	Relative toxicity: industrial chemicals < mustard < nerve: In terms of 
relative toxicity, the same amount of an industrial chemical is less toxic than a blister 
agent, and both are less toxic than a nerve agent. 
. �	Normal states are as a liquid or a vapor: These agents are either a liquid or 
a vapor in their normal state. 
. �	Inhalation hazard is of greatest concern: Nerve and blister agents pose both 
a skin and inhalation hazard. The inhalation hazard is of greater concern. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-18 
Bacteria 
Anthrax and plague are two examples of diseases caused by bacteria. This chart 
highlights the important characteristics of each, including: 
. � Incubation period 
. � Whether they are contagious 
. � Signs and symptoms 
. � Protection 
. � Treatment 

Again, a basic understanding of these characteristics will be valuable in developing an 
appropriate and effective protective action strategy for your facility. 
VISUAL VII-19 
Viruses 
Two viruses are highlighted: Smallpox and Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers. Both are 
contagious, and protective actions include the use of standard and airborne and contact 
precautions. 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-20 
Toxins 
Note: There are numerous naturally-occurring toxins. For our purposes, we will group them into two categories. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-20 
VISUAL VII-21 
Exam Questions #A14 and B13 
Biological weapons are considered the emerging mass weapon of destruction of choice for 
terrorists because many agents can be made with standard commercial laboratory or 
brewing equipment. 
Toxins 
Finally, there are numerous naturally-occurring toxins. For our purposes, we will group 
them into two categories: 
. �	Neurotoxins: Neurotoxins attack the nervous system. They are fairly 
fast-acting and can act in a manner opposite to that of the nerve agents because they 
prevent nerve-to-muscle stimulation. 
. �	Cytotoxins: Cytotoxins are cell poisons. They are slower acting and can 
have a variety of symptoms, including vomiting, diarrhea, rashes, blisters, jaundice, 
bleeding, or general tissue deterioration. 

There are numerous other modes of action of toxins, which are beyond our need to 
discuss here. 
Biological Agents Key Points 
. �	Onset of symptoms: Most biological agents have an incubation period. 
Delayed effects will make identifying a biological attack more difficult. 
. �	Contagious: Only a few biological agents are contagious: plague, 
smallpox, and viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHF), such as ebola 
. �	Signs and symptoms: Signs and symptoms of many biological attacks 
initially manifest themselves as flu-like; therefore, it may be difficult to identify that an 
attack has occurred. 
. �	Protection: Standard precautions will be adequate protection against most 
biological agents 
. �	Treatment: Some biological agents can be treated with antibiotics, 
vaccines, and antitoxins; for agents for which there are 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-22 
Nuclear/Radiological Materials 
Improvised Nuclear Devices 
Nuclear Plants 
Radiological Dispersal Device 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-22 
VISUAL VII-23 
Ionizing Radiation 
Alpha particles
Beta particles
Gamma rays
Neutrons

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Exam Questions #A13 and B12 
none of the aforementioned treatments, 
supportive care should be administered. 
The recent SARS and Avian Flu outbreaks demonstrate the relative ease by which 
naturally-occurring biological agents can quickly transmutate and spread across the 
globe. The flu strain that caused the Flu Pandemic of 1918 is still an active strain. 
Nuclear/Radiological Materials 
Of the three types of threats (chemical, biological, or nuclear/radiological), a nuclear 
weapon explosion is considered the least likely for terrorist use; however, the potential 
exists for it to happen and even more potential exists for the use of radiological materials. 
Possible scenarios: 
. �	The detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND) 
. �	Terrorist attack on a nuclear plant 
. �	Use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or "dirty" bomb - the 
simple act of spreading the materials 

Ionizing Radiation 
For our purposes, this radiation can be classified as: 
. �	Alpha particles 
. �	Beta particles 
. �	Gamma rays 
. �	Neutrons 

Again, for the purposes of this course, we are primarily concerned with the hazard, the 
detection of the hazard, and protective actions that we can take. 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Note: In its simplest definition, radiation can be defined as either electromagnetic or 
particulate emissions of energy from the disintegration of the nucleus of an atom. This 
energy, when impacting on or passing through material, including us, can cause some form 
of reaction. 
Radioactive material: Any material that is giving off some form of ionizing 
radiation. 
VISUAL VII-24 
Common Radiation Exposures 
Chronic 
Acute 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Note: Mild radiation sickness (i.e., nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea) may onset after 
receiving a whole body dose of approximately 200,000 mrem in a short amount of time 
(generally less than 24 hours). The Lethal Dose (LD), known as the LD50/60, is a single, 
acute, whole body exposure of around 450,000 mrem. The LD50/60 is defined when 50 
percent of all people present at an incident receive 450,000 mrem and die after 60 days 
after receiving no medical treatment. 
Ionizing radiation is what causes injury or death, and also a characteristic by which 
nuclear materials can be measured and identified. 
Common Radiation Exposures 
This chart reflects naturally-occurring radiation doses (and doses received during normal 
activities) to provide a point of reference and for comparison. The threshold for any real 
consequences begins around 200,000 mrem. 
The average annual radiation exposure has been calculated as: Naturally occurring 295 
mrem Medical 52 mrem Consumer products 10 mrem Other 3 mrem 
Total 360 mrem 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-25 
Health Hazards in an Incident 
. � Exposure to radiation source (external) 
. � Contamination (possible internal and/or external) 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Note: Internal exposure through wounds or broken skin is also possible. Responders 
should take extra precautions when sharp objects, such as broken glass or jagged metal, 
are at the scene. 
Exam Questions #A24 and B25 
VISUAL VII-26 
Protection from Radiation Exposure 
Time 
Distance 
Shielding 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Note: Do not shield neutron producing sources with lead or dense materials. Neutrons 
will produce gamma rays in reactions with the material. Use wax, water, or plastic. 
Health Hazards 
The two radiation concerns at an incident are exposure and contamination by 
radioactive material. External irradiation occurs when all or part of the body is exposed 
to penetrating radiation from an external source. Contamination means that radioactive 
materials in the form of gases, liquids, or solids are released into the environment and 
get on people externally, get in them, or both. 
Incidents involving either an explosion or fire will elevate the potential for internal or 
external contamination due to the spreading of the radioactive material in the form of small 
fragments (dust) or smoke. These materials can often be carried long distances downwind. 
Radiological materials are both colorless and odorless. 
Protection from Radiation Exposure 
The radiation exposure received will depend on the type and strength of radiation source. 
This exposure can be reduced by effective use of: 
. �	Time: The radiation dose is reduced in proportion to reduction of 
exposure time. 
. �	Distance: Distance is also critical for reducing radiation exposure dose. 
While alpha particles only travel a little over an inch in air, and beta particles will travel 
only a few yards in air, gamma rays can travel extensive distances. 
. �	Shielding: Radiation can also be blocked or reduced by various materials.  
Alpha radiation is stopped by a sheet of paper, beta radiation is stopped by aluminum 
foil or clothing, gamma rays 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-27 
CBR Detection 
Radiological 

Chemical 

Biological 
? 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-27 
Exam Questions #A19 and B20 
Sources of useful technical information: 
�	NBC Products and Services Handbook 
contains a catalogue of CBR detection equipment. 
. �	Guide for the Selection of Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material 
Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders, published by the National Institute 
of Justice (NIJ), June 2001. 
. �	An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency 
First Responders, published by the NIJ (Guide 101-00: December 2001. 

are only reduced by dense materials such as lead or earth, and neutrons are slowed or 
stopped by hydrogenous materials, such as wax or water. 
CBR Detection 
The underlying theme of this chapter is that effective protection against potential releases 
of CBR is a function of: 1) effective and timely detection of the agent(s); and 2) a public 
that is knowledgeable of the most appropriate protective actions to take in the event of a 
CBR release. 
The discussion on CBR detection includes: 
. �	CBR detection technology currently available. 
. �	Indications of CBR contamination. 
. �	Most strategies for protecting people from airborne hazards require a 
means of detection (determining that a hazard exists) 
. �	Chemical detection technology has improved vastly since Operation 
Desert Storm (when many military detection systems experienced high false-alarm rates). 
Current chemical detectors work in about 10 seconds. 
. �	Biological detection technology has not matured as fast; generally require 
trained specialists to administer; biological signatures can take 30 minutes to detect. 

A variety of radiological detectors have been developed for the nuclear industry and 
are commercially available. 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-28 
Chemical Incident Indicators (1) 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-28 
VISUAL VII-29 
Chemical Incident Indicators (2) 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-29 
Exam Questions #A16 and B16 Chemical Incident Indicators (1) 
Most hazardous chemicals have warning properties that provide a practical means for 
detecting a hazard and initiating protective actions. Such warning properties make 
chemicals perceptible; for example, vapors or gases can be perceived by the human senses 
(i.e., smell, sight, taste, or irritation of the eyes, skin, or respiratory tract) before serious 
effects occur. 
In the absence of a warning property, people can be alerted to some airborne hazards by 
observing symptoms or effects in others. This provides a practical means for initiating 
protective actions, because the susceptibility to hazardous materials varies from person 
to person. 
Chemical Incident Indicators (2) 
This chart depicts the following chemical indicators: definite pattern of casualties; 
illness associated with a confined geographic area; unused liquid droplets; areas that 
look different in appearance; unexplained odors; low-flying clouds; and unusual metal 
debris. 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-30 
Biological Incident Indicators 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-30 
VISUAL VII-31 
Radiological Incident Indicators 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-31 
VISUAL VII-32 
CBR Protection Strategies 
Protective Actions: 
. � Evacuation 
. � Sheltering in Place 
. � Personal Protective Equipment 
. � Air Filtration and Pressurization 
. � Exhausting and Purging 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-28 
Biological Incident Indicators 
In the case of a biological incident, the onset of symptoms takes days to weeks and, 
typically, there will be no characteristic indicators. Because of the delayed onset of 
symptoms in a biological incident, the area affected may be greater due to the migration of 
infected individuals. 
Radiological Incident Indicators 
In the case of a radiological incident, the onset of symptoms also takes days to weeks to 
occur and typically there will be no characteristic indicators. Radiological materials are 
not recognizable by the senses because they are colorless and odorless. 
CBR Protection Strategies 
Once the presence of an airborne hazard is detected, there are five possible protective 
actions for a building and its occupants. In increasing order of complexity and cost, 
these actions are: 
. � Evacuation 
. � Sheltering in Place 
. � Personal Protective Equipment 
. � Air Filtration and Pressurization 
. � Exhausting and Purging 

To ensure the protective actions are effective you must have: 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-33 
Evacuation 
Most common protective action In most cases, existing plans for fire evacuation apply 
� Assembly should be upwind and at least 1,000 feet 
Two considerations in non-fire evacuation are: 
1. 1.	Determine if the source of the airborne hazard is internal or external. 
2. 2.	Determine if evacuation may lead to other risks. Also, evacuation and 
assembly should be to the upwind side of the building and at least 1,000 feet away, since 
any airborne hazard escaping the building will be carried downwind. 

. �	A protective action plan specific to each building 
. �	Training and familiarization for occupants. 

Protective actions are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
Evacuation 
. �	Evacuation is the most common protective action taken when an airborne 
hazard, such as smoke or an unusual odor, is perceived in a building. 
. �	Orderly evacuation is the simplest and most reliable action for an internal 
airborne hazard, but may not be the best action in all situations, especially in the case of 
an external CBR release, particularly one that is widespread. 
. �	If some agent has infiltrated the building and evacuation is deemed not to 
be safe, the use of protective hoods may be appropriate. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-34 
Sheltering in Place (1) 
A building can provide substantial protection against agents released outside if the flow of fresh air is halted or significantly 
reduced 
The amount of protection varies with: 
. � How tight the building is 
. � Duration of exposure 
. � Purging or period of occupancy 
. � Natural filtering 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-30 
Exam Questions #A12 and B14 
In most cases, air conditioners and combustion heaters cannot be operated while 
sheltering in place because operating them increases the indoor-outdoor exchange of air. 
Sheltering in place is, therefore, suitable only for exposures of short duration, roughly 2 
hours or less, depending on conditions. 
Because the building slowly releases contaminants that have entered, at some point during 
cloud passage the concentration inside exceeds the concentration outside. Maximum 
protection is attained by increasing the air exchange rate after cloud passage or by exiting 
the building into clean air. The tighter the building, the greater the effect of this natural 
filtering. 
Sheltering in Place (1) 
Interrupting the flow of fresh air is the principal applied in the protective action 
known as sheltering in place. 
Advantage: It can be implemented rapidly. 
Disadvantage: Protection is variable and diminishes with the duration of the hazard. 
The level of protection that can be attained by sheltering in place is substantial, but it is 
less than can be provided by high-efficiency filtration of the fresh air introduced into the 
building. The amount of protection varies with: 
. �	The building's air exchange rate. The tighter the building (i.e., the lower 
the air exchange rate), the greater the protection it provides. 
. �	The duration of exposure. Protection varies with time, diminishing as the 
time of exposure increases. 
. �	Purging or period of occupancy. How long occupants remain in the 
building after the hazardous cloud has passed also affects the level of protection. 
. �	Natural filtering. Some filtering occurs when the agent is deposited in the 
building shell or upon interior surfaces as air passes into and out of the building. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-35 
Sheltering in Place (2) 
. � Sheltering Plan should include: 
. � Identifying all HVAC equipment 
to be deactivated

. � Identify cracks, seams, and 
joints to be temporarily sealed

. � Prepositioning supplies 
. � Identify safe rooms 
. � Identify procedures for purging 
. � Identify procedures for voluntary 
occupant participation


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-31 
Exam Questions #A20 and B19 
Note: Although sheltering is for protection against an external release, it is possible, but 
more complex, to shelter in place in one or more floors of a multi-story building after an 
internal release has occurred. In these circumstances, it is critical to isolate stairwells, and 
not use elevators. 
VISUAL VII-36 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Note: This slide depicts individuals wearing universal-fit escape hoods (upper left-hand 
corner picture and middle picture on the slide) 
Sheltering in Place (2) 
If the office environment is complex, planning and exercises is important. The 
sheltering plan should include: 
. �	Identifying all air handling units, fans, and the switches needed to 
deactivate them 
. �	Identifying cracks, seams, and joints, in the building shell to be temporarily 
sealed 
. �	Prepositioning supplies 
. �	Identifying safe rooms 
. �	Identifying procedures for voluntary occupant participation 
. �	Identifying procedures for purging after an internal release 
. �	Sealing doors with duct tape 
. �	Turning on TV or radio 

During an event, the decision to shelter in place is voluntary, but people should enter 
the designated shelter area within 3-5 minutes. 
Personal Protective Equipment 
. �	A wide range of individual protection equipment is available, including 
respirators, protective hoods, protective suits, CBR detectors, decontamination 
equipment, etc. 
. �	If masks have been issued, ensure that training is conducted on how to put 
on and wear the masks. 
. �	No selection of personal protective equipment is effective against every 
possible threat. Selection must be tied to specific threat/hazard characteristics. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
that have been developed for short-duration "escape-only" wear to protect against 
chemical agents, aerosols (including biological agents), and some toxic industrial chemicals. 
The hoods are compact enough to be stored in desks (see picture in upper left-hand 
corner of the slide) or to be carried on the belt. 
Exam Questions #A21 and B23 
VISUAL VII-37 
Filtration and Pressurization 
. �	Requires modifications to HVAC and electrical systems � significant initial and life-cycle costs 
. �Introduces filtered air at a rate sufficient to produce an overpressure and create an outward flow through leaks and cracks 

Note: Applying external filtration to a building requires modification to the building�s 
heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) system and electrical system. These changes 
are necessary to ensure that, when the protective system is in operation, all outside air 
enters the building through filters. The air exchange that normally occurs due to wind 
pressure, chimney effect, and operation of fans must be reduced to zero. 
�	Universal hoods designed for short duration escape wear only protect against chemical 
agents by using both HEPA and carbon filters. 
Filtration and Pressurization 
. �	Two basic methods of applying air filtration to a building are external 
filtration and internal filtration. External filtration involves filtering and/or cleaning of the 
air drawn from the outside, while internal filtration involves filtering and/or cleaning of 
the air drawn from inside the building. Both methods require HVAC modifications that 
can be costly. 
. �	Among the various protective measures for buildings, high efficiency air 
filtration/cleaning provides the highest level of protection against an outdoor release of 
hazardous materials. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-38 
Air Filtration and Cleaning


Two Types of Collection Systems: 
Particulate air filtration 
. � Principles of collection 
. � Types of particulate filters 
. � Filter testing and efficiency ratings 

Gas-phase air filtration 
. � Principles of collection 
. � Types of gas-phase filters 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-34 
Exam Questions #A23 and B21 Air Filtration and Cleaning 
Air filtration is the removal of particulate contaminants from the air. Air cleaning is the 
removal of gases or vapors from the air. The collection mechanisms for these two types 
of systems are very different. 
Particulate air filtration consists of fibrous materials, which capture aerosols. Their 
efficiency will depend on the size of the aerosol, the type of filter, the velocity of the air, 
and the type of microbe. The basic principle of particulate air filtration is not to restrict 
the passage of particles by the gap between fibers, but by altering the airflow streamlines. 
The airflow will slip around the fiber, but higher density aerosols and particulates will not 
change direction as rapidly. Particulate filters are not intended to remove gases and 
vapors. 
Gas-phase air filtration sorbent filters use one of two mechanisms for capturing and 
controlling gas-phase air contaminants, physical absorption. Both mechanisms remove 
specific types of gas-phase contaminants in indoor air. Unlike particulate filters, 
sorbents cover a wide range of highly porous materials, ranging from simple clays and 
carbons to complex engineered polymers. Activated carbon is the most common sorbent, 
but does not capture all chemicals. 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-39 
Air Contaminant Sizes 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VII-35 
Exam Questions #A22 and B22 
VISUAL VII-40 
Various Filter Types 
Pleated Panel Filters 
Air Contaminant Sizes 
This chart illustrates the particle size for a number of the chemical, biological, and 
radiological agents of concern. Viruses are the smallest and most difficult to protect 
against. 
In FEMA 426, Table 5-1 lists the new ASHRAE 52.2 Standards for particulate filter 
ratings to remove a given particle size. In most cases, new generation MERV 11 to 
MERV 13 filters can be used in commercial buildings and effectively remove most 
particulates of CBR concern. 
Various Filter Types 
A wide variety of filters are available to meet many specialized needs: 
. �	HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) Filters - high performance filters 
that are typically rated as 99.97 percent effective in removing dust and particulate matter 
greater than 0.3 micron in size. 
. �	Carbon Filters - sorbent filters (gas-phase) that remove gas and vapors 
using the thousands of bonding sites on the huge surface area of activated carbon. 
. �	Pleated Panel Filters - particulate air filters consisting of fibrous 
materials that capture aerosols. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-41 
ASHRAE Standards (1) 
The new ASHRAE Standard 52.2 is a more descriptive test than ASHRAE Standard 
52.1. Standard 52.2 quantifies filtration efficiency in different particle size ranges and is 
more applicable in determining a filter's effectiveness to capture a specific agent. Standard 
52.2 reports the particle size efficiency results as a Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value 
(MERV) rating between 1 and 20. A higher MERV rating indicates a more efficient filter. 
VISUAL VII-42 
ASHRAE Standards (2) 
The standard provides a table (depicted on the slide) that shows minimum Particle Size 
Efficiency (PSE) for three size ranges for each of the MERV numbers 1 through 16. Thus, 
if the size of a contaminant is known, an appropriate filter with the desired PSE for that 
particular particle size can be identified. 
VISUAL VII-43 
Typical Performance of a HEPA 
Filter 
HEPA filters are typically rated as 99.97 percent effective in removing dust and 
particulate matter greater than 0.3 micron in size. 
A typical HEPA performance curve is depicted on this slide. The dip between 0.1 and 0.3 
microns represents the most penetrating particle size. Many bacteria and viruses fall into 
this size range. Fortunately, microbes in this range are also vulnerable to ultraviolet 
radiation. For this reason, many 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-44 
Note: Mention that a ventilation system and smoke purge fans can be used to purge the 
building after an external release after the hazard outdoors has dissipated, and it has been 
confirmed that the agent is no longer present near the building. 
Exam Questions #A25 and B24 
facilities couple particulate air filters with ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI). 
UVGI will be discussed on slide VII-49. 
Exhausting and Purging 
The fifth protective measure for CBR covered in FEMA 426 is Exhausting and 
Purging. Turning on a building's ventilation fans and smoke-purge fans is a protective 
action for purging airborne hazards from the building and reducing the hazard to which 
building occupants are exposed, but it is mainly useful when the source of the hazard is 
indoors. 
. �	Purging must be carefully applied with regard to the location of the source 
and the time of the release. It must be clear that the source of the hazard is inside the 
building and, if not, purging should not be attempted. 
. �	If the hazardous material has been identified before release or immediately 
upon release, purging should not be employed, because it may spread the hazardous 
material throughout the building or zone. In this case, all air handling units should be 
turned off to isolate the hazard while evacuating or temporarily sheltering in place. The 
indoor-outdoor air exchange rate can be increased by opening all windows and energizing 
all fans. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-45 
VISUAL VII-46 
VISUAL VII-47 
Issues to Consider 
. �	What is the threat? 
. �	How clean does the air need to be? 
. �	What is the current system capacity? 
. �	Is there filter bypass? 
. �	Will improved indoor air quality offset upgrade costs? 
. �	Is system maintenance addressed? 

Economic Issues to Consider 
In developing, implementing, and sustaining a program to reduce vulnerability to terrorist 
threats, there are economic issues to consider, including three categories of costs: 
. �	Initial costs 
. �	Operating costs 
. �	Replacement costs 

These need to be factored into protection strategies. 
Access to Outdoor Intakes 
. �	Several physical security measures can be applied to reduce the potential 
for hazardous materials entering a building through the HVAC system. 
. �	One of the most important steps in protecting a building's indoor 
environment is the security of the outdoor air intakes. Outdoor air enters the building 
through these intakes and is distributed throughout the building by the HVAC system. 
. �	If relocation of outdoor air intakes is not 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Note: The goal of this protective measure is to minimize public accessibility. In general, 
this means the higher the extensions, the better� as long as other design constraints 
(excessive pressure loss, dynamic and static loads on structure) are appropriately 
considered. 
VISUAL VII-48 
VISUAL VII-49

Note:  UVGI has long been used in laboratories and health care facilities. Ultraviolet 
radiation in the range of 2,250-3,020 Angstroms is lethal to microorganisms. All viruses 
and almost all bacteria (excluding spores) are vulnerable to moderate levels of UVGI 
exposure. Spores, which are larger and more resistant to UVGI feasible, intake extensions 
can be constructed without creating adverse effects on HVAC performance. 
Extension Design Recommendations 
An extension height of 12 feet will place the intake out of reach of individuals without 
some assistance. Also, the entrance to the intake should be covered with a sloped metal 
mesh to reduce the threat of objects being tossed into the intake. A minimum slope of 45� 
is generally adequate. Extension height should be increased where existing platforms or 
building features (i.e., loading docks, retaining walls) might provide access to the outdoor 
air intakes. 
Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation (UVGI) 
A design utilizing a combination of filtration and UVGI can be very effective against 
biological agents. Smaller microbes, which are difficult to filter out, tend to be more 
susceptible to UVGI, while larger microbes, such as spores, which are more resistant to 
UVGI, tend to be easier to filter out. 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
than most bacteria, can be effectively removed through high efficiency air filtration. 
Consequently, most UGVI systems are installed in conjunction with high efficiency 
filtration systems. 
VISUAL VII-50 
Note: Building envelopes in residential and commercial buildings are, in general, quite 
leaky, and significant quantities of air can infiltrate the building envelope with minimal 
filtration. Field studies have shown that, unless specific measures are taken to reduce 
infiltration, as much air may enter a building through infiltration as through the mechanical 
ventilation system. 
Infiltration and Bypass 
Infiltration. Building managers should not expect filtration alone to protect a building 
from outdoor releases, particularly for systems in which no make-up air or inadequate 
overpressure is present. Filtration, in combination with other steps, such as building 
pressurization and tightening the building envelope, should be considered to increase the 
likelihood that the air entering the building actually passes through the filtration and air-
cleaning systems. 
Bypass. Filter bypass is a common problem found in many HVAC filtration systems. It 
occurs when air, rather than moving through the filter, goes around it, decreasing collection 
efficiency and defeating the intended purpose of the filtration system. Filter bypass is 
often caused by poorly fitting filters, poor sealing of filters in their framing systems, 
missing filter panels, or leaks and openings in the air handling unit downstream of the 
filter bank and upstream of the blower. Simply improving filter efficiency without 
addressing filter bypass provides little, if any, improvement to system efficiency. As a 
mechanical system loads with particulates over time, its collection efficiency increases, 
but so does the pressure drop. 
Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-51 
Things Not to Do 
More than anything else, building owners and managers should ensure that any actions 
they take do not have a detrimental effect on the building systems (HVAC, fire 
protection, life safety, etc.) or the building occupants under normal building operation. 
Some efforts to protect the building from a CBR attack could have adverse effects on the 
building's indoor environmental quality. Building owners and managers should understand 
how the building systems operate and assess the impact of security measures on those 
systems. 
VISUAL VII-52 
Summary 
. �	CBR threats are real and growing. 
. �	Industrial chemicals are readily available. 
. �	Military chemicals require specialty expertise. 
. �	Most buildings provide a reasonable level of protection. 
. �	Inside versus outside building release determines evacuation decision. 

Unit VII: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VII-53 
Refer participants to FEMA 426 and the Unit VII Case Study activity in the Student 
Manual. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist groups 
as needed. 
At the end of 10 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
1. 1.	Distribute the exam (Version A or B) and answer sheet. Ask the students 
to record their name and the date. Remind them that the test is an open book exam. 
2. 2.	Allow 30 minutes for test completion, then collect the tests and answer 
sheets. 
3. 3.	Score the tests. 
4. 4.	Return the students� tests and answer sheets, and review the correct 
answers by calling on the students to give the answers. Encourage them to ask questions, 
and explain (as needed) why each answer is correct. 

When finished, collect the tests and answer sheets. 
Student Activity 
This activity provides a check on learning about the nature of chemical, biological, and 
radiological agents. 
Activity Requirements 
Working in small groups, refer to the HIC Case Study and FEMA 426 to answer the 
worksheet questions. 
Take 10 minutes to complete this activity. Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
Transition 
This completes the information Units I through VII. A written exam will cover these 
units. Unit VIII will cover Building Design Guidance. Units VIII through XI will not 
have a written exam.



WRITTEN EXAM 
Two versions of the written exam (with answer sheet) are provided in Appendix B of the 
Student Manual: 
. �	Version A 
. �	Version B 

Use the provided Scoring Sheet. 
Correct answers and their sources are listed on the Answer Keys, which follow. 
UNIT VII CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) CONSIDERATIONS

The requirements in this Unit�s activity are intended to provide a check on learning 
about the nature of chemical, biological, and radiological agents. 
Requirement 
1.	Review the HIC Case Study and name the prevalent CBR threat(s) to the HIC. 
Chemical - fire and toxic fumes from an explosion at the petroleum tank farm, 
HazMat spills on the interstate or rail line Biological - Anthrax delivered by mail, 
smallpox by spray mechanism Radiological � "dirty" Bomb 
Refer to Table 5-1 on page 5-12 of FEMA 426 and answer the following questions: 
1. 2.	What size filtration unit (MERV) is required to filter out 75 percent of 
Legionella and dust particulates (1 to 3 microns) inside the HIC? 11 
2. 3.	What range of MERV is required to remove 85 percent of smoke particles 
greater than 0.3 micron in size? 15 
3. 4.	What mitigation measure can be used in the HVAC systems to destroy 
bacteria and viruses? 

UVGI lamps 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
Unit 
VIII 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 150 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Site and Layout Design Guidance 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Explain the concerns of land use as applied to threats and 
hazards due to terrorism and technological accidents 
1. 2.	Identify site planning concerns that can create, reduce, or eliminate 
vulnerabilities and understand the concept of "Layers of Defense" 
2. 3.	Compare the pros and cons of barrier mitigation measures that increase 
stand-off or create controlled access zones 
3. 4.	Identify the positive and negative aspects of mitigation approaches for 
entry control and vehicle access, signage, parking, loading docks, lighting, and site utilities 
4. 5.	Explain the basic concepts of Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design (CPTED) and its applicability to building security against terrorism 
5. 6.	Apply these concepts to an existing site or building and identify mitigation 
measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Land use considerations both outside and inside the property line 
2. 2.	Site planning issues to include site design, layout and form, vehicular and 
pedestrian circulation, and landscape and urban design 
3. 3.	Creating stand-off distance using perimeter controls, non-exclusive zones, 
and exclusive zones along with the design concepts and technology to consider 
4. 4.	Design considerations and mitigation measures for building security 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 2 
1. 2.	Student Manual, Unit VIII 
2. 3.	Case Study 
3. 4.	Unit VIII visuals 

Unit VIII 
REQUIREMENTS 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
1. 2.	Instructor Guide 
2. 3.	Student Manual (one per student) 
3. 4.	Overhead projector or computer display unit 
4. 5.	Unit VIII visuals 
5. 6.	Chart paper, easel, and markers 

UNIT VIII OUTLINE	Time Page 
VIII. Site and Layout Design Guidance 	150 minutes IG 
VIII-1 
1. 1.	Introduction and Unit Overview 5 minutes IG VIII-3 
2. 2.	Layout Design and Land Use Considerations 15 minutes IG VIII-4 
3. 3.	 Site Planning Issues 15 minutes IG VIII-5 
4. 4.	Entry Control and Vehicle Access 15 minutes IG VIII-9 
5. 5.	 Design Considerations and Mitigation Measures 20 minutes IG VIII-11 
6. 6.	Walk-through of Building Vulnerability Assessment 20 minutes IG VIII-21 
Checklist 
7. 7.	 Activity: Site and Layout Design Guidance 60 minutes IG VIII-23 

PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
. �	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to 
identify topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity: There is no student activity associated with this unit. However, 
information in this unit will be used during the student activities associated with Chapters 
2 and 3. 

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-1 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY


Unit VIII Site and Layout DesignGuidance 
VISUAL VIII-2 and 3 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit VIII Site and Layout Design Guidance. This lecture will examine site level 
considerations and concepts for integrating land use planning, landscape, architecture, 
site planning, and other strategies to mitigate the design basis threats. The students will 
gain an understanding of the myriad options available to enhance site design taking into 
account many environmental challenges. 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Explain the concerns of land use as applied to threats and hazards due to 
terrorism and technological accidents. 
2. 2.	Identify site planning concerns that can create, reduce, or eliminate 
vulnerabilities and understand the concept of "Layers of Defense." 
3. 3.	Compare the pros and cons of barrier mitigation measures that increase 
stand-off or create controlled access zones. 
4. 4.	Identify the positive and negative aspects of mitigation approaches for 
entry control and vehicle access, signage, parking, loading docks, lighting, and site utilities. 
5. 5.	Explain the basic concepts of Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design (CPTED) and its applicability to building security against terrorism. 
6. 6.	Apply these concepts to an existing site or building and identify mitigation 
measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities. 

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-4 
Layout and Site Design 
Layout Design
Siting
Entry Control and Vehicle Access
Signage
Parking
Loading Docks
Physical Security Lighting
Site Utilities

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-4 
VISUAL VIII-5 
Layers of Defense 
Note: Layers of Defense will be used through out the course and in Unit X Electronic 
Security Systems and illustrate the elements: 
. �	Deter 
. �	Detect 
. �	Deny 
. �	Devalue 

Instructors may want to relate to a castle. 
Site and Layout Design 
. �	Layout Design 
. �	Siting 
. �	Entry Control/Vehicle Access 
. �	Signage 
. �	Parking 
. �	Loading Docks 
. �	Physical Security Lighting 
. �	Site Utilities 

Layers of Defense 
. �	First layer starts at the site perimeter and outward 
. �	Second layers between the site perimeter and building 
. �	Third layer is building and interior 

It is important to remember that the nature of any threat is always changing. Although 
indications of potential threats may be scarce during the design stage, consideration 
should be given to accommodating enhanced protection measures in response to future 
threats that may emerge. Asset protection must be balanced with other design objectives, 
such as the efficient use of land and resources, and must also take into account existing 
physical, programmatic, and fiscal constraints. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-6 
Identify Adjacent Hazards 
First Layer of Defense 
Note the large fuel 
storage and distribution 
facility in the vicinity of 
the office building being 
assessed.

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-6 
VISUAL VIII-7 
Layout Design 
First Layer of Defense 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-7 
Identify Adjacent Hazards 
The designer should study the surrounding areas to identify particular threats/hazards. 
For this purpose, GIS is an excellent resource. Using GIS applications enable designers 
and building owners to analyze various demographic, hazardous areas, transportation 
networks, access control points, etc. These applications may depict a true picture of the 
surrounding threats, allowing decision-makers to take proactive measurements to mitigate 
potential vulnerabilities.  
Layout Design 
Depending on the site characteristics, the occupancy requirements, and other factors, 
buildings may be clustered tightly in one area, or dispersed across the site. Both patterns 
have compelling strengths and weaknesses. 
Concentrating people, property, and operations in one place creates a target-rich 
environment, and the mere proximity of any one building to any other may increase the 
risk of collateral impacts. Additionally, the potential exists for the establishment of more 
single-point vulnerabilities in a clustered design than would exist in a more dispersed 
pattern. However, grouping high risk activities, concentrations of personnel, and critical 
functions into a cluster can help maximize stand-off from the perimeter and create a 
"defensible space." 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-8 
Layout Design


First Layer of Defense 
Orientation has a significant 
impact on making the 
building visible to 
aggressors.

