Joint Field Office Activation and Operations Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure Appendixes and Annexes Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 2006 Table of Contents Appendix 1: List of Acronyms...................................................................................................................................1 Appendix 2: References............................................................................................................................................11 Annex A: Roles and Responsibilities.......................................................................................................................12 1.0 National Responsibilities ................................................................................................................................................ 12 2.0 Regional Responsibilities................................................................................................................................................ 13 Annex B: Administrative Reports...........................................................................................................................15 Tab 1 to Annex B: Financial Report Template......................................................................................................................... 15 Tab 2 to Annex B: Closeout Report.......................................................................................................................................... 16 Tab 3 to Annex B: After-Action and Lessons Learned (Hotwash) Report (LLR) .................................................................... 17 Tab 4 to Annex B: Secretary’sRemedial Action Management Program (SEC RAMP) AAR Format.....................................22 Annex C: Operations................................................................................................................................................23 1.0 Principles for Building Interagency Coordination........................................................................................................... 23 2.0 The JFO Coordination and Support Cycle ...................................................................................................................... 26 Tab 1 to Annex C: Decisionmaking Process ............................................................................................................................ 43 Tab 2 to Annex C: CP Cover Sheet .......................................................................................................................................... 46 Tab 3 to Annex C: Coordination Objectives............................................................................................................................. 47 Tab 4 to Annex C: Assignment List ......................................................................................................................................... 48 Tab 5 to Annex C: Assignment List Attachment...................................................................................................................... 49 Tab 6 to Annex C: ICS-209-JFO, Coordination Status Summary ............................................................................................ 50 Annex D: Logistical Requirements .........................................................................................................................59 1.0 Joint Field Office Logistics Requirements (conceptual) ................................................................................................. 59 2.0 Scenario One: Type I (Major) Disaster .......................................................................................................................... 62 3.0 Scenario Two: Type II Heightened Threat of Terrorism w/out WMD........................................................................... 63 4.0 Scenario Three: Type I Heightened Threat of Terrorism w/ WMD ............................................................................... 64 5.0 Scenario Four: Type I Federal-to-Federal Support (Spill of National Significance)......................................................65 6.0 Scenario Five: Type III Federal-to-Federal Support (Chemical Release Accident) ....................................................... 66 7.0 JFO Size Requirements Estimation Worksheet............................................................................................................... 67 Tab 1 to Annex D: Pre-deployment Conference Call Checklist ............................................................................................... 68 Tab 2 to Annex D: PFO Go Kit Footprint ................................................................................................................................ 69 Tab 3 to Annex D: DHS/NOC Go Kit Footprint ...................................................................................................................... 70 Annex E: Communications and Information Sharing...........................................................................................71 1.0 Purpose and Scope .......................................................................................................................................................... 71 2.0 Intra-JFO Communications.............................................................................................................................................71 i Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 3.0 External Communications...............................................................................................................................................74 4.0 Threat Monitoring and Initial Incident Assessment ........................................................................................................ 75 5.0 Daily Production ............................................................................................................................................................. 75 6.0 Secure Video Teleconferences (SVTCs)......................................................................................................................... 76 7.0 Situation Unit Watch Rotations ...................................................................................................................................... 77 8.0 Logs ................................................................................................................................................................................ 77 Tab 1 to Annex E: JFO “Battle Rhythm” Timeline .................................................................................................................. 78 Tab 2 to Annex E: Initial Situation Report (SITREP) .............................................................................................................. 79 Tab 3 to Annex E: Situation Reports........................................................................................................................................ 80 Tab 4 to Annex E: Urgent Situation (Spot) Reports ................................................................................................................. 90 Tab 5 to Annex E: Threat Situation Report .............................................................................................................................. 91 Tab 6 to Annex E: HSIN-JFOnet Technical Data..................................................................................................................... 94 Tab 7 to Annex E: Template JFO Information-Sharing Plan.................................................................................................... 95 Annex F: Security Procedures...............................................................................................................................106 Tab 1 to Annex F: SOP for Information Classification and Handling .................................................................................... 