Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
U
nit 
IX 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 150 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Building Design Guidance 
OBJECTIVES 
1. 1.	Explain architectural considerations to mitigate impacts from blast effects 
and transmission of chemical, biological, and radiological agents from exterior and interior 
incidents 
2. 2.	Identify key elements of building structural and nonstructural systems for 
mitigation of blast effects 
3. 3.	Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical system, 
electrical system, fire protection system, and communications system mitigation 
measures, including synergies and conflicts 
4. 4.	Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual design 
and identify mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Architectural considerations, including building configuration, space design, 
and special situations 
2. 2.	Building structural and nonstructural considerations with emphasis on 
progressive collapse, loads and stresses, and good engineering practices 
3. 3.	Design issues for the building envelope, including wall design, window 
design, door design, and roof system design with approaches to define levels of protection 
4. 4.	Mechanical system design issues, including interfacing with operational 
procedures, emergency plans, and training 
5. 5.	Other building systems design consideration for electrical, fire protection, 
communications, electronic security, entry control, and physical security that mitigate the 
effects of a threat or hazard 
6. 6.	Do an Activity that encompasses identified high risk pairs (asset � 
threat/hazard) in the threat-vulnerability matrix developed for the Case Study and select 
mitigation measures that reduce vulnerability and associated risk from the building 
perspective 

Unit IX


REFERENCES 
1. 1. FEMA 426, Instructor Guide, and Student Manual. 
2. 2.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings, pages 3-1 to 3-46 and 3-48 to 3-52; Checklist at end of Chapter 1. 
3. 3.	FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate 
Terrorist Attacks 
4. 4.	 FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components in 
Architectural Design 
5. 5. Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
6. 6. Unit IX visuals 


REQUIREMENTS 
1. 1. FEMA 426, pages 3-1 to 3-52 
2. 2. Unit IX visuals 
3. 3. Instructor Guide 
4. 4. Student Manual (one per student) 
5. 5. Overhead projector or computer display unit 
6. 6. Chart paper, easel, and markers 

UNIT IX OUTLINE 
Time 
Page 
IX. Building Design Guidance 
150 minutes 
IG IX-1 
1. 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
10 minutes 
IG IX-4 
2. 
Architectural Considerations 
15 minutes 
IG IX-6 
3. 
Structural and Nonstructural Considerations 
15 minutes 
IG IX-12 
4. 
Building Envelope Considerations 
15 minutes 
IG IX-16 
5. 
Other Building Systems 
15 minutes 
IG IX-26 
6. 
Walk-through of Building Vulnerability Assessment 
40 minutes 
IG IX-37 

Checklist 


7. 
Activity: Building Design Guidance 
40 minutes 
IG IX-39 

Unit IX


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
. �	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to 
identify topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity:  The students will continue the familiarization with the Case 
Study materials. The Case Study is a complete risk assessment and analysis of mitigation 
options and strategies for a typical commercial office building located in a mixed urban-
suburban environment business park. The assessment will use the DoD Antiterrorism 
standards and the GSA Interagency Security Criteria to determine Levels of Protection 
and identify specific vulnerabilities. Mitigation options and strategies will use the 
concepts provided in FEMA 426 and other standard reference materials such as the RS 
Means Building Security: Strategy and Costs, NFPA 5000, and other FEMA publications 
related to emergency planning and disaster recovery. 
. �	Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-1 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Unit IX Building Design Guidance 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit IX Building Design Guidance. Continuing with our understanding of 
vulnerability and mitigation measures, we have looked at site and layout concerns and 
now turn our attention to what considerations are needed in building design to mitigate 
tactics involving explosive blast or CBR agents. 
We will examine design considerations that achieve a balanced building envelope that 
provides a defensive layer against the given terrorist tactic and avoids creating ripple 
effects where one incident may affect more than one building system. 
Catastrophic collapse of any building is a primary concern. Historically, the majority of 
fatalities that occur in terrorist attacks directed against buildings are due to building 
collapse. This was true for the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 when 87 percent of the 
building occupants who were killed were in the collapsed portion of the Murrah Federal 
Building. But glass causes over 80 percent of injuries during bomb blast and there are 
some low cost techniques to keep CBR agents outside of buildings or to limit their spread 
inside. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-2 
Unit Objectives 
Explain architectural considerations to mitigate impacts from blast effects and transmission of chemical, biological, and 
radiological agents from exterior and interior incidents. 
Identify key elements of building structural and non-
structural systems for mitigation of blast effects.

Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical system, electrical system, fire protection system, and 
communication system mitigation measures, including synergies and conflicts. 
Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual design and identify mitigation measures needed to reduce 
vulnerabilities. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-2 
VISUAL IX-3 
Overview 
Architectural
Building Structural and Nonstructural Considerations
Building Envelope Considerations
Other Building Systems
Building Mitigation Measures
Activity

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-3 
Note that one mitigation measure may reduce the risk of more than one asset � 
threat/hazard pair as illustrated by Table 2-1 of FEMA 426, where a mitigation measure 
may apply to multiple tactics. 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Explain architectural considerations due to impact from blast effects and 
transmission of chemical, biological, and radiological agents from exterior and interior 
incidents. 
2. 2.	Identify key elements of building structural and nonstructural systems for 
mitigation of blast effects. 
3. 3.	Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical system, 
electrical system, fire protection system, and communication system mitigation measures, 
including synergies and conflicts. 

Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual design and identify 
mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities. 
Overview 
. �	Architectural 
. �	Building Structural and Nonstructural Considerations 
. �	Building Envelope Considerations 
. �	Other Building Design Issues 
. �	Building Mitigation Measures 
. �	Activity 

IG IX -5 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-4 
Architectural Building Configuration 
Tall, Small Footprint 
Low, Large Footprint 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-4 
Architectural Building Configuration (1) 
Designers should balance a number of relevant considerations to the extent that site, 
economic, and other factors allow. 
Some of the relevant considerations include the following: 
. �	The shape of the building 
. �	Low, large footprint buildings 
. �	Tall, small footprint buildings 

General benefits of the two basic approaches: 
Low, Large Footprint: 
. �	Reduced effect of explosive blast (catches less of the blast wave) 
. �	Reduced effect of progressive collapse (less of the building can fall) 
. �	Reduced surveillance or easier mitigation (lower height allows terrain and 
landscaping options) 
 �	Better energy conservation (green roof potential and earth-sheltered 
design) 
 Tall, Small Footprint: 
. �	Reduced blast effects on upper floors 
. �	Air intakes better protected against CBR events 
. �	Site runoff reduced, reducing culvert size as a covert entry point 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-5 
VISUAL IX-6 
Architectural Building Configuration 
Ground floor elevation 4 feet above grade
Orient glazing perpendicular 
Avoid exposed structural 

elements 
Pitched roofs and pitched 
window sills 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-6 
Architectural Building Configuration (2) 
A lot can be done architecturally to mitigate the effects of a terrorist bombing on a 
facility. These measures often cost nothing or very little if implemented early in the 
design process. Future FEMA 430 will contain an expanded discussion of incorporating 
security components in architectural design. 
�	Further looking at building shapes, certain configurations trap the blast wave 
increasing overall damage to the structure. For example, "U" or "L" shaped buildings, 
overhangs, and re-entrant corners in general should be avoided. 
Architectural -Building Configuration (3): 
. �	Elevating the ground floor makes moving vehicle attack more difficult 
. �	If the glazing looks perpendicular to the direction of travel for the blast 
wave, the glass sees less reflected pressure. 
. �	Do not have structural elements, like columns, easily exposed on the 
outside of the building. This goes for any architectural feature that can become damaged or 
disconnected by a blast wave. 
. �	If armed attack includes Molotov cocktails or home-made grenades, 
pitched roofs and pitched window sills tend to cause the thrown item to roll off and away 
from the building. Air intakes have similar considerations. 

IG IX -7 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-7 
VISUAL IX-8 
Architectural � Space Design (2) 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-8 
Architectural -Space Design (1) 
Unsecured areas should be physically separated from the main building to the extent 
possible. 
For example, a separate lobby pavilion or loading dock outside the main footprint 
provides enhanced protection against damages and potential building collapse in the event 
of an explosion. Similarly, placing parking areas outside the main footprint of the building 
can be highly effective in reducing the vulnerability to catastrophic collapse. 
The protection of the building interior can be divided into two categories: 
. � Functional layout 
. � Structural layout 

Architectural -Space Design (2) 
In terms of functional layout, public areas such as the lobby, loading dock, mail room, 
garage, and retail areas need to be separated from the more secured areas of the facility. 
This can be done by creating internal "hard lines" or buffer zones, using secondary 
stairwells, elevator shafts, corridors, and storage areas between public and secured 
areas. 
In lobby areas, the architect would be wise to consider the queuing requirements in front 
of the inspection stations so that visitors are not forced to stand outside during bad 
weather conditions or in a congested line inside a small lobby while waiting to enter the 
secured areas. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-9 
Architectural � Space Design (3) 
Eliminate hiding places
Interior barriers 
Offset doorways
Minimize glazing, 

particularly interior glazing 
near high-risk areas

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-9 
VISUAL IX-10 
Architectural � Other Design Elements 
Safe havens
Office locations 
Mixed occupancies
Public toilets and service areas
Retail uses in the lobby 
Stairwells 
Mailroom

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-10 
For additional information on safe havens, see FEMA 428. 
Architectural -Space Design (3) 
In this slide, a range of design measures are presented that � when implemented � can 
increase the safety of the building�s occupants from the effects of blast. 
Architectural - Other Design Elements 
When designing high-risk buildings, engineers and architects should consider the following: 
The innermost layer of protection within a physical security system is the safe 
haven. Safe havens are not intended to withstand a disciplined, paramilitary attack 
featuring explosives and heavy weapons. 
Offices considered to be high risk (more likely to be targeted by terrorists) should be 
placed or glazed so that the occupants cannot be seen from an uncontrolled public area 
such as a street. Whenever possible, these spaces should face courtyards, internal sites, or 
controlled areas. 
Mixed occupancies. High-risk tenants should not be housed with low-risk tenants. 
Terrorists may identify some targets based on their symbology, visibility, ideology, 
political views, potential for publicity, or simply the consequences of their loss. 
Public toilets and service areas, or access to vertical circulation systems should not be


IG IX -9 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-11 
Progressive Collapse Design 
GSA Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design Guidance for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects 
DoD Unified Facilities Criteria -Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-11 
To minimize the potential for progressive collapse, designers should understand the 
following: 
located in any non-secure areas, including the queuing area before visitor screening at the 
public entrance. 
Retail and other mixed uses, which have been encouraged in public buildings by the 
Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act of 1976, create spaces that are open and inviting. 
Although important to the public nature of the buildings, the presence of retail and other 
mixed uses may present a risk to buildings and their occupants and should be carefully 
considered on a project-specific basis during project design. 
Stairwells required for emergency egress should be located as remotely as possible from 
areas where blast events might occur and, wherever possible, should not discharge into 
lobbies, parking, or loading areas. 
Mailroom should be located away from facility main entrances areas containing critical 
services, utilities, distribution systems, and important assets. 
Progressive Collapse Design 
Progressive collapse is a situation where local failure of a primary structural component 
leads to the collapse of adjoining members, which, in turn, leads to additional collapse. 
Hence, the total damage is disproportionate to the original cause. Progressive collapse is 
a chain reaction of structural failures that follows from damage to a relatively small 
portion of a structure. Information on progressive collapse can also be found in FEMA 
427. 
Buildings should be designed with the intent of reducing the potential for progressive 
collapse as a result of an abnormal loading event, regardless of the required level of 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
. �	The use of redundant lateral and vertical forces is highly encouraged. 
. �	Ductile materials are needed for both primary and secondary structural 
elements to be capable of deforming well beyond the elastic limit. 
. �	Both the primary and secondary structural elements should be designed to 
resist load reversals. 
. �	Primary structural elements should be able to resist shear failures by 
having flexural capacity greater than shear capacity. 

VISUAL IX-12 protection. 
. �	Primary structural elements are columns girders and roof beams that are 
the first items for design to prevent progressive collapse. 
. �	Secondary structural elements, such as floor beams and slabs, also may 
contribute to progressive collapse, such as by slenderizing a column due to loss of 
connections. 
. �	Primary nonstructural elements, such as ceilings and heavy suspended 
mechanical equipment contribute to casualties but not progressive collapse. 
. �	Secondary nonstructural elements, such as partitions, furniture, and light 
fixtures, like primary nonstructural elements also contribute to casualties, but not 
progressive collapse. 