Enhance surveillance 
opportunities while 
minimizing views into the 
building.

. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-8 
VISUAL VIII-9 
Siting 
First Layer of Defense 
Figure 2-7:  Clear Zone with Unobstructed Views, page 2-21 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-9 
A clear zone facilitates monitoring of the immediate vicinity and visual detection of 
attacks. 
Walkways and other circulation features within a clear zone should located so that 
buildings do not block view of pedestrians 
Layout Design 
Orientation is the building�s spatial relationship to the site, its orientation relative to the 
sun, and its vertical or horizontal aspect relative to the ground. 
The physical positioning of a building relative to its surroundings may seem subtle, but 
can be a greater determinant of security. 
Good site design, orientation and building placement should allow building occupants to 
look out of the facility while minimizing views into the building. 
The proximity of a vulnerable fa�ade to a parking area, street, adjacent site, or other area 
that is accessible to vehicles and/or difficult to observe can greatly contribute to its 
vulnerability. 
Siting 
For high risk buildings, it may be necessary to provide additional protection by creating a 
clear zone immediately adjacent to the structure that is free of all visual obstructions or 
landscaping. The clear zone facilitates monitoring of the immediate vicinity and visual 
detection of attacks. Walkways and other circulation features within a clear zone should 
be located so that buildings do not block views of pedestrians and vehicles. If clear zones 
are implemented, it may be necessary to implement other anti-surveillance measures. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
and vehicles. 
VISUAL VIII-10 
Siting


First Layer of Defense 
Stand-off 
Distance

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-10 
VISUAL VIII-11 
Siting 
First Layer 
of Defense

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-11 
Stand-off Distance 
The distance between an asset and a threat is referred to as the stand-off distance, as 
shown in Visual VIII-10. There is no ideal stand-off distance; it is determined by the type 
of threat, the type of construction, and desired level of protection. The primary design 
strategy is to keep terrorists away from inhabited buildings. Although sufficient stand-off 
distance is not always possible in conventional construction, maximizing the distance may 
be the most cost-effective solution. Maximizing stand-off distance also ensures that there 
is opportunity in the future to upgrade buildings to meet increased threats or to 
accommodate higher levels of protection. 
Siting 
Controlled access zones may be exclusive or non-exclusive. An exclusive zone is the area 
surrounding a building within the exclusive control of the building. Anyone entering an 
exclusive zone must have a purpose related to the building. A non-exclusive zone is either 
a public right-of-way or an area related to several buildings. Someone entering a non-
exclusive zone could be headed for any building within that area. Public access areas 
outside a downtown building would typically be considered non-exclusive. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-12 
Siting 
First Layer 
of Defense

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-12 
VISUAL VIII-13 
Entry Control/Vehicular Access 
Prevent unauthorized access 
. � Avoid traffic queuing 
. � Rejection routes 
. � Search area out of traffic flow 

Traffic calming 
. � Avoid high speed approaches 
. � Commercial vehicle gate 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-13 
Siting 
A number of elements may be used to create a physical barrier, some natural and some 
manmade. Natural barrier elements include rivers, lakes, waterways, steep terrain, 
mountains, barren areas, plants, and other terrain features that are difficult to traverse. 
Manmade elements include fencing, walls, buildings, bollards, planters, concrete barriers, 
and fountains. Selection of elements must consider the level of security desired and the 
type of threat most likely to occur. 
Entry Control/Vehicular Access 
Entry control and vehicular access should: 
. � Prevent unauthorized access 
. � Provide for traffic calming 
. � Have commercial vehicle gates if possible 
. � Have equal capacity for exit 

Existing streets can be retrofitted with barriers, bollards, swing gates, or other measures to 
force vehicles to travel in a serpentine path. Again, high curbs and other measures should 
be installed to keep vehicles from departing the roadway in an effort to avoid these 
countermeasures. Less radical than these techniques are traffic calming strategies, which 
seek to use design measures to cue drivers as to the acceptable speed for an area. These 
include raised crosswalks, speed humps and speed tables, pavement treatments, build 
outs, and traffic circles. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-14 
Entry Control/Vehicular Access and Roadway Design 
First Layer 
of Defense

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-14 
Entry Control/Vehicular Access and Roadway Design 
The design of entry control and access points for vehicular and pedestrian circulation 
patterns can impact security. 
An entry-control point or guard building serves well as the designated point of entry for 
site access. It provides a point for implementation of desired/required levels of screening 
and access control. The objective of the entry control point is to prevent unauthorized 
access while maximizing the rate of authorized access by foot or vehicle. 
Location selection for vehicular access and entry control for a building starts with an 
evaluation of the anticipated demand for access to the controlled site. An analysis of 
traffic origin and destination, and an analysis of the capability of the surrounding 
connecting road network, including its capacity to handle additional traffic, should then be 
performed. Expansion capacity should also be considered. The analysis should be 
coordinated with the state and local departments of transportation. The existing terrain 
can have a significant impact on the suitability of a potential entry control point site. Flat 
terrain with no thick vegetation is generally preferred. A gentle rise in elevation up to the 
entry control guard building allows for a clear view of arriving vehicles. Consider how 
existing natural features such as bodies of water or dense tree stands may enhance 
perimeter security and vehicle containment. Entry control spatial requirements vary, 
depending on the type, the traffic demand, and the necessary security measures. 
Roadway network design that uses straight-line approaches to buildings may give 
approaching 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-15 
VISUAL VIII-16 
Building Siting and View Relationships 
First Layer of Defense 
Blocking Sight Lines 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-16 
vehicles the opportunity gather the necessary speed to ram protective barriers and crash 
into buildings. Possible solution: design approaches to be parallel to the fa�ade, with 
berms, high curbs, trees, and other measures used to prevent vehicles from departing the 
roadway. 
Site Access and Entry Control 
Robust vehicle inspection points can be used to inspect vehicles. The covered top 
provides protection from inclement weather. 
Building Siting and View Relationships 
Landscape and urban design inherently define the "line of sight" in a space. Operational 
security is not a traditional element of master planning, but managing the threat of 
hostile surveillance is a significant consideration in protecting people, property, and 
operations. With careful selection, placement, and maintenance, landscape elements can 
provide visual screening that protects sensitive operations, gathering areas, and other 
activities from surveillance without creating concealment for covert activity. 
These techniques seek to deny aggressors a "line of sight" to a potential target, either 
from on or off site. This increases the protection of sensitive information and operations 
by using stand-off weapons. In addition to the use of various screening options, anti-
surveillance measures (e.g., building orientation, landscaping, screening, and landforms) 
can 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-17 
Building Siting and View Relationships 
First Layer of Defense



Blocking Sight Lines and Establishing Clear Zones 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-17 
VISUAL VIII-18 
Urban Design 
Second Layer of Defense 
Given that the energy transferred when one object strikes another is a function of its mass 
and its velocity, a bollard that can stop a 15,000-pound truck moving at 35 miles per hour 
may not be able to stop the same truck moving at 55 miles per hour. In developing a 
system of street alignments with protection in mind, the designer cannot determine the 
size or weight of a vehicle that will travel along the road, because that is a management 
decision. However, the designer can propose a roadway system to minimize vehicle 
velocity, thus using the roadway itself as a protective measure. 
also be used to block sight lines. 
Building Siting and View Relationships 
Landforms can have a direct bearing on the security of a facility. They can be either 
beneficial (e.g., an elevated site that may enhance the surveillance of the surrounding 
area), or detrimental to anti-surveillance. Generally speaking: 
�	For security purposes, buildings should not be sited immediately adjacent to higher 
surrounding terrain. 
Urban Design (1) 
Streets in urban areas can minimize travel time and at the same time maximize safety. 
Although a straight line may be the most efficient course, designers should use caution 
when orienting streets relative to buildings. 
Most urban building lines are located within 50 feet of the street curb. The street can 
become the second layer of defense and provide standoff distance through the use of 
terrain, curvature, and streetscape furniture to prevent vehicles from approaching the 
building. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-19 
VISUAL VIII-20 
Urban Design 
Second Layer of Defense 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-20 
Urban Design (2) 
Numerous urban design elements present opportunities to provide security. The scale of 
the streetscape should be appropriate to its primary users, and it can be manipulated to 
increase the comfort level of desired users while creating a less inviting atmosphere for 
users with malicious intent. However, even at the pedestrian scale, certain operational 
requirements must be accommodated. For example, although efficient pedestrian and 
vehicle circulation systems are important for day-to-day living, they are also critical for 
emergency response, evacuation, and egress. Furthermore, despite an emphasis on 
downsizing the scale of the streetscape, it is critical to maintain the maximum stand-off 
distance possible between vehicles and structures. 
Urban Design (3) 
. �	Street furniture can be used to deter potential damage to buildings. 
. �	It is critical to maintain the maximum stand-off distance possible between 
vehicles and structures.  
. �	At the site perimeter, walls and fences used for space definition may be 
hardened to resist the impact of a weapon-laden truck; however, planters, bollards, or 
decorative boulders could accomplish the same objective in a much more aesthetically 
pleasing manner. 

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-21 
VISUAL VIII-22 
Explain the advantages of blocking the site of critical assets. 
Discuss the advantages of the placement of bollards and raised walls. 
Urban Design (4) 
Existing streets can be retrofitted with barriers, bollards, swing gates, or other measures to 
force vehicles to travel in a serpentine path. Again, high curbs and other measures should 
be installed to keep vehicles from departing the roadway in an effort to avoid these 
countermeasures. 
Bollard Applications 
Concrete bollards are excellent barriers that can prevent high speed approaches. 
These are examples of bollard placement. When placing bollards, make sure you adhere to 
ADA compliance. Bollards can be appealing streetscapes, depending on the current 
environment where they are installed. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-23 
Discuss the vehicle speed and the damage caused by velocity. 
Physical Protective Barriers 
Passive physical protective barriers can be used in parking lots, garages, next to buildings, 
and to create separate security zones. 
There are three primary types of parking facilities, all of which present security trade-
offs. 
Surface lots can be designed to keep vehicles away from buildings, but they consume 
large amounts of land and, if constructed of impervious materials, can contribute greatly 
to stormwater runoff volume. They can also be hazardous for pedestrians if dedicated 
pedestrian pathways are not provided. 
In contrast, non-street parking is often convenient for users and a source of revenue for 
local governments, but this type of parking may provide little or no setback. 
Finally, garage structures provide revenue and can be convenient for users, but they may 
require structural measures to ensure blast resistance as well as crime prevention measures 
to prevent street crime. 
Although the cost of land suggests that the construction of a garage below a building 
(either underground or aboveground) may be the most economically viable approach for 
many developments, they can be highly vulnerable to vehicle-borne weapons, endangering 
the building above If garages must be used, human security procedures (e.g., vehicle 
searches) and electronic systems (e.g., closed circuit television) may be necessary. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-24 
VISUAL VIII-25 
VISUAL VIII-26 
Physical Protective Barriers 
An active vehicle barrier is designed using the expected vehicle mass and velocity. 
Passive Vehicle Barrier Application 
A passive vehicle barrier can absorb a significant force and either stop or deflect the 
vehicle. 
Active Vehicle Barrier 
An active barrier can be activated in seconds and is capable of stopping large vehicles. 
Pop-up barriers can create serious damage to vehicles. These are some examples. 
Explain the vehicle impact damage in relation to high speed approaches. Greater force 
equals greater damage. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-27 
Active Vehicle Barrier Application 
World Bank Washington, DC 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-27 
VISUAL VIII-28 
VISUAL VIII-29 
Active Vehicle Barrier Application 
An example of active barriers is this one at the World Bank. The barriers stay in the down 
position during normal conditions, but are manned and deployed to the up position at 
higher threat levels. 
This is a typical pop-up barrier that is electronically controlled. 
Temporary Active Vehicle Barriers 
There are several temporary active vehicle barriers that can be rapidly deployed and 
moved into position to control site and parking access, control traffic flow, and provide 
standoff distance for buildings. 
Signage 
Unless required, signs should not identify sensitive areas. A comprehensive signage plan 
should be tailored to the mission of the facility accompanying the FEMA 426 guidelines. 
Minimize signs identifying critical utility complexes such as power plants and water 
treatment plants. 
Warning signs must use both languages in areas where two or more languages are 
commonly spoken. The wording on the signs 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-30 
Parking 
Maintain stand-off distance 
Restrict parking and access between buildings 
Consider one-way circulation in parking lots 
Locate parking within view of occupied buildings
Restrict parking underneath buildings 
Well-lit, with security presence, emergency 

communications, and/or CCTV Apply progressive collapse hardening to columns when parking garage is in the building 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-30 
VISUAL VIII-31 
Note the physical barriers that are in place to prevent vehicles entering underground 
parking areas. 
should denote warning of a restricted area. 
Signs should be posted at intervals of no more than 100 feet and should not be mounted 
on fences equipped with intrusion-detection equipment. 
Warning signs should be posted at all entrances to limited, controlled, and exclusion areas.  
Locate variable message signs, which give information on site/organization special events 
and visitors, far inside site perimeters. 
Parking (1) 
. �	Maintain stand-off distance 
. �	Restrict parking and access 
. �	Consider one-way circulation 
. �	Locate within view of occupied buildings 
. �	Restrict parking underneath buildings 
. �	Keep parking areas well lit 
. �	Apply progressive collapse hardening to high risk structures 

Parking (2) 
. �	Avoid having driveways or parking within or under buildings. Significant 
structural damage to the walls and ceiling of the loading dock may be acceptable; however, 
the areas adjacent to the loading dock should not experience severe structural damage or 
collapse. 
. �	Provide signage to clearly mark separate entrances for deliveries. 
. �	Visitor screening areas, receiving and loading areas, and mailrooms 
constitute the innermost line of defense, because they may be the first places where 
people and 

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-32 
Loading Docks/Service Access 
Ensure separation from critical systems and utility service entrances. 
Avoid driving trucks into or under building. 
Provide clear signage. 
Large truck carrying large bomb could go relatively unnoticed unless access control performed a significant distance from 
loading dock. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit VIII-32 
VISUAL VIII-33 
Discuss the other vulnerability pictured here. The trash dumpster should be relocated 
away from the building. Explosive devices can be tossed in the dumpster creating a blast 
effect. 
materials are closely inspected before 
being introduced into the facility. 
Loading Docks and Service Access 
Loading docks and service access areas are commonly required for a building and are 
typically desired to be kept as invisible as possible. For this reason, special attention 
should be devoted to avoid undesirable intruders. Design criteria for loading docks and 
service access include the following: 
Separate (by at least 50 feet) loading docks and shipping and receiving areas in any 
direction from utility rooms, utility mains, and service entrances, including electrical, 
telephone/data, fire detection/alarm systems, fire suppression water mains, cooling and 
heating mains, etc. 
Loading docks are sometimes located near critical assets just inside the building and a 
blast effect would be detrimental to the entire building and could result in a progressive 
collapse. 
Loading Dock Example 
Locate loading docks so that vehicles will not be allowed under the building. If this is not 
possible, the service should be hardened for blast. Loading dock design should limit 
damage to adjacent areas and vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building. 
If loading zones or drive-through areas are necessary, monitor them and restrict height to 
keep out large vehicles. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-34 
VISUAL VIII-35 
VISUAL VIII-36 
Physical Security Lighting 
Security lighting should be provided for overall site and building illumination and the 
perimeter to allow security personnel to maintain visual assessment during darkness. 
Lighting is desirable around areas such as piers, fence lines, dock, storage areas, and 
parking lots. At entry points, a minimum surface lighting average of 4 horizontal foot 
candles will help ensure adequate lighting is recommended. 
Site Utilities (1) 
Utility systems can suffer significant damage when subjected to the shock of an 
explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical for safely evacuating people from the 
building. Their destruction could cause damage that is disproportionate to other 
building damage resulting from an explosion. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
These are examples of protected utilities; however, some property has exposed natural 
water and gas lines that can easily be tampered with. A thorough walk-through of the site 
property should be conducted and proper protection devices should be applied to 
exposed utilities. 
VISUAL VIII-37 
VISUAL VIII-38

Compare and contrast the CPTED principal of single-point visitor control versus the 
location and placement of parking structures next to buildings. 
Site Utilities (2) 
The U.S. utility infrastructure is highly concentrated, utilizing the same rights-of-way, 
tunnels, underground conduits, and other service points. Examine where the utilities 
intersect (manholes, poles, city blocks, etc.) to find critical nodes. 
Install fencing and if possible, remote monitoring capability at key electrical 
substations, pumping plants, and communications vaults. 
CPTED 
The application of CPTED principles starts with a threat and vulnerability analysis to 
determine the potential for attack and what needs to be protected. Protecting a building 
from physical attack by criminal behavior or terrorist activity, in many cases, only 
reflects a change in the level and types of threats. 
The CPTED process provides direction to solve the challenges of crime and terrorism 
with organizational (people), mechanical (technology and hardware), and natural design 
(architecture and circulation flow) methods. 
Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL VIII-39 
Page 2-52 of FEMA 426 provides a comprehensive list of security/protection measures 
that can be taken � increasing in protection, cost, and level of effort � that complements 
this graphic on Site Mitigation Measures. 
VISUAL VIII-40 
Refer participants to FEMA 426, the Unit VIII Case Study activity in the Student 
Manual, and the GIS portfolio. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist groups 
as needed. 
Summary 
To summarize: 
. �	A broad spectrum of mitigation actions can be taken � with a wide range of 
cost, protection provided, and level of effort required by the asset owner. 
. �	This nominal ranking of mitigation measures provides a framework for the 
identification of short-term and long-term measures that can be taken. 

Student Activity 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment. The checklist includes 
questions that determine if critical systems will continue to function to enhance 
deterrence, detection, denial, and damage limitation, and if emergency systems will 
function during a threat or hazard situation. 
Activity Requirements 
. �	Continue working in small groups. 
. �	Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most 
knowledgeable and qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. 
. �	Refer to the HIC Case Study and to the GIS portfolio to determine 
answers to the worksheet questions. 

Unit VIII: Site and Layout Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
At the end of 45 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
�	Then review results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures. 
Take 45 minutes to complete this activity. Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
Transition 
Unit IX will cover Building Design Guidance. 
UNIT VIII CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment. The checklist includes 
questions that determine if critical systems will continue to function to enhance 
deterrence, detection, denial, and damage limitation, and emergency systems function 
during a threat or hazard situation. 
Requirement 
Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most knowledgeable and 
qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the HIC Case Study and 
to the GIS portfolio to determine answers to the questions. Then review results to 
identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures. 
1. 1.	Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist, which address site and layout. 
2. 2.	Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the site 
risk rating determined in Unit V Case Study Activity and, based on this detailed analysis, 
decide if the rating is accurate. 
3. 3.	Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from 
the site and layout perspective. 
4. 4.	Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the 
recommended mitigation measures. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
1.1 
What major structures 
surround the facility 
(site or building(s))? 
Critical infrastructure to 
consider includes: 
Telecommunications 
infrastructure 
There are two Critical Hazard 
Facilities within 2 miles of 
the HIC Headquarters, one to 
the 

What critical 
Facilities for broadcast TV, cable 
TV; cellular networks; newspaper 
north and the other to the 
southwest. In addition, there 

infrastructure, 
government, military, or 
recreation facilities are in 
the local area that impact 
transportation, 
offices, production, and 
distribution; radio stations; 
satellite base stations; telephone 
trunking and switching stations, 
including critical cable routes and 
major rights-of-way 
are more than a dozen Tier II 
HAZMAT Facilities within 
3 miles of the building (in 
all directions). A major 
interstate highway 

utilities, and collateral 
damage (attack at this 
facility impacting the 
other major structures or 
Electric power systems Power 
plants, especially nuclear 
facilities; transmission and 
distribution system components; 
fuel distribution, delivery, and 
is located within 1/4 mile of 
the HIC Headquarters. CSX 
Transportation and Norfolk-
Southern Railway 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

attack on the major 
structures impacting this 
facility)? 
storage Gas and oil facilities 
Hazardous material facilities, 
oil/gas pipelines, and storage 
facilities Banking and finance 
institutions Financial institutions 
(banks, credit unions) and the 
business district; note schedule 
business/financial district may 
follow; armored car services 
Transportation networks 
Airports: carriers, flight paths, and 
airport layout; location of air 
traffic control towers, runways, 
passenger terminals, and parking 
areas Bus Stations: Pipelines: oil; 
gas Trains/Subways: rails and 
lines, railheads/rail yards, 
interchanges, tunnels, and 
cargo/passenger terminals; note 
hazardous material transported 
Traffic: interstate 
highways/roads/tunnels/ bridges 
carrying large volumes; points of 
congestion; note time of day and 
day of week Trucking: hazardous 
materials cargo loading/unloading 
facilities; truck terminals, weigh 
stations, and rest areas Waterways: 
dams; levees; berths and ports for 
cruise ships, ferries, roll-on/roll-
off cargo vessels, and container 
ships; international (foreign) 
flagged vessels (and cargo) Water 
supply systems Pipelines and 
process/treatment facilities, dams 
for water collection; wastewater 
treatment Government services 
Federal/state/local government 
offices � post offices, law 
enforcement stations, fire/rescue, 
town/city hall, local 
mayor�s/governor�s residences, 
judicial offices and courts, 
military installations (include 
type-active, Reserves, National 
maintain a transportation 
corridor about 1/2 mile from 
HIC. There appear to be no 
restrictions on the material 
carried along these rail lines. 
A leg of the Piedmont 
Petroleum Pipeline (PPP) 
runs underneath the office 
park in the vicinity of HIC 
Headquarters. Part of 
Piedmont�s regional 
network, this portion of the 
pipeline normally carries a 
variety of refined products, 
including commercial and 
military jet fuels, diesel and 
three grades of gasoline, 
home heating fuels, etc. 
Four buried pipes carry 
approximately 20 million 
gallons per day. Connected 
to the pipeline, less than 1 
mile from HIC, is a 20-
million gallon capacity fuel 
farm. Operated by the 
Shellexxico Company, this 
tank farm stores a variety of 
petroleum products, 
primarily gasoline. Two 
airports are in the vicinity of 
HIC. One is a major 
international airport 
approximately 8 miles away. 
The other is a small, but 
busy general aviation airport 
approximately 2 miles away. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Guard) 



Emergency services 



Backup facilities, communications 



centers, Emergency Operations 



Centers (EOCs), fire/Emergency 



Medical Service (EMS) facilities, 



Emergency Medical Centers 



(EMCs), law enforcement 



facilities 



The following are not critical 



infrastructure, but have 



collateral damage potential to 



consider: 



Agricultural facilities: chemical 



distribution, storage, and 



application sites; crop spraying 



services; farms and ranches; food 



processing, storage, and 



distribution facilities 



Commercial/manufacturing/ind-



ustrial facilities: apartment 



buildings; business/corporate 



centers; chemical plants 



(especially those with Section 302 



Extremely Hazardous 



Substances); factories; fuel 



production, distribution, and 



storage facilities; hotels and 



convention centers; industrial 



plants; raw material production, 



distribution, and storage facilities; 



research facilities and laboratories; 



shipping, warehousing, transfer, 



and logistical centers 



Events and attractions: festivals 



and celebrations; open-air 



markets; parades; rallies, 



demonstrations, and marches; 



religious services; scenic tours; 



theme parks 



Health care system components: 



family planning clinics; health 



department offices; hospitals; 



radiological material and medical 



waste transportation, storage, and 



disposal; research facilities and 



laboratories, walk-in clinics 



Political or symbolically 



significant sites: embassies, 



consulates, landmarks, 



monuments, political party and 


Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


special interest groups offices, 
religious sites Public/private 
institutions: academic 
institutions, cultural centers, 
libraries, museums, research 
facilities and laboratories, schools 
Recreation facilities: 
auditoriums, casinos, concert halls 
and pavilions, parks, restaurants 
and clubs (frequented by potential 
target populations), sports arenas, 
stadiums, theaters, malls, and 
special interest group facilities; 
note congestion date and times for 
shopping centers References:  
FEMA 386-7, FEMA SLG 101, 
DOJ NCJ181200 

1.2 
Does the terrain place 
the building in a 
depression or low area? 
Depressions or low areas can trap 
heavy vapors, inhibit natural 
decontamination by prevailing 
winds, and reduce the 
effectiveness of in-place 
sheltering. Reference: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide 
The site is above the tank 
farm and the rear parking 
area slopes away from the 
building to a stream, which 
allows winds to pass over 
the structure unhindered. 
1.3 
In dense, urban areas, 
does curb lane parking 
place uncontrolled 
parked vehicles 
unacceptably close to a 
building in public rights-
of-way? 
Where distance from the building 
to the nearest curb provides 
insufficient setback, restrict 
parking in the curb lane. For 
typical city streets, this may 
require negotiating to close the 
curb lane. Setback is common 
terminology for the distance 
between a building and its 
associated roadway or parking. It 
is analogous to stand-off between 
a vehicle bomb and the building. 
The benefit per foot of increased 
stand-off between a potential 
vehicle bomb and a building is 
very high when close to a 
building and decreases rapidly as 
the distance increases. Note that 
the July 1, 1994, Americans with 
Disabilities Act Standards for 
Accessible Design states that 
required handicapped parking shall 
be located on the shortest 
accessible route of travel from 
adjacent parking to an accessible 
With a loading dock on the 
west side, it is possible for 
vehicles to park right next to 
the building. Normal 
parking for employees is in 
front; the closest row is 44 
feet from the front door. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


entrance. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 

1.4 
Is a perimeter fence or 
other types of barrier 
controls in place? 
The intent is to channel pedestrian 
traffic onto a site with multiple 
buildings through known access 
control points. For a single 
building, the intent is to have a 
single visitor entrance. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 
There is no fence or other 
type of barrier on the site�s 
perimeter. 
1.5 
What are the site access 
points to the site or 
building? 
The goal is to have at least two 
access points � one for passenger 
vehicles and one for delivery 
trucks due to the different 
procedures needed for each. 
Having two access points also 
helps if one of the access points 
becomes unusable, then traffic can 
be routed through the other access 
point. Reference: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide 
Loading dock on the west 
side of the building and 
front entrance with an 8-foot 
overhang. Additional exits 
(including mezzanine exits): 
4. 
1.6 
Is vehicle traffic 
separated from 
pedestrian traffic on the 
site? 
Pedestrian access should not be 
endangered by car traffic. 
Pedestrian access, especially from 
public transportation, should not 
cross vehicle traffic if possible. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 
Sidewalks at the front of the 
building allow access to the 
site without pedestrian/ 
vehicle interface. However, 
pedestrians must negotiate 
the parking lot to access the 
sidewalk. 
1.7 
Is there vehicle and 
pedestrian access control 
at the perimeter of the 
site? 
Vehicle and pedestrian access 
control and inspection should 
occur as far from facilities as 
possible (preferably at the site 
perimeter) with the ability to 
regulate the flow of people and 
vehicles one at a time. Control 
on-site parking with identification 
checks, security personnel, and 
access control systems. Reference: 
FEMA 386-7 
There is no access control to 
the site; however, security 
personnel monitor parking 
areas, and rear parking areas 
are well lit and monitored by 
CCTC cameras; front 
parking areas are lit only. 
Area proximity card prevent 
access by unauthorized 
personnel. 
1.8 
Is there space for 
inspection at the curb 
line or outside the 
protected perimeter? 
What is the minimum 
distance from the 
inspection location to 
the building? 
Design features for the vehicular 
inspection point include: vehicle 
arrest devices that prevent vehicles 
from leaving the vehicular 
inspection area and prevent 
tailgating. If screening space 
cannot be provided, consider other 
design features such as: hardening 
and alternative location for vehicle 
The building has no 
protected perimeter; 
however, there is adequate 
space in the rear parking area 
to conduct truck pre-
screening away from the 
building. 44 feet from first 
parking space to the 
building. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


search/ inspection. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

1.9 
Is there any potential 
access to the site or 
building through utility 
paths or water runoff? 
Eliminate potential site access 
through utility tunnels, corridors, 
manholes, stormwater runoff 
culverts, etc. Ensure covers to 
these access points are secured. 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 
1.10 
What are the existing 
types of vehicle anti-ram 
devices for the site or 
building? Are these 
devices at the property 
boundary or at the 
building? 
Passive barriers include bollards, 
walls, hardened fences (steel cable 
interlaced), trenches, 
ponds/basins, concrete planters, 
street furniture, plantings, trees, 
sculptures, and fountains. Active 
barriers include pop-up bollards, 
swing arm gates, and rotating 
plates and drums, etc. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 
There are no anti-ram barriers 
at the site. 
1.11 
What is the anti-ram 
buffer zone stand-off 
distance from the 
building to unscreened 
vehicles or parking? 
If the recommended distance for 
the postulated threat is not 
available, consider reducing the 
stand-off required through 
structural hardening or 
manufacturing additional stand-off 
through barriers and parking 
restrictions. Also consider 
relocation of vulnerable functions 
within the building or to a more 
hazard-resistant building. More 
stand-off should be used for 
unscreened vehicles than for 
screened vehicles that are searched. 
Reference: GSA PBS P-100 
There are no anti-ram barriers 
at the site. 
1.12 
Are perimeter barriers 
capable of stopping 
vehicles? Will the vehicle 
barriers at the perimeter 
and building maintain 
access for emergency 
responders, including 
large fire apparatus? 
Anti-ram protection may be 
provided by adequately designed: 
bollards, street furniture, 
sculpture, landscaping, walls, and 
fences. The anti-ram protection 
must be able to stop the threat 
vehicle size (weight) at the speed 
attainable by that vehicle at 
impact. If the anti-ram protection 
cannot absorb the desired kinetic 
energy, consider adding speed 
controls (serpentines or speed 
bumps) to limit the speed at 
impact. If the resultant speed is 
still too great, the anti-ram 
protection should be improved. 
There are no anti-ram barriers 
at the site. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Reference: Military Handbook 
1013/14 and GSA PBS P-100 

1.13 
Does site circulation 
prevent high-speed 
approaches by vehicles? 
The intent is to use site 
circulation to minimize vehicle 
speeds and eliminate direct 
approaches to structures. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
No, from the main road, 
there is a parking entrance 
road that leads directly to the 
center of the building 
complex. A vehicle could 
easily reach 30-40 mph. 
1.14 
Are there offsetting 
vehicle entrances from 
the direction of a 
vehicle�s approach to 
force a reduction of 
speed? 
Single or double 90-degree turns 
effectively reduce vehicle approach 
speed. Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Yes. Closing the gap 
between the last landscape 
area would eliminate the 
straightaway. 
1.15 
Is there a minimum 
setback distance between 
the building and parked 
vehicles? 
Adjacent public parking should be 
directed to more distant or better-
protected areas, segregated from 
employee parking and away from 
the building. Some publications 
use the term setback in lieu of the 
term stand-off. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
It is possible for vehicles to 
park right next to the 
building near the loading 
dock. Normal parking for 
employees is in front; the 
closest row is 44 feet from 
the front door. 
1.16 
Does adjacent surface 
parking on site maintain 
a minimum stand-off 
distance? 
The specific stand-off distance 
needed is based upon the design 
basis threat bomb size and the 
building construction. For initial 
screening, consider using 25 
meters (82 feet) as a minimum 
with more distance needed for 
unreinforced masonry or wooden 
walls. Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
No. minimum stand-off of 
44 feet at this location. 
1.17 
Do stand alone, 
aboveground parking 
garages provide adequate 
visibility across as well 
as into and out of the 
parking garage? 
Pedestrian paths should be 
planned to concentrate activity to 
the extent possible. Limiting 
vehicular entry/exits to a 
minimum number of locations is 
beneficial. Stair tower and elevator 
lobby design shall be as open as 
code permits. Stair and/or elevator 
waiting areas should be as open to 
the exterior and/or the parking 
areas as possible and well lighted. 
Impact-resistant, laminated glass 
for stair towers and elevators is a 
way to provide visual openness. 
Potential hiding places below 
No above-ground parking 
garages exist on site. 
However the open, ground-
level parking provides 
adequate visibility across the 
lot. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


stairs should be closed off; nooks 
and crannies should be avoided, 
and dead-end parking areas should 
be eliminated. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

1.18 
Are garage or service area 
entrances for employee-
permitted vehicles 
protected by suitable 
anti-ram devices? 
Coordinate this 
protection with other 
anti-ram devices, such as 
on the perimeter or 
property boundary to 
avoid duplication of 
arresting capability. 
Control internal building parking, 
underground parking garages, and 
access to service areas and loading 
docks in this manner with proper 
access control or eliminate the 
parking altogether. The anti-ram 
device must be capable of 
arresting a vehicle of the 
designated threat size at the speed 
attainable at the location. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
No above-ground parking 
garages exist on site. 
1.19 
Do site landscaping and 
street furniture provide 
hiding places? 
Minimize concealment 
opportunities by keeping 
landscape plantings (hedges, 
shrubbery, and large plants with 
heavy ground cover) and street 
furniture (bus shelters, benches, 
trash receptacles, mailboxes, 
newspaper vending machines) 
away from the building to permit 
observation of intruders and 
prevent hiding of packages. If 
mail or express boxes are used, 
the size of the openings should be 
restricted to prohibit the insertion 
of packages. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
Minimal landscaping and the 
layout of the property 
provide few if any hiding 
places. 
1.20 
Is the site lighting 
adequate from a security 
perspective in roadway 
access and parking areas? 
Security protection can be 
successfully addressed through 
adequate lighting. The type and 
design of lighting, including 
illumination levels, is critical. 
Illuminating Engineering Society 
of North America (IESNA) 
guidelines can be used. The site 
lighting should be coordinated 
with the CCTV system. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Both rear and front parking 
areas are well lit. Rear areas 
are also monitored by CCTC 
cameras. 
1.21 
Are line-of-sight 
The goal is to prevent the 
observation of critical assets by 
No. There are clear 
approximately 300 foot lines 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

perspectives from 
outside the secured 
boundary to the building 
and on the property 
along pedestrian and 
vehicle routes integrated 
with landscaping and 
green space? 
persons outside the secure 
boundary of the site. For 
individual buildings in an urban 
environment, this could mean 
appropriate window treatments or 
no windows for portions of the 
building. Once on the site, the 
concern is to ensure observation 
by a general workforce aware of 
any pedestrians and vehicles 
outside normal circulation routes 
or attempting to approach the 
building unobserved. Reference: 
USAF Installation Force 
Protection Guide 
of sight in all directions. 
1.22 
Do signs provide control 
of vehicles and people? 
The signage should be simple and 
have the necessary level of clarity. 
However, signs that identify 
sensitive areas should generally 
not be provided. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
There are no parking lots 
signs. 
1.23 
Are all existing fire 
hydrants on the site 
accessible? 
Just as vehicle access points to the 
site must be able to transit 
emergency vehicles, so too must 
the emergency vehicles have 
access to the buildings and, in the 
case of fire trucks, the fire 
hydrants. Thus, security 
considerations must accommodate 
emergency response requirements. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Yes. 
2 
Architectural 