107 Tab 2 to Annex F: SOP for Verification of NSCI Clearances ................................................................................................ 121 Tab 3 to Annex F: SOP for Emergency Disclosure of NSCI..................................................................................................122 Tab 4 to Annex F: SOP for SCI/SCIF Operation.................................................................................................................... 124 Tab 5 to Annex F: Template Physical and Information Security Plan....................................................................................144 Tab 6 to Annex F: SOP for SBU Information Handling......................................................................................................... 145 Annex G: Principal Federal Official .....................................................................................................................149 1.0 Alert and Designation ................................................................................................................................................... 149 2.0 Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................................................................................................ 149 3.0 Concept of Operations .................................................................................................................................................. 150 4.0 Logistical Requirements ............................................................................................................................................... 163 5.0 Administration and Logistics ........................................................................................................................................ 165 Tab 1 to Annex G: Reports/Scheduled Events........................................................................................................................ 168 Tab 2 to Annex G: Mission Points of Contact........................................................................................................................169 Tab 3 to Annex G: Weather.................................................................................................................................................... 170 Tab 4 to Annex G: Request for Information........................................................................................................................... 171 Tab 5 to Annex G: Communications Tracking Log................................................................................................................ 172 Tab 6 to Annex G: Attendance Tracking Log......................................................................................................................... 173 Tab 7 to Annex G: Requests for Information Tracking Log...................................................................................................174 Tab 8 to Annex G: Financial Information............................................................................................................................... 175 Tab 9 to Annex G: Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) .......................................................................................... 176 Annex H: Joint Field Office Organization............................................................................................................177 Tab 1 to Annex H: Sample JFO Organization for Natural Disasters ...................................................................................... 177 ii Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Tab 2 to Annex H: Sample JFO Organization for Terrorism Incidents .................................................................................. 178 Tab 3 to Annex H: Sample JFO Organization for Federal-to-Federal Support....................................................................... 179 Tab 4 to Annex H: Sample JFO Organization for National Special Security Events ............................................................. 180 Annex I: Joint Information Center .......................................................................................................................181 Annex J: JFO Exercise Evaluation Guidelines ....................................................................................................182 Annex K: Communications Unit ...........................................................................................................................195 1.0 Introduction................................................................................................................................................................... 195 2.0 Communications Unit ................................................................................................................................................... 195 3.0 Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................................................................................................ 198 4.0 Concept of Operations .................................................................................................................................................. 205 Tab 1 to Annex K: Communications Unit Staffing Patterns................................................................................................... 214 Tab 2 to Annex K: Communications Unit Organization Chart............................................................................................... 215 Tab 3 to Annex K: CommunicationsRequirements Process Using TIMACS........................................................................216 Tab 4 to Annex K: Spectrum Management ............................................................................................................................ 217 Tab 5 to Annex K: Communications Unit Toolkit ................................................................................................................. 225 iii Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Appendix 1: List of Acronyms AAR After-Action Report AC/IC Area Command/Incident Command ADP Automatic Data Processing AFO Area Field Office Air Ops Air Operations Branch Director ASIA Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis BPA Blanket Purchase Agreement CBP Customs and Border Protection CBRNE Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear/Explosive CFO Chief Financial Officer CIA Central Intelligence Agency CI/KR Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources CIO Chief Information Officer COA Course of Action COML Communications Unit Leader CONOPS Concept of Operations COOP Continuity of Operations Plan CPSD Contingency Planning and Support Division CRCL DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties CSA Cognizant Security Authority CUL Cost Unit Leader CVS Clearance Verification System 1 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 DAN Document Accountability Number DCE Defense Coordinating Element DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directive DCN Document Control Number DCO Defense Coordinating Officer DCS Defense Courier Service DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team DFO Disaster Field Office DHS Department of Homeland Security DISC Disaster Information Systems Clearinghouse DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team DMORT Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team DOB Date of Birth DOD Department of Defense DOJ Department of Justice DOM Disaster Operations Manual DPMU Disaster/Deployable Portable Morgue Unit