Progressive Collapse Concept 
The GSA and DoD require that the structural response of a building be analyzed in a 
test that removes a key structural element (e.g., vertical load carrying column, section of 
bearing wall, beam, etc.) to simulate local damage from an explosion. If effective 
alternative load paths are available for redistributing the loads, originally supported by 
the removed structural element, the building has a low potential for progressive collapse. 
. �	If a column is lost, will the rest of the building still stand? 
. �	If an exterior beam is lost, will the rest of the building still stand? 

If the threat can get to an interior column or beam, the same questions apply.


IG IX -11 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-13 
Structural Systems -Collapse 
GSA and DoD criteria do not provide specific guidance for an engineering structural response model. 
Owner and design team should decide how much 
progressive collapse analysis and mitigation to 
incorporate into design.

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-13 
Structural System Collapse 
. �	Although these criteria provide specific guidance on which structural 
elements must be analyzed for removal from the structural design configuration, they do 
not provide specific guidance for choosing an engineering structural response model for 
verifying the effectiveness of alternate load paths. 
. �	Unless a building is being designed to meet the GSA or DOD criteria, it is 
up to the owner and the design team to decide how much progressive collapse analysis 
and mitigation to incorporate into their design. 
. �	Priority should be given to the critical elements that are essential to 
mitigating the extent of collapse. Designs for secondary structural elements should 
minimize injury and damage. 
. �	Consideration should be given to reducing damage and injury from primary 
as well as secondary nonstructural elements. 

Both GSA and DoD take a threat-independent approach to progressive collapse � it does 
not matter how big the explosive weapon is, the building will remain standing if a column 
or beam is removed. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-14 
VISUAL IX-15 
Nonstructural elements 
False ceilings, light fixtures, venetian blinds, ductwork, air conditioners, and other 
equipment may become flying debris in the event of an explosion. 
Wherever possible, it is recommended that the design be simplified to limit these hazards. 
Placing heavy equipment such as air conditioners near the floor rather than the ceiling is 
one idea; using curtains rather than Venetian blinds, and using exposed duct works as an 
architectural device are others. 
Loads and Stresses - Collapse 
Structures should be designed to resist blast loads. The DoD designates the level of blast 
protection a building must meet based on how many occupants it contains and its 
function. The demands on the structure will be equal to the combined effects of dead, live, 
and blast loads. Blast loads or dynamic rebound may occur in directions opposed to 
typical gravity loads. 
Ronan Point had a whole section of the building collapse due to one wall in one 
apartment being lost. That changed the British Code to prevent that occurrence. Khobar 
Towers was designed to the British Code, and only the fa�ade was lost. The Murrah 
Federal Building was not designed to the British Code and the loss of one column then 
affected a transfer girder due to discontinuities in columns across the lobby, resulting in 
load transfers that the building could not handle.


IG IX -13 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-16 
Good Engineering Guidelines (1) 
The following guidelines are commonly used to mitigate the effects of blast on structures 
and to mitigate the potential for progressive collapse. These guidelines are not meant to be 
complete, but are provided to assist the designer in the initial evaluation and selection of 
design approaches. For example: 
. �	Consider incorporating internal damping into the structural system to 
absorb the blast impact.  While mass has been the blast design approach in the past, using 
more ductile materials with damping is being investigated. 
. �	The use of symmetric reinforcement can increase the ultimate load 
capacity of the structure. This is especially true for load reversals on floor slabs. 
. �	Consider wire mesh in plaster to reduce the incidence of flying fragments. 
. �	Recognize that components might act in opposite directions than designed. 
. �	Lap splices must be upgraded from those found in conventional 
construction to handle the forces during a blast event. Consider interlocking "J" splices. 

VISUAL IX-17 
Good Engineering Guidelines (2) 
Additional good engineering practices include: 
. �	A practical upper level for column spacing is 30 feet, 20 feet is better. If 
the column is lost, the remaining beam must span 40 to 60 feet. Above 60 feet, the beam 
becomes unreasonably large. 
. �	In general, floor to floor heights should be minimized. Unless there is an 
overriding architectural requirement, a practical limit 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
is generally less than or equal to 16 feet. Consider bond beams, as used in seismic 
zones, to reduce the effective height of the wall. 
. �	Avoid the use of unreinforced masonry when blast is a threat. Masonry 
walls break up readily and become secondary fragments during blasts. Grout (mass) and 
reinforcement (ductility) are definitely required for blast resistance. 
. �	Using one-way wall elements adds to prevention of progressive collapse. 
Although we are seeking a building envelope with balanced blast resistance, we would like 
the framing to be the last thing to fail. 
. �	In many cases, the ductile detailing requirements for seismic design and the 
alternate load paths provided by progressive collapse design assist in the protection from 
blast. 
. �	By keeping a 6-inch stand-off from vertical load carrying members, a small 
weapons charge is less likely to shear the member. 
 �	The designer must bear in mind, however, that the design approaches are, 
at times, in conflict. These conflicts must be worked out on a case by case basis. 
 Finally, designers should note that: 
. �	Deflections around certain members, such as windows, should be 
controlled to prevent premature failure. Additional reinforcement is generally required. 
Window frame deflection must not cause premature window glazing failure and window 
frame deflection must not differ greatly from the wall deflections. Seismic pinning of 
window frames may be required. 


IG IX -15 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES
	CONTENT/ACTIV
ITY 
VISUAL IX-18 
Building Materials: General 
Guidance 
. � All building materials and types acceptable under model building codes are 
allowed. 
. �	Special consideration should be given to materials that have inherent 
flexibility and that are better able to respond to load reversals (i.e., cast in place reinforced 
concrete and steel construction). 
. �	Careful detailing is required for material such as pre-stressed concrete, pre-
cast concrete, and masonry (brick and concrete masonry unit) to adequately respond to 
the design loads. Even calling out seismic connections may not be adequate as the 
workforce may not be familiar with the changes from their norm � thus detailing is very 
important. 
. �	The construction type selected must meet all performance criteria of the 
specified level of protection. 

VISUAL IX-19 
Building Envelope 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-20 
Ideally, the exterior walls need to be able to resist the loads transmitted by the windows 
and doors. It is not uncommon for bullet-resistant windows to have a higher ultimate 
capacity than the walls to which they are attached. 
Beyond ensuring a flexible failure mode, design the exterior wall to resist the pressure 
levels of the defined threat. Special reinforcing and anchors should be provided around 
blast-resistant window and door frames. 
Poured-in-place reinforced concrete will provide the highest level of protection, but 
solutions like pre-cast concrete, reinforced CMU block, and metal studs may also be 
used to achieve lower levels of protection. 
Thus, while the structural framing is the first consideration to prevent progressive 
collapse, the exterior walls are the second consideration to ensure blast pressure and 
fragmentation do not readily enter the building. 
Building Envelope � Walls (1) 
General principles: 
. �	The exterior envelope of the building is the most vulnerable to an exterior 
explosive threat because it is closest to the blast. 
. �	The exterior envelope also impacts the infiltration of CBR agents into the 
structure, but tight building construction must be done in conjunction with other actions 
to ensure some level of protection 
. �	Soil can be highly effective in reducing the impact of a major explosion by 
reducing fragmentation off walls and street furniture or directing a blast wave over a 
building. 
. �	Minimize "ornamentation" that may become flying debris in an explosion. 
This includes street furniture, overhangs, sculptures, etc. 

IG IX -17 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-21 
VISUAL IX-22 
Building Envelope � Windows (1) 
Window systems on the exterior fa�ade of a building should be designed to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying glass during an explosion event. Designs should integrate the 
features of the glass, connection of the glass to the frame (bite), and anchoring of the 
frame to the building structure to achieve a "balanced design." This means all the 
components should have compatible capacities and theoretically would all fail at the same 
pressure-pulse levels. In this way, the damage sequence and extent of damage are 
controlled. 
Ultimately, in a "balanced" design, the order of failure should be: 
. � Glass 
. � Window frame 
. � Frame anchoring 
. � Wall 
. � Building structural framing 

The pressure differences should not be large and the Level of Protection for the Design 
Basis Threat should be met. 
Building Envelope � Windows (2) 
Five types of glass are commonly used in window glazing systems: annealed glass, heat 
strengthened glass, fully thermally tempered, laminated glass, and polycarbonate. Other 
types of glass materials exist, but are not commonly used in typical commercial window 
systems. Of the five common types, annealed glass and fully thermally tempered 
glass are the type of windows for most office buildings. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Annealed glass, also known as float, plate, or sheet glass, is the most common glass 
type used in commercial construction. Annealed glass is of relatively low strength and, 
upon failure, fractures into razor sharp, dagger-shaped fragments (see slide -- the right 
photo is annealed glass failing during an actual explosive test and the left photo is a 
closeup of the shards). 
Heat strengthened glass (HS), also known as double strength glass, is used where wind 
loading starts becoming a problem.  It breaks like annealed glass. 
Fully thermally tempered glass (TTG) is typically four to five times stronger than 
annealed glass. Instead of shards, TTG breaks into pellets that can be stopped by a 
regular suit coat. 
Laminated glass is a pane with multiple glass layers and a pliable interlayer material 
(usually made from polyvinyl butyral (PVB)) between the glass layers. 
Thermoplastic polycarbonates are very strong and suitable for blast- and forced entry-
resistant window design. They are usually laminated with glass on the outside to prevent 
environmental degradation of the plastic and aid in cleaning. 
Wire-reinforced glass is a common glazing material. It consists of annealed glass with 
an embedded layer of wire mesh. It is usually used for fire resistance and as a forced 
entry barrier. It is not recommended for blast design. 
IG IX -19 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-23 
GSA Glazing Performance 
Conditions 
Table 3-1 in FEMA 426 presents six GSA glazing protection levels based on how far 
glass fragments would enter a space and potentially injure its occupants (known as a 
flight model). This slide depicts how far glass fragments could enter a structure for each 
GSA performance condition. The divide between performance conditions 3a and 3b can 
be equated to the "threshold of injury." The divide between performance conditions 4 and 
5 can be equated to the "threshold of lethality." A person standing in the room has a 
potential of being hit in the upper body/head area by glass fragments that are traveling 
fast enough to penetrate the body. 
The GSA glazing performance 
conditions shown will correlate with 
the DoD levels of protection 
presented in Table 3-2 in FEMA 
426. 
VISUAL IX-24 
Window Frames (1) 
Window frames need to retain the glass so that the entire pane does not pull out (glass 
flexes and can pull out of frame during the blast) and also should be designed to resist the 
breaking stress of the window glass. 
To retain the glass in the frame, a minimum of a 1/4-inch bead of structural sealant (i.e., 
silicone or polyvinyl butyral) should be used around the inner perimeter of the window. 
This should be done on all four sides of the window. Thus, strip windows with butt 
glazing are not good options as the bite must be large. 
The window bite (i.e., the depth of 
window captured by the frame) needs 
to be at least 1/2 inch. DoD criteria calls 
for a minimum 3/8-
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
inch bite if silicon sealant is applied, but 
calls out a 1-inch bite if no silicone 
sealant is used. Butt glazed windows 
can require even more bite with or 
without sealant. 
VISUAL IX-25 
Window Frames (2) 
The frame must not flex during the blast loading and cause the glass to pop out. 
The blast loading across the glass and frame now transfers to the frame connections to the 
building. These connections must handle the shear and tensile stresses and the bending 
moments of the connection design. 
The frame members connecting adjoining windows are referred to as mullions. These 
members may be designed using a static approach when the breaking strength of the 
window glass is applied to the mullion, or a dynamic load may be applied using the peak 
pressure and impulse values.  Since mullions only connect at the ends to the building 
structure, the mullion must handle the transferred blast loading from both adjacent 
windows. 
Other considerations for windows 
must balance the amount of light, 
energy conservation, noise 
transmission, venting of fumes, and 
emergency egress in addition to blast 
response and CBR protection. 
IG IX -21 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-26 
VISUAL IX-27 
Fragment Retention Film (FRF) (1) 
Another treatment used for mitigating the effects of an explosive attack is security 
window film. The polyester film used in commercial products is commonly referred to as 
fragment retention film (FRF), safety film, security film, protective film, or shatter-
resistant film. These films are adhered to the interior surface of the window to provide 
fragment retention and reduce the overall velocity of the glass fragments at failure. 
Fragment retention film combines a strong pressure sensitive adhesive with a tough 
polyester layer. It should be limited to use in retrofit applications due to degradation of 
the film and adhesive. Do not use for new construction. 
FRF (2) 
Fragment retention film behaves similarly to relatively thin laminated and 
polycarbonate glazing in terms of fragmentation. It is available in common thicknesses 
of 2, 4, 7, and 10 mils. Also found up to 15 mils. 
Fragment retention film improves the performance of the glass under blast loading to 
varying degrees, depending on the thickness, quality, and type of film installation. Note a 
daylight application will leave a 1/16 inch space around the edge of the FRF where water 
used to apply the FRF is squeegeed out. Daylight application of FRF to very thin glass 
can reduce the standoff distance in half for a given level of protection. The best 
performance is achieved when the film is installed into the bite of the glazing or is 
connected to the frame (mechanically or with chemical sealants). 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Fragment retention film can also 
provide solar control benefits. 
VISUAL IX-28 
Blast Curtains 
. �	Invented by the British during WWII 
. �	Can now see out of these curtains as opposed to the "blackout" curtains 
from WWII by using Kevlar or other high strength fibers 
. �	Allow venting of the blast wave while "catching" fragments 
. �	May be augmented with FRF 
. �	Connections of curtains or blast shields to building frame are critical 