2.1 
Does the site and 
architectural design 
incorporate strategies 
from a Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental 
Design (CPTED) 
perspective? 
The focus of CPTED is on 
creating defensible space by 
employing: 1. Natural access 
controls: Design streets, 
sidewalks, and building entrances 
to clearly indicate public routes 
and direct people away from 
private/restricted areas Discourage 
access to private areas with 
structural elements and limit 
access (no cut-through streets) 
Loading zones should be separate 
from public parking 2. Natural 
surveillance: Design that 
maximizes visibility of people, 
parking areas, and building 
entrances: doors and 
Site design clearly directs 
visitors to the front of the 
building and to clearly 
marked entrances. Loading 
areas are separate from public 
parking. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


windows that look out on to 



streets and parking areas 



Shrubbery under 2 feet in height 



for visibility 



Lower branches of existing trees 



kept at least 10 feet off ground 



Pedestrian-friendly sidewalks and 



streets to control pedestrian and 



vehicle circulation 



Adequate nighttime lighting, 



especially at exterior doorways 



3. Territorial reinforcement: 



Design that defines property lines 



Design that distinguishes 



private/restricted spaces from 



public spaces using separation, 



landscape plantings; pavement 



designs (pathway and roadway 



placement); gateway treatments at 



lobbies, corridors, and door 



placement; walls, barriers, 



signage, lighting, and "CPTED" 



fences 



"Traffic-calming" devices for 



vehicle speed control 



4. Target hardening: 



Prohibit entry or access: window 



locks, deadbolts for doors, interior 



door hinges 



Access control (building and 



employee/visitor parking) and 



intrusion detection systems 



5. Closed circuit television 



cameras: 



Prevent crime and influence 



positive behavior, while 



enhancing the intended uses of 



space. In other words, design that 



eliminates or reduces criminal 



behavior and at the same time 



encourages people to "keep an eye 



out" for each other. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and 



FEMA 386-7 

2.2 
Is it a mixed-tenant 
building? 
Separate high-risk tenants from 
low-risk tenants and from publicly 
accessible areas. Mixed uses may 
The building site is a 
multiple-tenant facility; HIC 
has neighbors on both sides. 


be accommodated through such 
In addition to other tenants 


means as separating entryways, 
in the building, the site also 


controlling access, and hardening 
contains multiple buildings 


shared partitions, as well as 
through special security 
in the same professional 
park. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


operational countermeasures. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

2.3 
Are pedestrian paths 
planned to concentrate 
activity to aid in 
detection? 
Site planning and landscape 
design can provide natural 
surveillance by concentrating 
pedestrian activity, limiting 
entrances/exits, and eliminating 
concealment opportunities. Also, 
prevent pedestrian access to 
parking areas other than via 
established entrances. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100. 
Each tenant facility has its 
own entrance, spreading 
pedestrian activity across the 
front of the buildings. 
Loading docks are likewise 
spread out across the west 
side of the building. 
2.4 
Are there trash 
receptacles and 
mailboxes in close 
proximity to the building 
that can be used to hide 
explosive devices? 
The size of the trash receptacles 
and mailbox openings should be 
restricted to prohibit insertion of 
packages. Street furniture, such as 
newspaper vending machines, 
should be kept sufficient distance 
(10 meters or 33 feet) from the 
building, or brought inside to a 
secure area. References: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide, DoD Minimum 
Antiterrorism Standards for 
Buildings 
No, the dumpster is 
approximately 50 feet from 
the rear of the building. 
5 
Utility Systems 


5.1 
What is the source of 
domestic water? (utility, 
municipal, wells, lake, 
river, storage tank) Is 
there a secure alternate 
drinking water supply? 
Domestic water is critical for 
continued building operation. 
Although bottled water can satisfy 
requirements for drinking water 
and minimal sanitation, domestic 
water meets many other needs � 
flushing toilets, building heating 
and cooling system operation, 
cooling of emergency generators, 
humidification, etc. Reference: 
FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 
5.2 
Are there multiple entry 
points for the water 
supply? 
If the building or site has only 
one source of water entering at one 
location, the entry point should be 
secure. Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 
5.3 
Is the incoming water 
supply in a secure 
location? 
Ensure that only authorized 
personnel have access to the water 
supply and its components. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 
5.4 
Does the building or site 
have storage capacity for 
domestic water? How 
many gallons of 
Operational facilities will require 
reliance on adequate domestic 
water supply. Storage capacity can 
meet short-term needs and use 
water trucks to replenish for 
extended outages. 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

storage capacity are 
available and how long 
will it allow operations 
to continue? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities. 

5.5 
What is the source of 
water for the fire 
suppression system? 
(local utility company 
lines, storage tanks with 
utility company backup, 
lake, or river) Are there 
alternate water supplies 
for fire suppression? 
The fire suppression system water 
may be supplied from the 
domestic water or it may have a 
separate source, separate storage, 
or nonpotable alternate sources. 
For a site with multiple 
buildings, the concern is that the 
supply should be adequate to fight 
the worst case situation according 
to the fire codes. Recent major 
construction may change that 
requirement. Reference: FEMA 
386-7 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 
5.6 
Is the fire suppression 
system adequate, code-
compliant, and protected 
(secure location)? 
Standpipes, water supply control 
valves, and other system 
components should be secure or 
supervised. Reference: FEMA 386-
7 
Yes, meets all fire codes. 
5.7 
Do the 
sprinkler/standpipe 
interior controls (risers) 
have fire- and blast-
resistant separation? Are 
the sprinkler and 
standpipe connections 
adequate and redundant? 
Are there fire hydrant 
and water supply 
connections near the 
sprinkler/standpipe 
connections? 
The incoming fire protection water 
line should be encased, buried, or 
located 50 feet from high risk 
areas. The interior mains should 
be looped and sectionalized. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 
5.8 
Are there redundant fire 
water pumps (e.g., one 
electric, one diesel)? Are 
the pumps located apart 
from each other? 
Collocating fire water pumps puts 
them at risk for a single incident 
to disable the fire suppression 
system. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 and FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 
5.9 
Are sewer systems 
accessible? 
Sanitary and stormwater sewers 
should be protected from 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

Are they protected or 
secured? 
unauthorized access. The main 
concerns are backup or flooding 
into the building, causing a health 
risk, shorting out electrical 
equipment, and loss of building 
use. Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

5.10 
What fuel supplies do 
the building rely upon 
for critical operation? 
Typically, natural gas, propane, or 
fuel oil are required for continued 
operation. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Heating for the HIC building 
is provided by a 
combination of natural gas 
and electricity. 
5.11 
How much fuel is stored 
on the site or at the 
building and how long 
can this quantity 
support critical 
operations? How is it 
stored? How is it 
secured? 
Fuel storage protection is essential 
for continued operation. Main fuel 
storage should be located away 
from loading docks, entrances, 
and parking. Access should be 
restricted and protected (e.g., 
locks on caps and seals). 
References:  GSA PBS-P100 and 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Emergency power is 
provided by a single diesel 
generator, located in a shed 
in the rear parking lot. The 
generator has a 50-gallon day 
tank, maintained at 80 
percent capacity. The 2,000-
gallon main tank is buried 
under the parking lot, near 
the generator. 
5.12 
Where is the fuel supply 
obtained? How is it 
delivered? 
The supply of fuel is dependent 
on the reliability of the supplier. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Natural gas enters the 
building through two meters 
under the loading dock 
staircase and goes through 
the overhead to the 
mechanical and electrical 
(M&E) room at the 
building�s southwest corner. 
Branches split off for two 
gas powered space heaters in 
the high bay area by the 
loading dock. The main gas 
line goes to the main heater 
in the M&E room. Main 
power for the HIC office is 
provided by Dominion 
Electric Power Company 
through two transformers 
outside the building. Two 
sets of buried transmission 
lines deliver 12,470 volt 
(12.47KV) power to the 
building from a nearby 
substation. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 



The two 12.47KV feeders 
lead to two separate 
transformers outside the 
building, one near the north 
side, and the other near the 
south side 
5.13 
Are there alternate 
sources of fuel? Can 
alternate fuels be used? 
Critical functions may be served 
by alternate methods if normal 
fuel supply is interrupted. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Emergency power is 
provided by a single diesel 
generator, located in a shed 
in the rear parking lot. The 
generator has a 50-gallon day 
tank, maintained at 80 
percent capacity. The 2,000-
gallon main tank is buried 
under the parking lot, near 
the generator. Batteries to 
support the UPS are in a 
small room next to the UPS 
room. 
5.14 
What is the normal 
source of electrical 
service for the site or 
building? 
Utilities are the general source 
unless co-generation or a private 
energy provider is available. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Main power for the HIC 
office is provided by 
Dominion Electric Power 
Company through two 
transformers outside the 
building. Two sets of buried 
transmission lines deliver 
12,470 volt (12.47KV) 
power to the building from a 
nearby substation. 
5.15 
Is there a redundant 
electrical service source? 
Can the site or buildings 
be fed from more than 
one utility substation? 
The utility may have only one 
source of power from a single 
substation. There may be only 
single feeders from the main 
substation. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 
5.16 
How may service entry 
points does the site or 
building have for 
electricity? 
Electrical supply at one location 
creates a vulnerable situation 
unless an alternate source is 
available. Ensure disconnecting 
requirements according to NFPA 
70 (National Fire Protection 
Association, National Electric 
Code) are met for multiple service 
entrances. 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 


Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 

5.17 
Is the incoming electric 
service to the building 
secure? 
Typically, the service entrance is a 
locked room, inaccessible to the 
public. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 
5.18 
What provisions for 
emergency power exist? 
What systems receive 
emergency power and 
have capacity 
requirements been 
tested? Is the emergency 
power collocated with 
the commercial electric 
service? Is there an 
exterior connection for 
emergency power? 
Besides installed generators to 
supply emergency power, portable 
generators or rental generators 
available under emergency contract 
can be quickly connected to a 
building with an exterior quick 
disconnect already installed. 
Testing under actual loading and 
operational conditions ensures the 
critical systems requiring 
emergency power receive it with a 
high assurance of reliability. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Emergency power is 
provided by a single diesel 
generator, located in a shed 
in the rear parking lot. The 
generator has a 50-gallon day 
tank, maintained at 80 
percent capacity. The 2,000-
gallon main tank is buried 
under the parking lot, near 
the generator. Batteries to 
support the UPS are in a 
small room next to the UPS 
room. 
5.19 
By what means do the 
main telephone and data 
communications 
interface the site or 
building? 
Typically communication ducts or 
other conduits are available. 
Overhead service is more 
identifiable and vulnerable 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
HIC has invested in NEC 
DS2000 telephone systems. 
It comes with an 8-slot 
cabinet, that can handle 32 
lines from 48 stations. 
5.20 
Are there multiple or 
redundant locations for 
the telephone and 
communication service? 
Secure locations of 
communications wiring entry to 
the site or building are required. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a more 
detailed on-site assessment. 
5.21 
Does the fire alarm 
system require 
communication with 
external sources? By 
what method is the alarm 
signal sent to the 
responding agency: 
telephone, radio, etc.? 
Typically, the local fire 
department responds to an alarm 
that sounds at the station or is 
transmitted over phone lines by an 
auto dialer. An intermediary 
control center for fire, security, 
and/or building system alarms 
may receive the initial notification 
at an on-site or off-site location. 
This center may 
Yes, the local fire 
department and the security 
company over telephone 
lines. 

Section 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 

Is there an intermediary 
alarm monitoring center? 
then determine the necessary 
response and inform the 
responding agency. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 

5.22 
Are utility lifelines 
aboveground, 
underground, or direct 
buried? 
Utility lifelines (water, power, 
communications, etc.) can be 
protected by concealing, burying, 
or encasing. Reference:  GSA PBS-
P100 and FEMA 386-7 
Utilities lines are buried at 
this location. 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
U
nit 
IX 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 150 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Building Design Guidance 
OBJECTIVES 
1. 1.	Explain architectural considerations to mitigate impacts from blast effects 
and transmission of chemical, biological, and radiological agents from exterior and interior 
incidents 
2. 2.	Identify key elements of building structural and nonstructural systems for 
mitigation of blast effects 
3. 3.	Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical system, 
electrical system, fire protection system, and communications system mitigation 
measures, including synergies and conflicts 
4. 4.	Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual design 
and identify mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Architectural considerations, including building configuration, space design, 
and special situations 
2. 2.	Building structural and nonstructural considerations with emphasis on 
progressive collapse, loads and stresses, and good engineering practices 
3. 3.	Design issues for the building envelope, including wall design, window 
design, door design, and roof system design with approaches to define levels of protection 
4. 4.	Mechanical system design issues, including interfacing with operational 
procedures, emergency plans, and training 
5. 5.	Other building systems design consideration for electrical, fire protection, 
communications, electronic security, entry control, and physical security that mitigate the 
effects of a threat or hazard 
6. 6.	Do an Activity that encompasses identified high risk pairs (asset � 
threat/hazard) in the threat-vulnerability matrix developed for the Case Study and select 
mitigation measures that reduce vulnerability and associated risk from the building 
perspective 

Unit IX 
REFERENCES 
1. 1. FEMA 426, Instructor Guide, and Student Manual. 
2. 2.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings, pages 3-1 to 3-46 and 3-48 to 3-52; Checklist at end of Chapter 1. 
3. 3.	FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate 
Terrorist Attacks 
4. 4.	 FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components in 
Architectural Design 
5. 5. Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
6. 6. Unit IX visuals 

REQUIREMENTS 1. FEMA 426, pages 3-1 to 3-52 
1. 2. Unit IX visuals 
2. 3. Instructor Guide 
3. 4. Student Manual (one per student) 
4. 5. Overhead projector or computer display unit 


6. Chart paper, easel, and markers 


UNIT IX OUTLINE 
Time 
Page 
IX. Building Design Guidance 
150 minutes 
IG IX-1 
1. 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
10 minutes 
IG IX-4 
2. 
Architectural Considerations 
15 minutes 
IG IX-6 
3. 
Structural and Nonstructural Considerations 
15 minutes 
IG IX-12 
4. 
Building Envelope Considerations 
15 minutes 
IG IX-16 
5. 
Other Building Systems 
15 minutes 
IG IX-26 
6. 
Walk-through of Building Vulnerability Assessment 
40 minutes 
IG IX-37 

Checklist 


7. 
Activity: Building Design Guidance 
40 minutes 
IG IX-39 

Unit IX 
PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
. �	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to 
identify topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity:  The students will continue the familiarization with the Case 
Study materials. The Case Study is a complete risk assessment and analysis of mitigation 
options and strategies for a typical commercial office building located in a mixed urban-
suburban environment business park. The assessment will use the DoD Antiterrorism 
standards and the GSA Interagency Security Criteria to determine Levels of Protection 
and identify specific vulnerabilities. Mitigation options and strategies will use the 
concepts provided in FEMA 426 and other standard reference materials such as the RS 
Means Building Security: Strategy and Costs, NFPA 5000, and other FEMA publications 
related to emergency planning and disaster recovery. 
. �	Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-1 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Unit IX Building Design Guidance 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit IX Building Design Guidance. Continuing with our understanding of 
vulnerability and mitigation measures, we have looked at site and layout concerns and 
now turn our attention to what considerations are needed in building design to mitigate 
tactics involving explosive blast or CBR agents. 
We will examine design considerations that achieve a balanced building envelope that 
provides a defensive layer against the given terrorist tactic and avoids creating ripple 
effects where one incident may affect more than one building system. 
Catastrophic collapse of any building is a primary concern. Historically, the majority of 
fatalities that occur in terrorist attacks directed against buildings are due to building 
collapse. This was true for the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 when 87 percent of the 
building occupants who were killed were in the collapsed portion of the Murrah Federal 
Building. But glass causes over 80 percent of injuries during bomb blast and there are 
some low cost techniques to keep CBR agents outside of buildings or to limit their spread 
inside. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-2 
Unit Objectives 
Explain architectural considerations to mitigate impacts from blast effects and transmission of chemical, biological, and 
radiological agents from exterior and interior incidents. 
Identify key elements of building structural and non-
structural systems for mitigation of blast effects.

Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical system, electrical system, fire protection system, and 
communication system mitigation measures, including synergies and conflicts. 
Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual design and identify mitigation measures needed to reduce 
vulnerabilities. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-2 
VISUAL IX-3 
Overview 
Architectural
Building Structural and Nonstructural Considerations
Building Envelope Considerations
Other Building Systems
Building Mitigation Measures
Activity

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-3 
Note that one mitigation measure may reduce the risk of more than one asset � 
threat/hazard pair as illustrated by Table 2-1 of FEMA 426, where a mitigation measure 
may apply to multiple tactics. 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Explain architectural considerations due to impact from blast effects and 
transmission of chemical, biological, and radiological agents from exterior and interior 
incidents. 
2. 2.	Identify key elements of building structural and nonstructural systems for 
mitigation of blast effects. 
3. 3.	Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical system, 
electrical system, fire protection system, and communication system mitigation measures, 
including synergies and conflicts. 

Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual design and identify 
mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities. 
Overview 
. �	Architectural 
. �	Building Structural and Nonstructural Considerations 
. �	Building Envelope Considerations 
. �	Other Building Design Issues 
. �	Building Mitigation Measures 
. �	Activity 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-4 
Architectural Building Configuration 
Tall, Small Footprint 
Low, Large Footprint 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-4 
Architectural Building Configuration (1) 
Designers should balance a number of relevant considerations to the extent that site, 
economic, and other factors allow. 
Some of the relevant considerations include the following: 
. �	The shape of the building 
. �	Low, large footprint buildings 
. �	Tall, small footprint buildings 

General benefits of the two basic approaches: 
Low, Large Footprint: 
. �	Reduced effect of explosive blast (catches less of the blast wave) 
. �	Reduced effect of progressive collapse (less of the building can fall) 
. �	Reduced surveillance or easier mitigation (lower height allows terrain and 
landscaping options) 
 �	Better energy conservation (green roof potential and earth-sheltered 
design) 
 Tall, Small Footprint: 
. �	Reduced blast effects on upper floors 
. �	Air intakes better protected against CBR events 
. �	Site runoff reduced, reducing culvert size as a covert entry point 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-5 
VISUAL IX-6 
Architectural Building Configuration 
Ground floor elevation 4 feet above grade
Orient glazing perpendicular 
Avoid exposed structural 

elements 
Pitched roofs and pitched 
window sills 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-6 
Architectural Building Configuration (2) 
A lot can be done architecturally to mitigate the effects of a terrorist bombing on a 
facility. These measures often cost nothing or very little if implemented early in the 
design process. Future FEMA 430 will contain an expanded discussion of incorporating 
security components in architectural design. 
�	Further looking at building shapes, certain configurations trap the blast wave 
increasing overall damage to the structure. For example, "U" or "L" shaped buildings, 
overhangs, and re-entrant corners in general should be avoided. 
Architectural -Building Configuration (3): 
. �	Elevating the ground floor makes moving vehicle attack more difficult 
. �	If the glazing looks perpendicular to the direction of travel for the blast 
wave, the glass sees less reflected pressure. 
. �	Do not have structural elements, like columns, easily exposed on the 
outside of the building. This goes for any architectural feature that can become damaged or 
disconnected by a blast wave. 
. �	If armed attack includes Molotov cocktails or home-made grenades, 
pitched roofs and pitched window sills tend to cause the thrown item to roll off and away 
from the building. Air intakes have similar considerations. 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-7 
VISUAL IX-8 
Architectural � Space Design (2) 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-8 
Architectural -Space Design (1) 
Unsecured areas should be physically separated from the main building to the extent 
possible. 
For example, a separate lobby pavilion or loading dock outside the main footprint 
provides enhanced protection against damages and potential building collapse in the event 
of an explosion. Similarly, placing parking areas outside the main footprint of the building 
can be highly effective in reducing the vulnerability to catastrophic collapse. 
The protection of the building interior can be divided into two categories: 
. � Functional layout 
. � Structural layout 

Architectural -Space Design (2) 
In terms of functional layout, public areas such as the lobby, loading dock, mail room, 
garage, and retail areas need to be separated from the more secured areas of the facility. 
This can be done by creating internal "hard lines" or buffer zones, using secondary 
stairwells, elevator shafts, corridors, and storage areas between public and secured 
areas. 
In lobby areas, the architect would be wise to consider the queuing requirements in front 
of the inspection stations so that visitors are not forced to stand outside during bad 
weather conditions or in a congested line inside a small lobby while waiting to enter the 
secured areas. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-9 
Architectural � Space Design (3) 
Eliminate hiding places
Interior barriers 
Offset doorways
Minimize glazing, 

particularly interior glazing 
near high-risk areas

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-9 
VISUAL IX-10 
Architectural � Other Design Elements 
Safe havens
Office locations 
Mixed occupancies
Public toilets and service areas
Retail uses in the lobby 
Stairwells 
Mailroom

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-10 
For additional information on safe havens, see FEMA 428. 
Architectural -Space Design (3) 
In this slide, a range of design measures are presented that � when implemented � can 
increase the safety of the building�s occupants from the effects of blast. 
Architectural - Other Design Elements 
When designing high-risk buildings, engineers and architects should consider the following: 
The innermost layer of protection within a physical security system is the safe 
haven. Safe havens are not intended to withstand a disciplined, paramilitary attack 
featuring explosives and heavy weapons. 
Offices considered to be high risk (more likely to be targeted by terrorists) should be 
placed or glazed so that the occupants cannot be seen from an uncontrolled public area 
such as a street. Whenever possible, these spaces should face courtyards, internal sites, or 
controlled areas. 
Mixed occupancies. High-risk tenants should not be housed with low-risk tenants. 
Terrorists may identify some targets based on their symbology, visibility, ideology, 
political views, potential for publicity, or simply the consequences of their loss. 
Public toilets and service areas, or access to vertical circulation systems should not be 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-11 
Progressive Collapse Design 
GSA Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design Guidance for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects 
DoD Unified Facilities Criteria -Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-11 
To minimize the potential for progressive collapse, designers should understand the 
following: 
located in any non-secure areas, including the queuing area before visitor screening at the 
public entrance. 
Retail and other mixed uses, which have been encouraged in public buildings by the 
Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act of 1976, create spaces that are open and inviting. 
Although important to the public nature of the buildings, the presence of retail and other 
mixed uses may present a risk to buildings and their occupants and should be carefully 
considered on a project-specific basis during project design. 
Stairwells required for emergency egress should be located as remotely as possible from 
areas where blast events might occur and, wherever possible, should not discharge into 
lobbies, parking, or loading areas. 
Mailroom should be located away from facility main entrances areas containing critical 
services, utilities, distribution systems, and important assets. 
Progressive Collapse Design 
Progressive collapse is a situation where local failure of a primary structural component 
leads to the collapse of adjoining members, which, in turn, leads to additional collapse. 
Hence, the total damage is disproportionate to the original cause. Progressive collapse is 
a chain reaction of structural failures that follows from damage to a relatively small 
portion of a structure. Information on progressive collapse can also be found in FEMA 
427. 
Buildings should be designed with the intent of reducing the potential for progressive 
collapse as a result of an abnormal loading event, regardless of the required level of 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
. �	The use of redundant lateral and vertical forces is highly encouraged. 
. �	Ductile materials are needed for both primary and secondary structural 
elements to be capable of deforming well beyond the elastic limit. 
. �	Both the primary and secondary structural elements should be designed to 
resist load reversals. 
. �	Primary structural elements should be able to resist shear failures by 
having flexural capacity greater than shear capacity. 

VISUAL IX-12 protection. 
. �	Primary structural elements are columns girders and roof beams that are 
the first items for design to prevent progressive collapse. 
. �	Secondary structural elements, such as floor beams and slabs, also may 
contribute to progressive collapse, such as by slenderizing a column due to loss of 
connections. 
. �	Primary nonstructural elements, such as ceilings and heavy suspended 
mechanical equipment contribute to casualties but not progressive collapse. 
. �	Secondary nonstructural elements, such as partitions, furniture, and light 
fixtures, like primary nonstructural elements also contribute to casualties, but not 
progressive collapse. 

Progressive Collapse Concept 
The GSA and DoD require that the structural response of a building be analyzed in a 
test that removes a key structural element (e.g., vertical load carrying column, section of 
bearing wall, beam, etc.) to simulate local damage from an explosion. If effective 
alternative load paths are available for redistributing the loads, originally supported by 
the removed structural element, the building has a low potential for progressive collapse. 
. �	If a column is lost, will the rest of the building still stand? 
. �	If an exterior beam is lost, will the rest of the building still stand? 

If the threat can get to an interior column or beam, the same questions apply. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-13 
Structural Systems -Collapse 
GSA and DoD criteria do not provide specific guidance for an engineering structural response model. 
Owner and design team should decide how much 
progressive collapse analysis and mitigation to 
incorporate into design.

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-13 
Structural System Collapse 
. �	Although these criteria provide specific guidance on which structural 
elements must be analyzed for removal from the structural design configuration, they do 
not provide specific guidance for choosing an engineering structural response model for 
verifying the effectiveness of alternate load paths. 
. �	Unless a building is being designed to meet the GSA or DOD criteria, it is 
up to the owner and the design team to decide how much progressive collapse analysis 
and mitigation to incorporate into their design. 
. �	Priority should be given to the critical elements that are essential to 
mitigating the extent of collapse. Designs for secondary structural elements should 
minimize injury and damage. 
. �	Consideration should be given to reducing damage and injury from primary 
as well as secondary nonstructural elements. 

Both GSA and DoD take a threat-independent approach to progressive collapse � it does 
not matter how big the explosive weapon is, the building will remain standing if a column 
or beam is removed. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-14 
VISUAL IX-15 
Nonstructural elements 
False ceilings, light fixtures, venetian blinds, ductwork, air conditioners, and other 
equipment may become flying debris in the event of an explosion. 
Wherever possible, it is recommended that the design be simplified to limit these hazards. 
Placing heavy equipment such as air conditioners near the floor rather than the ceiling is 
one idea; using curtains rather than Venetian blinds, and using exposed duct works as an 
architectural device are others. 
Loads and Stresses - Collapse 
Structures should be designed to resist blast loads. The DoD designates the level of blast 
protection a building must meet based on how many occupants it contains and its 
function. The demands on the structure will be equal to the combined effects of dead, live, 
and blast loads. Blast loads or dynamic rebound may occur in directions opposed to 
typical gravity loads. 
Ronan Point had a whole section of the building collapse due to one wall in one 
apartment being lost. That changed the British Code to prevent that occurrence. Khobar 
Towers was designed to the British Code, and only the fa�ade was lost. The Murrah 
Federal Building was not designed to the British Code and the loss of one column then 
affected a transfer girder due to discontinuities in columns across the lobby, resulting in 
load transfers that the building could not handle. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-16 
Good Engineering Guidelines (1) 
The following guidelines are commonly used to mitigate the effects of blast on structures 
and to mitigate the potential for progressive collapse. These guidelines are not meant to be 
complete, but are provided to assist the designer in the initial evaluation and selection of 
design approaches. For example: 
. �	Consider incorporating internal damping into the structural system to 
absorb the blast impact.  While mass has been the blast design approach in the past, using 
more ductile materials with damping is being investigated. 
. �	The use of symmetric reinforcement can increase the ultimate load 
capacity of the structure. This is especially true for load reversals on floor slabs. 
. �	Consider wire mesh in plaster to reduce the incidence of flying fragments. 
. �	Recognize that components might act in opposite directions than designed. 
. �	Lap splices must be upgraded from those found in conventional 
construction to handle the forces during a blast event. Consider interlocking "J" splices. 

VISUAL IX-17 
Good Engineering Guidelines (2) 
Additional good engineering practices include: 
. �	A practical upper level for column spacing is 30 feet, 20 feet is better. If 
the column is lost, the remaining beam must span 40 to 60 feet. Above 60 feet, the beam 
becomes unreasonably large. 
. �	In general, floor to floor heights should be minimized. Unless there is an 
overriding architectural requirement, a practical limit 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
is generally less than or equal to 16 feet. Consider bond beams, as used in seismic 
zones, to reduce the effective height of the wall. 
. �	Avoid the use of unreinforced masonry when blast is a threat. Masonry 
walls break up readily and become secondary fragments during blasts. Grout (mass) and 
reinforcement (ductility) are definitely required for blast resistance. 
. �	Using one-way wall elements adds to prevention of progressive collapse. 
Although we are seeking a building envelope with balanced blast resistance, we would like 
the framing to be the last thing to fail. 
. �	In many cases, the ductile detailing requirements for seismic design and the 
alternate load paths provided by progressive collapse design assist in the protection from 
blast. 
. �	By keeping a 6-inch stand-off from vertical load carrying members, a small 
weapons charge is less likely to shear the member. 
 �	The designer must bear in mind, however, that the design approaches are, 
at times, in conflict. These conflicts must be worked out on a case by case basis. 
 Finally, designers should note that: 
. �	Deflections around certain members, such as windows, should be 
controlled to prevent premature failure. Additional reinforcement is generally required. 
Window frame deflection must not cause premature window glazing failure and window 
frame deflection must not differ greatly from the wall deflections. Seismic pinning of 
window frames may be required. 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES
	CONTENT/ACTIV
ITY 
VISUAL IX-18 
Building Materials: General 
Guidance 
. � All building materials and types acceptable under model building codes are 
allowed. 
. �	Special consideration should be given to materials that have inherent 
flexibility and that are better able to respond to load reversals (i.e., cast in place reinforced 
concrete and steel construction). 
. �	Careful detailing is required for material such as pre-stressed concrete, pre-
cast concrete, and masonry (brick and concrete masonry unit) to adequately respond to 
the design loads. Even calling out seismic connections may not be adequate as the 
workforce may not be familiar with the changes from their norm � thus detailing is very 
important. 
. �	The construction type selected must meet all performance criteria of the 
specified level of protection. 