DRC Disaster Recovery Center DREC Deputy Regional Emergency Coordinator DRF Disaster Relief Fund DRG Disaster Readiness Group DRM Disaster Recovery Manager DSAT DHS Situational Awareness Team DSCA Defense Support of Civilian Authorities 2 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 DSEN Drug Enforcement Agency Sensitive DSO Disaster Safety Officer DT Development Team DTRIM Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management Policy Coordination PCC Committee DUL Documentation Unit Leader EAP Emergency Action Plan EC Emergency Coordinator EOC Emergency Operations Center EMI Emergency Management Institute (FEMA) EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPL Evaluated Products List ERT Emergency Response Team ERT-A Emergency Response Team–Advance Element ERT-N National Emergency Response Team ESF Emergency Support Function ESFLG Emergency Support Function Leadership Group FAA Federal Aviation Administration FAC Family Assistance Center FAMS Federal Air Marshals Service FAR Federal Acquisition Regulations FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FCO Federal Coordinating Officer FECC Federal Emergency Communications Coordinator 3 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FOC Full Operating Capability FOUO For Official Use Only FPS Federal Protective Service FRC Federal Resource Coordinator FSC Finance/Admin Section Chief GAR Governor’s Authorized Representative GSA General Services Administration GSAR General Services Administration Acquisition Regulations HHS Department of Health and Human Services HSC Homeland Security Council HSIN Homeland Security Information Network HSIR Homeland Security Intelligence Report HSOMB Homeland Security Operations Morning Brief HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive IA DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis IAC Incident Advisory Council IC Incident Command ICC Incident Communications Center ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement ICEPP Incident Communications Emergency Policy and Procedures ICP Incident Command Post ICS Incident Command System IDP Immediate Deployment Plan 4 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 IDS Intrusion Detection System IMSURT International Medical Surgical Response Team IO Information Officer IOC Initial Operating Capability IP DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection IR Infrared IT Information Technology JFO Joint Field Office JFO CG Joint Field Office Coordination Group JIC Joint Information Center JIS Joint Information System JOC Joint Operations Center JPAS Joint Personnel Adjudication System JRIES Joint Regional Information Exchange System JTF Joint Task Force JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force JRIES Joint Regional Information Exchange System LES Law Enforcement Sensitive LIMDIS Limited Distribution LLR Lessons Learned (Hot Wash) Report LNO Liaison Officer LOU Limited Official Use LSC Logistics Section Chief MACC Multiagency Command Center 5 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 MCRC Message Center/Switchboard Operator/Receptionist MERS Mobile Emergency Response Support MHAT Medical Health Advisory Team MNAT Medical Needs Assessment Team MOA Memorandum of Agreement MOB Mobile Operations Branch MOU Memorandum of Understanding MST Management Support Team NCR National Capital Region NCTC National Counterterrorism Center NGA National Geospatial Intelligence Agency NGO Nongovernmental Organization NICC National Infrastructure Coordinating Center NICCL National Incident Communications Conference Line NIMS National Incident Management System NISPOM National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual NMRT National Medical Response Team NOC National Operations Center NRCC National Response Coordination Center NRP National Response Plan NSA National Security Agency NSI Classified National Security Information NSSE National Special Security Event NVRT National Veterinary Response Team 6 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 OCONUS Outside the Continental United States OE Organizational Element OPA Office of Public Affairs OSC Operations Section Chief OSLGC Office of State and Local Government Coordination OUO Official Use Only PA Public Affairs PAO Public Affairs Office/Officer PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information PDA Personal Digital Assistant PDA Preliminary Damage Assessment PDD Presidential Decision Directive PDS Practice Dangerous to Security PED Portable Electronic Device PFO Principal Federal Official POB Place of Birth POE Projected Operating Environment PROPIN Proprietary Information PSC Planning Section Chief RA Regional Administrator REC Regional Emergency Coordinator RF Radio Frequency RFA Request for Assistance RFI Request for Information 7 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 RISC Regional Interagency Steering Committee RMD Risk Management Division RNA Rapid Needs Assessment (Team) ROC Required Operating Capability RON Rest Overnight RRCC Regional Response Coordination Center RRR Readiness, Response and Recovery RUL Resource Unit Leader S&T Science and Technology SAAR Secretary’s After Action Report SAC Special Agent in Charge (FBI) SAIC Special Agent in Charge (USSS) SBU Sensitive but Unclassified SC Safety Coordinator SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility SCO State Coordinating Officer SEC RAMP Secretary’s Remedial Action Management Program SERT Secretary’s Emergency Response Team (HHS) SFLEO Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official SFO Senior Federal Official SGI Safeguards Information SIOC Strategic Information and Operations Center (FBI) SITREP Situation Report 8 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 SMB Secretary’s Morning Brief SME Subject Matter Expert SO Security Officer SOIC Senior Official of the Intelligence Community SOP Standard Operating Procedure SPOTREP Spot Report SPSCIF Semi-Permanent Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility SSI Sensitive Security Information SSN Social Security Number SSO Special Security Officer STE Secure Telephone Equipment STU Secure Telephone Unit SUL Situation Unit Leader SVTC Secure Video Teleconference SWO Senior Watch Officer TAIS Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems TIMACS Telecommunications Information Management and Control System TLC Territory Logistics Center TSA Transportation Security Administration TSC Terrorist Screening Center TSCA Top Secret Control Account TSCM Technical Surveillance Countermeasures TSCO Top Secret Control Officer TS/SCI Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information 9 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 TSWA Temporary Secure Working Area UC Unified Command UCNI Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers USCG United States Coast Guard USSOCOM US Special Operations Command USSS United States Secret Service VMAT Veterinary Medical Assistance Team WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WMO (DHS) Wireless Management Office 10 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Appendix 2: References • DEST Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between DHS and FBI • Homeland Security Act of 2002 • National Operational Center (NOC) SOP • Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 • Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 • Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 • Incident Advisory Council (IAC) SOP • National Incident Management System (NIMS) • National Response Plan (NRP) • Presidential Decision Directive-39 • Presidential Decision Directive-62 • Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 11 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Annex A: Roles and Responsibilities 1.0 National Responsibilities 1.1 Type III Expeditionary JFO Development