VISUAL IX-29 
Catch Bar 
Increased safety for fragment retention can be obtained in the event of catastrophic failure 
from an explosive blast by placing a decorative catchbar or grillwork on the interior of the 
glazing. Note, catchbars must be mounted across the center of mass of each window pane 
(vision area of glass) to be effective. 
Catchbars are usually considered with a retrofit of fragment retention film to not only 
catch the glass, but also catch the existing window frame that may not be adequately 
connected to the wall. They can also be considered for laminated glass. 
IG IX -23 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-30 
Building Envelope � Good Window Practice 
The windows adjacent to doors allow easy access to the locking mechanism on the door. 
Fewer and smaller windows limit cost and reduce damage if failure during bomb blast 
occurs. 
Heavy duty aluminum frames have performed 
well.
VISUAL IX-31

Building Envelope - Doors 
A door system includes the door, frame, and anchorage to the building. As part of a 
balanced design approach, exterior doors in high risk buildings should be designed to 
withstand the maximum dynamic pressure and duration of the load from the design 
threat explosive blast. Other general door considerations are as follows: 
. �	Provide hollow steel doors or steel-clad doors with steel frames. 
. �	Provide blast-resistant doors for high threats and high levels of protection. 
. �	Limit normal entry/egress through one door, if possible. 
. �	Keep exterior doors to a minimum while accommodating emergency egress. 
. �	Ensure that exterior doors open outward from inhabited areas 
. �	Replace externally mounted locks and hasps with internally locking 
devices because the weakest part of a door system is the latching component. 
. �	Install doors, where practical, so that they present a blank, flush surface to 
the outside to reduce their vulnerability to 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-32 
attack. 
. �	Locate hinges on the interior or provide concealed hinges to reduce their 
vulnerability to tampering. 
. �	Install emergency exit doors so that they facilitate only exiting movement. 
. �	Equip any outward-opening double door with protective hinges and key-
operated mortise-type locks. 
. �	Provide solid doors or walls as a backup for glass doors in foyers. 

Building Envelope � Roofs 
For an explosive threat, especially for thrown explosives � satchels, hand grenades, and 
even mortars, the primary loading on the roof is downward over-pressure. The stand-off 
to the protected ceiling provides the protection. The sloped roof tends to cause the 
explosive to roll off and away from the building. For explosions at ground level, 
secondary loads include upward pressure due to the blast penetrating through openings 
and upward suction during the negative loading phase. The upward pressures may have 
an increased duration due to multiple reflections of the air blast internally. It is 
conservative to consider the downward and upward loads separately. 
The preferred system is to use poured-in-place reinforced concrete with beams in two 
directions. If this system is used, beams should have stirrups along the entire span 
spaced not greater than one half the beam depths. 
Less desirable systems include metal plate systems without concrete, and precast and 
pre/post tensioned systems. 
Precast panels are problematic because of the tendency to fail at the connections.


IG IX -25 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-33 
Mechanical system design standards address limiting damage to critical infrastructure 
and protecting building occupants against CBR threats. 
. �	Controlling access to building information, including the operation of the 
mechanical systems, should be a security priority. This information could aid a terrorist 
attack. 
. �	Finally, preventive maintenance that ensures the mechanical systems will 
work 

Pre/post tensioned systems tend to fail in a brittle manner if stressed beyond their 
elastic limit and they also are not able to accept upward loads without additional 
reinforcement. 
Many conventional roof designs will provide a suitable blast response for most buildings, 
considering minimum Design Basis Threats. The intent here is to point out what roofs 
may be a problem and why. For higher Design Basis Threats and tactics involving the 
roof, the protected ceiling and sacrificial roof concept applies. 
Mechanical Systems (1) 
The primary goal of a mechanical system after a terrorist attack should be to continue to 
operate key life safety systems. This can be accomplished by locating components in less 
vulnerable areas, limiting access to mechanical systems, and providing a reasonable 
amount of redundancy. 
Designers should consider the following: 
 �	During an interior bombing event, smoke removal and control are of 
paramount importance. The designer should consider the fact that, if window glazing is 
hardened, a blast may not blow out windows, and smoke may be trapped in the building. 
 The following suggestions attempt to protect the mechanical systems during an 
explosive blast event, have backup, or generally prevent access to utilities lines: 
. �	Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
in all required modes must be done to ensure proper functioning after an event. 
VISUAL IX-34 
Mechanical Systems (2) 
Restrict Access 
. � Rooms 
. � Closets 
. � Roofs 
. � Building information 
. � Also consider for other systems 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-34 
exterior walls, but, when this is unavoidable, mount fixtures on a separate wall at least 
6 inches from the exterior wall face. 
. �	Avoid plumbing on the roof slab. 
. �	Avoid suspending plumbing fixtures and piping from the ceiling. 
. �	Reduce the number of utility openings, manholes, tunnels, air conditioning 
ducts, filters, and access panels into the structure. 
. �	Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack, such as 
loading docks, lobbies, and parking areas. 
. �	Protect building operational control areas and utility feeds to lessen the 
negative effects of a blast. 
. �	Design operational redundancies to survive all kinds of attack. 
. �	Use lockable systems for utility openings and manholes where 
appropriate. Infrequently used utility covers/manholes can be tack-welded as an 
inexpensive alternative to locking tamper-resistant covers. 

Mechanical Systems (2) 
. �	Physical security for mechanical rooms to prevent the direct introduction 
of hazardous materials into the system of ducts that distributes air to the building should 
be maintained. 
. �	Public access to building roofs should be prevented. Access to the roof 
may allow entry to the building and access to air intakes and HVAC equipment (e.g., self-
contained HVAC units, laboratory or bathroom exhausts) located on the roof. 
. �	Access to information on building operations (including mechanical, 
electrical, vertical transport, fire and life safety, security system plans and 


IG IX -27 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
schematics, and emergency 
operations procedures) should be 
strictly controlled. 
. �	To prevent widespread dispersion of a contaminant released within 
lobbies, mailrooms, and loading docks, their HVAC systems should be isolated and the 
areas maintained at a negative pressure relative to the rest of the building, but at positive 
pressure relative to the outdoors. 
. �	Large buildings usually have multiple HVAC zones, with each zone served 
by its own air handling unit and duct system. 
. �	Consider "shelter-in-place" rooms or areas where people can congregate in 
the event of an outdoor release. The goal is to create areas where outdoor air infiltration is 
very low. 

VISUAL IX-35 
Ventilation and Filtration 
Simplest to most complex in approaches to control the HVAC (heating, ventilating, and 
air conditioning) system during or after a terrorist attack. 
. �	HVAC control may not be appropriate in all emergency situations. 
Protection from CBR attacks depends upon the design and operation of the HVAC 
system and the nature of the CBR agent release. 
. �	Ducted returns offer limited access points to introduce a CBR agent. The 
return vents can be placed in conspicuous locations, reducing the risk of an agent being 
secretly introduced into the return system. 
. �	A rapid response, such as shutting down an HVAC system, may involve 
closing various dampers, especially those controlling the flow of outdoor air (in the event 
of an exterior CBR release). 
. �	Consideration should be given to installing low leakage dampers to 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
minimize this flow pathway. 
VISUAL IX-36 
Emergency Plans 
All buildings should have current emergency plans to address fire, weather, and other 
types of emergencies. 
In light of past U.S. experiences with anthrax and similar threats, these plans should be 
updated to consider CBR attack scenarios and the associated procedures. Emergency 
plans should have procedures for communicating instructions to building occupants, 
identifying suitable shelter-in-place areas (if they exist), identifying appropriate use and 
selection of personal protective equipment (i.e., clothing, gloves, respirators), and 
directing emergency evacuations. 
Building design should be able to ensure 
the optimal operation of the emergency 
plans. The emergency plans should not 
default to only what can be done after 
the building is constructed. In other 
words, like security and homeland 
defense, emergency planning should be 
an up-front design consideration that 
gets incorporated into the planning, 
budgeting, and design of the building. 
IG IX -29 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-37 
VISUAL IX-38 
VISUAL IX-39 
Maintenance, Administration, and Training (1) 
In all cases, the HVAC Maintenance Staff must receive training in how the upgraded 
mechanical systems are designed to work, how they should be operated, and how they 
should be maintained and tested. 
Maintenance, Administration, and Training (2) 
. �	Training should be conducted 
. �	Plans should be tested 

Building Electrical Systems 
The major security functions of the electrical system are to maintain power to essential 
building services, especially those required for life safety and evacuation; provide lighting 
and surveillance to deter criminal activities; and provide emergency communications. 
Designers should consider the following recommendations for buildings requiring high 
security: 
�	Emergency and normal electric panels, conduits, and switchgear should be installed 
separately, at different locations, 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
and as far apart as possible. 
. �	Emergency generators should be located away from loading docks, 
entrances, and parking. 
. �	Fuel tanks should be mounted near the generator, given the same 
protection as the emergency generator, and sized to store an appropriate amount of fuel. 
. �	Conduits and lines should be installed outside to allow a trailer-mounted 
generator to connect to the building�s electrical system. 
. �	Site lighting should be coordinated with the CCTV system. 
. �	Emergency power should be provided for emergency lighting in restrooms. 
. �	Building access points should be illuminated to aid in threat detection. 
. �	Self-contained battery lighting will be in stairwells and for exit signs. 
. �	Suspending electrical conduits from the ceiling should be avoided. 
. �	Adequate lighting of perimeters and parking areas should be provided to 
aid in visual surveillance and to support the use of physical security systems. 

VISUAL IX-40 
Fire Protection Systems 
The fire protection system inside the building should maintain life safety protection after 
an incident and allow for safe evacuation of the building when appropriate. To enhance 
the performance of fire protection systems, especially in the case of an explosive blast, 
the designer should consider the following: 
. �	The fire protection water system should be protected from single-point 
failure in case of a blast event � maintain 50-foot separation from high risk areas (loading 
dock, lobby, etc.) 
. �	To increase the reliability of the fire 


IG IX -31 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-41 
protection system in strategic locations, a 
dual pump arrangement should be 
considered, with one electric pump and 
one diesel pump. 
. �	The pumps should be located away from each other. 
. �	All security locking arrangements on doors used for egress must comply 
with requirements of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 101, Life Safety 
Code. 