VISUAL IX-19 
Building Envelope 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-20 
Ideally, the exterior walls need to be able to resist the loads transmitted by the windows 
and doors. It is not uncommon for bullet-resistant windows to have a higher ultimate 
capacity than the walls to which they are attached. 
Beyond ensuring a flexible failure mode, design the exterior wall to resist the pressure 
levels of the defined threat. Special reinforcing and anchors should be provided around 
blast-resistant window and door frames. 
Poured-in-place reinforced concrete will provide the highest level of protection, but 
solutions like pre-cast concrete, reinforced CMU block, and metal studs may also be 
used to achieve lower levels of protection. 
Thus, while the structural framing is the first consideration to prevent progressive 
collapse, the exterior walls are the second consideration to ensure blast pressure and 
fragmentation do not readily enter the building. 
Building Envelope � Walls (1) 
General principles: 
. �	The exterior envelope of the building is the most vulnerable to an exterior 
explosive threat because it is closest to the blast. 
. �	The exterior envelope also impacts the infiltration of CBR agents into the 
structure, but tight building construction must be done in conjunction with other actions 
to ensure some level of protection 
. �	Soil can be highly effective in reducing the impact of a major explosion by 
reducing fragmentation off walls and street furniture or directing a blast wave over a 
building. 
. �	Minimize "ornamentation" that may become flying debris in an explosion. 
This includes street furniture, overhangs, sculptures, etc. 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-21 
VISUAL IX-22 
Building Envelope � Windows (1) 
Window systems on the exterior fa�ade of a building should be designed to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying glass during an explosion event. Designs should integrate the 
features of the glass, connection of the glass to the frame (bite), and anchoring of the 
frame to the building structure to achieve a "balanced design." This means all the 
components should have compatible capacities and theoretically would all fail at the same 
pressure-pulse levels. In this way, the damage sequence and extent of damage are 
controlled. 
Ultimately, in a "balanced" design, the order of failure should be: 
. � Glass 
. � Window frame 
. � Frame anchoring 
. � Wall 
. � Building structural framing 

The pressure differences should not be large and the Level of Protection for the Design 
Basis Threat should be met. 
Building Envelope � Windows (2) 
Five types of glass are commonly used in window glazing systems: annealed glass, heat 
strengthened glass, fully thermally tempered, laminated glass, and polycarbonate. Other 
types of glass materials exist, but are not commonly used in typical commercial window 
systems. Of the five common types, annealed glass and fully thermally tempered 
glass are the type of windows for most office buildings. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Annealed glass, also known as float, plate, or sheet glass, is the most common glass 
type used in commercial construction. Annealed glass is of relatively low strength and, 
upon failure, fractures into razor sharp, dagger-shaped fragments (see slide -- the right 
photo is annealed glass failing during an actual explosive test and the left photo is a 
closeup of the shards). 
Heat strengthened glass (HS), also known as double strength glass, is used where wind 
loading starts becoming a problem.  It breaks like annealed glass. 
Fully thermally tempered glass (TTG) is typically four to five times stronger than 
annealed glass. Instead of shards, TTG breaks into pellets that can be stopped by a 
regular suit coat. 
Laminated glass is a pane with multiple glass layers and a pliable interlayer material 
(usually made from polyvinyl butyral (PVB)) between the glass layers. 
Thermoplastic polycarbonates are very strong and suitable for blast- and forced entry-
resistant window design. They are usually laminated with glass on the outside to prevent 
environmental degradation of the plastic and aid in cleaning. 
Wire-reinforced glass is a common glazing material. It consists of annealed glass with 
an embedded layer of wire mesh. It is usually used for fire resistance and as a forced 
entry barrier. It is not recommended for blast design. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-23 
GSA Glazing Performance 
Conditions 
Table 3-1 in FEMA 426 presents six GSA glazing protection levels based on how far 
glass fragments would enter a space and potentially injure its occupants (known as a 
flight model). This slide depicts how far glass fragments could enter a structure for each 
GSA performance condition. The divide between performance conditions 3a and 3b can 
be equated to the "threshold of injury." The divide between performance conditions 4 and 
5 can be equated to the "threshold of lethality." A person standing in the room has a 
potential of being hit in the upper body/head area by glass fragments that are traveling 
fast enough to penetrate the body. 
The GSA glazing performance 
conditions shown will correlate with 
the DoD levels of protection 
presented in Table 3-2 in FEMA 
426. 
VISUAL IX-24 
Window Frames (1) 
Window frames need to retain the glass so that the entire pane does not pull out (glass 
flexes and can pull out of frame during the blast) and also should be designed to resist the 
breaking stress of the window glass. 
To retain the glass in the frame, a minimum of a 1/4-inch bead of structural sealant (i.e., 
silicone or polyvinyl butyral) should be used around the inner perimeter of the window. 
This should be done on all four sides of the window. Thus, strip windows with butt 
glazing are not good options as the bite must be large. 
The window bite (i.e., the depth of 
window captured by the frame) needs 
to be at least 1/2 inch. DoD criteria calls 
for a minimum 3/8-
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
inch bite if silicon sealant is applied, but 
calls out a 1-inch bite if no silicone 
sealant is used. Butt glazed windows 
can require even more bite with or 
without sealant. 
VISUAL IX-25 
Window Frames (2) 
The frame must not flex during the blast loading and cause the glass to pop out. 
The blast loading across the glass and frame now transfers to the frame connections to the 
building. These connections must handle the shear and tensile stresses and the bending 
moments of the connection design. 
The frame members connecting adjoining windows are referred to as mullions. These 
members may be designed using a static approach when the breaking strength of the 
window glass is applied to the mullion, or a dynamic load may be applied using the peak 
pressure and impulse values.  Since mullions only connect at the ends to the building 
structure, the mullion must handle the transferred blast loading from both adjacent 
windows. 
Other considerations for windows 
must balance the amount of light, 
energy conservation, noise 
transmission, venting of fumes, and 
emergency egress in addition to blast 
response and CBR protection. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-26 
VISUAL IX-27 
Fragment Retention Film (FRF) (1) 
Another treatment used for mitigating the effects of an explosive attack is security 
window film. The polyester film used in commercial products is commonly referred to as 
fragment retention film (FRF), safety film, security film, protective film, or shatter-
resistant film. These films are adhered to the interior surface of the window to provide 
fragment retention and reduce the overall velocity of the glass fragments at failure. 
Fragment retention film combines a strong pressure sensitive adhesive with a tough 
polyester layer. It should be limited to use in retrofit applications due to degradation of 
the film and adhesive. Do not use for new construction. 
FRF (2) 
Fragment retention film behaves similarly to relatively thin laminated and 
polycarbonate glazing in terms of fragmentation. It is available in common thicknesses 
of 2, 4, 7, and 10 mils. Also found up to 15 mils. 
Fragment retention film improves the performance of the glass under blast loading to 
varying degrees, depending on the thickness, quality, and type of film installation. Note a 
daylight application will leave a 1/16 inch space around the edge of the FRF where water 
used to apply the FRF is squeegeed out. Daylight application of FRF to very thin glass 
can reduce the standoff distance in half for a given level of protection. The best 
performance is achieved when the film is installed into the bite of the glazing or is 
connected to the frame (mechanically or with chemical sealants). 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Fragment retention film can also 
provide solar control benefits. 
VISUAL IX-28 
Blast Curtains 
. �	Invented by the British during WWII 
. �	Can now see out of these curtains as opposed to the "blackout" curtains 
from WWII by using Kevlar or other high strength fibers 
. �	Allow venting of the blast wave while "catching" fragments 
. �	May be augmented with FRF 
. �	Connections of curtains or blast shields to building frame are critical 

VISUAL IX-29 
Catch Bar 
Increased safety for fragment retention can be obtained in the event of catastrophic failure 
from an explosive blast by placing a decorative catchbar or grillwork on the interior of the 
glazing. Note, catchbars must be mounted across the center of mass of each window pane 
(vision area of glass) to be effective. 
Catchbars are usually considered with a retrofit of fragment retention film to not only 
catch the glass, but also catch the existing window frame that may not be adequately 
connected to the wall. They can also be considered for laminated glass. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-30 
Building Envelope � Good Window Practice 
The windows adjacent to doors allow easy access to the locking mechanism on the door. 
Fewer and smaller windows limit cost and reduce damage if failure during bomb blast 
occurs. 
Heavy duty aluminum frames have performed 
well.
VISUAL IX-31

Building Envelope - Doors 
A door system includes the door, frame, and anchorage to the building. As part of a 
balanced design approach, exterior doors in high risk buildings should be designed to 
withstand the maximum dynamic pressure and duration of the load from the design 
threat explosive blast. Other general door considerations are as follows: 
. �	Provide hollow steel doors or steel-clad doors with steel frames. 
. �	Provide blast-resistant doors for high threats and high levels of protection. 
. �	Limit normal entry/egress through one door, if possible. 
. �	Keep exterior doors to a minimum while accommodating emergency egress. 
. �	Ensure that exterior doors open outward from inhabited areas 
. �	Replace externally mounted locks and hasps with internally locking 
devices because the weakest part of a door system is the latching component. 
. �	Install doors, where practical, so that they present a blank, flush surface to 
the outside to reduce their vulnerability to 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-32 
attack. 
. �	Locate hinges on the interior or provide concealed hinges to reduce their 
vulnerability to tampering. 
. �	Install emergency exit doors so that they facilitate only exiting movement. 
. �	Equip any outward-opening double door with protective hinges and key-
operated mortise-type locks. 
. �	Provide solid doors or walls as a backup for glass doors in foyers. 

Building Envelope � Roofs 
For an explosive threat, especially for thrown explosives � satchels, hand grenades, and 
even mortars, the primary loading on the roof is downward over-pressure. The stand-off 
to the protected ceiling provides the protection. The sloped roof tends to cause the 
explosive to roll off and away from the building. For explosions at ground level, 
secondary loads include upward pressure due to the blast penetrating through openings 
and upward suction during the negative loading phase. The upward pressures may have 
an increased duration due to multiple reflections of the air blast internally. It is 
conservative to consider the downward and upward loads separately. 
The preferred system is to use poured-in-place reinforced concrete with beams in two 
directions. If this system is used, beams should have stirrups along the entire span 
spaced not greater than one half the beam depths. 
Less desirable systems include metal plate systems without concrete, and precast and 
pre/post tensioned systems. 
Precast panels are problematic because of the tendency to fail at the connections. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-33 
Mechanical system design standards address limiting damage to critical infrastructure 
and protecting building occupants against CBR threats. 
. �	Controlling access to building information, including the operation of the 
mechanical systems, should be a security priority. This information could aid a terrorist 
attack. 
. �	Finally, preventive maintenance that ensures the mechanical systems will 
work 

Pre/post tensioned systems tend to fail in a brittle manner if stressed beyond their 
elastic limit and they also are not able to accept upward loads without additional 
reinforcement. 
Many conventional roof designs will provide a suitable blast response for most buildings, 
considering minimum Design Basis Threats. The intent here is to point out what roofs 
may be a problem and why. For higher Design Basis Threats and tactics involving the 
roof, the protected ceiling and sacrificial roof concept applies. 
Mechanical Systems (1) 
The primary goal of a mechanical system after a terrorist attack should be to continue to 
operate key life safety systems. This can be accomplished by locating components in less 
vulnerable areas, limiting access to mechanical systems, and providing a reasonable 
amount of redundancy. 
Designers should consider the following: 
 �	During an interior bombing event, smoke removal and control are of 
paramount importance. The designer should consider the fact that, if window glazing is 
hardened, a blast may not blow out windows, and smoke may be trapped in the building. 
 The following suggestions attempt to protect the mechanical systems during an 
explosive blast event, have backup, or generally prevent access to utilities lines: 
. �	Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
in all required modes must be done to ensure proper functioning after an event. 
VISUAL IX-34 
Mechanical Systems (2) 
Restrict Access 
. � Rooms 
. � Closets 
. � Roofs 
. � Building information 
. � Also consider for other systems 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-34 
exterior walls, but, when this is unavoidable, mount fixtures on a separate wall at least 
6 inches from the exterior wall face. 
. �	Avoid plumbing on the roof slab. 
. �	Avoid suspending plumbing fixtures and piping from the ceiling. 
. �	Reduce the number of utility openings, manholes, tunnels, air conditioning 
ducts, filters, and access panels into the structure. 
. �	Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack, such as 
loading docks, lobbies, and parking areas. 
. �	Protect building operational control areas and utility feeds to lessen the 
negative effects of a blast. 
. �	Design operational redundancies to survive all kinds of attack. 
. �	Use lockable systems for utility openings and manholes where 
appropriate. Infrequently used utility covers/manholes can be tack-welded as an 
inexpensive alternative to locking tamper-resistant covers. 

Mechanical Systems (2) 
. �	Physical security for mechanical rooms to prevent the direct introduction 
of hazardous materials into the system of ducts that distributes air to the building should 
be maintained. 
. �	Public access to building roofs should be prevented. Access to the roof 
may allow entry to the building and access to air intakes and HVAC equipment (e.g., self-
contained HVAC units, laboratory or bathroom exhausts) located on the roof. 
. �	Access to information on building operations (including mechanical, 
electrical, vertical transport, fire and life safety, security system plans and 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
schematics, and emergency 
operations procedures) should be 
strictly controlled. 
. �	To prevent widespread dispersion of a contaminant released within 
lobbies, mailrooms, and loading docks, their HVAC systems should be isolated and the 
areas maintained at a negative pressure relative to the rest of the building, but at positive 
pressure relative to the outdoors. 
. �	Large buildings usually have multiple HVAC zones, with each zone served 
by its own air handling unit and duct system. 
. �	Consider "shelter-in-place" rooms or areas where people can congregate in 
the event of an outdoor release. The goal is to create areas where outdoor air infiltration is 
very low. 

VISUAL IX-35 
Ventilation and Filtration 
Simplest to most complex in approaches to control the HVAC (heating, ventilating, and 
air conditioning) system during or after a terrorist attack. 
. �	HVAC control may not be appropriate in all emergency situations. 
Protection from CBR attacks depends upon the design and operation of the HVAC 
system and the nature of the CBR agent release. 
. �	Ducted returns offer limited access points to introduce a CBR agent. The 
return vents can be placed in conspicuous locations, reducing the risk of an agent being 
secretly introduced into the return system. 
. �	A rapid response, such as shutting down an HVAC system, may involve 
closing various dampers, especially those controlling the flow of outdoor air (in the event 
of an exterior CBR release). 
. �	Consideration should be given to installing low leakage dampers to 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
minimize this flow pathway. 
VISUAL IX-36 
Emergency Plans 
All buildings should have current emergency plans to address fire, weather, and other 
types of emergencies. 
In light of past U.S. experiences with anthrax and similar threats, these plans should be 
updated to consider CBR attack scenarios and the associated procedures. Emergency 
plans should have procedures for communicating instructions to building occupants, 
identifying suitable shelter-in-place areas (if they exist), identifying appropriate use and 
selection of personal protective equipment (i.e., clothing, gloves, respirators), and 
directing emergency evacuations. 
Building design should be able to ensure 
the optimal operation of the emergency 
plans. The emergency plans should not 
default to only what can be done after 
the building is constructed. In other 
words, like security and homeland 
defense, emergency planning should be 
an up-front design consideration that 
gets incorporated into the planning, 
budgeting, and design of the building. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-37 
VISUAL IX-38 
VISUAL IX-39 
Maintenance, Administration, and Training (1) 
In all cases, the HVAC Maintenance Staff must receive training in how the upgraded 
mechanical systems are designed to work, how they should be operated, and how they 
should be maintained and tested. 
Maintenance, Administration, and Training (2) 
. �	Training should be conducted 
. �	Plans should be tested 

Building Electrical Systems 
The major security functions of the electrical system are to maintain power to essential 
building services, especially those required for life safety and evacuation; provide lighting 
and surveillance to deter criminal activities; and provide emergency communications. 
Designers should consider the following recommendations for buildings requiring high 
security: 
�	Emergency and normal electric panels, conduits, and switchgear should be installed 
separately, at different locations, 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
and as far apart as possible. 
. �	Emergency generators should be located away from loading docks, 
entrances, and parking. 
. �	Fuel tanks should be mounted near the generator, given the same 
protection as the emergency generator, and sized to store an appropriate amount of fuel. 
. �	Conduits and lines should be installed outside to allow a trailer-mounted 
generator to connect to the building�s electrical system. 
. �	Site lighting should be coordinated with the CCTV system. 
. �	Emergency power should be provided for emergency lighting in restrooms. 
. �	Building access points should be illuminated to aid in threat detection. 
. �	Self-contained battery lighting will be in stairwells and for exit signs. 
. �	Suspending electrical conduits from the ceiling should be avoided. 
. �	Adequate lighting of perimeters and parking areas should be provided to 
aid in visual surveillance and to support the use of physical security systems. 

VISUAL IX-40 
Fire Protection Systems 
The fire protection system inside the building should maintain life safety protection after 
an incident and allow for safe evacuation of the building when appropriate. To enhance 
the performance of fire protection systems, especially in the case of an explosive blast, 
the designer should consider the following: 
. �	The fire protection water system should be protected from single-point 
failure in case of a blast event � maintain 50-foot separation from high risk areas (loading 
dock, lobby, etc.) 
. �	To increase the reliability of the fire 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-41 
protection system in strategic locations, a 
dual pump arrangement should be 
considered, with one electric pump and 
one diesel pump. 
. �	The pumps should be located away from each other. 
. �	All security locking arrangements on doors used for egress must comply 
with requirements of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 101, Life Safety 
Code. 

Communications Systems 
For buildings requiring greater protection, the designer should consider the following: 
Redundant communications. The facility could have a second telephone service to 
maintain communications in case of an incident. A base radio communication system with 
an antenna should be installed in the stairwell, and portable sets distributed on floors. 
This is the preferred alternative. 
Radio telemetry. Distributed antennas could be located throughout the facility if 
required for emergency communications through wireless transmission of data. 
Alarm and information systems. Alarm and information systems should not be 
collected and mounted in a single conduit, or even collocated. Circuits to various parts of 
the building should be installed in at least two directions and/or risers. 
Empty conduits. Empty conduits and power outlets can be provided for future 
installation of security control equipment. 
Mass notification. All inhabited buildings should have a timely means to notify 
occupants of threats and give instructions as to responses. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-42 
Chapter 3 of FEMA 426 is not a design guide for Electronic Security Systems (ESS). The 
following criteria are only intended to stress those concepts and practices that warrant 
special attention to enhance public safety. Consult design guides pertinent to the specific 
project for detailed information about electronic security. A description of Electronic 
Security Systems is provided in 
Appendix D of FEMA 426. 
For control centers and building management systems, designers should consider the 
following: 
. �	The Operational Control Center (OCC), Fire Command Center (FCC), and 
Security Control Center (SCC) may be collocated. If collocated, the chain of command 
should be carefully preplanned to ensure the most qualified leadership is in control for 
specific types of events. Secure information links should be provided between the OCC, 
FCC, and SCC. 
. �	A Backup Control Center (BCC) should be provided in a different 
location, such 

Electronic Security Systems 
The purpose of electronic security is to improve the reliability and effectiveness of life 
safety systems, security systems, and building functions. When possible, 
accommodations should be made for future developments in security systems. 
Electronic security, including surveillance, intrusion detection, and screening, is a key 
element of facility protection. Many aspects of electronic security and the posting of 
security personnel have been adequately dealt with in other criteria and guideline 
documents. These criteria primarily address access control design, including stair and 
lobby design, because access control must be considered when design concepts for a 
building are first conceived. Although fewer options are available for modernization 
projects, some designs can be altered to consider future access control objectives. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
as a manager's or engineer's office. If feasible, an off-site location should be 
considered. 
. �	A fully redundant BCC should be installed (this is an alternative to the 
above). 
. �	Basic intrusion detection devices should be provided: magnetic reed 
switches for interior doors and openings, glass break sensors for windows up to scalable 
heights, and balanced magnetic contact switch sets for all exterior doors, including 
overhead/roll-up doors. Roof intrusion detection should be reviewed. 
. �	Monitoring should be at an off-site facility. 
. �	An on-site monitoring center should be used during normal business hours 
and be operational 24 hours. 
. �	A Color CCTV surveillance system with recording capability should be 
provided to view and record activity at the perimeter of the building, particularly at 
primary entrances and exits. 

VISUAL IX-43 
Entry Control Stations 
Entry control stations should be provided at main perimeter entrances of the building 
where security personnel are present (see Figure 3-12 of FEMA 426). In addition, entry 
control stations should be located close to the perimeter entrance to permit people inside 
the entry control station to maintain constant surveillance over the entrance and its 
approaches. Note that many of the considerations for entry control stations listed here 
are appropriate for Site and Layout Design as discussed in Chapter 2 of FEMA 426. 
Additional considerations at entry control stations include: 
�	A holding area for unauthorized vehicles 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
or those needing further inspection should be established. A turnaround area should be 
provided so that traffic is not impeded. This area should not be near the building 
(s) being protected. 
. �	Control measures such as displaying a decal on the window or having a 
specially marked vehicle should be established. 
. �	Entry control stations that are manned 24 hours each day should have 
interior and exterior lighting, interior heating (where appropriate), and a sufficient glassed 
area to afford adequate observation for people inside. 
. �	Signs should be erected to assist in controlling authorized entry, to deter 
unauthorized entry, and to preclude accidental entry. 
. �	The size and coloring of a sign, its letters, and the interval of posting must 
be appropriate to each situation. 
. �	Entry control stations should be hardened against attacks according to the 
type of threat. The methods of hardening may include: 
. �	Reinforced concrete or masonry 
. �	Steel plating 
. �	Bullet-resistant glass 
. �	Commercially fabricated, bullet-resistant building components or 
assemblies 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-44 
Direct students to Table 2-1 in FEMA 426. VISUAL IX-45 
Practical Applications 
What can be done with a reasonable level of effort? 
There is a range of FEMA 426 mitigation efforts at a range of cost. Consult Table 2-1 
of FEMA 426 to understand the benefit of various mitigation efforts against a range of 
terrorist tactics. 
Desired Building Protection Level 
The assessment process described to this point should determine the level of protection 
sought for the building structure for the threat/hazard specific to the facility. Explosive 
blast threats usually govern building structural design for high risk buildings. 
Some design approaches are threat independent, such as progressive collapse as we will 
see in the next slides. In every case, seek to include a balance between all the different 
requirements to include in design. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-46 
VISUAL IX-47 
Refer participants to FEMA 426, the Unit IX Case Study activity in the Student Manual, 
and the vulnerability portfolio. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist 
groups as needed. 
At the end of 45 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
Summary 
To summarize: 
This course will provide a foundation for a systematic approach to assessing the 
vulnerabilities of your facilities to manmade hazards. 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can provide an 
excellent framework for the identification of mitigation options that will � over time � 
significantly reduce the vulnerability of your facility to manmade hazards. 
Student Activity 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment. 
The checklist includes questions that determine if critical systems will continue to 
function to enhance deterrence, detection, denial, and damage limitation, and emergency 
systems function during a threat or hazard situation. 
Activity Requirements 
. �	Continue working is small groups. 
. �	Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most 
knowledgeable and qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. 
. �	Refer to the HIC Case Study and to the GIS portfolio to determine 
answers to the worksheet questions. 
. �	Then review results to identify 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Many sections of the checklist are annotated "Unknown without a more detailed on-site 
assessment". As students review the Case Study materials and complete the checklist, in 
most cases, the "70 percent" solution is found without having to conduct the on-site 
assessment. 
vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures. 
Take 45 minutes to complete this activity. Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
Transition 
Unit X will cover Electronic Security Systems. 
UNIT IX CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE 
In this Unit, the emphasis will be upon providing a balanced building envelope that is a 
defensive layer against the terrorist tactic of interest and avoiding situations where one 
incident affects more than one building system. The Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a screening tool for preliminary 
building design vulnerability assessment. 
Requirement 
Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most knowledgeable and 
qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the HIC Case Study 
and to the vulnerability portfolio to determine answers to the questions.  Then review 
results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures. 
1. 1.	Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist that address building design. 
2. 2.	Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the risk 
ratings determined in Unit V Case Study Activity and, based on this more detailed 
analysis, decide if the rating is accurate. 
3. 3.	Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from 
building design. 
4. 4.	Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the 
recommended mitigation measures. 

Sectio
n 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
2.5 
Do entrances avoid 
significant queuing? 
If queuing will occur within the 
building footprint, the area 
should be enclosed in blast-
resistant construction. If queuing 
is expected outside the building, 
a rain cover should be provided. 
For manpower and equipment 
requirements, collocate or 
combine staff and visitor 
entrances. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 

2.6 
Does security screening 
cover all public and 
private areas? Are public 
and private activities 
separated? 
Retail activities should be 
prohibited in non-secured areas. 
However, the Public Building 
Cooperative Use Act of 1976 
encourages retail and mixed uses 
to create open and inviting 
buildings. Consider separating 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


Are public toilets, service 
spaces, or access to stairs 
or elevators located in any 
non-secure areas, 
including the queuing area 
before screening at the 
public entrance? 
entryways, controlling access, 
hardening shared partitions, and 
special security operational 
countermeasures. References:  
GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7 

2.7 
Is access control provided 
through main entrance 
points for employees and 
visitors? (lobby 
receptionist, sign-
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Within HIC, access 
control, lobby 
receptionist, sign-in, 
staff escorts, issue of 
visitor badges, 
checking forms of 

in, staff escorts, issue of 
visitor badges, checking 
forms of personal 
identification, electronic 
access control systems) 

personal 
identification, and 
electronic access 
control systems are 
all present. 



Access control at 



other companies 



within the complex 



is unknown. 
2.8 
Is access to private and 
public space or restricted 
area space clearly defined 
through the design of the 
space, signage, use of 
Finishes and signage should be 
designed for visual simplicity. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The building is 
monitored by door 
and window alarms, 
which connect to 
ADT, the nationwide 
alarm company. 

electronic security 
devices, etc.? 

Unauthorized 
opening of any door 
or window will 



immediately notify 



ADT via telephone. 



ADT will normally 



call the HIC Security 



Office prior to 



contacting the police 



and DPS. HIC 



employees have 



proximity cards to 



allow them to enter 



the front and loading 



dock doors without 



activating the alarm. 



The innermost layer 



of physical security 



involves the 



Computer Data 



Center and the 



Communications 



Center. Equipped 




with locked doors, 
these two rooms 
meet the 
government�s 
requirements for 
handling classified 
material. Only 
authorized employees 
possess the necessary 
proximity cards and 
PINs to gain access 
2.9 
Is access to elevators 
distinguished as to those 
that are designated only 
for employees and 
visitors? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
No elevators in HIC. 
2.10 
Do public and employee 
entrances include space 
for possible future 
installation of access 
control and screening 
equipment? 
These include walk-through metal 
detectors and x-ray devices, 
identification check, electronic 
access card, search stations, and 
turnstiles. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
Yes, lobby area 
within HIC facility 
could accommodate 
space-saving 
screening equipment. 
Interior office space 
also has adequate 
room for such 
equipment. 
2.11 
Do foyers have reinforced 
concrete walls and offset 
interior and exterior doors 
from each other? 
Consider for exterior entrances to 
the building or to access critical 
areas within the building if 
explosive blast hazard must be 
mitigated. Reference: U.S. Army 
TM 5-853 
The exterior walls are 
made of CMU with a 
brick veneer on the 
outside. Steel 
framework supports 
the structure, and 
exposed columns are 
enclosed in gypsum 
wallboard. Windows 
are double glazed, 
1/4 inch thick 
annealed glass. The 
construction of 
interior walls is 
unknown. 
2.12 
Do doors and walls along 
the line of security 
screening meet 
requirements of UL752 
"Standard for Safety: 
Bullet-Resisting 
Equipment"? 
If the postulated threat in 
designing entrance access control 
includes rifles, pistols, or 
shotguns, then the screening area 
should have bullet-resistance to 
protect security personnel and 
uninvolved bystanders. Glass, if 
present, should also be bullet-
resistant. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

2.13 
Do circulation routes have 
unobstructed views of 
people approaching 
controlled access points? 
This applies to building entrances 
and to critical areas within the 
building. References: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide and DoD UFC 4-010-01 
Yes. 
2.14 
Is roof access limited to 
authorized personnel by 
means of locking 
mechanisms? 
References:  GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.15 
Are critical assets 
Critical building components 
Electrical service is 

(people, activities, 
building systems and 
components) located 
close to any main 
include: Emergency generator 
including fuel systems, day tank, 
fire sprinkler, and water supply; 
Normal fuel storage; Main 
switchgear; Telephone 
provided through 
two buried 
transmission lines 
from two separate 
transformers outside 

entrance, vehicle 
circulation, parking, 
maintenance area, loading 
dock, or interior parking? 
distribution and main switchgear; 
Fire pumps; Building control 
centers; Uninterruptible Power 
Supply (UPS) systems 
controlling critical functions; 
Main 
the building. 
Emergency power is 
provided by a single 
diesel generator, 
located in a shed in 


refrigeration and ventilation 
the rear parking lot. 

Are the critical building 
systems and components 
hardened? 
systems if critical to building 
operation; Elevator machinery and 
controls; Shafts for stairs, 
elevators, and utilities; Critical 
The generator has a 
50 gallon day tank, 
maintained at 80 
percent capacity. The 


distribution feeders for 
2,000-gallon main 


emergency power. Evacuation 
tank is buried under 


and rescue require emergency 
the parking lot, near 


systems to remain operational 
the generator. 


during a disaster and they should 



be located away from attack 
The diesel generator 


locations. Primary and backup 
is configured to 


systems should be separated to 
automatically start 


reduce the risk of both being 
upon loss of 


impacted by a single incident if 
commercial power to 


collocated.  Utility systems 
the Computer Center 


should be located at least 50 feet 
Bus. This happens 


from loading docks, front 
about twice a year 


entrances, and parking areas. 
due to electrical 



storms or utility 


One way to harden critical 
maintenance in the 


building systems and components 
neighborhood. The 


is to enclose them within 
backup diesel 


hardened walls, floors, and 
generator has never 


ceilings. Do not place them near 
had to support HIC�s 


high-risk areas where they can 
power demands for 


receive collateral damage. 
longer than about 2 


Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
hours, and never 
with 



more than one chiller 



operating. It has 



never been tested for 



an extended period 




under heavy load. 



The batteries to 



support the UPS are 



in a small room next 



to the UPS room. 



Heating for the HIC 



building is provided 



by a combination of 



natural gas and 



electricity. This 



provides a regulated 



environment for the 



sensitive computer 



and communications 



equipment, and a 



comfortable 



environment for 



employees. 



Natural gas enters 



the building through 



two meters under the 



loading dock 



staircase and goes 



through the overhead 



to the mechanical 



and electrical 



(M&E) room at the 



building�s southwest 



corner. Branches 



split off for two gas 



powered space 



heaters in the high-



bay area by the 



loading dock. The 



main gas line goes to 



the main heater in 



the M&E room. 
2.16 
Are high-value or critical 
assets located as far into 
the interior of the building 
as possible and separated 
from the public areas of 
the building? 
Critical assets, such as people and 
activities, are more vulnerable to 
hazards when on an exterior 
building wall or adjacent to 
uncontrolled public areas inside 
the building. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
People are located 
along the exterior 
wall at the front of 
the building. The 
secure space has the 
best interior space 
location � not on an 
exterior wall, as does 



the conference room. 



The office space acts 
as the buffer between 



the critical functions 



in the back and the 




public area of the 
building at the main 
entrance. 
2.17 
Is high visitor activity 
away from critical assets? 
High-risk activities should also 
be separated from low-risk 
activities. Also, visitor activities 
should be separated from daily 
activities. Reference: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide 
All visitors enter 
through a common 
front entrance. Once 
admitted to the site, 
visitor activity is 
n/a. 
2.18 
Are critical assets located 
in spaces that are 
occupied 24 hours per 
day? Are assets located in 
areas where they are 
visible to more than one 
person? 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.19 
Are loading docks and 
receiving and shipping 
areas separated in any 
direction from utility 
rooms, utility mains, and 
service entrances, 
including electrical, 
telephone/data, fire 
detection/alarm systems, 
fire suppression water 
mains, cooling and heating 
mains, etc.? 
Loading docks should be 
designed to keep vehicles from 
driving into or parking under the 
building. If loading docks are in 
close proximity to critical 
equipment, consider hardening 
the equipment and service against 
explosive blast. Consider a 50-
foot separation distance in all 
directions. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
No, the loading dock 
connects directly into 
interior space, critical 
functions, and 
infrastructure. 
2.20 
Are mailrooms located 
away from building main 
entrances, areas 
containing critical 
services, utilities, 
distribution systems, and 
important assets? Is the 
mailroom located near the 
loading dock? 
The mailroom should be located 
at the perimeter of the building 
with an outside wall or window 
designed for pressure relief. By 
separating the mailroom and the 
loading dock, the collateral 
damage of an incident at one has 
less impact upon the other. 
However, this may be the 
preferred mailroom location. Off-
site screening stations or a 
separate delivery processing 
building on site may be cost-
effective, particularly if several 
buildings may share one 
mailroom. A separate delivery 
processing building reduces risk 
and simplifies protection 
HIC has no mail 
room. Incoming mail 
is normally 
processed by the 
receptionist inside 
the front door. Large 
packages are 
delivered to the 
loading dock. 



measures. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 

2.21 
Does the mailroom have 
adequate space available 
for equipment to examine 
incoming packages and for 
an explosive disposal 
container? 
Screening of all deliveries to the 
building, including U.S. mail, 
commercial package delivery 
services, delivery of office 
supplies, etc. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
HIC has no mail 
room. 
2.22 
Are areas of refuge 
identified, with special 
consideration given to 
egress? 
Areas of refuge can be safe 
havens, shelters, or protected 
spaces for use during specified 
hazards. Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Yes, the Computer 
Data Center and the 
large conference 
room. 
2.23 
Are stairwells required for 
emergency egress located 
as remotely as possible 
from high-risk areas 
where blast events might 
occur? Are stairways 
maintained with positive 
pressure or are there other 
smoke control systems? 
Consider designing stairs so that 
they discharge into other than 
lobbies, parking, or loading areas. 
Maintaining positive pressure 
from a clean source of air (may 
require special filtering) aids in 
egress by keeping smoke, heat, 
toxic fumes, etc. out of the 
stairway. Pressurize exit stairways 
in accordance with the National 
Model Building Code. 
References:  GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
Emergency stairwells 
are located far from 
main stairwells. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.24 
Are enclosures for 
emergency egress 
hardened to limit the 
extent of debris that might 
otherwise impede safe 
passage and reduce the 
flow of evacuees? 
Egress pathways should be 
hardened and discharge into safe 
areas. Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.25 
Do interior barriers 
differentiate level of 
security within a 
building? 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Electronic controls 
exist in the form of 
alarms, door locks, 
proximity cards, and 
use of PIN numbers 
for room/area access. 
2.26 
Are emergency systems 
located away from high-
risk areas? 
The intent is to keep the 
emergency systems out of harm�s 
way, such that one incident takes 
out all capability � both the 
regular systems and their 
backups. Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Emergency stairwells 
are located far from 
main stairwells. 
Emergency/backup 
generators are located 
away from main 
power supply lines; 
UPS is located 
inside the building�s 
high bay area; exit 




doors are located 



throughout the site; 



natural gas enters the 



building under the 



loading dock 



stairwell. 
2.27 
Is interior glazing near 
high-threat areas 
minimized? Is interior 
glazing in other areas 
shatter-resistant? 
Interior glazing should be 
minimized where a threat exists 
and should be avoided in 
enclosures of critical functions 
next to high-risk areas. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.28 
Are ceiling and lighting 
systems designed to 
remain in place during 
hazard events? 
When an explosive blast shatters 
a window, the blast wave enters 
the interior space, putting 
structural and nonstructural 
building components under loads 
not considered in standard 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


building codes. It has been shown 
that connection criteria for these 



systems in high seismic activity 
areas resulted in much less falling 
debris that could injure building 



occupants. 



Mount all overhead utilities and 



other fixtures weighing 14 
kilograms (31 pounds) or more to 
minimize the likelihood that they 
will fall and injure building 
occupants. Design all equipment 
mountings to resist forces of 0.5 
times the equipment weight in 
any direction and 1.5 times the 
equipment weight in the 
downward direction. This 



standard does not preclude the 
need to design equipment 
mountings for forces required by 
other criteria, such as seismic 



standards. 