Team. To facilitate the development of the planned Type III Expeditionary JFOs for each high-threat or regional area, an Expeditionary JFO Development Team (DT) will be established. Although to devising a carefully crafted, long-term Required Operating Capability (ROC)/ Projected Operating Environment (POE) document or regional employment concept will be a long-term initiative, DHS/FEMA regions should immediately consider interim or bridging concepts to deliver a more "Expeditionary" capability for JFOs should the need arise before the deliberate planning process can be completed The DT will be co-chaired by DHS/FEMA and DHS/USCG. Membership of the team will include appropriate representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Department of Health and Human Services, and all DHS field elements. DHS/FEMA and DHS/USCG will coordinate general oversight and guidance throughout the process, ensuring that the years of experience and existing assets utilized in the development of DFOs and Incident Command Posts are carefully integrated into the Expeditionary JFO development process. DHS will share relevant JFO pre-planning information through established channels, including through the Regional Interagency Steering Committees (RISCs) and the national ESF Leadership Group (ESFLG), with other NRP agencies and seek their input as appropriate. 1.2 Expeditionary JFO Development Team Taskings 1.2.1 Develop an Expeditionary JFO Required Operating Capability (ROC) and Projected Operating Environment (POE) consistent with: • The JFO SOP • Threat environment • Demographics • The Homeland Security Council’s report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned • Capable of Type III initial operating capability (only); • Capable of being self-supporting for up to three weeks; and • Capable of operating in austere environments with minimal functioning infrastructure. 1.2.2 Develop an Expeditionary JFO Employment Strategy consistent with: • Regional JFO Development Team inputs (see section 2.0 to this Annex) • The JFO SOP 12 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 • Threat environment • Demographics • Existing political structure • Level of local and State readiness and operational systems • Existing regional Federal structure; and • Locations to stage the Expeditionary JFO so as to be deployable and functioning within 12 hours of deployment notification from any RRCC. 1.2.3 Develop an Expeditionary JFO staffing plan, consistent with the Expeditionary JFO ROC/POE, supporting all organizational elements of an initial operating capability Type III Expeditionary JFO. These plans should identify the organizations or representatives from the appropriate DHS elements needed to maintain the Expeditionary JFO readiness posture once established for each region. 2.0 Regional Responsibilities 2.1 JFO Developmental Organizations. To facilitate the development of future JFOs and other DHS facilities for each high-threat or regional area, a JFO DT will be established immediately upon approval of this SOP. JFO DTs are intended to ensure that DHS can meet its intended timeframes for establishing JFOs and deploying Expeditionary JFOs (rather than based on threat streams, etc.) for all areas deemed by the JFO DT to be risk for an Incident of National Significance or other incident requiring a coordinated Federal response. These teams will be co-chaired by the appropriate DHS/FEMA regional office, DHS/USSS field office, and/or FBI field office. Membership of the team will include all DHS field elements within the defined urban threat area or regional area. DHS/FEMA will coordinate general oversight and guidance throughout the process, ensuring that the years of experience and existing assets utilized in the development of DFOs are carefully integrated into the JFO developmental process. The Under Secretary for Preparedness will assign organizational responsibility to the appropriate DHS/FEMA elements to ensure oversight of the process. 2.2 Regional JFO Development Team Taskings 2.2.1 Develop a JFO Strategy consistent with: • JFO SOP • NSSE requirements • Threat environment • Demographics • Existing political structure • Level of local and State readiness and operational systems • Existing regional Federal structure; and 13 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 • The Expeditionary JFO ROC/POE and Expeditionary JFO Strategy (see section 1 to this Annex, above). 2.2.2 Develop JFO staffing plans, consistent with the JFO SOP, supporting all organizational elements of a fully functional JFO for the specific regional area, including the Expeditionary JFO and/or AFO when those capabilities are established. Expeditionary staffing plans should identify the organizations or representatives from the appropriate DHS elements needed to maintain the JFO readiness posture once established for each region or urban threat area. AFO staffing plans should identify the logistical capabilities required to simultaneously support four JFOs and three AFOs across two regions. 1.2.3 Support the National Expeditionary Development Team. In addition to managing its own potential JFO deployments, each regional DT should support the development of the Expeditionary JFO ROC/POE. 2.2.4 Develop an Expeditionary JFO IDP. In addition to pre-identification of non-expeditionary facilities, each regional DT should develop an Expeditionary JFO Immediate Deployment Plan (IDP) to support any activation resulting from a no-notice threat or actual incident. This plan should be activated/implemented in the event of a WMD incident and in the absence of an available functional site. It would provide a critical action plan that provides Federal, State, local, and private-sector contacts with those organizations that have previously agreed to support the use of the Expeditionary JFO capability. 14 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Annex B: Administrative Reports Tab 1 to Annex B: Financial Report Template [RESERVED] 15 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Tab 2 to Annex B: Closeout Report [RESERVED] 16 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Tab 3 to Annex B: After-Action and Lessons Learned (Hotwash) Report (LLR) 1.0 General The After-Action Report is a narrative summary of the operations, contingency response, or exercise. An AAR may contain specific associated lesson(s) learned and primarily: • Summarizes JFO operations or exercises, • Assesses how well the NRP’s objectives were accomplished, and • Documents major lessons learned for follow-up action, including action by the Secretary of Homeland Security through the SEC RAMP. The Planning Section Chief is responsible for initiating the AAR/LLR process prior to demobilization of the Planning Section. The PFO/FRC/FCO, as appropriate, is responsible for overseeing the AAR/LLR process in a manner to comply with the deadline. The Lessons Learned (Smart Practice) Report is a standalone record that documents specific issues, problem areas, best practices, and work-arounds pertaining to operations, contingency response, or exercises. Each lesson learned should be prepared so that it does not rely on another part of the document (AAR/LLR) for clarification. The AAR for the JFO does not replace separate agency after-action processes. The JFO AAR may be integrated into agency-specific after-action systems. AARs/LLRs pertaining to the JFO established for a NSSE will address only the JFO and NRP aspects of the operation. 