Communications Systems 
For buildings requiring greater protection, the designer should consider the following: 
Redundant communications. The facility could have a second telephone service to 
maintain communications in case of an incident. A base radio communication system with 
an antenna should be installed in the stairwell, and portable sets distributed on floors. 
This is the preferred alternative. 
Radio telemetry. Distributed antennas could be located throughout the facility if 
required for emergency communications through wireless transmission of data. 
Alarm and information systems. Alarm and information systems should not be 
collected and mounted in a single conduit, or even collocated. Circuits to various parts of 
the building should be installed in at least two directions and/or risers. 
Empty conduits. Empty conduits and power outlets can be provided for future 
installation of security control equipment. 
Mass notification. All inhabited buildings should have a timely means to notify 
occupants of threats and give instructions as to responses. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-42 
Chapter 3 of FEMA 426 is not a design guide for Electronic Security Systems (ESS). The 
following criteria are only intended to stress those concepts and practices that warrant 
special attention to enhance public safety. Consult design guides pertinent to the specific 
project for detailed information about electronic security. A description of Electronic 
Security Systems is provided in 
Appendix D of FEMA 426. 
For control centers and building management systems, designers should consider the 
following: 
. �	The Operational Control Center (OCC), Fire Command Center (FCC), and 
Security Control Center (SCC) may be collocated. If collocated, the chain of command 
should be carefully preplanned to ensure the most qualified leadership is in control for 
specific types of events. Secure information links should be provided between the OCC, 
FCC, and SCC. 
. �	A Backup Control Center (BCC) should be provided in a different 
location, such 

Electronic Security Systems 
The purpose of electronic security is to improve the reliability and effectiveness of life 
safety systems, security systems, and building functions. When possible, 
accommodations should be made for future developments in security systems. 
Electronic security, including surveillance, intrusion detection, and screening, is a key 
element of facility protection. Many aspects of electronic security and the posting of 
security personnel have been adequately dealt with in other criteria and guideline 
documents. These criteria primarily address access control design, including stair and 
lobby design, because access control must be considered when design concepts for a 
building are first conceived. Although fewer options are available for modernization 
projects, some designs can be altered to consider future access control objectives. 
IG IX -33 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
as a manager's or engineer's office. If feasible, an off-site location should be 
considered. 
. �	A fully redundant BCC should be installed (this is an alternative to the 
above). 
. �	Basic intrusion detection devices should be provided: magnetic reed 
switches for interior doors and openings, glass break sensors for windows up to scalable 
heights, and balanced magnetic contact switch sets for all exterior doors, including 
overhead/roll-up doors. Roof intrusion detection should be reviewed. 
. �	Monitoring should be at an off-site facility. 
. �	An on-site monitoring center should be used during normal business hours 
and be operational 24 hours. 
. �	A Color CCTV surveillance system with recording capability should be 
provided to view and record activity at the perimeter of the building, particularly at 
primary entrances and exits. 

VISUAL IX-43 
Entry Control Stations 
Entry control stations should be provided at main perimeter entrances of the building 
where security personnel are present (see Figure 3-12 of FEMA 426). In addition, entry 
control stations should be located close to the perimeter entrance to permit people inside 
the entry control station to maintain constant surveillance over the entrance and its 
approaches. Note that many of the considerations for entry control stations listed here 
are appropriate for Site and Layout Design as discussed in Chapter 2 of FEMA 426. 
Additional considerations at entry control stations include: 
�	A holding area for unauthorized vehicles 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
or those needing further inspection should be established. A turnaround area should be 
provided so that traffic is not impeded. This area should not be near the building 
(s) being protected. 
. �	Control measures such as displaying a decal on the window or having a 
specially marked vehicle should be established. 
. �	Entry control stations that are manned 24 hours each day should have 
interior and exterior lighting, interior heating (where appropriate), and a sufficient glassed 
area to afford adequate observation for people inside. 
. �	Signs should be erected to assist in controlling authorized entry, to deter 
unauthorized entry, and to preclude accidental entry. 
. �	The size and coloring of a sign, its letters, and the interval of posting must 
be appropriate to each situation. 
. �	Entry control stations should be hardened against attacks according to the 
type of threat. The methods of hardening may include: 
. �	Reinforced concrete or masonry 
. �	Steel plating 
. �	Bullet-resistant glass 
. �	Commercially fabricated, bullet-resistant building components or 
assemblies 

IG IX -35 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-44 
Direct students to Table 2-1 in FEMA 426. VISUAL IX-45 
Practical Applications 
What can be done with a reasonable level of effort? 
There is a range of FEMA 426 mitigation efforts at a range of cost. Consult Table 2-1 
of FEMA 426 to understand the benefit of various mitigation efforts against a range of 
terrorist tactics. 
Desired Building Protection Level 
The assessment process described to this point should determine the level of protection 
sought for the building structure for the threat/hazard specific to the facility. Explosive 
blast threats usually govern building structural design for high risk buildings. 
Some design approaches are threat independent, such as progressive collapse as we will 
see in the next slides. In every case, seek to include a balance between all the different 
requirements to include in design. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-46 
VISUAL IX-47 
Refer participants to FEMA 426, the Unit IX Case Study activity in the Student Manual, 
and the vulnerability portfolio. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist 
groups as needed. 
At the end of 45 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
Summary 
To summarize: 
This course will provide a foundation for a systematic approach to assessing the 
vulnerabilities of your facilities to manmade hazards. 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can provide an 
excellent framework for the identification of mitigation options that will � over time � 
significantly reduce the vulnerability of your facility to manmade hazards. 
Student Activity 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment. 
The checklist includes questions that determine if critical systems will continue to 
function to enhance deterrence, detection, denial, and damage limitation, and emergency 
systems function during a threat or hazard situation. 
Activity Requirements 
. �	Continue working is small groups. 
. �	Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most 
knowledgeable and qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. 
. �	Refer to the HIC Case Study and to the GIS portfolio to determine 
answers to the worksheet questions. 
. �	Then review results to identify 


IG IX -37 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Many sections of the checklist are annotated "Unknown without a more detailed on-site 
assessment". As students review the Case Study materials and complete the checklist, in 
most cases, the "70 percent" solution is found without having to conduct the on-site 
assessment. 
vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures. 
Take 45 minutes to complete this activity. Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
Transition 
Unit X will cover Electronic Security Systems. 
UNIT IX CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE 
In this Unit, the emphasis will be upon providing a balanced building envelope that is a 
defensive layer against the terrorist tactic of interest and avoiding situations where one 
incident affects more than one building system. The Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a screening tool for preliminary 
building design vulnerability assessment. 
Requirement 
Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most knowledgeable and 
qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the HIC Case Study 
and to the vulnerability portfolio to determine answers to the questions.  Then review 
results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures. 
1. 1.	Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist that address building design. 
2. 2.	Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the risk 
ratings determined in Unit V Case Study Activity and, based on this more detailed 
analysis, decide if the rating is accurate. 
3. 3.	Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from 
building design. 
4. 4.	Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the 
recommended mitigation measures. 

Sectio
n 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
2.5 
Do entrances avoid 
significant queuing? 
If queuing will occur within the 
building footprint, the area 
should be enclosed in blast-
resistant construction. If queuing 
is expected outside the building, 
a rain cover should be provided. 
For manpower and equipment 
requirements, collocate or 
combine staff and visitor 
entrances. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 

2.6 
Does security screening 
cover all public and 
private areas? Are public 
and private activities 
separated? 
Retail activities should be 
prohibited in non-secured areas. 
However, the Public Building 
Cooperative Use Act of 1976 
encourages retail and mixed uses 
to create open and inviting 
buildings. Consider separating 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


IG IX -39 IG IX -41 IG IX -43 IG IX -45 IG IX -47 IG IX -49 IG IX -51 IG IX -53 IG IX -55 IG IX 
-57 IG IX -59 IG IX -61 IG IX -63 IG IX -65 IG IX -67 IG IX -69 IG IX -71 IG IX -73 IG IX -75 

Are public toilets, service 
spaces, or access to stairs 
or elevators located in any 
non-secure areas, 
including the queuing area 
before screening at the 
public entrance? 
entryways, controlling access, 
hardening shared partitions, and 
special security operational 
countermeasures. References:  
GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7 

2.7 
Is access control provided 
through main entrance 
points for employees and 
visitors? (lobby 
receptionist, sign-
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Within HIC, access 
control, lobby 
receptionist, sign-in, 
staff escorts, issue of 
visitor badges, 
checking forms of 

in, staff escorts, issue of 
visitor badges, checking 
forms of personal 
identification, electronic 
access control systems) 

personal 
identification, and 
electronic access 
control systems are 
all present. 



Access control at 



other companies 



within the complex 



is unknown. 
2.8 
Is access to private and 
public space or restricted 
area space clearly defined 
through the design of the 
space, signage, use of 
Finishes and signage should be 
designed for visual simplicity. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The building is 
monitored by door 
and window alarms, 
which connect to 
ADT, the nationwide 
alarm company. 

electronic security 
devices, etc.? 

Unauthorized 
opening of any door 
or window will 



immediately notify 



ADT via telephone. 



ADT will normally 



call the HIC Security 



Office prior to 



contacting the police 



and DPS. HIC 



employees have 



proximity cards to 



allow them to enter 



the front and loading 



dock doors without 



activating the alarm. 



The innermost layer 



of physical security 



involves the 



Computer Data 



Center and the 



Communications 



Center. Equipped 




with locked doors, 
these two rooms 
meet the 
government�s 
requirements for 
handling classified 
material. Only 
authorized employees 
possess the necessary 
proximity cards and 
PINs to gain access 
2.9 
Is access to elevators 
distinguished as to those 
that are designated only 
for employees and 
visitors? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
No elevators in HIC. 
2.10 
Do public and employee 
entrances include space 
for possible future 
installation of access 
control and screening 
equipment? 
These include walk-through metal 
detectors and x-ray devices, 
identification check, electronic 
access card, search stations, and 
turnstiles. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
Yes, lobby area 
within HIC facility 
could accommodate 
space-saving 
screening equipment. 
Interior office space 
also has adequate 
room for such 
equipment. 
2.11 
Do foyers have reinforced 
concrete walls and offset 
interior and exterior doors 
from each other? 
Consider for exterior entrances to 
the building or to access critical 
areas within the building if 
explosive blast hazard must be 
mitigated. Reference: U.S. Army 
TM 5-853 
The exterior walls are 
made of CMU with a 
brick veneer on the 
outside. Steel 
framework supports 
the structure, and 
exposed columns are 
enclosed in gypsum 
wallboard. Windows 
are double glazed, 
1/4 inch thick 
annealed glass. The 
construction of 
interior walls is 
unknown. 
2.12 
Do doors and walls along 
the line of security 
screening meet 
requirements of UL752 
"Standard for Safety: 
Bullet-Resisting 
Equipment"? 
If the postulated threat in 
designing entrance access control 
includes rifles, pistols, or 
shotguns, then the screening area 
should have bullet-resistance to 
protect security personnel and 
uninvolved bystanders. Glass, if 
present, should also be bullet-
resistant. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

2.13 
Do circulation routes have 
unobstructed views of 
people approaching 
controlled access points? 
This applies to building entrances 
and to critical areas within the 
building. References: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide and DoD UFC 4-010-01 
Yes. 
2.14 
Is roof access limited to 
authorized personnel by 
means of locking 
mechanisms? 
References:  GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.15 
Are critical assets 
Critical building components 
Electrical service is 

(people, activities, 
building systems and 
components) located 
close to any main 
include: Emergency generator 
including fuel systems, day tank, 
fire sprinkler, and water supply; 
Normal fuel storage; Main 
switchgear; Telephone 
provided through 
two buried 
transmission lines 
from two separate 
transformers outside 

entrance, vehicle 
circulation, parking, 
maintenance area, loading 
dock, or interior parking? 
distribution and main switchgear; 
Fire pumps; Building control 
centers; Uninterruptible Power 
Supply (UPS) systems 
controlling critical functions; 
Main 
the building. 
Emergency power is 
provided by a single 
diesel generator, 
located in a shed in 


refrigeration and ventilation 
the rear parking lot. 

Are the critical building 
systems and components 
hardened? 
systems if critical to building 
operation; Elevator machinery and 
controls; Shafts for stairs, 
elevators, and utilities; Critical 
The generator has a 
50 gallon day tank, 
maintained at 80 
percent capacity. The 


distribution feeders for 
2,000-gallon main 


emergency power. Evacuation 
tank is buried under 


and rescue require emergency 
the parking lot, near 


systems to remain operational 
the generator. 


during a disaster and they should 



be located away from attack 
The diesel generator 


locations. Primary and backup 
is configured to 


systems should be separated to 
automatically start 


reduce the risk of both being 
upon loss of 


impacted by a single incident if 
commercial power to 


collocated.  Utility systems 
the Computer Center 


should be located at least 50 feet 
Bus. This happens 


from loading docks, front 
about twice a year 


entrances, and parking areas. 
due to electrical 



storms or utility 


One way to harden critical 
maintenance in the 


building systems and components 
neighborhood. The 


is to enclose them within 
backup diesel 


hardened walls, floors, and 
generator has never 


ceilings. Do not place them near 
had to support HIC�s 


high-risk areas where they can 
power demands for 


receive collateral damage. 
longer than about 2 


Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
hours, and never 
with 



more than one chiller 



operating. It has 



never been tested for 



an extended period 




under heavy load. 



The batteries to 



support the UPS are 



in a small room next 



to the UPS room. 



Heating for the HIC 



building is provided 



by a combination of 



natural gas and 



electricity. This 



provides a regulated 



environment for the 



sensitive computer 



and communications 



equipment, and a 



comfortable 



environment for 



employees. 