Reference: DoD Minimum 



Antiterrorism Standards for 



Buildings 


3 
Structural Systems 


3.1 
What type of construction? 
What type of concrete and 
reinforcing steel? 
The type of construction provides 
an indication of the robustness to 
abnormal loading and load 
reversals. A reinforced concrete 
moment-resisting frame provides 
Located in a 
suburban office 
complex, the HIC 
office building 
comprises a 22,000 


What type of steel? What 
type of foundation? 
greater ductility and redundancy 
than a flat-slab or flat-plate 
construction. The ductility of 
steel frame with metal deck 
depends on the connection details 
and pre-tensioned or post-
tensioned construction provides 
little capacity for abnormal 
loading patterns and load 
reversals. The resistance of load-
bearing wall structures varies to a 
great extent, depending on 
whether the walls are reinforced or 
un-reinforced. A rapid screening 
process developed by FEMA for 
assessing structural hazards 
identifies the following types of 
construction with a structural 
score ranging from 1.0 to 8.5. A 
higher score indicates a greater 
capacity to sustain load reversals. 
Wood buildings of all types - 4.5 
to 8.5 Steel moment-resisting 
frames -3.5 to 4.5 Braced steel 
frames - 2.5 to 3.0 Light metal 
buildings - 5.5 to 6.5 Steel 
frames with cast-in-place concrete 
shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5 Steel 
frames with unreinforced masonry 
infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0 Concrete 
moment-resisting frames - 2.0 to 
4.0 Concrete shear wall buildings 
-3.0 to 4.0 Concrete frames with 
unreinforced masonry infill walls 
- 1.5 to 3.0 Tilt-up buildings - 
2.0 to 3.5 Precast concrete frame 
buildings -1.5 to 2.5 Reinforced 
masonry - 3.0 to 4.0 Unreinforced 
masonry - 1.0 to 2.5 References: 
FEMA 154 and Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
square foot main 
floor for offices and 
computers, and a 
3,300 square foot 
executive mezzanine 
(a second floor over 
part of the office). 
The building that 
houses the 
Hazardville 
Information 
Company (HIC) is 
an office building of 
standard 
construction. The 
walls are made of 
CMU with a brick 
veneer on the 
outside. Steel 
framework supports 
the structure, and 
exposed columns are 
enclosed in gypsum 
wallboard. The roof 
is a metal deck with 
gravel on top and 
insulation 
underneath. It is 
slightly angled to 
allow water to drain. 
The roof overhangs 
the front entrance by 
8 feet. This provides 
a covered area for 
employees to stay 
dry on rainy days. 
Cylindrical columns 
support the 
overhang. Windows 
are double glazed, 
1/4 inch thick 
annealed glass. 
3.2 
Do the reinforced concrete 
structures contain 
symmetric steel 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


reinforcement (positive and 



negative faces) in all floor 



slabs, roof slabs, walls, 



beams and girders that may 



be subjected to rebound, 



uplift and suction 
pressures? 



Do the lap splices fully 



develop the capacity of the 



reinforcement? 



Are lap splices and other 



discontinuities staggered? 



Do the connections possess 



ductile details? 



Is special shear 



reinforcement, including 



ties and stirrups, available 



to allow large post-elastic 



behavior? 


3.3 
Are the steel frame 
connections moment 
connections? Is the column 
spacing minimized so that 
reasonably sized members 
will resist the design loads 
and increase the redundancy 
of the system? 
A practical upper level for column 
spacing is generally 30 feet. 
Unless there is an overriding 
architectural requirement, a 
practical limit for floor-to-floor 
heights is generally less than or 
equal to 16 feet. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

What are the floor-to-floor 



heights? 


3.4 
Are critical elements 
vulnerable to failure? 
The priority for upgrades should 
be based on the relative 
importance of structural or non-
structural elements that are 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


essential to mitigating the extent 
of collapse and minimizing injury 
and damage. 



Primary Structural Elements 
provide the essential parts of the 
building�s resistance to 
catastrophic blast loads and 




progressive collapse. These 



include columns, girders, roof 



beams, and the main lateral 



resistance system. 



Secondary Structural Elements 



consist of all other load bearing 



members, such as floor beams, 



slabs, etc. 



Primary Nonstructural Elements 



consist of elements (including 



their attachments) which are 



essential for life safety systems or 



elements which can cause 



substantial injury if failure 
occurs, 



including ceilings or heavy 



suspended mechanical units. 



Secondary Nonstructural 



Elements consist of all elements 



not covered in primary 



nonstructural elements, such as 



partitions, furniture, and light 



fixtures. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

3.5 
Will the structure suffer an 
The extent of damage to the 
The standard 

unacceptable level of 
damage resulting from the 
postulated threat (blast 
loading or weapon impact)? 
structure and exterior wall 
systems from the bomb threat 
may be related to a protection 
level. The following is for new 
buildings: 
construction 
techniques used to 
build the site HIC 
occupies do not 
create buildings that 


Level of Protection Below 
Antiterrorism Standards � Severe 
damage. Frame collapse/massive 
destruction. Little left standing. 
withstand explosive 
blasts. Terrorist 
threat was not a part 
of design 
consideration. 


Doors and windows fail and 
result 



in lethal hazards. Majority of 



personnel suffer fatalities. 



Very Low Level Protection � 



Heavy damage. Onset of 



structural collapse. Major 



deformation of primary and 



secondary structural members, 



but progressive collapse is 



unlikely. Collapse of non-



structural elements. Glazing will 



break and is likely to be propelled 



into the building, resulting in 



serious glazing fragment injuries, 



but fragments will be reduced. 



Doors may be propelled into 




rooms, presenting serious 



hazards. Majority of personnel 



suffer serious injuries. There are 



likely to be a limited number (10 



percent to 25 percent) of 



fatalities. 



Low Level of Protection � 



Moderate damage, unrepairable. 



Major deformation of non-



structural elements and secondary 



structural members and minor 



deformation of primary structural 



members, but progressive 



collapse is unlikely. Glazing will 



break, but fall within 1 meter of 



the wall or otherwise not present 



a significant fragment hazard. 



Doors may fail, but they will 



rebound out of their frames, 



presenting minimal hazards. 



Majority of personnel suffer 



significant injuries. There may be 



a few (<10 percent) fatalities. 



Medium Level Protection � 



Minor damage, repairable. Minor 



deformations of non-structural 



elements and secondary structural 



members and no permanent 



deformation in primary structural 



members. Glazing will break, but 



will remain in the window frame. 



Doors will stay in frames, but 
will 



not be reusable. Some minor 



injuries, but fatalities are 
unlikely. 



High Level Protection � Minimal 



damage, repairable. No 



permanent deformation of 



primary and secondary structural 



members or non-structural 



elements. Glazing will not break. 



Doors will be reusable. Only 



superficial injuries are likely. 



Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 

3.6 
Is the structure vulnerable 
to 
Design to mitigate progressive 
Unknown without a 

progressive collapse? 
collapse is an independent 
analysis to determine a system�s 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Is the building capable of 
sustaining the removal of a 
column for one floor above 
ability to resist structural collapse 
upon the loss of a major 
structural element or the system�s 
ability to resist the loss of a 
major 



grade at the building 
perimeter without 
progressive collapse? In the 
event of an internal 
explosion in an uncontrolled 
public ground floor area 
does the design prevent 
progressive collapse due to 
the loss of one primary 
column? Do architectural or 
structural features provide a 
minimum 6-inch standoff to 
the internal columns 
(primary vertical load 
carrying members)? Are the 
columns in the unscreened 
internal spaces designed for 
an unbraced length equal to 
two floors, or three floors 
where there are two levels 
of parking? 
structural element. Design to 
mitigate progressive collapse may 
be based on the methods outlined 
in ASCE 7-98 (now 7-02). 
Designers may apply static and/or 
dynamic methods of analysis to 
meet this requirement and 
ultimate load capacities may be 
assumed in the analyses. 
Combine structural upgrades for 
retrofits to existing buildings, 
such as seismic and progressive 
collapse, into a single project due 
to the economic synergies and 
other cross benefits. Existing 
facilities may be retrofitted to 
withstand the design level threat 
or to accept the loss of a column 
for one floor above grade at the 
building perimeter without 
progressive collapse. Note that 
collapse of floors or roof must 
not be permitted. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

3.7 
Are there adequate 
redundant load paths in the 
structure? 
Special consideration should be 
given to materials that have 
inherent ductility and that are 
better able to respond to load 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


reversals, such as cast in place 



reinforced concrete, reinforced 



masonry, and steel construction. 
Careful detailing is required for 



material such as pre-stressed 



concrete, pre-cast concrete, and 



masonry to adequately respond to 



the design loads. Primary vertical 
load carrying members should be 



protected where parking is inside 



a facility and the building 



superstructure is supported by the 



parking structure. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

3.8 
Are there transfer girders 
supported by columns 
within unscreened public 
spaces or at the exterior of 
Transfer girders allow 
discontinuities in columns 
between the roof and foundation. 
This design has inherent 
difficulty in transferring load to 
redundant 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


the building? 
paths upon loss of a column or 
the girder. Transfer beams and 
girders that, if lost, may cause 
progressive collapse are highly 
discouraged. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

3.9 
What is the grouting and 
reinforcement of masonry 
(brick and/or concrete 
masonry unit (CMU)) 
exterior walls? 
Avoid unreinforced masonry 
exterior walls. Reinforcement can 
run the range of light to heavy, 
depending upon the stand-off 
distance available and postulated 
design threat. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 recommends fully 
grouted and reinforced CMU 
construction where CMU is 
selected. Reference: DoD 
Minimum Antiterrorism 
Standards for Buildings states 
"Unreinforced masonry walls are 
prohibited for the exterior walls 
of new buildings. A minimum of 
0.05 percent vertical 
reinforcement with a maximum 
spacing of 1,200 mm (48 in) will 
be provided. For existing 
buildings, implement mitigating 
measures to provide an equivalent 
level of protection." [This is light 
reinforcement and based upon the 
recommended stand-off distance 
for the situation.] 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
3.10 
Will the loading dock design 
limit damage to adjacent 
areas and vent explosive 
force to the exterior of the 
building? 
Design the floor of the loading 
dock for blast resistance if the 
area below is occupied or contains 
critical utilities. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
No. 
3.11 
Are mailrooms, where 
packages are received and 
opened for inspection, and 
unscreened retail spaces 
designed to mitigate the 
effects of a blast on primary 
vertical or lateral bracing 
members? 
Where mailrooms and unscreened 
retail spaces are located in 
occupied areas or adjacent to 
critical utilities, walls, ceilings, 
and floors, they should be blast-
and fragment- resistant. Methods 
to facilitate the venting of 
explosive forces and gases from 
the interior spaces to the outside 
of the structure may include 
blow-out panels and window 
system designs that provide 
protection from blast pressure 
applied to the outside, 
There is no mail 
room at this facility. 

4 
Building Envelope 


4.1 
What is the designed or 
estimated protection level of 
the exterior walls against the 
postulated explosive threat? 
The performance of the fa�ade 
varies to a great extent on the 
materials. Different construction 
includes brick or stone with block 
backup, steel stud walls, precast 
panels, or curtain wall with glass, 
stone, or metal panel elements. 
Shear walls that are essential to 
the lateral and vertical load 
The exterior walls are 
made of CMU with a 
brick veneer on the 
outside. Steel 
framework supports 
the structure, and 
exposed columns are 
enclosed in gypsum 
wallboard. 


bearing system and that also 
function as exterior walls should 
Windows are double 


be considered primary structures 
and should resist the actual blast 
loads predicted from the threats 
specified. Where exterior walls are 
not designed for the full design 
loads, special consideration 
should be given to construction 
types that reduce the potential for 
injury. Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
glazed, 1/4 inch 
thick annealed glass. 
The construction of 
interior walls is 
unknown. The level 
of protection 
provided by the 
buildings structure 
depends upon the 
blast exposure. 
4.2 
Is there less than 40 % 
The performance of the glass will 
Windows are only 

fenestration openings per 
structural bay? 
similarly depend on the materials. 
Glazing may be single pane or 
double pane, monolithic or 
used in the office 
space area of the 
building. While 

Is the window system 
laminated, annealed, heat 
strengthened or fully tempered. 
dimensions are not 
given, it looks like 

design on the exterior fa�ade 
balanced to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying 
glazing following an 
explosive event? 
The percent fenestration is a 
balance between protection level, 
cost, the architectural look of the 
building within its surroundings, 
and building codes. One goal is 
to keep fenestration to below 40 
the glass is at least 
40 percent of the 
wall area between 
building structural 
columns. The 
window system is a 

(glazing, frames, anchorage 
to supporting walls, etc.) 
percent of the building envelope 
vertical surface area, but the 
process must balance differing 
standard commercial 
installation and thus, 
the glass, framing, 

Do the glazing systems with 
a 1/2-inch (3/4-inch better) 
requirements. A blast engineer 
may prefer no windows; an 
architect may favor window 
and anchorage is 
expected to be 
insufficient for the 

bite contain an application 
of structural silicone? 
curtain walls; building codes 
require so much fenestration per 
square footage of floor area; fire 
design basis threat at 
the available 
standoff. One benefit 

Is the glazing laminated or is 
it protected with an anti-
codes require a prescribed window 
opening area if the window is a 
designated escape 
is that there are 
windows only on 
two sides of the 

shatter (fragment retention) 
film? 
route; and the building owner has 
cost concerns. Ideally, an owner 
would want 100 
building. 

If an anti-shatter film is 
used, is it a minimum of a 
percent of the glazed area to 
provide the design protection 
level against the postulated 



7-mil thick film, or specially 
manufactured 4mil thick 
film? 
explosive threat (design basis 
threat� weapon size at the 
expected stand-off distance). 
However, economics and 
geometry may allow 80 percent to 
90 percent due to the statistical 
differences in the manufacturing 
process for glass or the angle of 
incidence of the blast wave upon 
upper story windows (4th floor 
and higher). Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

4.3 
Do the walls, anchorage, and 
window framing fully 
develop the capacity of the 
glazing material selected? 
Are the walls capable of 
withstanding the dynamic 
reactions from the 
windows? Will the 
anchorage remain attached 
to the walls of the building 
during an explosive event 
without failure? Is the 
fa�ade connected to back-up 
block or to the structural 
frame? 
Government produced and 
sponsored computer programs 
coupled with test data and 
recognized dynamic structural 
analysis techniques may be used 
to determine whether the glazing 
either survives the specified 
threats or the post damage 
performance of the glazing 
protects the occupants. A 
breakage probability no higher 
than 750 breaks per 1,000 may be 
used when calculating loads to 
frames and anchorage. The intent 
is to ensure the building envelope 
provides relatively equal 
protection against the postulated 
explosive threat for the walls and 
window systems for the safety of 
the occupants, especially in 
rooms with exterior walls. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Are non-bearing masonry 
walls reinforced? 


4.4 
Does the building contain 
ballistic glazing? Does the 
ballistic glazing meet the 
requirements of UL 752 
Bullet-Resistant Glazing? 
Does the building contain 
security-glazing? 
Glass-clad polycarbonate or 
laminated polycarbonate are two 
types of acceptable glazing 
material. If windows are upgraded 
to bullet-resistant, burglar-
resistant, or forced entry-resistant, 
ensure that doors, ceilings, and 
floors, as applicable, can resist 
the same for the areas of concern. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Does the security-glazing 




meet the requirements of 



ASTM F1233 or UL 972, 



Burglary Resistant Glazing 



Material? 



Do the window assemblies 



containing forced entry 



resistant glazing (excluding 



the glazing) meet the 



requirements of ASTM F 



588? 


4.5 
Do non-window openings, 
such as mechanical vents 
and exposed plenums, 
provide the same level of 
protection required for the 
exterior wall? 
In-filling of blast over-pressures 
must be considered through non-
window openings such that 
structural members and all 
mechanical system mountings 
and attachments should resist 
these interior fill pressures. These 
non-window openings should 
also be as secure as the 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


rest of the building envelope 
against forced entry. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 


6 
Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR) 

6.1 
Where are the air intakes 
Air intakes should be located on 
The air used to heat 

and exhaust louvers for the 
building? (low, high, or 
midpoint of the building 
structure) Are the intakes 
and exhausts accessible to 
the public? 
the roof or as high as possible. 
Otherwise secure within CPTED-
compliant fencing or enclosure. 
The fencing or enclosure should 
have a sloped roof to prevent the 
throwing of anything into the 
enclosure near the intakes. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states 
that air intakes should be on the 
fourth floor or higher and, on 
buildings with three floors or 
less, they should be on the roof 
or as high as practical. Locating 
intakes high on a wall is preferred 
over a roof location. 
or cool the HIC 
Headquarters 
building is filtered in 
the HVAC room 
using standard 
industrial grade 
filters. Outside air is 
brought in through a 
vent in the wall. The 
vent is alarmed to 
prevent intruder 
access. A screened 
exhaust 


Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 
duct is on the roof. 


states that, for all new inhabited 
buildings covered by this 
document, all air intakes should 
be located at least 3 meters (10 
feet) above the ground. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
states: "An extension 
Airflow throughout 
the building is 
through a series of 
ducts hidden in the 
ceiling of each area. 
The ducts are divided 


height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will 
in half to allow them 



place the intake out of reach of 
individuals without some 
assistance. Also, the entrance to 
the intake should be covered with 
a sloped metal mesh to reduce 
the threat of objects being tossed 
into the intake. A minimum 
slope of 45� is generally 
adequate. Extension height 
should be increased where 
existing platforms or building 
features (i.e., loading docks, 
retaining walls) might provide 
access to the outdoor air intakes". 
Reference: LBNL PUB-51959: 
Exhausts are also a concer n 
during an outdoor release, 
especially if exhaust fans are not 
in continuous operation, due to 
wind effects and chimney effects 
(air movement due to differential 
temperature). 
to serve as supply 
and return headers. 
The divider is 
insulated to 
minimize heat 
transfer from one 
side to the other. 
6.2 
Is roof access limited to 
authorized personnel by 
means of locking 
mechanisms? Is access to 
mechanical areas similarly 
controlled? 
Roofs are like entrances to the 
building and are like mechanical 
rooms when HVAC is installed. 
Adjacent structures or 
landscaping should not allow 
access to the roof. References: 
GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH 
Pub 2002-139, and LBNL Pub 
51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.3 
Are there multiple air intake 
locations? 
Single air intakes may feed 
several air handling units. 
Indicate if the air intakes are 
localized or separated. Installing 
low-leakage dampers is one way 
to provide the system separation 
when necessary. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
No. 
6.4 
What are the types of air 
filtration? Include the 
efficiency and number of 
filter modules for each of 
the main air handling 
systems. Is there any 
collective 
MERV � Minimum Efficiency 
Reporting Value HEPA � High 
Efficiency Particulate Air 
Activated charcoal for gases 
Ultraviolet C for biologicals 
Consider mix of approaches for 
optimum protection and cost-
effectiveness. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 
Standard industrial 
grade filters are used. 


protection for chemical, 
biological, and radiological 
contamination designed into 
the building? 
2002-139 

6.5 
Is there space for larger 
filter assemblies on critical 
air handling systems? 
Air handling units serving critical 
functions during continued 
operation may be retrofitted to 
provide enhanced protection 
during emergencies. However, 
upgraded filtration may have 
negative effects upon the overall 
air handling system operation, 
such as increased pressure drop. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.6 
Are there provisions for air 
monitors or sensors for 
chemical or biological 
agents? 
Duct mounted sensors are usually 
found in limited cases in 
laboratory areas. Sensors 
generally have a limited spectrum 
of high reliability and are costly. 
Many different technologies are 
undergoing research to provide 
capability. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.7 
By what method are air 
intakes and exhausts closed 
when not operational? 
Motorized (low-leakage, fast-
acting) dampers are the preferred 
method for closure with fail-safe 
to the closed position so as to 
support in-place sheltering. 
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.8 
How are air handling 
systems zoned? What areas 
and functions do each of the 
primary air handling 
systems serve? 
Understanding the critical areas of 
the building that must continue 
functioning focuses security and 
hazard mitigation measures. 
Applying HVAC zones that 
isolate lobbies, mailrooms, 
loading docks, and other entry 
and storage areas from the rest of 
the building HVAC zones and 
maintaining negative pressure 
within these areas will contain 
CBR releases. Identify common 
return systems that service more 
than one zone, effectively making 
a large single zone. Conversely, 
emergency egress routes should 
receive positive pressurization to 
ensure 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



contamination does not hinder 
egress. Consider filtering of the 
pressurization air. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 

6.9 
Are there large central air 
handling units or are there 
multiple units serving 
separate zones? 
Independent units can continue to 
operate if damage occurs to 
limited areas of the building. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The HVAC ducts are 
divided in half to 
allow them to serve 
as supply and return 
headers. The divider 
is insulated to 
minimize heat 
transfer from one side 
to the other. 
6.10 
Are there any redundancies 
in the air handling system? 
Can critical areas be served 
from other units if a major 
system is disabled? 
Redundancy reduces the security 
measures required compared to a 
non-redundant situation. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.11 
Is the air supply to critical 
areas compartmentalized? 
Similarly, are the critical 
areas or the building as a 
whole, considered tight with 
little or no inleakage? 
During chemical, biological, and 
radiological situations, the intent 
is to either keep the 
contamination localized in the 
critical area or prevent its entry 
into other critical, non-critical, or 
public areas. Systems can be 
cross-connected through building 
openings (doorways, ceilings, 
partial wall), ductwork leakage, or 
pressure differences in air 
handling system. In standard 
practice, there is almost always 
some air carried between 
ventilation zones by pressure 
imbalances, due to elevator piston 
action, chimney effect, and wind 
effects. Smoke testing of the air 
supply to critical areas may be 
necessary. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.12 
Are supply, return, and 
exhaust air systems for 
critical areas secure? Are all 
supply and return ducts 
completely connected 
The air systems to critical areas 
should be inaccessible to the 
public, especially if the ductwork 
runs through the public areas of 
the building. It is also more 
secure to have a ducted air 
handling system versus sharing 
hallways and plenums above drop 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


to their grilles and registers 
and secure? Is the return air 
not ducted? 
ceilings for return air. Non-ducted 
systems provide greater 
opportunity for introducing 
contaminants. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 

6.13 
What is the method of 
temperature and humidity 
control? Is it localized or 
centralized? 
Central systems can range from 
monitoring only to full control. 
Local control may be available to 
override central operation. Of 
greatest concern are systems 
needed before, during, and after 
an incident that may be 
unavailable due to temperature 
and humidity exceeding 
operational limits (e.g., main 
telephone switch room). 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
The main heater 
sends hot air into the 
Heating, Ventilation 
and Air Conditioning 
(HVAC) Room, next 
to the M&E Room. 
From here it is 
distributed 
throughout the 
building. Offices, 
restrooms and the 
employee�s lounge 
are directly heated by 
this warm air. The 



Computer Center and 
the Communications 



Center use Digital 
Environmental 



Managers (DEM) to 
direct the warm air 



where it is needed, 



add or remove 



humidity from the air 
or even cool some 



areas while warming 
others. 



Cooling (or heat 
removal) is done by 
two chillers in the 



M&E room. Three 



Trane 100-ton 



chillers are available; 



normally only two 
are needed to cover 



all heat loads. The 



chillers remove heat 



from the Chilled 



Water System, and 
use the Condenser 



Water System to 
send the waste heat 



to two rooftop 
Cooling Towers. The 
Chilled Water is then 



routed from the 



chillers to air 




handlers for the 



majority of the 



building; cooling for 



the Computer Center 



and the 



Communications 



Center is done by 



directing Chilled 



Water to the DEMs. 



Chiller operation 



along with Chilled 



Water and Condenser 



Water flow are 



managed from a 



single control unit in 



the M&E room. A 



single Chilled Water 



pump provides 



adequate flow for all 



cooling situations; a 



backup pump is 



available at the push 



of a button. The 
same 



is true for the 



Condenser Water 



pumps. 
6.14 
Where are the building 
automation control centers 
and cabinets located? Are 
they in secure areas? How 
is the control wiring routed? 
Access to any component of the 
building automation and control 
system could compromise the 
functioning of the system, 
increasing vulnerability to a 
hazard or precluding their proper 
operation during a hazard 
incident. The HVAC and exhaust 
system controls should be in a 
secure 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


area that allows rapid shutdown 
or other activation based upon 
location and type of attack. 
References: FEMA 386-7, DOC 



CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 and LBNL Pub 



51959 

6.15 
Does the control of air 
handling systems support 
plans for sheltering in place 
or other protective 
approach? 
The micro-meteorological effects 
of buildings and terrain can alter 
travel and duration of chemical 
agents and hazardous material 
releases. Shielding in the form of 
sheltering in place can protect 
people and property from harmful 
effects. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


To support in-place sheltering, 
the air handling systems require 




the ability for authorized 
personnel to rapidly turn off all 
systems. However, if the system 
is properly filtered, then keeping 
the system operating will provide 
protection as long as the air 
handling system does not 
distribute an internal release to 
other portions of the building. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 

6.16 
Are there any smoke 
evacuation systems 
installed? Does it have 
purge capability? 
For an internal blast, a smoke 
removal system may be essential, 
particularly in large, open spaces. 
The equipment should be located 
away from high-risk areas, the 
system controls and wiring 
should be protected, and it should 
be connected to emergency power. 
This exhaust capability can be 
built into areas with significant 
risk on internal events, such as 
lobbies, loading docks, and 
mailrooms. Consider filtering of 
the exhaust to capture CBR 
contaminants. References: GSA 
PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139, and LBNL Pub 51959 
Yes. 
6.17 
Where is roof-mounted 
equipment located on the 
roof? (near perimeter, at 
center of roof) 
Roof-mounted equipment should 
be kept away from the building 
perimeter. Reference: U.S. Army 
TM 5-853 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.18 
Are fire dampers installed at 
all fire barriers? Are all 
dampers functional and seal 
well when closed? 
All dampers (fire, smoke, outdoor 
air, return air, bypass) must be 
functional for proper protection 
within the building during an 
incident. Reference: CDC/NIOSH 
Pub 2002-139 
Yes. 
6.19 
Do fire walls and fire doors 
maintain their integrity? 
The tightness of the building 
(both exterior, by weatherization 
to seal cracks around doors and 
windows, and internal, by zone 
ducting, fire walls, fire stops, and 
fire doors) provides energy 
conservation benefits and 
functional benefits during a CBR 
incident. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



Reference: LBNL Pub 51959 

6.20 
Do elevators have recall 
capability and elevator 
emergency message 
capability? 
Although a life-safety code and 
fire response requirement, the 
control of elevators also has 
benefit during a CBR incident. 
The elevators generate a piston 
effect, causing pressure 
differentials in the elevator shaft 
and associated floors that can 
force contamination to flow up or 
down. Reference: LBNL Pub 
51959 
No elevators in HIC. 
6.21 
Is access to building 
information restricted? 
Information on building 
operations, schematics, 
procedures, plans, and 
specifications should be strictly 
controlled and available only to 
authorized personnel. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
No. 
6.22 
Does the HVAC 
maintenance staff have the 
proper training, procedures, 
and preventive maintenance 
schedule to ensure CBR 
equipment is functional? 
Functional equipment must 
interface with operational 
procedures in an emergency plan 
to ensure the equipment is 
properly operated to provide the 
protection desired. The HVAC 
system can be operated in 
different ways, depending upon 
an external or internal release and 
where in the building an internal 
release occurs. Thus maintenance 
and security staff must have the 
training to properly operate the 
HVAC system under different 
circumstances, even if the 
procedure is to turn off all air 
movement equipment. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

7 
Plumbing and Gas 
Systems 


7.1 
What is the method of 
water distribution? 
Central shaft locations for piping 
are more vulnerable than multiple 
riser locations. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.2 
What is the method of gas 
distribution? (heating, 
cooking, medical, process) 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.3 
Is there redundancy to the 
main piping distribution? 
Looping of piping and use of 
section valves provide 
redundancies in the event sections 
of the system are damaged. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.4 
What is the method of 
heating domestic water? 
What fuel(s) is used? 
Single source of hot water with 
one fuel source is more vulnerable 
than multiple sources and 
multiple fuel types. Domestic hot 
water availability is an operational 
concern for many building 
occupancies. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.5 
Where are gas storage tanks 
located? (heating, cooking, 
medical, process) How are 
they piped to the 
distribution system? (above 
or below ground) 
The concern is that the tanks and 
piping could be vulnerable to a 
moving vehicle or a bomb blast 
either directly or by collateral 
damage due to proximity to a 
higher-risk area. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.6 
Are there reserve supplies 
of critical gases? 
Localized gas cylinders could be 
available in the event of damage 
to the central tank system. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

8 
Electrical Systems 


8.1 
Are there any transformers 
or switchgears located 
outside the building or 
accessible from the building 
exterior? Are they 
vulnerable to public access? 
Are they secured? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Transformers 
providing electricity 
to this site are 
located outside the 
building. The two 
12.47KV feeders lead 
to two separate 
transformers outside 
the building, one 
near the north side, 
and the other near the 
south side. 
8.2 
What is the extent of the 
external building lighting in 
utility and service areas and 
at normal entryways used 
by the building occupants? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.3 
How are the electrical rooms 
secured and where are they 
located relative to other 
higher risk areas, starting 
with the main electrical 
distribution room at the 
service entrance? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.4 
Are critical electrical 
systems co-located with 
other building systems? Are 
critical electrical systems 
located in areas outside of 
secured electrical areas? Is 
security system wiring 
located separately from 
electrical and other service 
systems? 
Collocation concerns include 
rooms, ceilings, raceways, 
conduits, panels, and risers. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Yes. 
8.5 
How are electrical 
distribution panels serving 
branch circuits secured or 
are they in secure locations? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.6 
Does emergency backup 
power exist for all areas 
within the building or for 
There should be no single critical 
node that allows both the normal 
electrical service and the 
Yes. Critical 
computer 


critical areas only? How is 
the emergency power 
distributed? Is the 
emergency power system 
independent from the 
normal electrical service, 
particularly in critical areas? 
emergency backup power to be 
affected by a single incident. 
Automatic transfer switches and 
interconnecting switchgear are the 
initial concerns. Emergency and 
normal electrical equipment 
should be installed separately, at 
different locations, and as far 
apart as possible. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
systems are backed 
up by an UPS which 
is maintained 
separately from the 
sites generator back-
up power. 
8.7 
How is the primary 
electrical system wiring 
distributed? Is it co-located 
with other 
Central utility shafts may be 
subject to damage, especially if 
there is only one for the building. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

major utilities? 



Is there redundancy of 
distribution to critical areas? 



9 
Fire Alarm Systems 


9.1 
Is the building fire alarm 
system centralized or 
localized? How are alarms 
annunciated, both locally 
and centrally? Are critical 
documents and control 
systems located in a secure 
yet accessible location? 
Fire alarm systems must first 
warn building occupants to 
evacuate for life safety. Then they 
must inform the responding 
agency to dispatch fire equipment 
and personnel. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Centralized. 
9.2 
Where are the fire alarm 
panels located? Do they 
allow access to 
unauthorized personnel? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Building next to 
HIC. 
9.3 
Is the fire alarm system 
stand-alone or integrated 
with other functions such as 
security and environmental 
or building management 
systems? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Standalone. 


What is the interface? 


9.4 
Do key fire alarm system 
components have fire- and 
blast-resistant separation? 
This is especially necessary for 
the fire command center or fire 
alarm control center. The concern 
is to similarly protect critical 
components as described in Items 
2.19, 5.7, and 10.3. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
9.5 
Is there redundant off-
premises fire alarm 
reporting? 
Fire alarms can ring at a fire 
station, at an intermediary alarm 
monitoring center, or autodial 
someone else. See Items 5.21 and 
10.5. 
Yes. 

10 
Communications and IT Systems 

10.1 
Where is the main telephone 
distribution room and where 
is it in relation to higher risk 
areas? Is the main telephone 
distribution room secure? 
One can expect to find voice, 
data, signal, and alarm systems to 
be routed through the main 
telephone distribution room. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Communications. 
10.2 
Does the telephone system 
have an UPS 
(uninterruptible power 
supply)? What is its type, 
power rating, operational 
duration under load, and 
location? (battery, on-line, 
filtered) 
Many telephone systems are now 
computerized and need a UPS to 
ensure reliability during power 
fluctuations. The UPS is also 
needed to await any emergency 
power coming on line or allow 
orderly shutdown. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.3 
Where are communication 
systems wiring closets 
located? (voice, data, signal, 
alarm) Are they co-located 
with other utilities? Are 
they in secure areas? 
Concern is to have separation 
distance from other utilities and 
higher-risk areas to avoid 
collateral damage. Security 
approaches on the closets include 
door alarms, closed circuit 
television, swipe cards, or other 
logging notifications to ensure 
only authorized personnel have 
access to these closets. Reference: 
FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.4 
How is communications 
system wiring distributed? 
(secure chases and risers, 
accessible public areas) 
The intent is to prevent tampering 
with the systems. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

10.5 
Are there redundant 
communications systems 
available? 
Critical areas should be supplied 
with multiple or redundant means 
of communications. Power outage 
phones can provide redundancy as 
they connect directly to the local 
commercial telephone switch off 
site and not through the building 
telephone switch in the main 
telephone distribution room. A 
base radio communication system 
with antenna can be installed in 
stairwells, and portable sets 
distributed to floors. References: 
GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7 
No. 
10.6 
Where are the main 
distribution facility, data 
centers, routers, firewalls, 
and servers located and are 
they secure? Where are the 
secondary and/or 
intermediate distribution 
facilities and are they 
secure? 
Concern is collateral damage from 
manmade hazards and redundancy 
of critical functions. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
Interior and secure. 
10.7 
What type and where are 
the WAN (wide area 
network) connections? 
Critical facilities should have two 
Minimum-Points-of-Presence 
(MPOPs) where the telephone 
company�s outside cable 
terminates inside the building. It 
is functionally a service entrance 
connection that demarcates where 
the telephone company�s property 
stops and the building owner�s 
property begins. The MPOPs 
should not be collocated and they 
should connect to different 
telephone company central offices 
so that the loss of one cable or 
central office does not reduce 
capability. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.8 
What type, power rating, 
and location of the UPS 
(uninterruptible power 
supply)? (battery, on-line, 
filtered) 
Consider that UPS should be 
found at all computerized points 
from the main distribution 
facility to individual data closets 
and at critical personal 
computers/terminals. 
Lead acid battery. 