2.0 Objective The objective of the JFO AAR/LLR process is to provide an assessment of JFO effectiveness during the incident response or exercise. It includes a brief mission description and significant events, discussion of interoperability with other organizations, and recommendations. It may identify areas for improvement in homeland security doctrine (i.e., policy, procedures, plans, and tactics) and training. Individual lessons learned may be attached to the AAR, providing a more comprehensive picture of the response or exercise. Individual LLRs are used to describe a better way of accomplishing a task or overcoming a problem, describe a successful action that should be noted for future contingencies, describe a problem encountered and the action the participants took to bypass or alleviate that problem, or document an issue that was encountered for which no solution was found. 3.0 Requirements for Submission The JFO AAR/LLR should be completed and forwarded to arrive at the DHS/Preparedness Directorate within 60 days of JFO stand-down and should be in the format outlined below. 4.0 AAR Format 4.1 Identifying Information This section provides standard information to index and identify the report and document 17 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 submission of the AAR. 4.1.1 Incident Name This is the name given to the operation, response, or exercise, such as Desert Storm, Positive Response Y2K, Exxon Valdez, Hurricane Andrew, etc. 4.1.2 Type of Incident This is the specific NRP incident criterion which caused the implementation of the NRP and JFO. 4.1.3 Point of Contact Name of person and home organization of the person submitting the AAR. 4.1.4 Expenditures Actual expenses made through the JFO against all applicable NRP-activated funds. 4.2 Executive Summary This section should contain a concise summary of JFO and NRP-related strategic and operational highlights while addressing areas for improvement in effectiveness, efficiency, coordination, and interoperability. 4.3 JFO Coordination and Support Operations This section should be used to discuss specific JFO and NRP operational issues in the following areas: 4.3.1 Command Center Interoperability, Communication, and Information (essentially C3I) 4.3.2 Intelligence Issues (threat assessment, vulnerability evaluation, consequence assessment, integrated risk-based decision making, quality and capability of dissemination of information); 4.3.3 Coordination Planning Issues and Activities (coordination cycle implementation, support operations, coordination activities); 4.3.4 Security Issues (information classification and handling, physical security, badging and access control, emergency disclosure, operation of SCIFs); 4.3.5 National Response Plan Issues (deriving from the NRP itself); and 4.3.6 Statistical Data such as support assets provided, JFO-related aircraft sorties/hours, and law enforcement activities. 4.4 JFO Support This section should address specific JFO support issues such as planning documents and 18 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 SOPs, personnel requirements, logistics/supplies requirements, financial issues, legal issues, and external affairs (including media affairs) items. 4.5 NRP and JFO Objectives and Major Lessons Learned This section should address how well the NRP and JFO objectives were met during the operation, response, or exercise. 4.6 Limitations and Accidents This section should detail any factor that limited full accomplishment of NRP and JFO objectives and should detail any JFO-related accidents, injuries, or deaths. 4.7 Participants This section should identify the coordinating entities involved in JFO operations. 5.0 LLR Format 5.1 Incident Name This is the name given to the operation, response, or exercise, such as Desert Storm, Positive Response Y2K, Exxon Valdez, Hurricane Andrew, etc. 5.2 LLR Identifying Information The identifying information associated with each lesson learned is very important for retrieving lessons learned by a number of categories. See the QUICK HITTER Lessons Learned Capture Worksheet at the end of this tab. 5.2.1 Lesson Learned Title This is not the same as the event name. It should be something that can be easily recognizable as the main theme of the lesson learned. 5.2.2 Recommended Action This should be a short description of what the author has concluded should be done as follow-on action. If the lesson learned contains a recommendation for follow-on action, then the author should so indicate here. If action was recommended and has since been taken, then “no further action” should be noted. If the lesson learned requires no action, then it should be characterized as “for information only.” 5.2.3 Observation Capture Date(s) This should record the date(s) on which the lesson learned was observed in the field or at the JFO. 5.2.4 Type of Incident Choose the contingency that was supported during the event. 5.2.5 NRP or ICS Category Choose the NIMS ICS position or function from the LLR Worksheet on page 22 that 19 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 would most likely deal with the theme of the lesson learned. The NRP and NIMS are good references for deciding the best NRP category or ICS position to choose. 5.2.6 Plan Component This category helps define the lesson learned in the context of what component of a plan (if any) was being exercised or executed when the lesson learned observation was made. 5.2.7 Recommended Action Area Choose what area is the best place to implement the recommendation of the lesson learned. This is especially important because it places the lesson learned in the context of how best to improve performance, prevention, plans, and policy, which is one of the primary reasons for collecting and disseminating lessons learned. 5.3 Observation Should contain a brief factual statement of the observed success or problem. Statement can be (1) positive about something done exceptionally well or about procedures used that should be shared, or (2) negative about something that happened that should not have occurred or something that did not occur but should have. 5.4 Discussion Should amplify the success or problem described in the observation. Should answer the questions “Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How.” 5.5 Lesson Learned (Smart Practice) Should contain information on the positive action taken to generate success or the action that should be taken to avoid or alleviate or work around a problem. 5.6 Recommendation Should contain a statement of how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem and who should make the correction. The recommendation could result in a requirement for new or modified publication, procuring new equipment, changing force structure, revising command relationships, or improving training. 20 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Joint Field Office QUICK HITTER Lessons Learned Capture Worksheet Topic Date Observed / Lesson Captured Type of Incident: Recommended Action: . Follow-on Action needed . Information Only . Follow-on Action completed . Other Recommended Action . Smart Practice NRP or NIMS ICS Category: . JFO Coordination Group . JFO Logistics Section . NRP ESF Annexes . PFO / FCO / FRC / FC . JFO Finance / Admin Section . NRP Incident Annexes . PFO Support Staff . JFO Joint Information Center . NOC Interface . JFO Coordination Staff . JFO Security . Command Posts . JFO Operations Section . NRP Base Plan . Other Category . JFO Planning Section . NRP Support Annexes Relevant Plan or SOP Component Plan Component Observation. A brief factual statement of the observed success or problem; can be (1) positive about something done exceptionally well or procedures used that should be shared, or (2) negative about something that happened that should not have occurred or something that did not occur but should have. Discussion. Amplify the success or problem described in the observation; answer the questions “Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How.” Lesson Learned (Smart Practice). Information about the positive action taken to generate success or the action that should be taken to avoid, alleviate, or work around a problem. Recommendation. A statement of how to repeat the success or permanently correct the problem, who should make the correction, and the area in which it should be made. The recommendation could result in a requirement for new or modified publication, procuring new equipment, changing personnel structure, revising command relationships, or improving training. 