Natural gas enters 



the building through 



two meters under the 



loading dock 



staircase and goes 



through the overhead 



to the mechanical 



and electrical 



(M&E) room at the 



building�s southwest 



corner. Branches 



split off for two gas 



powered space 



heaters in the high-



bay area by the 



loading dock. The 



main gas line goes to 



the main heater in 



the M&E room. 
2.16 
Are high-value or critical 
assets located as far into 
the interior of the building 
as possible and separated 
from the public areas of 
the building? 
Critical assets, such as people and 
activities, are more vulnerable to 
hazards when on an exterior 
building wall or adjacent to 
uncontrolled public areas inside 
the building. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
People are located 
along the exterior 
wall at the front of 
the building. The 
secure space has the 
best interior space 
location � not on an 
exterior wall, as does 



the conference room. 



The office space acts 
as the buffer between 



the critical functions 



in the back and the 




public area of the 
building at the main 
entrance. 
2.17 
Is high visitor activity 
away from critical assets? 
High-risk activities should also 
be separated from low-risk 
activities. Also, visitor activities 
should be separated from daily 
activities. Reference: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide 
All visitors enter 
through a common 
front entrance. Once 
admitted to the site, 
visitor activity is 
n/a. 
2.18 
Are critical assets located 
in spaces that are 
occupied 24 hours per 
day? Are assets located in 
areas where they are 
visible to more than one 
person? 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.19 
Are loading docks and 
receiving and shipping 
areas separated in any 
direction from utility 
rooms, utility mains, and 
service entrances, 
including electrical, 
telephone/data, fire 
detection/alarm systems, 
fire suppression water 
mains, cooling and heating 
mains, etc.? 
Loading docks should be 
designed to keep vehicles from 
driving into or parking under the 
building. If loading docks are in 
close proximity to critical 
equipment, consider hardening 
the equipment and service against 
explosive blast. Consider a 50-
foot separation distance in all 
directions. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
No, the loading dock 
connects directly into 
interior space, critical 
functions, and 
infrastructure. 
2.20 
Are mailrooms located 
away from building main 
entrances, areas 
containing critical 
services, utilities, 
distribution systems, and 
important assets? Is the 
mailroom located near the 
loading dock? 
The mailroom should be located 
at the perimeter of the building 
with an outside wall or window 
designed for pressure relief. By 
separating the mailroom and the 
loading dock, the collateral 
damage of an incident at one has 
less impact upon the other. 
However, this may be the 
preferred mailroom location. Off-
site screening stations or a 
separate delivery processing 
building on site may be cost-
effective, particularly if several 
buildings may share one 
mailroom. A separate delivery 
processing building reduces risk 
and simplifies protection 
HIC has no mail 
room. Incoming mail 
is normally 
processed by the 
receptionist inside 
the front door. Large 
packages are 
delivered to the 
loading dock. 



measures. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 

2.21 
Does the mailroom have 
adequate space available 
for equipment to examine 
incoming packages and for 
an explosive disposal 
container? 
Screening of all deliveries to the 
building, including U.S. mail, 
commercial package delivery 
services, delivery of office 
supplies, etc. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
HIC has no mail 
room. 
2.22 
Are areas of refuge 
identified, with special 
consideration given to 
egress? 
Areas of refuge can be safe 
havens, shelters, or protected 
spaces for use during specified 
hazards. Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Yes, the Computer 
Data Center and the 
large conference 
room. 
2.23 
Are stairwells required for 
emergency egress located 
as remotely as possible 
from high-risk areas 
where blast events might 
occur? Are stairways 
maintained with positive 
pressure or are there other 
smoke control systems? 
Consider designing stairs so that 
they discharge into other than 
lobbies, parking, or loading areas. 
Maintaining positive pressure 
from a clean source of air (may 
require special filtering) aids in 
egress by keeping smoke, heat, 
toxic fumes, etc. out of the 
stairway. Pressurize exit stairways 
in accordance with the National 
Model Building Code. 
References:  GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
Emergency stairwells 
are located far from 
main stairwells. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.24 
Are enclosures for 
emergency egress 
hardened to limit the 
extent of debris that might 
otherwise impede safe 
passage and reduce the 
flow of evacuees? 
Egress pathways should be 
hardened and discharge into safe 
areas. Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.25 
Do interior barriers 
differentiate level of 
security within a 
building? 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Electronic controls 
exist in the form of 
alarms, door locks, 
proximity cards, and 
use of PIN numbers 
for room/area access. 
2.26 
Are emergency systems 
located away from high-
risk areas? 
The intent is to keep the 
emergency systems out of harm�s 
way, such that one incident takes 
out all capability � both the 
regular systems and their 
backups. Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Emergency stairwells 
are located far from 
main stairwells. 
Emergency/backup 
generators are located 
away from main 
power supply lines; 
UPS is located 
inside the building�s 
high bay area; exit 




doors are located 



throughout the site; 



natural gas enters the 



building under the 



loading dock 



stairwell. 
2.27 
Is interior glazing near 
high-threat areas 
minimized? Is interior 
glazing in other areas 
shatter-resistant? 
Interior glazing should be 
minimized where a threat exists 
and should be avoided in 
enclosures of critical functions 
next to high-risk areas. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.28 
Are ceiling and lighting 
systems designed to 
remain in place during 
hazard events? 
When an explosive blast shatters 
a window, the blast wave enters 
the interior space, putting 
structural and nonstructural 
building components under loads 
not considered in standard 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


building codes. It has been shown 
that connection criteria for these 



systems in high seismic activity 
areas resulted in much less falling 
debris that could injure building 



occupants. 



Mount all overhead utilities and 



other fixtures weighing 14 
kilograms (31 pounds) or more to 
minimize the likelihood that they 
will fall and injure building 
occupants. Design all equipment 
mountings to resist forces of 0.5 
times the equipment weight in 
any direction and 1.5 times the 
equipment weight in the 
downward direction. This 



standard does not preclude the 
need to design equipment 
mountings for forces required by 
other criteria, such as seismic 



standards. 



Reference: DoD Minimum 



Antiterrorism Standards for 



Buildings 


3 
Structural Systems 


3.1 
What type of construction? 
What type of concrete and 
reinforcing steel? 
The type of construction provides 
an indication of the robustness to 
abnormal loading and load 
reversals. A reinforced concrete 
moment-resisting frame provides 
Located in a 
suburban office 
complex, the HIC 
office building 
comprises a 22,000 


What type of steel? What 
type of foundation? 
greater ductility and redundancy 
than a flat-slab or flat-plate 
construction. The ductility of 
steel frame with metal deck 
depends on the connection details 
and pre-tensioned or post-
tensioned construction provides 
little capacity for abnormal 
loading patterns and load 
reversals. The resistance of load-
bearing wall structures varies to a 
great extent, depending on 
whether the walls are reinforced or 
un-reinforced. A rapid screening 
process developed by FEMA for 
assessing structural hazards 
identifies the following types of 
construction with a structural 
score ranging from 1.0 to 8.5. A 
higher score indicates a greater 
capacity to sustain load reversals. 
Wood buildings of all types - 4.5 
to 8.5 Steel moment-resisting 
frames -3.5 to 4.5 Braced steel 
frames - 2.5 to 3.0 Light metal 
buildings - 5.5 to 6.5 Steel 
frames with cast-in-place concrete 
shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5 Steel 
frames with unreinforced masonry 
infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0 Concrete 
moment-resisting frames - 2.0 to 
4.0 Concrete shear wall buildings 
-3.0 to 4.0 Concrete frames with 
unreinforced masonry infill walls 
- 1.5 to 3.0 Tilt-up buildings - 
2.0 to 3.5 Precast concrete frame 
buildings -1.5 to 2.5 Reinforced 
masonry - 3.0 to 4.0 Unreinforced 
masonry - 1.0 to 2.5 References: 
FEMA 154 and Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
square foot main 
floor for offices and 
computers, and a 
3,300 square foot 
executive mezzanine 
(a second floor over 
part of the office). 
The building that 
houses the 
Hazardville 
Information 
Company (HIC) is 
an office building of 
standard 
construction. The 
walls are made of 
CMU with a brick 
veneer on the 
outside. Steel 
framework supports 
the structure, and 
exposed columns are 
enclosed in gypsum 
wallboard. The roof 
is a metal deck with 
gravel on top and 
insulation 
underneath. It is 
slightly angled to 
allow water to drain. 
The roof overhangs 
the front entrance by 
8 feet. This provides 
a covered area for 
employees to stay 
dry on rainy days. 
Cylindrical columns 
support the 
overhang. Windows 
are double glazed, 
1/4 inch thick 
annealed glass. 
3.2 
Do the reinforced concrete 
structures contain 
symmetric steel 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


reinforcement (positive and 



negative faces) in all floor 



slabs, roof slabs, walls, 



beams and girders that may 



be subjected to rebound, 



uplift and suction 
pressures? 



Do the lap splices fully 



develop the capacity of the 



reinforcement? 



Are lap splices and other 



discontinuities staggered? 



Do the connections possess 



ductile details? 



Is special shear 



reinforcement, including 



ties and stirrups, available 



to allow large post-elastic 



behavior? 


3.3 
Are the steel frame 
connections moment 
connections? Is the column 
spacing minimized so that 
reasonably sized members 
will resist the design loads 
and increase the redundancy 
of the system? 
A practical upper level for column 
spacing is generally 30 feet. 
Unless there is an overriding 
architectural requirement, a 
practical limit for floor-to-floor 
heights is generally less than or 
equal to 16 feet. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

What are the floor-to-floor 



heights? 


3.4 
Are critical elements 
vulnerable to failure? 
The priority for upgrades should 
be based on the relative 
importance of structural or non-
structural elements that are 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


essential to mitigating the extent 
of collapse and minimizing injury 
and damage. 



Primary Structural Elements 
provide the essential parts of the 
building�s resistance to 
catastrophic blast loads and 




progressive collapse. These 



include columns, girders, roof 



beams, and the main lateral 



resistance system. 



Secondary Structural Elements 



consist of all other load bearing 



members, such as floor beams, 



slabs, etc. 



Primary Nonstructural Elements 



consist of elements (including 



their attachments) which are 



essential for life safety systems or 



elements which can cause 



substantial injury if failure 
occurs, 



including ceilings or heavy 



suspended mechanical units. 



Secondary Nonstructural 



Elements consist of all elements 



not covered in primary 



nonstructural elements, such as 



partitions, furniture, and light 



fixtures. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

3.5 
Will the structure suffer an 
The extent of damage to the 
The standard 

unacceptable level of 
damage resulting from the 
postulated threat (blast 
loading or weapon impact)? 
structure and exterior wall 
systems from the bomb threat 
may be related to a protection 
level. The following is for new 
buildings: 
construction 
techniques used to 
build the site HIC 
occupies do not 
create buildings that 


Level of Protection Below 
Antiterrorism Standards � Severe 
damage. Frame collapse/massive 
destruction. Little left standing. 
withstand explosive 
blasts. Terrorist 
threat was not a part 
of design 
consideration. 


Doors and windows fail and 
result 



in lethal hazards. Majority of 



personnel suffer fatalities. 



Very Low Level Protection � 



Heavy damage. Onset of 



structural collapse. Major 



deformation of primary and 



secondary structural members, 



but progressive collapse is 



unlikely. Collapse of non-



structural elements. Glazing will 



break and is likely to be propelled 



into the building, resulting in 



serious glazing fragment injuries, 



but fragments will be reduced. 



Doors may be propelled into 




rooms, presenting serious 



hazards. Majority of personnel 



suffer serious injuries. There are 



likely to be a limited number (10 



percent to 25 percent) of 



fatalities. 



Low Level of Protection � 



Moderate damage, unrepairable. 



Major deformation of non-



structural elements and secondary 



structural members and minor 



deformation of primary structural 



members, but progressive 



collapse is unlikely. Glazing will 



break, but fall within 1 meter of 



the wall or otherwise not present 



a significant fragment hazard. 



Doors may fail, but they will 



rebound out of their frames, 



presenting minimal hazards. 



Majority of personnel suffer 



significant injuries. There may be 



a few (<10 percent) fatalities. 



Medium Level Protection � 



Minor damage, repairable. Minor 



deformations of non-structural 



elements and secondary structural 



members and no permanent 



deformation in primary structural 



members. Glazing will break, but 



will remain in the window frame. 



Doors will stay in frames, but 
will 



not be reusable. Some minor 



injuries, but fatalities are 
unlikely. 