Are the UPS also connected 
to emergency power? 
Critical LAN sections should also 
be on backup power. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 

10.9 
What type of LAN (local 
area network) cabling and 
physical topology is used? 
(Category(Cat) 5, Gigabit 
Ethernet, Ethernet, Token 
Ring) 
The physical topology of a 
network is the way in which the 
cables and computers are 
connected to each other. The main 
types of physical topologies are: 
Bus (single radial where any 
damage on the bus affects the 
whole system, but especially all 
portions downstream) Star 
(several computes are connected 
to a hub and many hubs can be in 
the network � the hubs can be 
critical nodes, but the other hubs 
continue to function if one fails) 
Ring (a bus with a continuous 
connection - least used, but can 
tolerate some damage because if 
the ring fails at a single point it 
can be rerouted much like a 
looped electric or water system) 
The configuration and the 
availability of surplus cable or 
spare capacity on individual 
cables can reduce vulnerability to 
hazard incidents. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.10 
For installed radio/wireless 
systems, what are their 
types and where are they 
located? (RF (radio 
frequency), HF (high 
frequency), VHF (very high 
frequency), MW (medium 
wave) 
Depending upon the function of 
the wireless system, it could be 
susceptible to accidental or 
intended jamming or collateral 
damage. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.11 
Do the IT (Information 
Technology � computer) 
systems meet requirements 
of confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability? 
Ensure access to terminals and 
equipment for authorized 
personnel only and ensure system 
up-time to meet operational 
needs. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Yes. 





10.12 
Where is the disaster 
recovery/mirroring site? 
A site with suitable equipment 
that allows continuation of 
operations or that mirrors 
(operates in parallel to) the 
existing operation is beneficial if 
equipment is lost during a natural 
or manmade disaster. The need is 
based upon the criticality of the 
operation and how quickly 
replacement equipment can be put 
in place and operated. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
In local geographic 
area. 
10.13 
Where is the back-up 
tape/file storage site and 
what is the type of safe 
environment? (safe, vault, 
underground) Is there 
redundant refrigeration in 
the site? 
If equipment is lost, data are 
most likely lost, too. Backups are 
needed to continue operations at 
the disaster recovery site or when 
equipment can be delivered and 
installed. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.14 
Are there any SATCOM 
(satellite communications) 
links? (location, power, 
UPS, emergency power, 
spare capacity/capability) 
SATCOM links can serve as 
redundant communications for 
voice and data if configured to 
support required capability after a 
hazard incident. Reference: DOC 
CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.15 
Is there a mass notification 
system that reaches all 
building occupants? (public 
address, pager, cell phone, 
computer override, etc.) 
Will one or more of these 
systems be operational 
under hazard conditions? 
(UPS, emergency power) 
Depending upon building size, a 
mass notification system will 
provide warning and alert 
information, along with actions 
to take before and after an 
incident if there is redundancy 
and power. Reference: DoD UFC 
4-010-01 
No. 
10.16 
Do control centers and their 
designated alternate 
locations have equivalent or 
reduced capability for voice, 
data, mass 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Yes, large conference 
room. 


notification, etc.? 
(emergency operations, 
security, fire alarms, 
building automation) Do the 
alternate locations also have 
access to backup systems, 
including emergency power? 



11 
Equipment Operations and Maintenance 

11.1 
Are there composite 
drawings indicating location 
and capacities of major 
systems and are they 
current? (electrical, 
mechanical, and fire 
protection; and date of last 
update) Do updated O&M 
(operation and maintenance) 
manuals exist? 
Within critical infrastructure 
protection at the building level, 
the current configuration and 
capacity of all critical systems 
must be understood to ensure 
they meet emergency needs. 
Manuals must also be current to 
ensure operations and 
maintenance keeps these systems 
properly functioning. The system 
must function during an 
emergency unless directly affected 
by the hazard incident. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.2 
Have critical air systems 
been rebalanced? If so, when 
and how often? 
Although the system may 
function, it must be tested 
periodically to ensure it is 
performing as designed. 
Balancing is also critical after 
initial construction to set 
equipment to proper performance 
per the design. Rebalancing may 
only occur during renovation. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.3 
Is air pressurization 
monitored regularly? 
Some areas require positive or 
negative pressure to function 
properly. Pressurization is critical 
in a hazardous environment or 
emergency situation. Measuring 
pressure drop across filters is an 
indication when filters should be 
changed, but also may indicate 
that low pressures are developing 
downstream and could result in 
loss of expected 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



protection. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 

11.4 
Does the building have a 
policy or procedure for 
periodic recommissioning of 
major M/E/P 
(Mechanical/Electrical/ 
Plumbing) systems? 
Recommissioning involves 
testing and balancing of systems 
to ascertain their capability to 
perform as described. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.5 
Is there an adequate 
operations and maintenance 
program including training 
of facilities management 
staff? 
If O&M of critical systems is 
done with in-house personnel, 
management must know what 
needs to be done and the 
workforce must have the 
necessary training to ensure 
systems reliability. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.6 
What maintenance and 
service agreements exist for 
M/E/P systems? 
When an in-house facility 
maintenance work force does not 
exist or does not have the 
capability to perform the work, 
maintenance and service contracts 
are the alternative to ensure 
critical systems will work under 
all conditions. The facility 
management staff requires the 
same knowledge to oversee these 
contracts as if the work was being 
done by in-house personnel. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.7 
Are backup power systems 
periodically tested under 
load? 
Loading should be at or above 
maximum connected load to 
ensure available capacity and 
automatic sensors should be 
tested at least once per year. 
Periodically (once a year as a 
minimum) check the duration of 
capacity of backup systems by 
running them for the expected 
emergency duration or estimating 
operational duration through fuel 
consumption, water consumption, 
or voltage loss. Reference: FEMA 
386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


11.8 
Is stairway and exit sign 
lighting operational? 
The maintenance program for 
stairway and exit sign lighting 
(all egress lighting) should ensure 
functioning under normal and 
emergency power conditions. 
Expect building codes to be 
updated as emergency egress 
lighting is moved from upper 
walls and over doorways to floor 
level as heat and smoke drive 
Yes. 


occupants to crawl along the floor 
to get out of the building. Signs 
and lights mounted high have 
limited or no benefit when 



obscured. 



Reference: FEMA 386-7 


13 
Security Master Plan 


13.1 
Does a written security plan 
exist for this site or 
building? When was the 
initial security plan written 
and last revised? Who is 
responsible for preparing 
and reviewing the security 
plan? 
The development and 
implementation of a security 
master plan provides a roadmap 
that outlines the strategic 
direction and vision, operational, 
managerial, and technological 
mission, goals, and objectives of 
the organization�s security 
program. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
HIC does have a fire 
evacuation plan. HIC 
does not have a mass 
evacuation plan and 
rally point. 
13.2 
Has the security plan been 
communicated and 
disseminated to key 
management personnel and 
departments? 
The security plan should be part 
of the building design so that the 
construction or renovation of the 
structure integrates with the 
security procedures to be used 
during daily operations. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.3 
Has the security plan been 
benchmarked or compared 
against related organizations 
and operational entities? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.4 
Has the security plan ever 
been tested and evaluated 
from a cost-benefit and 
operational efficiency and 
effectiveness perspective? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

13.5 
Does it define mission, 
vision, short-long term 
security program goals and 
objectives? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.6 
Are threats, vulnerabilities, 
risks adequately defined and 
security countermeasures 
addressed and prioritized 
relevant to their criticality 
and probability of 
occurrence? 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.7 
Has a security 
implementation schedule 
been established to address 
recommended security 
solutions? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.8 
Have security operating and 
capital budgets been 
addressed, approved and 
established to support the 
plan? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.9 
What regulatory or industry 
guidelines/standards were 
followed in the preparation 
of the security plan? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.10 
Does the security plan 
address existing security 
conditions from an 
administrative, operational, 
managerial and technical 
security systems 
perspective? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.11 
Does the security plan 
address the protection of 
people, property, assets, 
and information? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.12 
Does the security plan 
address the following major 
components: access control, 
surveillance, response, 
building hardening and 
protection against biological, 
chemical, radiological and 
cybernetwork attacks? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

13.13 
Has the level of risk been 
identified and communicated 
in the 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

security plan through the 
performance of a physical 
security assessment? 


13.14 
When was the last security 
assessment performed? 
Who performed the security 
risk assessment? 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.15 
Were the following areas of 
security analysis addressed 
in the security master plan:  
Asset Analysis: Does the 
security plan identify and 
prioritize the assets to be 
protected in accordance to 
their location, control, 
This process is the input to the 
building design and what 
mitigation measures will be 
included in the facility project to 
reduce risk and increase safety of 
the building and people. 
Reference: USA TM 5-853, 
Security Engineering 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

current value, and 



replacement value? 



Threat Analysis: Does the 
security plan address 
potential threats; causes of 
potential harm in the form 
of death, injury, destruction, 
disclosure, interruption of 
operations, or denial of 
services? 



(possible criminal acts 
(documented and review of 
police/security incident 
reports) associated with 
forced entry, bombs, 
ballistic assault, 



biochemical and related 



terrorist tactics, attacks 



against utility systems 
infrastructure and buildings) 



Vulnerability Analysis: 
Does the security plan 
address other areas and 




anything else associated 
with a site or building and 
it's operations that can be 
taken advantage of to carry 
out a threat? (architectural 
design and construction of 
new and existing buildings, 
technological support 
systems (e.g. heating, air 
conditioning, power, lighting 
and security systems, etc.) 
and operational procedures, 
policies and controls) Risk 
Analysis: Does the security 
plan address the findings 
from the asset, threat, and 
vulnerability analyses to 
develop, recommend and 
consider implementation of 
appropriate security 
countermeasures? 



Building Design Mitigation Measures 
Asset-Threat/Hazard 
Pair 
Current Risk 
Rating 
Suggested Mitigation 
Measure 
Revised Risk 
Rating 
1. Explosive 
Blast/Structural 
High 
FRF film on window 
Medium 
2. Explosive 
Blast/Structural 
High 
Enclose open entrance 
area 
Medium 
3. Chemical/Mechanical 
High 
Extend Air Intake 
Medium 
4. Biological/Mechanical 
High 
Extend Air Intake 
Medium 
5. Radiological/Site 
Medium 
Mass Evacuation Plan 
and Rally Point 
Low 

Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
U
ni
t 
X 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 45 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Electronic Security Systems 
OBJECTIVES 
1. 1.	Use the assessment process to identify electronic security system 
requirements that are needed to mitigate vulnerabilities 
2. 2.	Describe the electronic security system concepts and practices that 
warrant special attention to enhance public safety 
3. 3.	Explain the basic concepts of electronic security system components, their 
capabilities, and their interaction with other systems 
4. 4.	Justify selection of electronic security systems to mitigate vulnerabilities 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Control centers and building management systems 
2. 2. Perimeter layout and zoning of sensors 
3. 3.	Intrusion detection systems and sensor technologies 
4. 4.	Entry-control systems and electronic entry control technologies 
5. 5.	Closed circuit television and data-transmission media 
6. 6.	Definitions of the degree of security and control 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 3-47 to 3-50; Appendix D; 
and Security Systems and Security Master Plan sections of 
Checklist at end of Chapter (pages 1-81 � 1-92) 
1. 2.	Unit X visuals 
2. 3.	Case Study 

REQUIREMENTS 1. Overhead projector or computer display unit 
1. 2.	Unit X visuals 
2. 3. Instructor Guide 
3. 4. Student Manual 

Unit X 
UNIT X OUTLINE	Time Page 

X.  Electronic Security Systems	45 minutes IG  X-
1


1.	 Introduction and Unit Overview 5 minutes IG  X-3

2.	 Perimeter Layout and Zoning Sensors 5 minutes IG  X-5

3.	 Intrusion Detection Systems and Technology 10 minutes IG  X-6

4.	 Entry Control Systems and Technology 5 minutes IG  X-13

5.	 CCTV Systems and Data Transmission Media 5 minutes IG  X-18

6.	 Terminology for the Degree of Security 5 minutes IG  X-18

7.	 Activity: Electronic Security Systems 10 minutes IG  X-20

PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
�	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to identify 
topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic content, 
and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
The Instructor will walk the students through the various components and technology 
currently available for use in security systems, including biometrics for access control, 
closed circuit television, and terminology to describe levels of security. These are the 
mitigation measures available to reduce risks due to vulnerabilities in physical security 
systems. 
�	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this Unit. 
�	Activity: There is no student activity associated with this Unit. However, any 
mitigation measures identified as a priority to reduce high risks will be covered in Unit 
XI as part of the group presentation. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-1 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit X Electronic Security Systems (ESS). This unit will describe the types of 
sensors, concepts of operation of electronic security systems, and terminology used in 
the industry. 
VISUAL X-2 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Use the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist to identify electronic 
security system requirements that are needed to mitigate vulnerabilities. 
2. 2.	Describe the electronic security system concepts and practices that 
warrant special attention to enhance public safety. 
3. 3.	Explain the basis concepts of electronic security system components, their 
capabilities, and their interaction with other systems. 
4. 4.	Justify selection of electronic security systems to mitigate vulnerabilities. 

Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-3 
Electronic Security Systems 
Concepts 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, Section 12, can be used for the 
assessment of security systems. Security systems historically have been designed, 
installed, serviced, and monitored by physical security companies, typically after the 
completion of the building. New Internet and wireless technologies have significantly 
changed the way in which security systems are designed and now incorporation of 
security system design and processes should begin at the earliest stages of design or 
renovation. An electronic security system is the physical implementation of the elements 
of the Layers of Defense: 
. � Deter 
. � Detect 
. � Deny 
 � Devalue 
 In this unit, the student should have an appreciation for: 
. � Basic concepts of ESS 
. � Use of ESS 
. � General ESS Description 
. � ESS Design Considerations 

Fundamental objective: 
Provide appropriate, effective, 
and economical protective design 
for assets. 
Approach: 
Coordinated effort between security 
and law enforcement and engineering 
communities. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-4 
Perimeter Zone 
The protection of a facility is designed with layers of defense, detection, and response. 
Before we discuss security systems, we need to review several basic concepts: 
�	A protected area�s perimeter is usually defined by an enclosing wall or fence or a 
natural barrier such as water. For exterior sensors to be effective, the perimeter around 
which they are to be deployed must be precisely defined. 
Perimeter Zone and Layers of 
Defense 
. �	First layer of defense is from the perimeter outward. 
. �	Second layer of defense is between the building and the perimeter. 
. �	Third layer of defense is inside the building. 

VISUAL X-5 
Perimeter Layout and Zoning 
Sensors 
. � After the perimeter has been defined, the next step is to divide it into specific 
detection zones. The length of each detection zone is determined by evaluating the 
contour, the existing terrain, and the operational activities along the perimeter. 
. �	The exterior and interior Intrusion and Detection Systems should be 
configured as layers of unbroken rings concentrically surrounding the asset. These rings 
should correspond to defensive layers that constitute the delay system. The first 
detection layer is located at the outermost defensive layer necessary to provide the 
required delay. Detection layers can be on a defensive layer, in the area between two 
defensive layers, or on the asset itself, 

Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
depending on the delay required. 
�	If an alarm occurs in a specific 
zone, the operator can readily 
determine its approximate location 
by referring to a map of the 
perimeter.
 VISUAL X-6 
Intrusion Detection Systems 
There are a number of different sensor technologies: 
. �	Boundary Penetration Sensors 
. �	Volumetric Motion Sensors 
. �	Exterior Intrusion Detection Sensors 
. �	Fence Sensors 
. �	Buried Line Sensors 
. �	Microwave Sensors 
. �	Infrared Sensors 
. �	Video Motion Sensors 

VISUAL X-7 
Boundary Penetration Sensors 
. �	Structural Vibration Sensors 
. �	Glass Breaking Sensors 
. �	Balanced Magnetic Switches 
. �	Passive Ultrasonic Sensors 
. �	Grid Wire Sensors 

Structural vibration sensors detect low-frequency energy generated in an attempted 
penetration of a physical barrier (such as a wall or a ceiling) by hammering, drilling, 
cutting, detonating explosives, or employing other forcible methods of entry. 
Glass breaking sensors detect the 
breaking of glass. The noise from 
breaking glass consists of frequencies 
in both the audible and ultrasonic 
range. 
Balanced magnetic switches (BMSs) 
are typically used to detect the opening 
of a door. These sensors can also be 
used on windows, 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
hatches, gates, or other structural 
devices that can be opened to gain 
entry. 
Passive ultrasonic sensors detect 
acoustical energy in the ultrasonic 
frequency range, typically between 20 
and 30 kilohertz (kHz). They are used 
to detect an attempted penetration 
through rigid barriers (such as metal or 
masonry walls, ceilings, and floors). and 
windows and vents covered by metal 
grilles, shutters, or bars if these 
openings are properly sealed against 
outside sounds. 
Grid wire sensors consist of a 
continuous electrical wire arranged in a 
grid pattern. The wire maintains an 
electrical current. An alarm is generated 
when the wire is broken. The sensor 
detects forced entry through walls, 
floors, ceilings, doors, windows, and 
other barriers. 
VISUAL X-8 
Volumetric Motion Sensors 
Designed to detect intruder motion within the interior of the protected volume 
. � Microwave Motion Sensors 
. � Passive Infrared (PIR) Motion Sensors 
. � Dual Technology Sensors 
. � Video Motion Sensors 
. � Point Sensors 
. � Capacitance Sensors 
. � Pressure Mats 
. � Pressure Switches 

Microwave motion sensors use 
high-frequency electromagnetic 
energy to detect an intruder�s motion 
within the protected area. Interior or 
sophisticated microwave motion 
sensors are normally used. 
Interior microwave motion sensors 
are typically monostatic; the 
transmitter and the receiver are housed 
in the same enclosure 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
(transceiver). 
Sophisticated microwave motion 
sensors 
may be equipped with electronic range gating. This feature allows the sensor to ignore 
the signals reflected beyond the settable detection range. Range gating may be used to 
effectively minimize unwanted alarms from activity outside the protected area. 
Passive infrared (PIR) motion sensors 
detect a change in the thermal energy pattern caused by a moving intruder and initiate an 
alarm when the change in energy satisfies the detector�s alarm criteria. These sensors are 
passive devices because they do not transmit energy; they monitor the energy radiated by 
the surrounding environment. 
Dual technology sensors combine two different technologies in one unit to minimize the 
generation of alarms caused by sources other than intruders. 
Video motion sensors generate an alarm when an intruder enters a selected portion of a 
CCTV camera�s field of view. The sensor processes and compares successive images 
between the images against predefined alarm criteria. There are two categories of video 
motion detectors, analog and digital. Analog detectors generate an alarm in response to 
changes in a picture�s contrast. Digital devices convert selected portions of the analog 
video signal into digital data that are compared with data converted previously; if 
differences exceed preset limits, an alarm is generated. The signal processor usually 
provides an adjustable window that can be positioned anywhere on the video image. 
Point sensors are used to protect specific objects within a facility. These sensors 
(sometimes referred to as proximity sensors) 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
detect an intruder coming in close 
proximity to, touching, or lifting an 
object. Several different types are 
available, including capacitance 
sensors, pressure mats, and pressure 
switches. 
Capacitance sensors detect an 
intruder approaching or touching a 
metal object by sensing a change in 
capacitance between the object and the 
ground. 
Pressure mats generate an alarm 
when pressure is applied to any part 
of the mat�s surface, such as when 
someone steps on the mat. 
Pressure switches are mechanically 
activated contact switches or single 
ribbon switches. 
VISUAL X-9 
Exterior Intrusion Detection 
Sensors 
. �	Strain Sensitive Cable - fences and gates 
. �	Fiber Optic Cable - fences, gates, and gravel pathways 
. �	Bistatic/Monostatic Microwave - line of sight, clear zones 
. �	Active Infrared - portals, short perimeter gap filters 
. �	Ported Coax - exterior clear zones 
. �	Dual Technology (PIR/MW) - portals and gap fillers 
. �	Video Motion - volumetric traffic, open areas 

Exterior intrusion detection sensors are 
customarily used to detect an intruder 
crossing the boundary of a protected 
area. They can also be used in clear 
zones between fences or around 
buildings, for protecting materials and 
equipment stored outdoors within a 
protected boundary, or in estimating the 
POD for buildings and other facilities. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Because of the nature of the outdoor 
environment, exterior sensors are also 
more susceptible to nuisance and 
environmental alarms than interior 
sensors. Inclement weather conditions 
(e.g., heavy rain, hail, and high wind), 
vegetation, the natural variation of the 
temperature of objects in the detection 
zone, blowing debris, and animals are 
major sources of unwanted alarms. 
VISUAL X-10 
Fence Sensors 
. � Strain sensitive cables 
. � Taut wire sensors 
. � Fiber optic sensors 
. � Capacitance proximity sensors 

Fence sensors detect attempts to penetrate a fence around a protected area. Penetration 
attempts (e.g., climbing, cutting, or lifting) generate mechanical vibrations and stresses 
in fence fabric and posts that are usually different than those caused by natural 
phenomena like wind and rain. 
Strain sensitive cables are 
transducers that are uniformly 
sensitive along their entire length. 
They generate an analog voltage when 
subject to mechanical distortions or 
stress resulting from fence motion. 
Taut wire sensors combine a 
physically taut-wire barrier with an 
intrusion detection sensor network. The 
taut wire sensor consists of a column of 
uniformly spaced horizontal wires up 
to several hundred feet in length and 
securely anchored at each end. 
Fiber optic sensors are functionally 
equivalent to the strain-sensitive cable 
sensors previously discussed. However, 
rather than electrical signals, modulated 
light is transmitted down the cable and 
the resulting received signals are 
processed to 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
determine whether an alarm should be 
initiated. 
Capacitance proximity sensors 
measure the electrical capacitance 
between the ground and an array of 
sense wires. Any variations in 
capacitance, such as that caused by an 
intruder approaching or touching one of 
the sense wires, initiates an alarm. 
VISUAL X-11 
Buried Line Sensors 
A buried line sensor system consists of detection probes or cable buried in the ground, 
typically between two fences that form an isolation zone. These devices are wired to 
an electronic processing unit. The processing unit generates an alarm if an intruder 
passes through the detection field. Buried line sensors have several significant features: 
. �	They are hidden, making them difficult to detect and circumvent. 
. �	They follow the terrain�s natural contour. 
. �	They do not physically interfere with human activity, such as grass 
mowing or snow removal. 
. �	They are affected by certain environmental conditions, such as running 
water and ground freeze/thaw cycles. 

Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-12 
Microwave Sensors 
. � Bistatic system 
. � Monostatic 

Microwave intrusion detection sensors are categorized as bistatic or monostatic. Bistatic 
sensors use transmitting and receiving antennas located at opposite ends of the microwave 
link, whereas monostatic sensors use the same antenna. 
A bistatic system uses a transmitter and a receiver that are typically separated by 100 to 
1,200 feet and that are within direct line of sight of each other. 
Monostatic microwave sensors use the 
same antenna or virtually coincident 
antenna arrays for the transmitter and 
receiver, which are usually combined 
into a single package. 
VISUAL X-13 
Infrared (IR) Sensors 
The IR sensors are available in both active and passive models. An active sensor generates 
one or more near-IR beams that generate an alarm when interrupted. A passive sensor 
detects changes in thermal IR radiation from objects located within its field of view. 
Active sensors consist of transmitter/receiver pairs. The transmitter contains an IR light 
source (such as a gallium arsenide light-emitting diode [LED]) that generates an IR beam. 
The receiver detects changes in the signal power of the received beam. To minimize 
nuisance alarms from birds or blowing debris, the alarm criteria usually require that a high 
percentage of the beam be blocked for a specific interval of time. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-14 
Video Motion Sensors 
Video motion sensors are available on most digital video recorders used in security 
applications. They can be programmed to activate alarms, initiate recording, or any other 
designated action when motion is detected by a security camera. Some digital video 
recorders can be programmed to monitor very specific fields of view for specific rates of 
motion in order to increase effectiveness and minimize extraneous detections. Video 
motion sensors can also greatly improve the efficiency of security personnel monitoring 
security cameras by alerting them when motion is detected. 
VISUAL X-15 
Entry Control Systems and 
Technology 
. � Coded Devices 
. � Credential Devices 
. � Biometric Devices 

The function of an entry control system is to ensure that only authorized personnel are 
permitted into or out of a controlled area. Entry can be controlled by locked fence gates, 
locked doors to a building or rooms within a building, or specially designed portals. These 
means of entry control can be applied manually by guards or automatically by using entry 
control devices. In a manual system, guards verify that a person is authorized to enter an 
area, usually by comparing the photograph and personal characteristics of the individual 
requesting entry. In an automated system, the entry control device verifies that a person 
is authorized to enter or exit. The automated system usually interfaces with locking 
mechanisms on doors or gates that open momentarily to permit passage. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
All entry control systems control 
passage by using one or more of three 
basic techniques (e.g., something a 
person knows, something a person has, 
or something a person is or does). 
Automated entry control devices based 
on these techniques are grouped into 
three categories: coded, credential, and 
biometric devices. 
VISUAL X-16 
Coded Devices 
. � Electronic Keypad Devices 
. � Computer Controlled Keypad Devices 

Coded devices operate on the principle that a person has been issued a code to enter into 
an entry control device. This code will match the code stored in the device and permit 
entry. Depending on the application, a single code can be used by all persons authorized 
to enter the controlled area or each authorized person can be assigned a unique code. 
Group codes are useful when the group is small and controls are primarily for keeping out 
the general public. Individual codes are usually required for control of entry to more 
critical areas. Electronically coded devices include electronic and computer controlled 
keypads. 
Electronic keypad devices are 
similar to telephone keypads (12 
keys). This type of keypad consists 
of simple push-button switches that, 
when depressed, are decoded by 
digital logic circuits. When the correct 
sequence of buttons is pushed, an 
electric signal unlocks the door for a 
few seconds. 
Computer controlled keypad devices 
are devices similar to electronic keypad 
devices, except they are equipped with 
a microprocessor in the keypad or in a 
separate enclosure at a different 
location. The microprocessor monitors 
the sequence in which the keys are 
depressed and may 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
provide additional functions such as 
personal ID and digit scrambling. When 
the correct code is entered and all 
conditions are satisfied, an electric 
signal unlocks the door. 
VISUAL X-17 
Credential Devices 
. � Magnetic Stripe Card 
. � Wiegand-effect Card 
. � Proximity Card 
. � Smart Card 
. � Bar Code 

A credential device identifies a person having legitimate authority to enter a controlled 
area. A coded credential (e.g., plastic card or key) contains a prerecorded, machine-
readable code. An electric signal unlocks the door if the prerecorded code matches the 
code stored in the system when the card is read. 
Magnetic stripe card is a strip of 
magnetic material located along one 
edge of the card which is encoded 
with data (sometimes encrypted). 
The data is read by moving the card 
past a magnetic read head. 
Wiegand-effect card contains a series 
of small-diameter, parallel wires 
approximately 1/2-inch long, 
embedded in the bottom half of the 
card. The wires are manufactured from 
ferromagnetic materials that produce a 
sharp change in magnetic flux when 
exposed to a slowly changing magnetic 
field. This type of card is impervious 
to accidental erasure. The card reader 
contains a small read head and a tiny 
magnet to supply the applied magnetic 
field. It usually does not require 
external power. 
Proximity card is not physically 
inserted into a reader; the coded 
pattern on the card is sensed when it is 
brought within several inches of the 
reader. Several techniques are 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
used to code cards. One technique uses 
a number of electrically tuned circuits 
embedded in the card. Data are encoded 
by varying resonant frequencies of the 
tuned circuits. The reader contains a 
transmitter that continually sweeps 
through a specified range of frequencies 
and a receiver that senses the pattern of 
resonant frequencies contained in the 
card. Another technique uses an 
integrated circuit embedded in the card 
to generate a code that can be 
magnetically or electrostatically coupled 
to the reader. 
Smart card is embedded with a 
microprocessor, memory, 
communication circuitry, and a 
battery. The card contains edge 
contacts that enable a reader to 
communicate with the microprocessor. 
Entry control information and other 
data may be stored in the 
microprocessor�s memory. 
Bar code consists of black bars 
printed on white paper or tape that 
can be easily read with an optical 
scanner. This type of coding is not 
widely used for entry control 
applications because it can be easily 
duplicated. 
VISUAL X-18 
Biometric Devices 
. � Fingerprints 
. � Hand Geometry 
. � Retinal Patterns 

The third basic technique used to control entry is based on the measurement of one or 
more physical or personal characteristics of an individual. Because most entry control 
devices based on this technique rely on measurements of biological characteristics, they 
have become commonly known as biometric devices. Characteristics such as fingerprints, 
hand geometry, voiceprints, handwriting, and retinal blood-vessel patterns have been used 
for controlling entry. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Typically, in enrolling individuals, several reference measurements are made of the 
selected characteristic and then stored in the device�s memory or on a card. From then on, 
when that person attempts entry, a scan of the characteristic is compared with the 
reference data template. If a match is found, entry is granted. 
Fingerprints verification devices use one of two approaches. One is pattern recognition 
of the whorls, loops, and tilts of the referenced fingerprint, which is stored in a digitized 
representation of the image and compared with the fingerprint of the prospective entrant. 
The second approach is minutiae comparison, which means that the endings and 
branching points of ridges and valleys of the referenced fingerprint are compared with the 
fingerprint of the prospective entrant. 
Hand geometry devices use a variety of physical measurements of the hand, such as 
finger length, finger curvature, hand width, webbing between fingers, and light 
transmissivity through the skin to verify identity. Both two- and three-dimensional 
units are available. 
Retinal patterns is based on the premise that the pattern of blood vessels on the human 
eye�s retina is unique to an individual. While the eye is focused on a visual target, a low-
intensity IR light beam scans a circular area of the retina. The amount of light reflected 
from the eye is recorded as the beam progresses around the circular path. Reflected light is 
modulated by the difference in reflectivity between blood-vessel pattern and adjacent 
tissue. This information is processed and converted to a digital template that is stored as 
the eye�s signature. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-19 
Closed Circuit Television Systems 
. � Interior CCTV - alarm assessment, card reader door assessment, emergency exit 
door assessment, and surveillance of lobbies, corridors, and open areas 
. �	Exterior CCTV - alarm assessment, individual zones and portal 
assessment, specific paths and areas, exclusion areas, surveillance of waterside activities 

VISUAL X-20 
Summary 
Remember all the different components of the system must support each others function. 
For example, the best barriers are those tied to a detection system, like a strain sensitive 
cable alarm sensor on a chain link fence, with a steel cable woven into the fence, delay 
function, and overseen by an assessment method, such as a CCTV system. 
. �	Use the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist to identify electronic 
security system requirements. 
. �	Public safety is enhanced by electronic security system (deter, detect, 
deny, devalue). 
. �	Electronic security systems components and capabilities interact with 
other systems (LAN, doors, windows, lighting). 
. �	Electronic security systems can be used to mitigate vulnerabilities. 

Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-21 
Refer participants to FEMA 426, the Unit X Case Study activity in the Student 
Manual, and the GIS portfolio. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist 
groups as needed. 
At the end of 10 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
Student Activity 
In this Unit, the emphasis will be upon the various components and technology available 
for use in electronic security systems. 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for preliminary building design vulnerability assessment. 
Activity Requirements 
. �	Working in small groups, refer to the HIC Case Study and to the GIS 
portfolio to determine answers to the worksheet questions. 
. �	Then review results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures. 