21 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Tab 4 to Annex B: Secretary’s Remedial Action Management Program (SEC RAMP) AAR Format [RESERVED] 22 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Annex C: Operations 1.0 Principles for Building Interagency Coordination Interagency coordination and cooperation is critical to effective and efficient operations to preempt or mitigate natural or man-made disasters. It is imperative that representatives of agencies with diverse capabilities synchronize their efforts through the application of basic teaming principles. These principles, shown below, support a systematic methodology toward building a homogeneous effort at all levels of government. 1.1 Define the Problem in Clear and Unambiguous Terms Agreed to by All Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can often limit clear understanding of the problem. Representatives from each major group of agencies, departments, and organizations—to include the on-scene Incident Command agencies— should be involved in all levels of coordination planning from the outset. These representatives are especially important in order to achieve unity of effort during this problem definition phase; early development of options for interagency consideration is very important. Not all agencies and individuals clearly distinguish in the same way between wide-area operational coordination and incident command-and-control or oversight. Defining the problem that the JFO solves should involve extensive focus on the difference between wide-area operational coordination and command-and-control over the incident itself. 1.2 Define the Objectives Within the context of interagency operations, decision makers in the JFO Coordination Group should seek clearly defined and attainable objectives, a concrete end state, and exit criteria. Successful interagency coordination is essential to achieve these goals and the development of accurate and timely assessments. Such definition allows application of resources of the most appropriate agency(s). Not all agencies will necessarily understand or agree to the need to clearly define the objective with urgency or specificity. Complications can arise because each agency has its own perspective, capabilities, and culture. This diversity is the strength and not the weakness of the interagency coordination process. While there may be disagreement about solutions, the differences provide a broad range of options that can be applied. 1.3 Operations Drive at Tactical Level; Logistics, Situation, and Planning Drive at Strategic Level At the field or tactical level, an Incident Command surges in as operations are already occurring; everything in the Incident Command serves to support operations. At the strategic level, coordination of operations typically follows in-depth development of the situation in the “wide area,” answering of requests for logistics support, and digestion/consolidation of 23 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 incident and coordinating agency plans of action. In the “zone of coordination” between the Incident Commander(s), local EOCs, and the JFO (see figure below), logistics, situation, and planning should drive coordination. Joint Field Office 1.4 Establish a Common Frame of Reference The interagency environment can become complicated by differences in key terminology. The meaning of the terms “safe zone” or “operations” to one agency may have somewhat different connotations to another. This misunderstanding may cause operational impacts. The semantic differences commonly experienced within a given Federal department may grow in the interagency arena, particularly in broad interdisciplinary incident responses. JFO staff must anticipate possible semantic mismatches and take measures to clarify and establish common terms with clear and specific usage. 1.5 Develop Courses of Action or Options These should address the problem and achieve the objectives. JFO staff should focus their efforts on their agency’s enabling capabilities that contribute to coordination objective attainment and are part of the interagency plan of action. Resource-sensitive problems require good options to lead to good solutions. Providing too few or clearly impractical options or recommending the “middle of the road” approach merely for the sake of achieving consensus is of little service to decision makers. The synergism of open debate within the interagency community produces the best options. 1.6 Capitalize on Experience Review after-action reports and lessons learned to assess proposed courses of action and to reduce the requirement to learn on the job. Though their lessons learned systems differ in scope and nature, almost all agencies have their own systems in place to capitalize on operational experience. These should be sought and used in all cases prior to the beginning of JFO operations. Lessons learned must be captured throughout the duration of the JFO’s operation and documented in the After-Action and Lessons Learned Report described in Tab 24 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 3 to Annex B of this SOP. 1.7 Establish Responsibility When all participants in the interagency process understand what needs to be done, agree upon the means to accomplish it, and identify who will do what through coordination, a common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution help achieve unity of effort. The resources required for a mission must be painstakingly identified, with specific and agreed-upon responsibility assigned to the agency(s) that will provide those resources. To receive proper reimbursement for materiel support, agencies must establish careful accounting procedures. 1.8 Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Functions Immediately upon initiating interagency coordination, it is imperative to plan for the transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from emergency to more routine entities. This planning usually occurs simultaneously at the national level. When interagency transition planning (including assignment of specific responsibilities and timelines for accomplishment) does not occur, JFO involvement may be needlessly protracted. As coordination plans are developed at the JFO Coordination Group level, effective transition planning should also be a primary consideration. The JFO Coordination Group should anticipate the need to “ratchet down” coordination and/or direct incident support to lessen the impact of transitioning to other “routine ops” organizations. 1.9 Direct All Means Toward Unity of Effort Achieving unity of effort can be made more complex by the number of participants, distinctive agency cultures, undefined relationships among the agencies, and differing objectives. The principle of unity of effort pertains directly to interagency coordination. Unity will lead to success for the mission, not a zero-sum equation among the agencies. Achieving this principle begins by identifying agencies that have the requisite capabilities to reach the common objective or a need to adapt their wide-area operations in light of the incident response and by bringing their core competencies to the interagency forum. Because the principles of Unified Command apply to the JFO Coordination Group, the objectives are a reflection of the agencies’ collective approach rather than “tasking” from a senior commander. Concerns of national authorities and the IAC may well be conveyed to the JFO Coordination Group and may ultimately influence the JFO Coordination Plan objectives. 