High Level Protection � Minimal 



damage, repairable. No 



permanent deformation of 



primary and secondary structural 



members or non-structural 



elements. Glazing will not break. 



Doors will be reusable. Only 



superficial injuries are likely. 



Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 

3.6 
Is the structure vulnerable 
to 
Design to mitigate progressive 
Unknown without a 

progressive collapse? 
collapse is an independent 
analysis to determine a system�s 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Is the building capable of 
sustaining the removal of a 
column for one floor above 
ability to resist structural collapse 
upon the loss of a major 
structural element or the system�s 
ability to resist the loss of a 
major 



grade at the building 
perimeter without 
progressive collapse? In the 
event of an internal 
explosion in an uncontrolled 
public ground floor area 
does the design prevent 
progressive collapse due to 
the loss of one primary 
column? Do architectural or 
structural features provide a 
minimum 6-inch standoff to 
the internal columns 
(primary vertical load 
carrying members)? Are the 
columns in the unscreened 
internal spaces designed for 
an unbraced length equal to 
two floors, or three floors 
where there are two levels 
of parking? 
structural element. Design to 
mitigate progressive collapse may 
be based on the methods outlined 
in ASCE 7-98 (now 7-02). 
Designers may apply static and/or 
dynamic methods of analysis to 
meet this requirement and 
ultimate load capacities may be 
assumed in the analyses. 
Combine structural upgrades for 
retrofits to existing buildings, 
such as seismic and progressive 
collapse, into a single project due 
to the economic synergies and 
other cross benefits. Existing 
facilities may be retrofitted to 
withstand the design level threat 
or to accept the loss of a column 
for one floor above grade at the 
building perimeter without 
progressive collapse. Note that 
collapse of floors or roof must 
not be permitted. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

3.7 
Are there adequate 
redundant load paths in the 
structure? 
Special consideration should be 
given to materials that have 
inherent ductility and that are 
better able to respond to load 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


reversals, such as cast in place 



reinforced concrete, reinforced 



masonry, and steel construction. 
Careful detailing is required for 



material such as pre-stressed 



concrete, pre-cast concrete, and 



masonry to adequately respond to 



the design loads. Primary vertical 
load carrying members should be 



protected where parking is inside 



a facility and the building 



superstructure is supported by the 



parking structure. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

3.8 
Are there transfer girders 
supported by columns 
within unscreened public 
spaces or at the exterior of 
Transfer girders allow 
discontinuities in columns 
between the roof and foundation. 
This design has inherent 
difficulty in transferring load to 
redundant 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


the building? 
paths upon loss of a column or 
the girder. Transfer beams and 
girders that, if lost, may cause 
progressive collapse are highly 
discouraged. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

3.9 
What is the grouting and 
reinforcement of masonry 
(brick and/or concrete 
masonry unit (CMU)) 
exterior walls? 
Avoid unreinforced masonry 
exterior walls. Reinforcement can 
run the range of light to heavy, 
depending upon the stand-off 
distance available and postulated 
design threat. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 recommends fully 
grouted and reinforced CMU 
construction where CMU is 
selected. Reference: DoD 
Minimum Antiterrorism 
Standards for Buildings states 
"Unreinforced masonry walls are 
prohibited for the exterior walls 
of new buildings. A minimum of 
0.05 percent vertical 
reinforcement with a maximum 
spacing of 1,200 mm (48 in) will 
be provided. For existing 
buildings, implement mitigating 
measures to provide an equivalent 
level of protection." [This is light 
reinforcement and based upon the 
recommended stand-off distance 
for the situation.] 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
3.10 
Will the loading dock design 
limit damage to adjacent 
areas and vent explosive 
force to the exterior of the 
building? 
Design the floor of the loading 
dock for blast resistance if the 
area below is occupied or contains 
critical utilities. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
No. 
3.11 
Are mailrooms, where 
packages are received and 
opened for inspection, and 
unscreened retail spaces 
designed to mitigate the 
effects of a blast on primary 
vertical or lateral bracing 
members? 
Where mailrooms and unscreened 
retail spaces are located in 
occupied areas or adjacent to 
critical utilities, walls, ceilings, 
and floors, they should be blast-
and fragment- resistant. Methods 
to facilitate the venting of 
explosive forces and gases from 
the interior spaces to the outside 
of the structure may include 
blow-out panels and window 
system designs that provide 
protection from blast pressure 
applied to the outside, 
There is no mail 
room at this facility. 

4 
Building Envelope 


4.1 
What is the designed or 
estimated protection level of 
the exterior walls against the 
postulated explosive threat? 
The performance of the fa�ade 
varies to a great extent on the 
materials. Different construction 
includes brick or stone with block 
backup, steel stud walls, precast 
panels, or curtain wall with glass, 
stone, or metal panel elements. 
Shear walls that are essential to 
the lateral and vertical load 
The exterior walls are 
made of CMU with a 
brick veneer on the 
outside. Steel 
framework supports 
the structure, and 
exposed columns are 
enclosed in gypsum 
wallboard. 


bearing system and that also 
function as exterior walls should 
Windows are double 


be considered primary structures 
and should resist the actual blast 
loads predicted from the threats 
specified. Where exterior walls are 
not designed for the full design 
loads, special consideration 
should be given to construction 
types that reduce the potential for 
injury. Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
glazed, 1/4 inch 
thick annealed glass. 
The construction of 
interior walls is 
unknown. The level 
of protection 
provided by the 
buildings structure 
depends upon the 
blast exposure. 
4.2 
Is there less than 40 % 
The performance of the glass will 
Windows are only 

fenestration openings per 
structural bay? 
similarly depend on the materials. 
Glazing may be single pane or 
double pane, monolithic or 
used in the office 
space area of the 
building. While 

Is the window system 
laminated, annealed, heat 
strengthened or fully tempered. 
dimensions are not 
given, it looks like 

design on the exterior fa�ade 
balanced to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying 
glazing following an 
explosive event? 
The percent fenestration is a 
balance between protection level, 
cost, the architectural look of the 
building within its surroundings, 
and building codes. One goal is 
to keep fenestration to below 40 
the glass is at least 
40 percent of the 
wall area between 
building structural 
columns. The 
window system is a 

(glazing, frames, anchorage 
to supporting walls, etc.) 
percent of the building envelope 
vertical surface area, but the 
process must balance differing 
standard commercial 
installation and thus, 
the glass, framing, 

Do the glazing systems with 
a 1/2-inch (3/4-inch better) 
requirements. A blast engineer 
may prefer no windows; an 
architect may favor window 
and anchorage is 
expected to be 
insufficient for the 

bite contain an application 
of structural silicone? 
curtain walls; building codes 
require so much fenestration per 
square footage of floor area; fire 
design basis threat at 
the available 
standoff. One benefit 

Is the glazing laminated or is 
it protected with an anti-
codes require a prescribed window 
opening area if the window is a 
designated escape 
is that there are 
windows only on 
two sides of the 

shatter (fragment retention) 
film? 
route; and the building owner has 
cost concerns. Ideally, an owner 
would want 100 
building. 

If an anti-shatter film is 
used, is it a minimum of a 
percent of the glazed area to 
provide the design protection 
level against the postulated 



7-mil thick film, or specially 
manufactured 4mil thick 
film? 
explosive threat (design basis 
threat� weapon size at the 
expected stand-off distance). 
However, economics and 
geometry may allow 80 percent to 
90 percent due to the statistical 
differences in the manufacturing 
process for glass or the angle of 
incidence of the blast wave upon 
upper story windows (4th floor 
and higher). Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

4.3 
Do the walls, anchorage, and 
window framing fully 
develop the capacity of the 
glazing material selected? 
Are the walls capable of 
withstanding the dynamic 
reactions from the 
windows? Will the 
anchorage remain attached 
to the walls of the building 
during an explosive event 
without failure? Is the 
fa�ade connected to back-up 
block or to the structural 
frame? 
Government produced and 
sponsored computer programs 
coupled with test data and 
recognized dynamic structural 
analysis techniques may be used 
to determine whether the glazing 
either survives the specified 
threats or the post damage 
performance of the glazing 
protects the occupants. A 
breakage probability no higher 
than 750 breaks per 1,000 may be 
used when calculating loads to 
frames and anchorage. The intent 
is to ensure the building envelope 
provides relatively equal 
protection against the postulated 
explosive threat for the walls and 
window systems for the safety of 
the occupants, especially in 
rooms with exterior walls. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Are non-bearing masonry 
walls reinforced? 


4.4 
Does the building contain 
ballistic glazing? Does the 
ballistic glazing meet the 
requirements of UL 752 
Bullet-Resistant Glazing? 
Does the building contain 
security-glazing? 
Glass-clad polycarbonate or 
laminated polycarbonate are two 
types of acceptable glazing 
material. If windows are upgraded 
to bullet-resistant, burglar-
resistant, or forced entry-resistant, 
ensure that doors, ceilings, and 
floors, as applicable, can resist 
the same for the areas of concern. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Does the security-glazing 




meet the requirements of 



ASTM F1233 or UL 972, 



Burglary Resistant Glazing 



Material? 



Do the window assemblies 



containing forced entry 



resistant glazing (excluding 



the glazing) meet the 



requirements of ASTM F 



588? 


4.5 
Do non-window openings, 
such as mechanical vents 
and exposed plenums, 
provide the same level of 
protection required for the 
exterior wall? 
In-filling of blast over-pressures 
must be considered through non-
window openings such that 
structural members and all 
mechanical system mountings 
and attachments should resist 
these interior fill pressures. These 
non-window openings should 
also be as secure as the 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


rest of the building envelope 
against forced entry. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 


6 
Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR) 

6.1 
Where are the air intakes 
Air intakes should be located on 
The air used to heat 

and exhaust louvers for the 
building? (low, high, or 
midpoint of the building 
structure) Are the intakes 
and exhausts accessible to 
the public? 
the roof or as high as possible. 
Otherwise secure within CPTED-
compliant fencing or enclosure. 
The fencing or enclosure should 
have a sloped roof to prevent the 
throwing of anything into the 
enclosure near the intakes. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states 
that air intakes should be on the 
fourth floor or higher and, on 
buildings with three floors or 
less, they should be on the roof 
or as high as practical. Locating 
intakes high on a wall is preferred 
over a roof location. 
or cool the HIC 
Headquarters 
building is filtered in 
the HVAC room 
using standard 
industrial grade 
filters. Outside air is 
brought in through a 
vent in the wall. The 
vent is alarmed to 
prevent intruder 
access. A screened 
exhaust 


Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 
duct is on the roof. 


states that, for all new inhabited 
buildings covered by this 
document, all air intakes should 
be located at least 3 meters (10 
feet) above the ground. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
states: "An extension 
Airflow throughout 
the building is 
through a series of 
ducts hidden in the 
ceiling of each area. 
The ducts are divided 


height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will 
in half to allow them 



place the intake out of reach of 
individuals without some 
assistance. Also, the entrance to 
the intake should be covered with 
a sloped metal mesh to reduce 
the threat of objects being tossed 
into the intake. A minimum 
slope of 45� is generally 
adequate. Extension height 
should be increased where 
existing platforms or building 
features (i.e., loading docks, 
retaining walls) might provide 
access to the outdoor air intakes". 
Reference: LBNL PUB-51959: 
Exhausts are also a concer n 
during an outdoor release, 
especially if exhaust fans are not 
in continuous operation, due to 
wind effects and chimney effects 
(air movement due to differential 
temperature). 
to serve as supply 
and return headers. 
The divider is 
insulated to 
minimize heat 
transfer from one 
side to the other. 
6.2 
Is roof access limited to 
authorized personnel by 
means of locking 
mechanisms? Is access to 
mechanical areas similarly 
controlled? 
Roofs are like entrances to the 
building and are like mechanical 
rooms when HVAC is installed. 
Adjacent structures or 
landscaping should not allow 
access to the roof. References: 
GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH 
Pub 2002-139, and LBNL Pub 
51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.3 
Are there multiple air intake 
locations? 
Single air intakes may feed 
several air handling units. 
Indicate if the air intakes are 
localized or separated. Installing 
low-leakage dampers is one way 
to provide the system separation 
when necessary. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
No. 
6.4 
What are the types of air 
filtration? Include the 
efficiency and number of 
filter modules for each of 
the main air handling 
systems. Is there any 
collective 
MERV � Minimum Efficiency 
Reporting Value HEPA � High 
Efficiency Particulate Air 
Activated charcoal for gases 
Ultraviolet C for biologicals 
Consider mix of approaches for 
optimum protection and cost-
effectiveness. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 
Standard industrial 
grade filters are used. 