Take 10 minutes to complete this activity. Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
Transition 
In the next unit, you will finalize and present of Case Study Results. This will include 
preparation and presentation of the top three risks identified by the group, the 
vulnerabilities identified for these risks, and top three recommended mitigation measures 
to reduce vulnerability and risk. The top three risks will be prioritized as well as the top 
three recommended mitigation measures with rationale and justification. It includes any 
consideration for changes to security systems per Unit X. 
UNIT X CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS 
In this Unit, the emphasis will be upon the various components and technology available 
for use in electronic security systems. The Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a screening tool for preliminary building design 
vulnerability assessment. 
Requirement 
Refer to the HIC Case Study and to the GIS portfolio to determine answers to the 
questions. Then review results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures. 
1. 1.	Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist that address security systems 
2. 2.	Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the risk 
ratings determined in Unit VI Case Study Activity and, based on this detailed analysis, 
decide if the rating is accurate. 
3. 3.	Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from 
security system design. 
4. 4.	Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the 
recommended mitigation measures. 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
12.1 
Are black/white or color CCTV 
(closed circuit television) 
cameras used? Are they 
monitored and recorded 24 
hours/7 days a week? By 
whom? Are they analog or 
digital by design? What are the 
number of fixed, wireless and 
pan-tilt-zoom cameras used? 
Who are the manufacturers of 
the CCTV cameras? 
Security technology is frequently 
considered to complement or 
supplement security personnel 
forces and to provide a wider area 
of coverage. Typically, these 
physical security elements 
provide the first line of defense 
in deterring, detecting, and 
responding to threats and 
reducing vulnerabilities. They 
must be viewed as an integral 
component of the overall security 
program. Their design, 
engineering, installation, 
operation, and management must 
be able to meet daily security 
challenges from a cost-effective 
and efficiency perspective. 
During and after an incident, the 
system, or its backups, should be 
CCTV systems are 
used in the back 
parking area, 
including the loading 
dock area. The HIC 
security officer 
monitors the cameras 
from his desk. There 
is a VHS recorder. It 
is an older generation 
analog system. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


What is the age of the CCTV 
cameras in use? 
functional per the planned 
design. Consider color CCTV 
cameras to view and record 
activity at the perimeter of the 
building, particularly at primary 
entrances and exits. A mix of 
monochrome cameras should be 
considered for areas that lack 
adequate illumination for color 
cameras. Reference: GSA PBS P-
100 

12.2 
Are the cameras programmed to 
respond automatically to 
perimeter building alarm 
events? Do they have built-in 
video motion capabilities? 
The efficiency of monitoring 
multiple screens decreases as the 
number of screens increases. 
Tying the alarm system or 
motion sensors to a CCTV 
camera and a monitoring screen 
improves the man-machine 
interface by drawing attention to 
a specific screen and its 
associated camera. Adjustment 
may be required after installation 
due to initial false alarms, 
usually caused by wind or small 
animals. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.3 
What type of camera housings 
are used and are they 
environmental in design to 
protect against exposure to heat 
and cold weather elements? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.4 
Are panic/duress alarm buttons 
or sensors used, where are they 
located, and are they hardwired 
or portable? 
Call buttons should be provided 
at key public contact areas and as 
needed in offices of managers and 
directors, in garages and parking 
lots, and other high risk 
locations by assessment. 
Reference: GSA PBS P-100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.5 
Are intercom call boxes used in 
parking areas or along the 
building perimeter? 
See item 12.4. 
No. 
12.6 
What is the transmission media 
used to transmit camera video 
signals: fiber, wire line, 
telephone wire, coaxial, 
wireless? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Telephone wire. 
12.7 
Who monitors the CCTV 
system? 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
The HIC security 
officer. 

12.8 
What is the quality of video 
images both during the day and 
hours of darkness? Are infrared 
camera illuminators used? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.9 
Are the perimeter cameras 
supported by an uninterruptible 
power supply, battery, or 
building emergency power? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.10 
What type of exterior Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) sensors 
are used? (electromagnetic; fiber 
optic; active infrared; bistatic 
microwave; seismic; 
photoelectric; ground; fence; glass 
break (vibration/shock); single, 
double, and roll-up door magnetic 
contacts or switches) 
Consider balanced magnetic 
contact switch sets for all exterior 
doors, including overhead/roll-up 
doors, and review roof intrusion 
detection. Consider glass break 
sensors for windows up to 
scalable heights. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.11 
Is a global positioning satellite 
system (GPS) used to monitor 
vehicles and asset movements? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Security System Mitigation Measures 
Asset-Threat/Hazard 
Pair 
Current Risk 
Rating 
Suggested Mitigation 
Measure 
Revised Risk 
Rating 
1. Explosive Blast/Site 
High 
Upgrade CCTVs to 
digital and use DVRs. 
Install CCTVs to monitor 
front parking. 
Medium 
2. Explosive 
Blast/Building 
High 
Upgrade CCTVs to 
digital and use DVRs. 
Install CCTVs to monitor 
interior lobby and loading 
dock. 
Medium 
3. Chemical/Mechanical 
Systems 
High 
Install basic chemical 
sensors on outside air 
intake-HVAC system. 
Medium 
4. Biological/Mechanical 
Systems 
High 
Evaluate acquisition of 
portable or basic level 
biological sensors 
High to Medium 
5. Radiological 
High 
Evaluate acquisition of 
portable or basic level 
radiological sensors 
High to Medium 

Unit XI:  Case Study 
U
nit 
XI 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 135 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Case Study 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Explain building security design issues to a building owner 
for consideration prior to a renovation or new construction 
1. 2.	Explain the identification process to arrive at the high risk asset � 
threat/hazard pairs 
2. 3.	Justify the recommended mitigation measures, explaining the benefits in 
reducing the risk for the high risk situations of interest 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1.	Activity: Preparation and presentation of the top three risks 
identified by the group, the vulnerabilities identified for these 
risks, and top three recommended mitigation measures to 
reduce vulnerability and risk. The top three risks will be 
prioritized as well as the top three recommended mitigation 
measures with rationale and justification. Includes any 
consideration for changes to security systems per Unit X. 
REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings 
1. 2.	Student Manual, Unit XI (handouts will be a 1-page summary of analysis 
results and briefing format for presentation of information) 
2. 3.	Unit XI visuals 
3. 4.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 

REQUIREMENTS 1. Overhead projector or computer display unit 
1. 2.	Unit XI visuals 
2. 3. Instructor Guide 
3. 4. Student Manual 

 Unit XI 
UNIT XI OUTLINE	Time Page 
XI. Case Study	135 minutes IG XI-
1 
1. 1.	Activity: Preparation of Presentation by Groups 45 minutes IG XI-15 
2. 2.	Presentation by Groups 90 minutes IG XI-20 

PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
 �	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to 
identify topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
 The Instructor will review the Hazardville Information Inc. site and building 
portfolio, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, and GSA Interagency Security Criteria, and 
provide the building owners parameters for the Design Basis Threat and Levels of 
Protection. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity: The students will prepare and present the top three risks 
identified by the group, the vulnerabilities identified for these risks, and top three 
recommended mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and risk. The top three risks 
will be prioritized as well as the top three recommended mitigation measures with 
rationale and justification. Includes any consideration for changes to security systems per 
Unit X. 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-1 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit XI Case Study activity. This unit will review the Hazardville Information 
Company, Inc., site and building portfolio, DoD Antiterrorism Standards and GSA 
Interagency Security Criteria, and provide the building owners parameters for the Design 
Basis Threat and Levels of Protection. 
Students will prepare and present the top three risks identified by the group, the 
vulnerabilities identified for these risks, and top three recommended mitigation measures 
to reduce vulnerability and risk. The top three risks will be prioritized as well as the top 
three recommended mitigation measures with rationale and justification. Includes any 
consideration for changes to security systems per Unit X. 
VISUAL XI-2 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Explain building security design issues to a building owner for 
consideration prior to a renovation or new construction. 
2. 2.	Explain the identification process to arrive at the high risk asset � 
threat/hazard pairs. 
3. 3.	Justify the recommended mitigation measures, explaining the benefits in 
reducing the risk for the high risk situations of interest. 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-3 
VISUAL XI-4 
VISUAL XI-5 
Hazardville Information Company 
The Case Study will be a comprehensive review and practical application of FEMA 
426. 
In this unit, the following topics will be presented: 
. � Company Functions 
. � Company Infrastructure 
. � Threats/Hazards 
. � Vulnerabilities 

Hazardville Information Company 
The Hazardville Information Company supports approximately 1,000 users and 100 
applications as a primary data center and as a disaster recovery backup site. 
HIC has over 130 employees and approximately 80 to 100 employees are in the building 
at any given time. 
. � Regional computer center 
. � Suburban business park 
. � Customers and neighbors 

HIC 5-Mile Radius 
The Hazardville Information Company is located approximately 15 miles outside of a 
major urban city in the suburbs, and adjacent to a major interstate highway. There are 
several commercial iconic properties, one military installation, and several government 
offices within a 5mile radius of the HIC building. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
 VISUAL XI-6 
HIC Local Imagery 
The office building is part of a corporate business park. HIC does not control the front 
parking area, signage, or other general site conditions such as stormwater drainage, 
lighting, or vehicle and pedestrian traffic flow and movement. The business park is 
responsible for grounds maintenance to include cutting the grass, planting flowers, 
trimming trees, sweeping the parking lot, and towing unauthorized vehicles. Trash service 
is the responsibility of tenants. HIC has a large dumpster located at the rear of the loading 
dock area approximately 50 feet from the building. 
HIC receives the mail and packages at 
the front office lobby desk. Large 
packages and equipment are delivered to 
the rear loading dock. HIC does not 
have a separate mail room, but does 
have an internal administrative space 
with copiers, printers, supplies, and 
staff mailboxes. The front desk 
receptionist is responsible for sorting 
and screening all mail. 
The business park is adjacent to a 
major interstate highway and there are 
a number of storage tanks, 
manufacturing and production 
facilities, and other commercial 
properties across the interstate. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-7 
VISUAL XI-8 
VISUAL XI-9 
HIC Office Building 
The HIC office space has client and staff parking in the front and a rear parking and 
loading dock area for supply trucks, vendors, and trash. 
The front parking are is unrestricted, but the back parking area is fully enclosed with 
chain link fencing on the perimeter of the property. There is no gate or means to prevent 
vehicles from transiting around the rear of the business park. 
HIC HazMat Sites 
There are a significant number of hazardous waste sites in near proximity to the HIC 
building. The vast majority are small generators such as gas stations, dry cleaning, and 
other commercial businesses. Large generators include the petroleum storage and 
production facility located across the interstate. 
HIC Emergency Response 
The local emergency response capabilities include primary police, fire, and medical 
facilities approximately 8 to 10 miles away. There are multiple means of ingress and 
egress to the HIC building complex and the site is served by fire mains with a hydrant 
located approximately 200 feet from the HIC office. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-10 
HIC Functional Layout 
. � Downstairs: Computers Center, Communications, Staff 
. �	Upstairs: Executive offices 
. �	Highbay loading dock, mechanical and electrical (M&E) room 

VISUAL XI-11 
HIC Car Bomb Blast Effects 
The nominal range-to-effects chart radius of influence of a small car bomb detonation at 
the front entrance indicates that the building would experience significant damage, but 
likely not suffer progressive collapse. The front fa�ade of the building is approximately 
75 percent annealed glass and has an 8-foot overhang. The terrain slopes upward from the 
parking lot to the main entrance, and is landscaped with flower beds and trees. Key staff 
would probably be killed and administrative functions destroyed, but the Computer 
Center and Communications functions would likely survive relatively intact. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-12 
HIC Truck Bomb Blast Effects 
A truck bomb detonation occurring on the interstate would also significantly damage the 
HIC building, primarily glass breakage and potentially some structural damage. If the 
truck bomb were to detonate near the tank farm, the ensuing explosion, fire, and plume 
would have significant impact on the HIC building. 
VISUAL XI-13 
HIC Truck Bomb Effects 
A truck bomb detonation at the rear of the HIC building at the loading dock would result 
in significant structural damage and potentially progressive collapse. The Computer 
Center, Communications, and other critical functions would be destroyed. Critical 
infrastructure that would be destroyed includes the mechanical/electrical room. 
VISUAL XI-14 
HIC Building Data 
. � Structural 
. � Mechanical 
. � Electrical 
. � IT 
. � Physical Security 

HIC Structural System 
The HIC building is a two-story steel frame structure with a brick facade and annealed 
glass. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-15 
HIC Mechanical Systems 
The air used to heat or cool the HIC Headquarters building is filtered in the HVAC room 
using standard industrial grade MERV 8 filters. Outside make-up air is brought in through 
a vent in the wall located approximately 3 feet above ground level. 
The Computer Data Center has two additional air cooling units located in the data center 
and uses the main chill water supply. The data center maintains a slight net positive 
pressure compared to the main office areas. 
VISUAL XI-16 
HIC Mechanical Systems 
The return air for the main office space has sufficient room inside the ductwork and 
mechanical room area to incorporate additional filters and equipment. 
VISUAL XI-17 
HIC Mechanical Systems 
Chiller operation along with chilled water and condenser water flow are managed from 
a single control unit in the M&E room. A single chilled water pump provides adequate 
flow for all cooling situations; a backup pump is available at the push of a button. The 
same is true for the condenser water pumps. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-18 
HIC Electrical One-Line Diagram 
HIC�s electrical loads are divided between two main electrical buses, the Computer Center 
Bus (CCB) and the Support Bus (SB). They are located in separate "closets" of the 
building. A tie breaker allows the buses to be connected, so they can be powered by a 
single main transformer, or to allow SB loads to be carried by the backup diesel generator. 
The system is monitored by a digital energy management system, which provides 
indications, alarms, and instructions. VISUAL XI-19 
HIC Mechanical and Electrical 
Room 
Typical of many commercial office buildings, the mechanical and electrical systems share 
common utility penetetrations and floor space. There are no redundant utility feeds to the 
building from different directions. 
VISUAL XI-20 
Physical Security 
HIC uses a layered approach to physical 
security. 
. �	The outermost physical security layer is provided by a contract security 
firm and the Defense Protective Service (DPS). 
. �	The parking lot behind the HIC office is well lit and monitored by older 
generation analog CCTV cameras. 
. �	The front parking lot is lit, but not monitored. 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
HIC�s middle layer of security is the 
building envelope. 
�	The building is monitored by door 
and window alarms, which connect 
to ADT, the nationwide alarm 
company. 
The innermost layer of physical 
security 
involves the Computer Center and the 
Communications Center. 
. �	Equipped with locked doors, rooms meet the government�s requirements 
for handling classified material. 
. �	Only authorized employees possess the necessary proximity cards and 
PINs to gain access. 

VISUAL XI-21 
IT 
The Computer Center is the heart of the Hazardville Information Company�s (HIC) 
operation. 
The Computer Center is composed of several interconnected systems and one 
independent system for classified data processing. The systems run either VMS, Unix, 
or Windows. 
Data: 
HIC has two T1 lines and one T3 line 
connected at the demark to ATT�s 
high performance backbone network. 
The ATT fiber connectivity provides 
more than enough bandwidth for 
HIC�s current needs and planned 
future expansion. 
Telecom and Network Connections: 
. �	Two T1 lines (1.544 Mbps) 
. �	One T3 (45 Mbps) 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
. � Frame Relay 
. � Narrowband ISDN (64/128 Kbps) 

Voice 
NEC DS2000 telephone systems that 
come with an 8-slot cabinet that can 
handle 32 lines from 48 stations. 
VISUAL XI-22 
Emergency Response 
In the event of an emergency, the HIC senior management use the large conference 
room as an emergency operations center. The room is equipped with network and 
telephone connections and cell phones are able to receive a signal. 
The nearest fire station is approximately 21/2 miles north of the HIC Headquarters. 
Seven others are within 5 miles of the site. Firefighters are trained as Emergency 
Medical Technicians (EMTs) and Hazardous Material Technicians. Many are also 
skilled in technical rescue (high places, confined spaces, etc.). Ambulances are also 
dispatched from these stations. Emergency response time for emergencies is estimated 
to be 8-10 minutes. Fire hydrants are available in the office park. 
The nearest hospital with an 
emergency room is 5 miles away. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-23 
Threats/Hazards 
. � Terrorism 
. � Intelligence 
. � Crime 
. � HazMat 
. � Natural Hazards 

VISUAL XI-24 
Design Basis Threat 
Explosive Blast: Car Bomb � approximately 250 lb TNT equivalent. Truck Bomb � 
approximately 5,000 lb TNT equivalent (Murrah Federal Building class weapon) 
Chemical: Large quantity gasoline spill and toxic plume from the adjacent tank farm, small 
quantity (tanker truck and rail car size) spills of HazMat materials (chlorine). 
Biological: Anthrax delivered by mail or 
in packages, smallpox distributed by 
spray mechanism mounted on truck or 
aircraft around metropolitan area. 
Radiological: Small "dirty" bomb 
detonation within the 10-mile radius of 
the HIC building. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-25 
VISUAL XI-26 
VISUAL XI-27 
Level of Protection 
GSA Level II Interagency Security Criteria 
. � Perimeter Security 
. � Entry Security 
. � Interior Security 
. � Administrative Procedures 
. � Blast/Setback Standards 

Level of Protection 
DoD Low, Inhabited Building 
. � Potential Structural Damage 
. � Potential Door and Glazing Hazards 
. � Potential Injury 

Level of Protection 
DoD Low, Inhabited Building Stand-off Distance or Separation Requirements 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-28 
VISUAL XI-29 
VISUAL XI-30 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist groups 
as needed. 
Level of Protection 
UFC 4-010-01 Appendix B DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for New and 
Existing Buildings Standards 1-12 
What standards are applicable to the Case Study? 
Level of Protection 
UFC 4-010-01 Appendix B DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for New and 
Existing Buildings Standards 13-22 
What standards are applicable to the Case Study? 
In addition to the standards, review the DoD Recommendations for New and Existing 
Buildings, Appendix C. 
Case Study Activity 
In this Unit, the students will finalize the assessment, determine high priority risk 
concerns, recommend mitigation options, and present findings to the class. 
Activity Requirements 
. �	Working in small groups, refer to the HIC Case Study and the GIS 
portfolio to determine answers to the worksheet questions. 
. �	Then review results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures, rank and prioritize the findings. 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
At the end of 45 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
VISUAL XI-31 
VISUAL XI-32

Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
Car Bomb Blast/Site 
�	Protect front entrance from car bomb blast � 82-foot stand-off 
a. o	Use planters, plinth walls, landscaping 
b. o	FRF film on windows or replace with laminated glass 
c. o	Consider closing in overhang area 

Truck Bomb/Site 
�	Protect rear parking area from truck bomb 
o	Use chain link gate, vehicle pop barriers, pre-screening away from building 
Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
Chemical/Mechanical-HVAC 
. �	Install emergency shut down switch, protect outside air intake 
. �	Evaluate carbon filters for chlorine type spills 
 .�	Upgrade filters to MERV 11 to remove gasoline plume and other particulates 
 .Biological/Mechanical-HVAC 
. �	Evaluate UVGI 
 .�	Evaluate a standalone mailroom on separate HVAC zone 
 .Radiological/Site 
. �	Install emergency shut down switch on HVAC 
. �	Upgrade filters to MERV 11 to remove radioactive particulates 

Unit XI: 	Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES
	CONTENT/AC
TIVITY 
VISUAL XI-33 
Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
Other significant vulnerabilities/mitigations 
Blast/Site 
. �	Separate front lobby from interior office space with security door if 
primary mail entry point is the lobby area 
. �	Distribute internal functions for redundancy 
 �	Evaluate other utility connections/distribution capability for redundant 
feed to the building 
 Blast/Structural/Building 
. �	Strengthen overhead anchorage elements 

o	Heaters 
VISUAL XI-34 
Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
Mechanical 
 .�	Fire sprinklers 
 .o Install enunciator panel and go to zones, dual stage in data center, clean agents versus 
water 
 .�	Chill water 
 .o	Install backup piping to primary air handling units 
. �	Install exhaust fan in UPS room (lead acid batteries) 
 .�	Place bollards around or relocate natural 
 .gas meters Electrical 
 .�	Primary Bus 
 .o	Separate Computer Center Bus from Support Bus 
. �	Place bollards or fencing around transformers 
. �	Increase size of generator fuel tank 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-35 
Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
IT Systems 
. �	Store backup tapes/data at least 10 miles away 
. �	Identify alternate telecom carrier circuits and availability 
 �	Conduct full extended load test of emergency power/UPS system 
 Physical Security 
. �	Raise height of rear perimeter fencing 
. �	Evaluate installing a small Security Operations Center and increase 
monitoring/awareness of exterior 
. �	Upgrade CCTV system to digital and DVR and install additional cameras 
to view front parking, lobby, and loading dock 

VISUAL XI-36 
Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
Emergency Operations/Disaster Recovery 
. �	Install mass notification system 
. �	Post shelter and evacuation procedures 
. �	Identify rally point at site away from building 
. �	Use Computer Data Center for Shelter in Place 
. �	Acquire personal protective evacuation hoods 

Transition 
This completes the Building Design 
for Homeland Security instruction. In 
this course, you have learned how to 
perform a multi-hazard risk 
assessment of a building and have 
become familiar with the key 
concepts of to protect buildings from 
manmade threats and hazards: 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
. � Asset Value 
. � Design Basis Threat 
. � Level of Protection 
. � Layers of Defense 
. � Vulnerability Assessment 
. � Risk Assessment 
. � Mitigation Options 

Using the approach and guidance provided in FEMA 426, the majority of building owners 
should be able to complete a risk assessment of their building in a few days and identify 
the primary vulnerabilities, mitigation options, and make informed decisions on the ability 
of their building to survive, recover, and operate should an attack or event occur. 
Course certificates will be presented in the next unit. 
UNIT XI CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:
PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF GROUP RESULTS

In this activity, students work with their groups to finalize their assessments, decide 
on high priority risk concerns, determine appropriate mitigation measures and present 
findings to the class. 
Requirement 
1. 1. Based on findings from the previous activities completed in the previous ten 
units, complete the following table. 
2. 2. Be prepared to present conclusions and to justify decisions to the class in a 5-7 
minute presentation. 

Prioritized Asset-
Requirements to Mitigate 
Rationale 
Threat/Hazard Pair 


Car Bomb Blast/Site and 
Building 
Protect front entrance from car 
bomb blast � 82-foot stand-off 
DoD Standard 1 DoD 
Standard 6 

Use planters, plinth walls, 
landscaping 
DoD Standard 8 

FRF film on windows or 


replace with laminated glass 


Consider closing in overhang 


area 

Truck Bomb/Site 
Protect rear parking area from 
truck bomb 
DoD Standard 1 


DoD Standard 6 

Use chain link gate, vehicle 
pop barriers, pre-screening 
away from building 
DoD Standard 8 

Consider closing in overhang 


area 


Chemical/Mechanical-
HVAC 
Install emergency shut down 
switch, protect outside air 
intake 
DoD Standard 17 DoD 
Standard 18 

Evaluate carbon filters for 
DoD Recommendation 6 

chlorine type spills 


Upgrade filters to MERV 11 to 
remove gasoline plume and 
other particulates 

Biological/Mechanical-
Evaluate UVGI 
DoD Standard 13 
HVAC 



Evaluate a standalone 
DoD Standard 17 

mailroom on separate HVAC 


zone 
DoD Standard 18 
Radiological/Site 
Install emergency shut down 
switch on HVAC 
DoD Standard 17 


DoD Standard 18 

Upgrade filters to MERV 11 to 
remove radioactive particulates 

Armed Attack/Site and 
Building 
Separate front lobby from 
interior office space with 
security door if primary mail 
entry point is the lobby area 
DoD Standard 11 DoD 
Standard 19 DoD 
Recommendation 2 

Distribute internal functions 


for redundancy 
DoD Recommendation 3 

Evaluate other utility 
connections/distribution 
capability for redundant feed 
to the building 
DoD Recommendation 12 
DoD Recommendation 13 
DoD Recommendation 15 

Blast/ Structural 
Strengthen overhead anchorage 
elements - Heaters 
DoD Standard 15 DoD 
Standard 20 
Blast/Mechanical 
Fire sprinklers - Install 
enunciator panel and go to 
zones, dual stage in data center, 
clean agents versus water Chill 
water - Install backup piping 
to primary air handling units 
Install exhaust fan in UPS 
room (lead acid batteries) Place 
bollards around or relocate 
natural gas meters 
DoD Standard 16 DoD 
Standard 17 DoD Standard 18 
DoD Standard 19 
Electrical 
Primary Bus - Separate 
Computer Center Bus from 
Support Bus Place bollards or 
fencing around transformers 
Increase size of generator fuel 
tank 
DoD Standard 18 DoD 
Standard 19 
IT Systems 
Store backup tapes/data at 
least 10 miles away Identify 
alternate telecom carrier 
circuits and availability 
Conduct full extended load test 
of emergency power/UPS 
system 
DoD Standard 18 DoD 
Standard 19 DoD Standard 20 

Physical Security 
Raise height of rear perimeter 
DoD Standard 1 

fencing 



DoD Standard 2 

Evaluate installing a small 


Security Operations Center and 


increase monitoring/awareness 


of exterior 


Upgrade CCTV system to 


digital and DVR and install 


additional cameras to view 


front parking, lobby, and 


loading dock 

Emergency 
Install mass notification 
DoD Standard 18 
Operations/Disaster 
system 

Recovery 

DoD Standard 22 

Post shelter and evacuation 


procedures 
DoD Recommendation 
14 

Identify rally point at site away 


from building 


Use Computer Data Center for 


Shelter in Place 


Acquire personal protective 


evacuation hoods 


Unit XII:  Course Wrap-up 
Uni
t 
XII 
COURSE TITLE 
Building Design for Homeland Security 



TIME 60 minutes 
UNIT TITLE 
Course Wrap-up 

SCOPE 
1. Discussion of general issues and concerns 


2. Course evaluation 


3. Distribution of course certificates 

REFERENCES 
No references are required for this unit. 


REQUIREMENTS 
1. Course evaluation form (one per student) 

2. Course certificates 
PREPARATION 
Before training this unit, review the students� lists of expectations 

recorded in Unit I. 

Unit XII Outline 
Time 
Page 
XII. Wrap-up 
60 minutes 
IG XII-1 
1. General Discussion 
15 minutes 
IG XII-2 
2. Course Evaluations 
15 minutes 
IG XII-2 
3. Course Certificates 
30 minutes 
IG XII-2 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES 
Review the students� course expectations, as listed in Unit I. Relate those expectations to 
key concepts covered in each unit of the course. Determine whether the students feel that 
each expectation was met, and discuss as needed. 
Invite questions and comments from the students related to the training or to building 
design for Homeland security in general (e.g., state or local issues, funding sources, use 
of FEMA 426, etc.). 
Address the students� concerns, as needed. 
Distribute the course evaluation forms. Ask the students to take their time in completing 
the evaluation. 
Distribute the course certificates to the students. 
CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
General Discussion 
Sample questions to ask include: 
. �	How does this expectation relate to material covered in the course? 
. �	Has this expectation been met? 
. �	Have any issues have been left unaddressed? 
. �	How does this issue relate to your role in building design for Homeland 
security, and how do you expect to apply this material on the job? 
. �	Are there any questions or comments about the course content, exercises, 
written exam or other aspects of the training? 
. �	Are there any questions or comments about building design for Homeland 
security in general? 

Course Evaluations 
FEMA uses the evaluations to improve future course deliveries. The students� feedback 
is very important for ensuring a quality program. 
Course Certificates 
APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY 
HAZARDVILLE INFORMATION COMPANY (HIC) 
INTRODUCTION 
The Hazardville Information Company (HIC) is a state-of-the art information technology 
(IT) services company located in a major metropolitan city in a typical suburban business 
office park. The company�s mission is to provide information technology and services 
support to include hosting servers, databases, applications, and other hardware and 
software; develop, install, and maintain software applications; provide field support IT 
technicians; and provide 24-hour help desk support. 
Figure 1. Hazardville Information Company (HIC) 
The Hazardville Information Company has over 20 clients and supports approximately 
1,000 users and 100 applications as a primary data center and as a disaster recovery 
backup site. HIC clients include local and regional government offices and commercial 
entities. Many clients depend on HIC�s ability to provide real time IT support, on a 24 x 
7 basis. Others rely on the company�s IT backup services. Major clients and support 
contracts include: 
. � Fortune 500 companies 
. � National and regional banks and credit unions 
. � A major airline 
. � Large prime defense contractors 
. � Government agencies, including one classified client 

HIC is certified to provide IT support and storage to government clients at Top Secret 
levels, using dedicated classified equipment and networks. HIC�s technology ranges from 
leading edge mainframe and desktop computers and optical mass storage devices to 
wired and wireless networks. HIC has over 130 employees and approximately 80 to 100 
employees are in the building at any given time. 
The Hazardville Information Company has a number of key staff that support the 
various projects. The president, chief executive officer, security officer, and several 
division managers possess high level government security clearances. Approximately half 
of the technical staff hold mid-level government security clearances. All company 
employees sign confidentiality agreements for the commercial clients and have access to a 
number of company�s proprietary data. The IT division manager and his staff of database 
administrators have full administrative privileges on all systems. The company has a 
robust recall system and staff notification process in the event of an emergency and/or 
surge support requirement. 
The HIC building is strategically located near many of HIC�s clients and management 
does not want to move from the facility or location. 
GENERAL SITE DATA 
The Hazardville Information Company is located approximately 15 miles outside of a 
major urban city in the suburbs, and adjacent to a major interstate highway. There are 
several commercial iconic properties, one military installation, and several government 
offices within a 5-mile radius of the HIC building. 
Figure 2. HIC Corporate Business Park 5-Mile Radius 
The office building is part of a corporate business park. HIC does not control the front 
parking area, signage, or other general site conditions such as stormwater drainage, 
lighting, or vehicle and pedestrian traffic flow and movement. Front parking spots are 
approximately 44 feet from the main HIC lobby entrance. The business park is 
responsible for grounds maintenance, including cutting the grass, planting flowers, 
trimming trees, sweeping the parking lot, and towing unauthorized vehicles. Trash service 
is the responsibility of tenants. HIC has a large dumpster located at the rear of the loading 
dock area approximately 50 feet from the building. HIC receives the mail and packages at 
the front office lobby desk. Large packages and equipment are delivered to the rear loading 
dock. HIC does not have a separate mail room, but does have an internal administrative 
space with copiers, printers, supplies, and staff mailboxes. The front desk receptionist is 
responsible for sorting and screening all mail. 
The business park is adjacent to a major interstate highway and there are a number of 
storage tanks, manufacturing and production facilities, and other commercial properties 
across the interstate. 
Figure 3. HIC Business Park Perimeter and Surrounding Buildings 
The HIC office space has client and staff parking in the front and a rear parking and 
loading dock area for supply trucks, vendors, and trash. 
The front parking area is unrestricted, but the back parking area is fully enclosed with 
chain link fencing on the perimeter of the property. There is no gate or means to prevent 
vehicles from transiting around the rear of the business park. 
Figure 4. HIC Office Location 
There are a significant number of hazardous waste sites in near proximity to the HIC 
building.  The vast majority are small generators such as gas stations, dry cleaning, and 
other commercial businesses. Large generators include the petroleum storage and 
production facility located across the interstate. 
Figure 5. HAZMAT Sites Near the HIC Building 
The prevailing weather pattern in the summer and fall is from the south Atlantic and the 
Gulf of Mexico. Warm, moist air brings thunderstorms and higher humidity. In the fall, 
cooler air from the north and west returns. Winter weather blasts across the state from 
the northern or central part of the continent. With no other weather activity, the 
prevailing wind is normally from the west-northwest. 
The local emergency response capabilities include primary police, fire, and medical 
facilities approximately 8 to 10 miles away. There are multiple means of ingress and 
egress to the HIC building complex and the site is served by fire mains with a hydrant 
located approximately 200 feet from the HIC office. 
Figure 6. Emergency Response Capability Near the HIC Building Figure 7. HIC 
Functions and Building Layout 
The nominal range to effects chart radius of influence of a small car bomb detonation at 
the front entrance indicates that the building would experience significant damage, but 
likely not suffer progressive collapse. The front fa�ade of the building is approximately 
75 percent annealed glass and has an 8-foot overhang. The terrain slopes upward from the 
parking lot to the main entrance, and is landscaped with flower beds and trees. Key staff 
would probably be killed and administrative functions destroyed, but the Computer 
Center and Communications functions would likely survive relatively intact. 
Figure 8. Car Bomb Blast Effects (Front Entrance Parking) 
A truck bomb detonation on the interstate would also significantly damage the HIC 
building, primarily glass breakage and potentially some structural damage. If the truck 
bomb were to detonate near the tank farm, the ensuing explosion, fire, and plume would 
have significant impact on the HIC building. 
Figure 9. Truck Bomb Blast Effects (Interstate Highway) 
A truck bomb detonation at the rear of the HIC building at the loading dock would result 
in significant structural damage and potentially progressive collapse. The Computer 
Center, Communications, and other critical functions would be destroyed. Critical 
infrastructure that would be destroyed includes the mechanical/electrical room. 
Figure 10. Truck Bomb Blast Effects (Loading Dock) 
BUILDING DATA 
The HIC Headquarters building was built in the 1980s using conventional construction 
techniques. The building has a 22,000-square foot main floor for offices and computers, 
and a 3,300-square foot executive mezzanine (a second floor over the front part of the 
office). 
Occupancy Construction Type No. of Floors High 
Rise Code Fire Suppression Floor Area 
First Floor 
Mezzanine 
Total Number of Exits Exits from Mezzanine Occupancy Load 
First Floor 
MezzanineB, S-1 
2C 
1 floor and mezzanine, high bay in rear 
No 
Fully sprinklered, wet pipe 
19,157 SF 
3,380 SF 
22,537 SF 
6 
3 
102 occupants
31 occupants

Area Separation No Fire Alarm System No Monitored Sprinkler Yes Fence 4 feet high, 
rear only, to keep people from falling into a valley 
Applicable Codes Building 1996 BOCA National Building Code 
w/ 2000 VUSBC amendments
Electric 1996 VUSBC, 1996 NEC
Plumbing 1995 IPC w/1996 supplement
Mechanical 1996 International Mechanical Code
Fire 1996 BOCA National Fire Prevention Code
Accessible 1996 BOCA, 1992 CABO/ANSI 117.1