1.10 Media Impact on Interagency Coordination The formulation and execution of any policy must consider the public’s traditional values if the policy is to be successful. The media can be a powerful force in shaping public attitudes and policy development. The media often has a dramatic influence on the interagency process—whether at the strategic decision-making level of the IAC or in the field as agencies and NGOs vie for public attention. Coordination plans that include interaction with these agencies should anticipate the importance that public affairs and media relations have on the operation and in the interagency process. As early as possible in the planning process, all 25 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 participating agencies and organizations need to establish and agree on procedures for media access, issuing and verifying credentials, and briefing, escorting, and transporting media members and their equipment. Common communication points and public affairs themes should be developed as quickly as possible so that organizations are not perceived by the media as working at cross purposes with one another. Responsibility for interaction with the media should be established clearly so that, to the extent possible, the media hears from a single voice. ESF #15 has primary responsibility for developing and executing the public affairs strategy, in close coordination with DHS Public Affairs. ESF #15 is also responsible for establishing the JIC. 2.0 The JFO Coordination and Support Cycle 2.1 Initial Coordination, Support, and Assessment Initial Coordination and Assessment occurs in all incidents. Short-term coordination efforts, which are small in scope and/or duration (e.g., a few agencies supplying only a few resources to the Incident Command on-scene and completing adaptive changes to their routine operations surrounding the incident in one coordination period) can often be coordinated without developing a full Coordination Plan using only Initial Situation Reports (see Tab 2 to Annex E of this SOP). The extent of the JFO role in resource and logistics support may vary depending on the needs of the ICP and funding mechanisms being used for the incident. 2.1.1 Coordination Briefing (Situation Report and Agency/Incident Coordination Plans) During the transfer of coordination responsibilities, a coordination briefing based on the existing situation reports and Coordination Plans obtained through appropriate Federal, State, and local channels from Incident Commanders, Area Commanders, EOCs, coordinating agencies, and the ERT-A, if deployed, will provide the incoming JFO Coordination Group (or initial coordinating agency) with basic information regarding the incident situation, resource support requested, and relevant “wide-area” operations that have been adapted because of the incident. Most importantly, the coordination briefing and situation report function as the Coordination Plan for initial coordination and support and remain in force and continue to develop until the coordination effort ends or the JFO Planning Section generates the first Coordination Plan. The coordination briefing and situation report is also suitable for briefing individuals newly assigned to the JFO Coordination Staff as well as needed assessment briefings for the staff. The required situation report documents coordinated “wide-area” coordination objectives, incident support objectives, situational awareness, resource requests and deployment, and significant actions taken. This form is essential for future planning and the effective management of initial response activities. 26 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 When: New JFO Coordination Group, PFO/FCO/FRC; staff briefing as required Facilitator: Current Federal incident coordinator(s) (e.g., DHS/FEMA, FBI, DHS/USSS, other) Attendees: JFO Coordination Group; JFO Coordination Staff (equivalent to the Unified Command Staff) and JFO Section Chiefs (equivalent to the Unified Command General Staff). General Tasks JFO CG . Obtain coordination brief. . Assess organizational and support requirements and objectives. . Consider future coordination requirements and objectives. JFO OSC . Obtain briefing from lead coordinator State, Federal, tribal, and local EOCs. . Conduct operation support in current coordination period as requests arise. JFO PSC . Brief Situation, Coordination Plans in effect. . Consider available Contingency Plans. . Document, evaluate, and develop strategies. JFO LSC . Brief Resource Requests. . Consider available resources. JFO FSC . Brief Funding Expenditures and Ceiling. • Agenda. Using the Situation Briefing and/or Coordination Plan template as an outline, include: . Consolidated situation from all agencies/Incident Commanders (note territory, exposures, safety concerns, etc.; use map/charts). . Synopsis of current agency and Incident Commander objectives. . National strategy and areas of concern from the IAC. . Synopsis of all agencies’ and Incident Commanders’ strategies in effect, including on-scene response strategy (from collected ICS Form 201s or Coordination Plans). 27 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 UNCLASSIFIED . . . . . Readily apparent gaps, seams, and overlaps in consolidated Objectives and Strategies. Tactical/Response Resources requested from the JFO, en route and/or ordered. Summary all known Agency and Incident Commander Resource assignments (recognizing this will be incomplete initially). Current JFO coordination and support organization. Facilities established (particularly COOP sites or candidates for the JFO). 2.1.2 Initial JFO Coordination Group Meeting This meeting provides the JFO Coordination Group with an opportunity to discuss and concur on important issues prior to coordination and to support incident action planning. The meeting should be brief and important points documented. Prior to the meeting, JFO Coordination Group members should have an opportunity to review and prepare to address the agenda items. Planning Meeting participants will use the results of this meeting to guide coordination and support efforts prior to the first Strategy Meeting. When: Typically this meeting occurs immediately after the first Coordination Briefing to the JFO Coordination Group. Facilitator: PFO/FCO/FRC or designee Attendees: Only JFO Coordination Group members General Tasks JFO CG . Identify additional JFO CG members. . Negotiate/facilitate JFO participation. . Clarify JFO CG roles and responsibilities. . Negotiate and agree on coordination organization, facilities, and support. . Synchronize Coordination Period length/start time. JFO OSC (if requested) . Brief JFO CG members on current coordination and operational support. JFO PSC (if requested) . Brief JFO CG members on current situation, planning coordination, and technical support. JFO LSC (if requested) . Brief JFO CG members on current coordination and logistical support. JFO FSC (if requested) . Brief JFO CG members on current coordination and logistical support. 