protection for chemical, 
biological, and radiological 
contamination designed into 
the building? 
2002-139 

6.5 
Is there space for larger 
filter assemblies on critical 
air handling systems? 
Air handling units serving critical 
functions during continued 
operation may be retrofitted to 
provide enhanced protection 
during emergencies. However, 
upgraded filtration may have 
negative effects upon the overall 
air handling system operation, 
such as increased pressure drop. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.6 
Are there provisions for air 
monitors or sensors for 
chemical or biological 
agents? 
Duct mounted sensors are usually 
found in limited cases in 
laboratory areas. Sensors 
generally have a limited spectrum 
of high reliability and are costly. 
Many different technologies are 
undergoing research to provide 
capability. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.7 
By what method are air 
intakes and exhausts closed 
when not operational? 
Motorized (low-leakage, fast-
acting) dampers are the preferred 
method for closure with fail-safe 
to the closed position so as to 
support in-place sheltering. 
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.8 
How are air handling 
systems zoned? What areas 
and functions do each of the 
primary air handling 
systems serve? 
Understanding the critical areas of 
the building that must continue 
functioning focuses security and 
hazard mitigation measures. 
Applying HVAC zones that 
isolate lobbies, mailrooms, 
loading docks, and other entry 
and storage areas from the rest of 
the building HVAC zones and 
maintaining negative pressure 
within these areas will contain 
CBR releases. Identify common 
return systems that service more 
than one zone, effectively making 
a large single zone. Conversely, 
emergency egress routes should 
receive positive pressurization to 
ensure 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



contamination does not hinder 
egress. Consider filtering of the 
pressurization air. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 

6.9 
Are there large central air 
handling units or are there 
multiple units serving 
separate zones? 
Independent units can continue to 
operate if damage occurs to 
limited areas of the building. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The HVAC ducts are 
divided in half to 
allow them to serve 
as supply and return 
headers. The divider 
is insulated to 
minimize heat 
transfer from one side 
to the other. 
6.10 
Are there any redundancies 
in the air handling system? 
Can critical areas be served 
from other units if a major 
system is disabled? 
Redundancy reduces the security 
measures required compared to a 
non-redundant situation. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.11 
Is the air supply to critical 
areas compartmentalized? 
Similarly, are the critical 
areas or the building as a 
whole, considered tight with 
little or no inleakage? 
During chemical, biological, and 
radiological situations, the intent 
is to either keep the 
contamination localized in the 
critical area or prevent its entry 
into other critical, non-critical, or 
public areas. Systems can be 
cross-connected through building 
openings (doorways, ceilings, 
partial wall), ductwork leakage, or 
pressure differences in air 
handling system. In standard 
practice, there is almost always 
some air carried between 
ventilation zones by pressure 
imbalances, due to elevator piston 
action, chimney effect, and wind 
effects. Smoke testing of the air 
supply to critical areas may be 
necessary. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.12 
Are supply, return, and 
exhaust air systems for 
critical areas secure? Are all 
supply and return ducts 
completely connected 
The air systems to critical areas 
should be inaccessible to the 
public, especially if the ductwork 
runs through the public areas of 
the building. It is also more 
secure to have a ducted air 
handling system versus sharing 
hallways and plenums above drop 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


to their grilles and registers 
and secure? Is the return air 
not ducted? 
ceilings for return air. Non-ducted 
systems provide greater 
opportunity for introducing 
contaminants. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 

6.13 
What is the method of 
temperature and humidity 
control? Is it localized or 
centralized? 
Central systems can range from 
monitoring only to full control. 
Local control may be available to 
override central operation. Of 
greatest concern are systems 
needed before, during, and after 
an incident that may be 
unavailable due to temperature 
and humidity exceeding 
operational limits (e.g., main 
telephone switch room). 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
The main heater 
sends hot air into the 
Heating, Ventilation 
and Air Conditioning 
(HVAC) Room, next 
to the M&E Room. 
From here it is 
distributed 
throughout the 
building. Offices, 
restrooms and the 
employee�s lounge 
are directly heated by 
this warm air. The 



Computer Center and 
the Communications 



Center use Digital 
Environmental 



Managers (DEM) to 
direct the warm air 



where it is needed, 



add or remove 



humidity from the air 
or even cool some 



areas while warming 
others. 



Cooling (or heat 
removal) is done by 
two chillers in the 



M&E room. Three 



Trane 100-ton 



chillers are available; 



normally only two 
are needed to cover 



all heat loads. The 



chillers remove heat 



from the Chilled 



Water System, and 
use the Condenser 



Water System to 
send the waste heat 



to two rooftop 
Cooling Towers. The 
Chilled Water is then 



routed from the 



chillers to air 




handlers for the 



majority of the 



building; cooling for 



the Computer Center 



and the 



Communications 



Center is done by 



directing Chilled 



Water to the DEMs. 



Chiller operation 



along with Chilled 



Water and Condenser 



Water flow are 



managed from a 



single control unit in 



the M&E room. A 



single Chilled Water 



pump provides 



adequate flow for all 



cooling situations; a 



backup pump is 



available at the push 



of a button. The 
same 



is true for the 



Condenser Water 



pumps. 
6.14 
Where are the building 
automation control centers 
and cabinets located? Are 
they in secure areas? How 
is the control wiring routed? 
Access to any component of the 
building automation and control 
system could compromise the 
functioning of the system, 
increasing vulnerability to a 
hazard or precluding their proper 
operation during a hazard 
incident. The HVAC and exhaust 
system controls should be in a 
secure 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


area that allows rapid shutdown 
or other activation based upon 
location and type of attack. 
References: FEMA 386-7, DOC 



CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 and LBNL Pub 



51959 

6.15 
Does the control of air 
handling systems support 
plans for sheltering in place 
or other protective 
approach? 
The micro-meteorological effects 
of buildings and terrain can alter 
travel and duration of chemical 
agents and hazardous material 
releases. Shielding in the form of 
sheltering in place can protect 
people and property from harmful 
effects. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


To support in-place sheltering, 
the air handling systems require 




the ability for authorized 
personnel to rapidly turn off all 
systems. However, if the system 
is properly filtered, then keeping 
the system operating will provide 
protection as long as the air 
handling system does not 
distribute an internal release to 
other portions of the building. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 

6.16 
Are there any smoke 
evacuation systems 
installed? Does it have 
purge capability? 
For an internal blast, a smoke 
removal system may be essential, 
particularly in large, open spaces. 
The equipment should be located 
away from high-risk areas, the 
system controls and wiring 
should be protected, and it should 
be connected to emergency power. 
This exhaust capability can be 
built into areas with significant 
risk on internal events, such as 
lobbies, loading docks, and 
mailrooms. Consider filtering of 
the exhaust to capture CBR 
contaminants. References: GSA 
PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139, and LBNL Pub 51959 
Yes. 
6.17 
Where is roof-mounted 
equipment located on the 
roof? (near perimeter, at 
center of roof) 
Roof-mounted equipment should 
be kept away from the building 
perimeter. Reference: U.S. Army 
TM 5-853 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.18 
Are fire dampers installed at 
all fire barriers? Are all 
dampers functional and seal 
well when closed? 
All dampers (fire, smoke, outdoor 
air, return air, bypass) must be 
functional for proper protection 
within the building during an 
incident. Reference: CDC/NIOSH 
Pub 2002-139 
Yes. 
6.19 
Do fire walls and fire doors 
maintain their integrity? 
The tightness of the building 
(both exterior, by weatherization 
to seal cracks around doors and 
windows, and internal, by zone 
ducting, fire walls, fire stops, and 
fire doors) provides energy 
conservation benefits and 
functional benefits during a CBR 
incident. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



Reference: LBNL Pub 51959 

6.20 
Do elevators have recall 
capability and elevator 
emergency message 
capability? 
Although a life-safety code and 
fire response requirement, the 
control of elevators also has 
benefit during a CBR incident. 
The elevators generate a piston 
effect, causing pressure 
differentials in the elevator shaft 
and associated floors that can 
force contamination to flow up or 
down. Reference: LBNL Pub 
51959 
No elevators in HIC. 
6.21 
Is access to building 
information restricted? 
Information on building 
operations, schematics, 
procedures, plans, and 
specifications should be strictly 
controlled and available only to 
authorized personnel. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
No. 
6.22 
Does the HVAC 
maintenance staff have the 
proper training, procedures, 
and preventive maintenance 
schedule to ensure CBR 
equipment is functional? 
Functional equipment must 
interface with operational 
procedures in an emergency plan 
to ensure the equipment is 
properly operated to provide the 
protection desired. The HVAC 
system can be operated in 
different ways, depending upon 
an external or internal release and 
where in the building an internal 
release occurs. Thus maintenance 
and security staff must have the 
training to properly operate the 
HVAC system under different 
circumstances, even if the 
procedure is to turn off all air 
movement equipment. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

7 
Plumbing and Gas 
Systems 


7.1 
What is the method of 
water distribution? 
Central shaft locations for piping 
are more vulnerable than multiple 
riser locations. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.2 
What is the method of gas 
distribution? (heating, 
cooking, medical, process) 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.3 
Is there redundancy to the 
main piping distribution? 
Looping of piping and use of 
section valves provide 
redundancies in the event sections 
of the system are damaged. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.4 
What is the method of 
heating domestic water? 
What fuel(s) is used? 
Single source of hot water with 
one fuel source is more vulnerable 
than multiple sources and 
multiple fuel types. Domestic hot 
water availability is an operational 
concern for many building 
occupancies. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.5 
Where are gas storage tanks 
located? (heating, cooking, 
medical, process) How are 
they piped to the 
distribution system? (above 
or below ground) 
The concern is that the tanks and 
piping could be vulnerable to a 
moving vehicle or a bomb blast 
either directly or by collateral 
damage due to proximity to a 
higher-risk area. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.6 
Are there reserve supplies 
of critical gases? 
Localized gas cylinders could be 
available in the event of damage 
to the central tank system. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

8 
Electrical Systems 


8.1 
Are there any transformers 
or switchgears located 
outside the building or 
accessible from the building 
exterior? Are they 
vulnerable to public access? 
Are they secured? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Transformers 
providing electricity 
to this site are 
located outside the 
building. The two 
12.47KV feeders lead 
to two separate 
transformers outside 
the building, one 
near the north side, 
and the other near the 
south side. 
8.2 
What is the extent of the 
external building lighting in 
utility and service areas and 
at normal entryways used 
by the building occupants? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.3 
How are the electrical rooms 
secured and where are they 
located relative to other 
higher risk areas, starting 
with the main electrical 
distribution room at the 
service entrance? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.4 
Are critical electrical 
systems co-located with 
other building systems? Are 
critical electrical systems 
located in areas outside of 
secured electrical areas? Is 
security system wiring 
located separately from 
electrical and other service 
systems? 
Collocation concerns include 
rooms, ceilings, raceways, 
conduits, panels, and risers. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Yes. 
8.5 
How are electrical 
distribution panels serving 
branch circuits secured or 
are they in secure locations? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.6 
Does emergency backup 
power exist for all areas 
within the building or for 
There should be no single critical 
node that allows both the normal 
electrical service and the 
Yes. Critical 
computer 


critical areas only? How is 
the emergency power 
distributed? Is the 
emergency power system 
independent from the 
normal electrical service, 
particularly in critical areas? 
emergency backup power to be 
affected by a single incident. 
Automatic transfer switches and 
interconnecting switchgear are the 
initial concerns. Emergency and 
normal electrical equipment 
should be installed separately, at 
different locations, and as far 
apart as possible. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
systems are backed 
up by an UPS which 
is maintained 
separately from the 
sites generator back-
up power. 
8.7 
How is the primary 
electrical system wiring 
distributed? Is it co-located 
with other 
Central utility shafts may be 
subject to damage, especially if 
there is only one for the building. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

major utilities? 



Is there redundancy of 
distribution to critical areas? 



9 
Fire Alarm Systems 


9.1 
Is the building fire alarm 
system centralized or 
localized? How are alarms 
annunciated, both locally 
and centrally? Are critical 
documents and control 
systems located in a secure 
yet accessible location? 
Fire alarm systems must first 
warn building occupants to 
evacuate for life safety. Then they 
must inform the responding 
agency to dispatch fire equipment 
and personnel. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Centralized. 
9.2 
Where are the fire alarm 
panels located? Do they 
allow access to 
unauthorized personnel? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Building next to 
HIC. 
9.3 
Is the fire alarm system 
stand-alone or integrated 
with other functions such as 
security and environmental 
or building management 
systems? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Standalone. 