BOCA - Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc USBC � Uniform 
Statewide Building Code NEC � National Electric Code IPC - International Plumbing 
CABO/ANSI 117.1 � Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards 
BUILDING STRUCTURE 
The walls are made of concrete masonry units (CMUs) with a brick veneer on the 
outside. Steel framework supports the structure, and exposed columns are enclosed in 
gypsum wallboard. The roof is a metal deck with gravel on top and insulation 
underneath. It is slightly angled to allow water to drain. The roof overhangs the front 
entrance by 8 feet. This provides a covered area for employees to stay dry on rainy 
days. Cylindrical columns support the overhang. 
Windows are double glazed, 1/4-inch thick annealed glass. 
With a loading dock on the west side, it is possible for vehicles to park right next to the 
building. Normal parking for employees is in front; the closest row is 44 feet from the 
front door. 
The company does not have a mailroom; incoming mail is normally processed by the 
receptionist just inside the front door. Large packages shipped to the company 
(computers, etc.) are delivered to the loading dock in the rear and handled by the 
Computer Center staff. 
MECHANICAL SYSTEMS 
Heating for the HIC building is provided by a combination of natural gas and 
electricity. This provides a regulated environment for the sensitive computer and 
communications equipment, and a comfortable environment for employees. 
The main heater sends hot air into the heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) 
room, next to the mechanical and electrical (M&E) room. From here it is distributed 
throughout the building. Offices, restrooms and the employee�s lounge are directly 
heated by this warm air. The Computer Center and the Communications Center use 
Digital Environmental Managers (DEMs) to direct the warm air where it is needed, add 
or remove humidity from the air, or even cool some areas while warming others. 
The air used to heat or cool the HIC Headquarters building is filtered in the HVAC room 
using standard industrial grade MERV 8 filters. Outside make-up air is brought in through 
a vent in the wall located approximately 10 feet above ground level. The vent is alarmed 
to prevent intruder access. A screened exhaust duct is on the roof. Airflow throughout the 
building is through a series of ducts hidden in the ceiling of each area. The ducts are 
divided in half to allow them to serve as supply and return headers. The divider is 
insulated to minimize heat transfer from one side to the other. 
The Computer Data Center has two additional air cooling units located in the data 
center and uses the main chill water supply. The Data Center maintains a slight net 
positive pressure compared to the main office areas. 
Figure 11. HVAC Supply 
The return air for the main office space has sufficient room inside the ductwork and 
mechanical room area to incorporate additional filters and equipment. 
Figure 12. HVAC Return 
Cooling (or heat removal) is done by two chillers in the M&E room. Three Trane 100-ton 
chillers are available; normally only two are needed to cover all heat loads. The chillers 
remove heat from the chilled water system, and use the condenser water system to send 
the waste heat to two rooftop cooling towers. The chilled water is then routed from the 
chillers to air handlers for the majority of the building; cooling for the Computer Center 
and the Communications Center is done by directing chilled water to the DEMs. Chiller 
operation along with chilled water and condenser water flow are managed from a single 
control unit in the M&E room. A single chilled water pump provides adequate flow for all 
cooling situations; a backup pump is available at the push of a button. The same is true 
for the condenser water pumps. 
The air intake is exposed and of typical louver construction. 
Figure 13. Air Intake 
Figure 14. Chilled Water System 
The DEMs in the Computer Center and the Communications Center use airflow to 
transfer heat from electronic equipment to the chilled water, and return cool air to the 
equipment. Humidity is raised or lowered as necessary for each area of the room. The 
DEMs operate without the need for frequent monitoring by technicians; parameters and 
flowrates are controlled from a central station based on the needs of individual pieces of 
equipment. 
Natural gas enters the building through two meters under the loading dock staircase and 
goes through the overhead to the M&E room at the building�s southwest corner. Branches 
split off for two gas powered space heaters in the high-bay area by the loading dock. The 
main gas line goes to the main heater in the M&E room. 
Figure 15. Loading Dock Area Figure 16. Gas Meters Under Stairs 
The chillers, pumps, cooling towers, fans, etc., are all powered from the Support Bus 
(SB). The DEMs and all of the building thermostats receive power from the Computer 
Center Bus (CCB). 
Fire Protection and Life Safety 
A key concern for HIC is fire. The building has been designed to meet the latest 
National Fire Prevention and Life Safety Codes. Sprinklers are located throughout the 
building, along with hand-held portable fire extinguishers. There are six exits that can 
be used for evacuation. 
The fire protection and life safety systems consist of a "wet-pipe" single stage sprinkler 
system throughout the building, ceiling mounted automatic fire and smoke detectors 
connected to the central business park fire enunciator panel located in the next building 
and HVAC fire and smoke dampers in the M&E room air handling unit (AHU). There are 
no manual fire pulls, and the sprinkler system header is continuously pressurized, with 
water being held back by the temperature actuated valve on the sprinkler head. Each 
sprinkler head is individually activated by heat; any valve reaching 130� F would open. 
This system would allow a kitchen or office space fire to be extinguished, without 
unnecessarily dousing critical computer equipment with water. However, the sprinkler 
heads are exposed in the overhead of each room, and can be accidentally activated if 
bumped by a ladder, pole, etc. None of the ingress or egress doors have the new 
generation illuminating markings, only the standard door or ceiling mounted exit signs and 
emergency lighting. Should a fire occur, other than the fire detector flashing lights, there is 
not a mass notification system. 
Figure 17. Sprinkler Head 
There are 20 hand-held dry chemical fire extinguishers located throughout the building, 5 
on the mezzanine level, and 15 on the first floor. Filled with monoammonium phosphate 
under approximately 200-250 pounds pressure, these extinguishers are designed to 
combat Class A, B and C fires. The fire extinguishers are visually inspected to make sure 
pressure is in the allowable band on a monthly basis by a local company. 
The Computer Center and the Communications Center are equipped like the rest of the 
building. HIC has a long-term plan to install a clean agent extinguishing system in the 
electronic spaces, but construction has not started. 
The Security Officer maintains the fire evacuation and response plan, has posted fire 
evacuation routes in key office hallways and break areas, and has a key to the building 
that has the main fire panel. The main fire panel is located in the lobby area, which is 
open to unrestricted access during normal business hours. In the event of a fire, the panel 
alerts the local fire department and the security company. 
ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 
Main power for the HIC office is provided by Hazardville Electric Power Company 
through two transformers outside the building. Two sets of buried transmission lines 
deliver 12,470 volt (12.47KV) power to the building from a nearby substation. 
The two 12.47KV feeders lead to two separate transformers outside the building, one near 
the north side, and the other near the south side. The two "mini-mite" pad-mounted 
transformers are rated at 2500KVA, and they reduce the 12.47KV power to 480/277 
volts for distribution around the building. 
Figure 18. One of Two Transformers 
Both transformers are continuously on line, and feed separate loads. Neither is loaded 
above 50 percent, and a tie breaker allows either transformer to support all building loads, 
except during the peak cooling months when three chillers are operating. 
Backup power for HIC is provided by a single diesel generator, located in a shed in 
the rear parking lot. Specs for this Detroit Diesel Model 1250DS-4 Spectrum unit 
follow: 
Model 12V4000 Engine 
Model 7M4052 Generator 
4-Cycle 
Voltage 480/277 VAC 
Turbocharged, Intercooled 
3 Phase/60 Hz 
V-12 Cylinder Configuration 
1250KW/1563KVA 
2975 Cubic Inch Displacement 
1879 Amps 
1800 RPM 
Sustained Short Circuit Current up to 
Max Power 1380 KW/1850 BHP
   300 Percent of Rated for 10 Seconds 
Exhaust Temperature 402� C/755� F 
Brushless, Rotating-Field 
Water Cooled, Electric Start 
Pilot Excited 
319 GPH Fuel Flow at 100 Percent Load 

240 GPH Fuel Flow at 75 Percent Load 
1 Year Limited Warranty 
165 GPH Fuel Flow at 50 Percent Load 


The backup generator is equipped with a 50-gallon day tank, normally kept at least 80 
percent full. The day tank draws fuel from a 2,000-gallon main fuel tank, buried under the 
parking lot near the diesel generator shed. A small electric pump is used to fill the day tank 
when necessary. 
The day tank�s level is measured using a sightglass. The level of the main fuel tank is 
measured with a probe each quarter by a visiting Detroit Diesel representative, who also starts 
the engine to run unloaded for about 20 minutes. Fuel is delivered by a local contractor, who 
normally responds the day after being called. 
The diesel generator is configured to automatically start upon loss of commercial power to 
the CCB. This happens about twice a year due to electrical storms or utility maintenance in 
the neighborhood. An automatic bus transfer switch aligns the generator to the CCB as soon 
as the generator is ready to support the bus loads. This normally takes less than 5 seconds. 
In addition, a manually operated tie breaker is available to supply backup power to the SB 
via the CCB; however, the SB cannot receive backup power by itself. The backup diesel 
generator has never had to support HIC�s power demands for longer than about 2 hours, 
and never with more than one chiller operating. It has never been tested for an extended 
period under heavy load. 
An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) is located inside the building�s "high-bay" area. 
Rated at 1000KVA, it is designed to support all loads on the CCB for up to 60 minutes. The 
diesel generator has never taken more than 30 seconds to start and assume the bus loads. If 
the diesel generator did not start on a loss of commercial power, 60 minutes would be 
ample time for HIC personnel to conduct an orderly shutdown of Computer Center 
equipment. 
The batteries to support the UPS are in a small room next to the UPS room. The only 
instrumentation in the room is a thermometer. The 50 lead-acid batteries are inspected semi-
annually by the manufacturer�s representative. A capacity test discharge was conducted when 
the batteries were installed 2 years ago. The 60-minute endurance was calculated from that 
test. 
HIC�s electrical loads are divided between two main electrical buses, the CCB and the SB. 
They are located in separate "closets" of the building. A tie breaker allows the buses to be 
connected, so they can be powered by a single main transformer, or to allow SB loads to be 
carried by the backup diesel generator. The system is monitored by a digital energy 
management system, which provides indications, alarms, and instructions. 
Figure 19. Electrical "One-Line" Diagram 
Typical of many commercial office buildings, the mechanical and electrical systems share 
common utility penetrations and floor space. There are no redundant utility feeds to the 
building from different directions. 
Figure 20. Mechanical and Electrical Room 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
The Computer Center is the heart of HIC�s operations. The rest of HIC exists to 
support the Computer Center. 
Hardware 
The Computer Center is composed of several interconnected systems and one 
independent system for classified data processing. The systems run VMS, Unix, or 
Windows. Although the equipment list changes almost monthly as systems are upgraded 
and new clients� needs are being met, as of April 2003, the computers included the 
following: 
. � One 4-processor Silicon Graphics Power Challenge 
. � Three dual-processor Silicon Graphics Origin 200 servers 
. � One dual-processor Silicon Graphics Octane 
. � Five Microway Dec Alpha 500 MHz systems (four Unix, one VMS) 
. � Three DEC Alpha 600 5/266 systems 
. � Two IBM RISC 6000/560 systems with 160 and 128 Megabytes (MB) of 
memory 
. � One Stardent 3000 with 128 MB of memory, triple scalar & vector processors 
. � One DEC Alpha-based (RISC) Model 3000/400 VMS workstation 
. � One DEC Vaxstation 4000/90 system with 128 MB of memory 
. � Sixteen Windows based workstations 

Figure 21. Computer Center 
All computers have access to large-capacity disk storage units, with shared mounting of 
major disk units throughout the complex. The VMS systems are configured as a Vax 
cluster; the Unix systems have common user accounts and files. The major systems are 
reachable from throughout the center and also through an Ethernet. The networks 
interface to the company-wide network and through it to the Internet. 
Because some customers rely on HIC to support their data storage needs, the Computer 
Center also contains a massive data storage "jukebox." A StoreAll Model 5500 provides 
fully automated storage, using robot arms to provide rapid retrieval. Its capabilities 
include: 
. � 3.0 Terabyte Total Capacity 
. � 2.5 Megabyte Per Second (MBps) Transfer Rate 
. � 500 CD Per Hour Change Rate 
. � 10,000 CD Storage Rack 

Client data is backed up as requested by the clients, as frequently as once per day. The 
Back-O-Matic digital backup system manages the backup process, selecting which data 
are backed up on which day. All backups are done to CD; these are stored in the 
StoreAll Model 5500. HIC maintains an off-site storage location for clients that require 
backup data to be stored at a separate site. Classified backup data for certain government 
clients are stored in a special fireproof safe in the Secure Space. 
Backup procedures for HIC�s computer operating systems, digital telephones and other 
company systems are similar as for their clients. Most of HIC�s computer systems can 
be used to backup another system. For those systems without in-house backups, 
replacement sources are identified. In most cases, replacement hardware can be delivered 
and setup within 2 days. 
COMMUNICATIONS Data 
HIC has two T1 lines and one T3 line connected at the demark to ATT�s high 
performance backbone network. The ATT fiber connectivity provides more than enough 
bandwidth for HIC�s current needs and planned future expansion. 
Telecom and Network Connections 
. � Two T1 lines (1.544 MBps) 
. � One T3 (45 MBps) 
. � Frame Relay 
. � Narrowband ISDN (64/128 KBps) 

Figure 22. Telecom and Network Connections 
Figure 23. Telecom and Network Connections 
The Cisco powered network features multiple 7500 VXR+ routers. Border Gateway 
Protocol (BGP) reroutes traffic between the routers and to the Internet. A variety of 
switches in the Communications Center and at client sites are used to ensure 
connectivity. Some clients use Hot Standby Routing Protocol (HSRP), which provides 
additional redundancy. 
A variety of firewalls and other security systems are in place to protect the company 
and its clients. The firewall solution is based on the Cisco PIX to provide highly 
resilient firewall protection. Other security systems include reporting and analysis 
tools and network detection devices, which help protect the company�s computers 
from hacking. 
Communications to support HIC�s classified government clients cannot be discussed 
in detail. Nevertheless, they used leased lines for point-to-point connectivity, and 
they are robust, with diversity and redundancy built in. 
Voice 
Although HIC does not provide voice communications services to customers, the need 
to communicate with them quickly and reliably is important. Therefore, the company 
has invested in NEC DS2000 telephone systems, which come with 8-slot cabinets that 
can handle 32 lines from 48 stations. The system�s digital processor provides 
reliability, speed, and features to keep HIC staff members in touch with their 
customers. 
PHYSICAL SECURITY 
Much of the company�s guidance for security comes from the National Industrial 
Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), the government�s guide to protecting 
contractor facilities. The NISPOM is promulgated by the Defense Security Service 
(DSS) and is available on the World Wide Web at: 
http://www.dss.mil/isec/nispom_0195.htm. 
HIC�s Security Officer uses a layered approach to physical security. The outermost 
physical security layer is provided by a contract security firm and the Defense 
Protective Service (DPS). 
The contract security firm periodically patrols the parking lots in marked vehicles. The 
security officers are not armed, but they carry cellular phones to contact the local 
police. These officers do not have security clearances, and are not allowed to enter the 
HIC Headquarters if no employees are present. 
The DPS officers patrol the entire National Capital Region (NCR) and are tasked to 
respond to emergencies at Defense Department or contractor facilities. DPS officers are 
armed and have law enforcement authority. They are allowed to enter the HIC building, 
but normally do not as part of their rounds. 
The parking lot behind the HIC office is well lit and monitored by older generation 
analog CCTV cameras using telephone wires that are connected to video displays in 
the HIC Security Officer�s office and recorded on standard VHS tape. The CCTVs are 
commercial grade black and white with a 180-degree field of view that the security 
officer can control via the display panel. The front parking lot is lit, but not monitored. 
HIC�s middle layer of security is the building envelope. The building is monitored by 
door and window alarms, which connect to ADT, the nationwide alarm company. 
Unauthorized opening of any door or window will immediately notify ADT via 
telephone. ADT will normally call the HIC Security Office prior to contacting the police 
and DPS. HIC employees have proximity cards to allow them to enter the front and 
loading dock doors without activating the alarm. 
Figure 24. Proximity Cards Readers and Alarms 
Figure 25. Security Lighting Figure 26. Electronic Badge Reader 
Figure 27. Motion Detector 
The innermost layer of physical security involves the Computer Center and the 
Communications Center. Equipped with locked doors, these two rooms meet the 
government�s requirements for handling classified material. Only authorized employees 
possess the necessary proximity cards and PINs to gain access. Unauthorized access to 
either space will sound sirens, flash lights, and notify the HIC Security Officer and DPS. 
The access doors are not manned or monitored with cameras. The crawl spaces created by 
the raised floor in the Computer Center are barricaded by a wire fence in the three 
locations where it can be accessed from other parts of the building. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
In the event of an emergency, HIC senior management use the large conference room as an 
Emergency Operations Center. The room is equipped with network and telephone 
connections and cell phones are able to receive a signal. 
Figure 28. Large Conference Room, Emergency Operations 
The nearest fire station is approximately 21/2 miles north of the HIC Headquarters. Seven 
other fire stations are within 5 miles of the site. Firefighters are trained as Emergency 
Medical Technicians (EMTs) and Hazardous Material Technicians. Many are also skilled 
in technical rescue (high places, confined spaces, etc.). Ambulances are also dispatched 
from these stations. Emergency response time for emergencies is estimated to be 8-10 
minutes. Fire hydrants are available in the office park. 
The nearest hospital with an emergency room is 5 miles away. Other emergency 
response information includes: 
. �	Exit signs: Located above each exit. 
. �	Battery operated emergency lights: Strategically placed throughout the 
building. 
. �	Emergency exits: Normally closed and locked doors have "panic bars" for 
use in emergencies. 
. �	Announcing system: The telephone system has a building-wide 
announcing feature that can be activated by pressing one button at any phone. 
. �	Evacuation plan and escape ladders for the mezzanine: None. 
. �	Emergency stairway: Located far from main stairs. 

NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS 
Natural Disasters Hazards 
The county�s Local Emergency Planning Committee provided the following 
information regarding natural disasters: 
. � The state experiences an average of 7 tornadoes/hurricanes per year. 
. � The area�s earthquake risk is 1 (Scale 0-4). 
. � The state experiences 80-100 days per year with one or more lightning strikes. 

Technological Disasters Hazards 
HIC is surrounded by a number of commercial activities and key national critical 
infrastructure to include HAZMAT facilities, HAZMAT being transported on the roads 
and rails, a nearby fuel tank farm, and an airport. 
Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Facilities 
There are two large manufacturing plants with large quantities of hazardous materials 
stored on site within 2 miles of the HIC Headquarters, one to the north and the other to 
the southwest. In addition, there are more than a dozen Tier II HAZMAT Facilities 
within 3 miles of the building (in all directions). 
The prevailing weather pattern for the area in the summer and fall is from the south 
Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. Warm, moist air brings thunderstorms and higher 
humidity. In the fall, cooler air from the north and west returns. Winter weather blasts 
across the state from the northern or central part of the continent. With no other weather 
activity, the prevailing wind is normally from the south in the Summer and from the 
north-northwest in the Winter. 
None of the nearby facilities were contacted during this analysis. There is no 
information available regarding accidents or incidents involving these facilities. 
Highway Movement of Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) 
A major interstate highway is located within 1/4 mile of the HIC Headquarters. 
Approximately 5,000 trucks per day pass the HIC office on the nearby interstate 
highway. About 30 percent of these trucks (1,500 trucks/day) carry placards indicating 
that HAZMAT is aboard, but only about 5 percent (250 trucks/day) carry sufficient 
HAZMAT to warrant placarding. 
Approximately 50 percent of the HAZMAT passing the HIC office is Class 3 
(flammable and combustible liquids). Class 2 (gases) and Class 8 (corrosives) each 
constitute about 15 percent. Approximately 10 percent of the trucks carry more than 
one class of HAZMAT. 
Figure 29. HAZMAT Truck on Interstate Highway 
The State Police Department inspects 5-10 percent of the HAZMAT carrying trucks on 
interstate highways. 
Approximately 476 incidents involving the transportation of HAZMAT occur each 
year in the county in which HIC is located. Most of these involve flammable gas and 
liquids. Only one HAZMAT incident took place on a highway within 2 miles of HIC 
in the period 1995 to 2002. 
Rail Movement of Hazardous Material 
CSX Transportation and Norfolk-Southern Railway maintain a transportation corridor 
approximately 1/2 mile from HIC. There appear to be no restrictions on the material 
carried along these rail lines. Neither company was available for interviews. 
Nevertheless, rail traffic has been informally monitored in this area. It is estimated 
that approximately 10,000 railcars of HAZMAT move through this area each 
year. Hazardous materials range from liquid petroleum products to chlorine to 
anhydrous ammonia. 
There are no recent records of any HAZMAT spills or incidents involving rail 
transportation in the county in which HIC is located. 
Liquid Fuels 
A leg of the Piedmont Petroleum Pipeline (PPP) runs underneath the office park in the 
vicinity of HIC Headquarters. Part of Piedmont�s regional network, this portion of the 
pipeline normally carries a variety of refined products, including commercial and military 
jet fuels, diesel and three grades of gasoline, home heating fuels, etc. Four buried pipes 
carry approximately 20 million gallons per day. 
There is no available information regarding any pipeline ruptures or incidents in the 
vicinity of HIC. 
Connected to the pipeline, less than 1 mile from HIC, is a 20-million gallon capacity fuel 
farm. Operated by the Shellexxico Company, this tank farm stores a variety of petroleum 
products, primarily gasoline. Although representatives of Shellexxico were unavailable for 
an interview, their operations appear to conform to industry standards. Thirteen tank 
trucks were observed leaving the tank farm in a 1- hour period, indicating a calculated 
movement rate of approximately 300 trucks per day (about 3 million gallons of fuel). 
Figure 30. Shellexxico Tank Farm 
Based on terrain elevation data, the ground level of the tank farm is 6 feet higher than the 
ground level at HIC. Only some of the fuel tanks are bermed, but leaking fuel is not likely 
to reach HIC�s office park; the interstate highway between the two is 10 feet lower than 
the tank farm. 
Air Traffic 
Two airports are in the vicinity of HIC. One is a major international airport 
approximately 8 miles away. The other is a small, but busy general aviation airport less 
than 2 miles away. The office park in which HIC is located is in direct line with one of the 
approach and departure paths of this regional airport. 
The website for the regional airport indicates it is capable of handling business jets, 
providing jet fuel and high octane aviation gasoline and other services. 
The airport is tower controlled and handles approximately 100,000 flights per year. 
THREAT ANALYSIS 
The following information was obtained from the regional office of the FBI and the State 
Police: 
Terrorist Threat 
Since September 11, 2001, the terrorist threat in the area has been Yellow or Orange. 
Yellow has been the norm, except for the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and during the 
recent war in Iraq. 
Yellow Definition: Elevated risk of terrorist attack, but a specific region of the United 
States or target has not been identified 
Orange Definition: Credible intelligence indicates that there is a high risk of a local 
terrorist attack, but a specific target has not been identified. 
The elevated and high threat condition is not due to any specific information or threat to 
the area in which the HIC office is located, but rather due to the proximity to the 
metropolitan area, nearby military installations, etc. 
There is no known threat to HIC Incorporated, any of its officers or employees. 
There are no known threats to any of the companies within the office park. Nearby 
commercial entities that are likely terrorist targets include the Shellexxico tank farm, 
two rail lines, the busy interstate highway, and the transformer substation. 
Although HIC is probably not a primary target, there is a military installation within 
10 miles, two large prime contractors and one federal agency office in the business 
park, and potential collateral damage or targeting of HIC as an alternate if those 
organizations are targeted and attacked. 
Intelligence Threat 
The HIC Security Officer maintains close coordination with government security officers 
and law enforcement agents as part of his normal duties. All HIC employees hold security 
clearances, Secret or higher. This makes them targets for foreign intelligence services. 
Although there has been no known case of an HIC employee being approached by a 
foreign intelligence agent, this is certainly a possibility. The company follows 
counterintelligence guidance and procedures from the Defense Security Service (DSS) and 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) regarding: 
. � Risk management of classified programs in industry 
. � Threat awareness 
. � Deterrence of illegal technology transfers 
. � Facilitating the prevention of economic espionage in defense contractor facilities 

Criminal Threat 
Gangs and Drugs 
There are several gangs operating in the metropolitan area and they have been 
responsible for a number of gang related murders. Drug activity continues to be a 
problem in the metropolitan area, but less so in the suburbs. There has not been any 
gang or drug activity near the HIC building. 
Violent Crime 
The 2002 Crime Index, which is composed of murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft, was relatively unchanged from 
2001 figures. In 2002, a woman waiting at a bus stop near HIC�s office complex was 
assaulted; there have been no other reported crimes in the "neighborhood." 
Year 2000 Area Crime Comparison (Rates per 100,000 population) 
Crime 
County
 State 
United States 
Murder 
1.30
 5.7
 5.5 
Rape
 10.74
 22.8
 32.0 
Robbery
 41.32
 88.9
 144.9 
Aggravated Assault 
40.02
 164.3
 323.6 
Burglary
 155.95
 429.9
 728.4 
Larceny 
1950.84
 2064.8 
2457.3 
Vehicle Theft 
197.27
 251.6
 414.2 

Other Crimes: Employee Fraud and Identity Theft have become a growing problem in the 
state in which HIC is located. County crime statistics indicate these problems are prevalent 
nearby, and a nearby business lost $11,000 to "trusted employees" in 2001, but there have 
been no indications of such problems at HIC. 
DESIGN BASIS THREAT 
The senior management of HIC reviewed the site, building, and threat information 
collected, and determined the Design Basis Threat to be: Explosive Blast: Car Bomb - 
approximately 250 lb. TNT equivalent.  Truck Bomb approximately 5,000 lb. TNT 
equivalent (Murrah Federal Building class weapon) 
Chemical: Large quantity gasoline spill and toxic plume from the adjacent tank farm, 
small quantity (tanker truck and rail car size) spills of HAZMAT materials 
(chlorine). 
Biological: Anthrax delivered by mail or in packages, smallpox distributed by spray 
mechanism mounted on truck or aircraft around metropolitan area. 
Radiological: Small "dirty" bomb detonation within the 10-mile radius of the HIC 
building. 
Criminal Activity/Armed Attack: High powered rifle or handgun exterior shooting 
(sniper attack or direct assault on key staff, damage to infrastructure [i.e., transformers, 
chillers, etc.]). 
Cyber Attack: Focus on IT and building systems infrastructure (SCADA, alarms, etc.) 
accessible via internet access. Computer Data Center and Communications Center 
supporting infrastructure (e.g., firewalls, routers, main distribution rooms, backup tapes 
storage, etc.) location, redundancy, and power supply meet NIST and industry 
standards for physical access and protection. The analysis is not to include information 
assurance assessment activities (e.g., password, network monitoring, host and intrusion 
detection, etc.). 
LEVEL OF PROTECTION 
Based on the Design Basis Threat and after reviewing the General Services Administration 
(GSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) standards, senior management selected 
preliminary Levels of Protection most applicable to HIC, with the guidance that adoption 
of any recommendations would be to the most stringent standard and would be in 
compliance with life safety codes. After the vulnerability and risk assessments were 
complete and mitigation options developed, final selection of mitigation options would be 
made by senior management and determined on a benefit-cost and risk reduction basis. 
The Levels of Protection to be used as the basis for the vulnerability and risk assessments 
are: 
GSA Level II 
A Level II facility has between 11 and 150 employees and from 2,500 to 80,000 square 
feet. 
1. Perimeter Security 
 .a. Security control for parking (surface lots, adjacent structures, underground garages 
under the Lessor's control) is solely limited to the assignment (marked "reserved") of 
authorized Government parking spaces and vehicles. 
 .b. Adequate lighting, with emergency power backup, for the exterior of the building is 
required. Parking areas shall also be adequately lighted. 
 .c. 24-hour CCTV surveillance cameras with time-lapse video recording may be required 
as deemed necessary by a Security Specialist. 
 .d. Application of shatter-resistant material shall be applied on exterior windows.  

2. Entry Security 
 .a. Security Guards may be required, as deemed necessary by a Security Specialist. 
 .b. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with central monitoring capability may be required, 
as deemed necessary by a Security Specialist, for the building exterior. 
 .c. Peepholes in exterior doors may be required, as deemed necessary by a Security 
Specialist, when an IDS is not appropriate. 
 .d. An intercom system, used in conjunction with a peephole, may be required as deemed 
necessary by a Security Specialist. 
 .e. Entry control with CCTV and door strikes may be required to allow employees to 
view and communicate remotely with visitors before allowing access, as deemed 
necessary by a Security Specialist. 
 .f. Exterior entrances shall have high security locks.

3. Interior Security 
 .a. A visitor control/screening system is not required for these levels.
 .b. Utility areas shall be secured and only authorized personnel shall have access.
 .c. Emergency power sources to critical systems (i.e., alarm systems, radio 
communications, computer facilities, CCTV monitoring, fire detection, entry control 
devices, etc.) are required. 
 .d. The following requirements pertain to the added protection of the building 
environment from airborne chemical, biological, or radiological attacks. 
 .(1)  Access to mechanical areas and building roofs shall be strictly controlled. 
 .(2) Access to building information, including mechanical, electrical, vertical transport, fire 
and life safety, security system plans and schematics, computer automation systems, and 
emergency operations procedures shall be required. Such information shall be released to 
 .authorized personnel only. Names and locations of Government tenants shall not be 
disclosed within any publicly accessed document or record. 
 .(3) Procedures (should airborne hazards be suspected or found) are required for the 
notification of the lessor's building manager, building security guard desk, local emergency 
personnel, or other Government emergency personnel, for the possible shutdown of air 
handling units serving any possibly affected areas. 

4. Administrative Procedures 
 .a. Building managers and owners are required to cooperate with and participate in the 
development and implementation of Government Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs). 
 .b. Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control procedures for 
contract service personnel as deemed necessary. 
 .c. The Government reserves the right, at it's own expense and manpower, to temporarily 
upgrade security during heightened security conditions due to emergency situations such 
as terrorist attacks, natural disaster and civil unrest. The measures shall be in accordance 
with the latest version of the Homeland Security Advisory System. 

5. Blast/Setback Standards 
a. The following blast/setback standards shall be met: 
1. For Level II, a 20 foot setback1 guideline with appropriate window glazing, 
as prescribed by WINGARD 3.15 or later or WINLAC 4.3 software, to 
achieve a glazing performance condition of 3b2 and a fa�ade protection level of 
"medium"3 given a blast load standard of 4 psi/28 psi-msec is required.      
1 Setback refers to the distance from the face of the building's exterior to the 
protected/defended perimeter (i.e., any potential point of explosion). This would 
mean the distance from the building to the curb or other boundary protected by 
bollards, planters, or other street furniture.  Such potential points of explosion may 
be, but not limited to, such areas that could be accessible by any motorized vehicle 
(i.e., street, alley, sidewalk, driveway, parking lot). 
2 Glazing Performance Condition 3b provides for a high protection level and a low 
hazard level. For a blast of 4psi/28psi-msec, the glazing cracks and fragments 
enter the space and land on the floor not further than 10 feet from the window. 
3 A "Medium Level Protection" to the facade will result in moderate, but repairable 
damage. The facility or protected space will sustain a significant degree of damage, 
but the structure should be reusable. Some casualties may occur and assets may be 
damaged. Building elements other than major structural members may require 
replacement. 
DoD Standards 
HIC senior management evaluated the DoD standards and determined that they would 
attempt to meet the intent and objective of as many of the recommendations as possible. 
Of particular concern are blast, CBR, and associated operations/locations of functions and 
equipment such as mailrooms, dumpsters, loading docks, and emergency shut down. 
The DoD level of protection selected is "low", and the building category is "Inhabited 
Building". 
UFC 4-010-01 APPENDIX B DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR 
NEW AND EXISTING BUILDINGS 
Standard 1 
Minimum Standoff Distances 
Standard 2 
Unobstructed Space 
Standard 3 
Drive-Up/Drop-Off Areas 
Standard 4 
Access Roads 
Standard 5 
Parking Beneath Buildings or on Rooftops 
Standard 6 
Progressive Collapse Avoidance 
Standard 7 
Structural Isolation 
Standard 8 
Building Overhangs 
Standard 9 
Exterior Masonry Walls 
Standard 10 
Windows and Glazed Doors 
Standard 11 
Building Entrance Layout 
Standard 12 
Exterior Doors 
Standard 13 
Mailrooms 
Standard 14 
Roof Access 

Standard 15 
Overhead Mounted Architectural Features 
Standard 16 
Air Intakes 
Standard 17 
Mailroom Ventilation 
Standard 18 
Emergency Air Distribution Shutoff 
Standard 19 
Utility Distribution and Installation 
Standard 20 
Equipment Bracing 
Standard 21 
Under Building Access 
Standard 22 
Mass Notification 
Recommendation 1 
Vehicle Access Points 
Recommendation 2 
High-Speed Vehicle Approaches 
Recommendation 3 
Vantage Points 
Recommendation 4 
Drive-Up/Drop-Off 
Recommendation 5 
Building Location 
Recommendation 6 
Railroad Location 
Recommendation 7 
Access Control for Family Housing 
Recommendation 8 
Standoff for Family Housing 
Recommendation 9 
Minimize Secondary Debris 
Recommendation 10 
Structural Redundancy 
Recommendation 11 
Internal Circulation 
Recommendation 12 
Visitor Control 
Recommendation 13 
Asset Location 
Recommendation 14 
Room Layout 
Recommendation 15 
External Hallways 
Recommendation 16 
Windows 

Level of 
Potential Structural 
Potential Door and 
Potential Injury 
Protection 
Damage 
Glazing 



Hazards 

Low 
Damaged � unrepairable. 
Major deformation of 
nonstructural elements 
and secondary structural 
members and minor 
deformation of primary 
structural members, but 
progressive collapse is 
unlikely. 
Glazing will break, 
but fall within 1 
meter of the wall or 
otherwise not present 
a significant fragment 
hazard. Doors may 
fail, but they will 
rebound out of their 
frames, presenting 
minimal hazards. 
Majority of 
personnel suffer 
significant injuries. 
There may be a few 
(<10%) fatalities 

Location 
Building 
Standoff Distance or Separation Requirements 

Category 



Applicable 
Conventional 
Effective 
Applicable 


Level of 
Construction 
Stand-off 
Explosives 


Protection 
Stand-off 
Distance 
Weight 



Distance 


Controlled 
Inhabited 
Very Low 
25 M 
10 M 
Approx 
Perimeter or 
Building 

82 ft 
33 ft 
250 lbs 
Parking and 





Roadways without 





a Controlled 





Perimeter 






Figure 31. DoD Stand-off Distance