What is the interface? 


9.4 
Do key fire alarm system 
components have fire- and 
blast-resistant separation? 
This is especially necessary for 
the fire command center or fire 
alarm control center. The concern 
is to similarly protect critical 
components as described in Items 
2.19, 5.7, and 10.3. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
9.5 
Is there redundant off-
premises fire alarm 
reporting? 
Fire alarms can ring at a fire 
station, at an intermediary alarm 
monitoring center, or autodial 
someone else. See Items 5.21 and 
10.5. 
Yes. 

10 
Communications and IT Systems 

10.1 
Where is the main telephone 
distribution room and where 
is it in relation to higher risk 
areas? Is the main telephone 
distribution room secure? 
One can expect to find voice, 
data, signal, and alarm systems to 
be routed through the main 
telephone distribution room. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Communications. 
10.2 
Does the telephone system 
have an UPS 
(uninterruptible power 
supply)? What is its type, 
power rating, operational 
duration under load, and 
location? (battery, on-line, 
filtered) 
Many telephone systems are now 
computerized and need a UPS to 
ensure reliability during power 
fluctuations. The UPS is also 
needed to await any emergency 
power coming on line or allow 
orderly shutdown. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.3 
Where are communication 
systems wiring closets 
located? (voice, data, signal, 
alarm) Are they co-located 
with other utilities? Are 
they in secure areas? 
Concern is to have separation 
distance from other utilities and 
higher-risk areas to avoid 
collateral damage. Security 
approaches on the closets include 
door alarms, closed circuit 
television, swipe cards, or other 
logging notifications to ensure 
only authorized personnel have 
access to these closets. Reference: 
FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.4 
How is communications 
system wiring distributed? 
(secure chases and risers, 
accessible public areas) 
The intent is to prevent tampering 
with the systems. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

10.5 
Are there redundant 
communications systems 
available? 
Critical areas should be supplied 
with multiple or redundant means 
of communications. Power outage 
phones can provide redundancy as 
they connect directly to the local 
commercial telephone switch off 
site and not through the building 
telephone switch in the main 
telephone distribution room. A 
base radio communication system 
with antenna can be installed in 
stairwells, and portable sets 
distributed to floors. References: 
GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7 
No. 
10.6 
Where are the main 
distribution facility, data 
centers, routers, firewalls, 
and servers located and are 
they secure? Where are the 
secondary and/or 
intermediate distribution 
facilities and are they 
secure? 
Concern is collateral damage from 
manmade hazards and redundancy 
of critical functions. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
Interior and secure. 
10.7 
What type and where are 
the WAN (wide area 
network) connections? 
Critical facilities should have two 
Minimum-Points-of-Presence 
(MPOPs) where the telephone 
company�s outside cable 
terminates inside the building. It 
is functionally a service entrance 
connection that demarcates where 
the telephone company�s property 
stops and the building owner�s 
property begins. The MPOPs 
should not be collocated and they 
should connect to different 
telephone company central offices 
so that the loss of one cable or 
central office does not reduce 
capability. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.8 
What type, power rating, 
and location of the UPS 
(uninterruptible power 
supply)? (battery, on-line, 
filtered) 
Consider that UPS should be 
found at all computerized points 
from the main distribution 
facility to individual data closets 
and at critical personal 
computers/terminals. 
Lead acid battery. 


Are the UPS also connected 
to emergency power? 
Critical LAN sections should also 
be on backup power. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 

10.9 
What type of LAN (local 
area network) cabling and 
physical topology is used? 
(Category(Cat) 5, Gigabit 
Ethernet, Ethernet, Token 
Ring) 
The physical topology of a 
network is the way in which the 
cables and computers are 
connected to each other. The main 
types of physical topologies are: 
Bus (single radial where any 
damage on the bus affects the 
whole system, but especially all 
portions downstream) Star 
(several computes are connected 
to a hub and many hubs can be in 
the network � the hubs can be 
critical nodes, but the other hubs 
continue to function if one fails) 
Ring (a bus with a continuous 
connection - least used, but can 
tolerate some damage because if 
the ring fails at a single point it 
can be rerouted much like a 
looped electric or water system) 
The configuration and the 
availability of surplus cable or 
spare capacity on individual 
cables can reduce vulnerability to 
hazard incidents. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.10 
For installed radio/wireless 
systems, what are their 
types and where are they 
located? (RF (radio 
frequency), HF (high 
frequency), VHF (very high 
frequency), MW (medium 
wave) 
Depending upon the function of 
the wireless system, it could be 
susceptible to accidental or 
intended jamming or collateral 
damage. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.11 
Do the IT (Information 
Technology � computer) 
systems meet requirements 
of confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability? 
Ensure access to terminals and 
equipment for authorized 
personnel only and ensure system 
up-time to meet operational 
needs. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Yes. 





10.12 
Where is the disaster 
recovery/mirroring site? 
A site with suitable equipment 
that allows continuation of 
operations or that mirrors 
(operates in parallel to) the 
existing operation is beneficial if 
equipment is lost during a natural 
or manmade disaster. The need is 
based upon the criticality of the 
operation and how quickly 
replacement equipment can be put 
in place and operated. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
In local geographic 
area. 
10.13 
Where is the back-up 
tape/file storage site and 
what is the type of safe 
environment? (safe, vault, 
underground) Is there 
redundant refrigeration in 
the site? 
If equipment is lost, data are 
most likely lost, too. Backups are 
needed to continue operations at 
the disaster recovery site or when 
equipment can be delivered and 
installed. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.14 
Are there any SATCOM 
(satellite communications) 
links? (location, power, 
UPS, emergency power, 
spare capacity/capability) 
SATCOM links can serve as 
redundant communications for 
voice and data if configured to 
support required capability after a 
hazard incident. Reference: DOC 
CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.15 
Is there a mass notification 
system that reaches all 
building occupants? (public 
address, pager, cell phone, 
computer override, etc.) 
Will one or more of these 
systems be operational 
under hazard conditions? 
(UPS, emergency power) 
Depending upon building size, a 
mass notification system will 
provide warning and alert 
information, along with actions 
to take before and after an 
incident if there is redundancy 
and power. Reference: DoD UFC 
4-010-01 
No. 
10.16 
Do control centers and their 
designated alternate 
locations have equivalent or 
reduced capability for voice, 
data, mass 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Yes, large conference 
room. 


notification, etc.? 
(emergency operations, 
security, fire alarms, 
building automation) Do the 
alternate locations also have 
access to backup systems, 
including emergency power? 



11 
Equipment Operations and Maintenance 

11.1 
Are there composite 
drawings indicating location 
and capacities of major 
systems and are they 
current? (electrical, 
mechanical, and fire 
protection; and date of last 
update) Do updated O&M 
(operation and maintenance) 
manuals exist? 
Within critical infrastructure 
protection at the building level, 
the current configuration and 
capacity of all critical systems 
must be understood to ensure 
they meet emergency needs. 
Manuals must also be current to 
ensure operations and 
maintenance keeps these systems 
properly functioning. The system 
must function during an 
emergency unless directly affected 
by the hazard incident. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.2 
Have critical air systems 
been rebalanced? If so, when 
and how often? 
Although the system may 
function, it must be tested 
periodically to ensure it is 
performing as designed. 
Balancing is also critical after 
initial construction to set 
equipment to proper performance 
per the design. Rebalancing may 
only occur during renovation. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.3 
Is air pressurization 
monitored regularly? 
Some areas require positive or 
negative pressure to function 
properly. Pressurization is critical 
in a hazardous environment or 
emergency situation. Measuring 
pressure drop across filters is an 
indication when filters should be 
changed, but also may indicate 
that low pressures are developing 
downstream and could result in 
loss of expected 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



protection. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 

11.4 
Does the building have a 
policy or procedure for 
periodic recommissioning of 
major M/E/P 
(Mechanical/Electrical/ 
Plumbing) systems? 
Recommissioning involves 
testing and balancing of systems 
to ascertain their capability to 
perform as described. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.5 
Is there an adequate 
operations and maintenance 
program including training 
of facilities management 
staff? 
If O&M of critical systems is 
done with in-house personnel, 
management must know what 
needs to be done and the 
workforce must have the 
necessary training to ensure 
systems reliability. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.6 
What maintenance and 
service agreements exist for 
M/E/P systems? 
When an in-house facility 
maintenance work force does not 
exist or does not have the 
capability to perform the work, 
maintenance and service contracts 
are the alternative to ensure 
critical systems will work under 
all conditions. The facility 
management staff requires the 
same knowledge to oversee these 
contracts as if the work was being 
done by in-house personnel. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.7 
Are backup power systems 
periodically tested under 
load? 
Loading should be at or above 
maximum connected load to 
ensure available capacity and 
automatic sensors should be 
tested at least once per year. 
Periodically (once a year as a 
minimum) check the duration of 
capacity of backup systems by 
running them for the expected 
emergency duration or estimating 
operational duration through fuel 
consumption, water consumption, 
or voltage loss. Reference: FEMA 
386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

11.8 
Is stairway and exit sign 
lighting operational? 
The maintenance program for 
stairway and exit sign lighting 
(all egress lighting) should ensure 
functioning under normal and 
emergency power conditions. 
Expect building codes to be 
updated as emergency egress 
lighting is moved from upper 
walls and over doorways to floor 
level as heat and smoke drive 
Yes. 


occupants to crawl along the floor 
to get out of the building. Signs 
and lights mounted high have 
limited or no benefit when 



obscured. 



Reference: FEMA 386-7 


13 
Security Master Plan 


13.1 
Does a written security plan 
exist for this site or 
building? When was the 
initial security plan written 
and last revised? Who is 
responsible for preparing 
and reviewing the security 
plan? 
The development and 
implementation of a security 
master plan provides a roadmap 
that outlines the strategic 
direction and vision, operational, 
managerial, and technological 
mission, goals, and objectives of 
the organization�s security 
program. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
HIC does have a fire 
evacuation plan. HIC 
does not have a mass 
evacuation plan and 
rally point. 
13.2 
Has the security plan been 
communicated and 
disseminated to key 
management personnel and 
departments? 
The security plan should be part 
of the building design so that the 
construction or renovation of the 
structure integrates with the 
security procedures to be used 
during daily operations. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.3 
Has the security plan been 
benchmarked or compared 
against related organizations 
and operational entities? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.4 
Has the security plan ever 
been tested and evaluated 
from a cost-benefit and 
operational efficiency and 
effectiveness perspective? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

13.5 
Does it define mission, 
vision, short-long term 
security program goals and 
objectives? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.6 
Are threats, vulnerabilities, 
risks adequately defined and 
security countermeasures 
addressed and prioritized 
relevant to their criticality 
and probability of 
occurrence? 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.7 
Has a security 
implementation schedule 
been established to address 
recommended security 
solutions? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.8 
Have security operating and 
capital budgets been 
addressed, approved and 
established to support the 
plan? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.9 
What regulatory or industry 
guidelines/standards were 
followed in the preparation 
of the security plan? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.10 
Does the security plan 
address existing security 
conditions from an 
administrative, operational, 
managerial and technical 
security systems 
perspective? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.11 
Does the security plan 
address the protection of 
people, property, assets, 
and information? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.12 
Does the security plan 
address the following major 
components: access control, 
surveillance, response, 
building hardening and 
protection against biological, 
chemical, radiological and 
cybernetwork attacks? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

13.13 
Has the level of risk been 
identified and communicated 
in the 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

security plan through the 
performance of a physical 
security assessment? 


13.14 
When was the last security 
assessment performed? 
Who performed the security 
risk assessment? 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.15 
Were the following areas of 
security analysis addressed 
in the security master plan:  
Asset Analysis: Does the 
security plan identify and 
prioritize the assets to be 
protected in accordance to 
their location, control, 
This process is the input to the 
building design and what 
mitigation measures will be 
included in the facility project to 
reduce risk and increase safety of 
the building and people. 
Reference: USA TM 5-853, 
Security Engineering 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

current value, and 



replacement value? 



Threat Analysis: Does the 
security plan address 
potential threats; causes of 
potential harm in the form 
of death, injury, destruction, 
disclosure, interruption of 
operations, or denial of 
services? 



(possible criminal acts 
(documented and review of 
police/security incident 
reports) associated with 
forced entry, bombs, 
ballistic assault, 



biochemical and related 



terrorist tactics, attacks 



against utility systems 
infrastructure and buildings) 



Vulnerability Analysis: 
Does the security plan 
address other areas and 




anything else associated 
wi