28 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 • Agenda. . Identify JFO Coordination Group members and potential members, based on NRP criteria. . Identify JFO Coordination Group agency and Incident Commander support and coordination objectives. . Present jurisdictional limitations, concerns, and restrictions. . Develop a collective set of support and coordination objectives. . Establish and agree on JFO Coordination Group consolidated support and coordination priorities. . Verify that Incident Commanders, Area Commands, EOCs, and coordinating agencies have been informed they can “outsource” technical assistance requests to the JFO rather than importing redundant tech specialists to each ICP/operations center (i.e., avoid unnecessary competition for scientific and other technical resources). . Agree on basic JFO section organization structure. . Agree on JFO Coordination Staff and JFO section personnel designations and operations, planning, logistical, and financial agreements and procedures. . Agree on unified logistics approach to resource ordering (support) procedures to follow. . Agree on cost sharing/mission assignment or authorization procedures. . Agree on informational matters. . Designate a JFO External Affairs Officer. • Identifying Additional JFO Coordination Group Members. During the initial JFO Coordination Group meeting, a key task is identifying all agencies, departments, and organizations that are or should be involved in developing and executing the wide-area strategy and/or in supporting the on-scene Incident Commander. This analysis needs to include identification of the participating NGOs and private-sector organizations. In many cases, initial planning and coordination have occurred in Washington, DC, so the PFO/FCO/FRC should ensure that the JFO staff are made aware of all the agencies to be involved in the mission. • Clarifying Interagency Relationships. Similarly, during the initial JFO Coordination Group meeting, a second key task is clarifying an authoritative interagency relationship based on the NRP Annexes, considering the coordinating agency identified in the NRP or by national authorities, and determining the cooperating agencies within the JFO Coordination Group. Establishing such an interagency hierarchy may be more or less complex based on interagency player familiarity with the NRP. Nonetheless, the JFO Coordination Group should attempt to insert discipline, responsibility, and rigor into the process in order to function effectively. In many cases, the JFO Coordination Group will discover that information and concurrence of perception will smooth the process, both of which 29 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 are established by ensuring constant communication between and among all concerned parties. Regardless of the Coordination Group’s efforts to foster coordination and cooperation, critical issues may arise that must be forwarded for resolution to the IAC. • Synchronizing the Coordination Period. Typically the on-scene Incident Command will have established operational periods before (or at least concurrent with) the establishment of a JFO. In this case, because requests for resources in the next operational period will flow up to the JFO following the on-scene Incident Command’s tactics meeting, the JFO should carefully consider delaying the start of the JFO Coordination Period such that these resource requests are briefed during the JFO Coordination Group Objectives Meeting. This will put the JFO slightly “out of phase” with the on-scene Incident Command but might better support on-scene logistical needs. Similarly, the information cycle outlined in this document should not, in itself, drive the start and length of the JFO Coordination Period. Instead, the information requirements should be viewed as output products which can be tasked for production in the Coordination Plan (via ICS Form 204 or other tasking) to the appropriate JFO organizational element. Where national-level demands for completed wide-area strategy are required, however, the JFO Coordination Group must consider this in synchronizing the JFO Coordination Period. Finally, coordination and support missions tend to be more strategic than tactical, with “operationalizing” (putting into operational orders/Incident Action Plans, then tactical execution) and fruition occurring on a much longer timeframe than the on-scene tactical operation. For this reason, the JFO Coordination Group may find itself synchronizing closely to the on-scene Incident Command operational period early in the incident response, and shifting as the incident progresses to longer (more strategic) Coordination Periods. 2.2 Full Coordination and Support 2.2.1 JFO Coordination Group Objectives Meeting The JFO Coordination Group will identify/review and prioritize objectives for the next coordination period. Support and coordination objectives from the previous coordination period are reviewed and any new objectives are identified. 30 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 When: Prior to Strategy Meeting. Facilitator: PFO/FCO/FRC or designee Attendees: JFO Coordination Group members; JFO Coordination Staff and sections as appropriate General Tasks JFO CG . Develop coordination and support objectives. . Consider all national interest areas. . Delegate and provide guidance to Coordination Staff and Section Chiefs. . Consider Continuity of Operations and Exit Strategy/Demobilization. Operations Section Chief (OSC) . Summarize operational coordination and support objectives not likely to be completely attained within current Coordination Period. Planning Section Chief (PSC) . Summarize planning coordination and support objectives not likely to be completely attained within current Coordination Period. . Identify gaps, seams, and overlaps. . Propose draft objectives to JFO CG members. Logistics Section Chief (LSC) . Summarize logistical coordination and support objectives not likely to be completely attained within current Coordination Period. . Summarize requests for support. Finance/Admin (FSC) . Summarize financial coordination and support objectives not likely to be completely attained within current Coordination Period. • Agenda. . Review coordination and support objectives from JFO operations, planning, logistics, and finance unlikely to be completely attained in the current Coordination Period and thus carried over to the next. 31 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 . Identify issues, concerns, and improvements allowing attainment of coordination and support objectives within targeted timeframe. . Review, consider, and prioritize requests for support for next Coordination Period. . Review consolidated list of agency “trigger points” and criteria for engaging or altering operations. Review interagency information flow in view of these critical information requirements. . Review and identify operational gaps, seams, and overlaps in consolidated national response to the incident. . Identify objectives for the next Coordination Period (clearly stated and attainable with the resources available, yet flexible enough to allow coordinating agencies, Incident Commanders, and Section Chiefs to choose strategies). Objectives will typically focus on closing gaps, eliminating overlaps, and smoothing transitions at seams in the response. . Review any open agenda items from initial/previous meetings. • Agency Perception of the Problem and Priorities. Solicit from each agency, department, or organization a clear definition of the role that each plays in wide-area operations. The understanding of operating principles, legal issues, shortage of capabilities, points of contact, emergency management organization, Presidential/IAC direction (if applicable), and issues or tasks that cannot be undertaken may well affect mission success. An excellent starting point is to consider what types of information would cause a given agency to change or adapt its wide-area operations/strategy in view of the incident. This information helps build the information-sharing process within the JFO and clearly indicate the agency’s view of the problem. • Obstacles to Unity of Effort. Identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities. Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence as to solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution. History demonstrates that obstacles are frequently identified too late in the process and become nearly insurmountable for the on-scene incident commander. Too often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by another agency, department, or organization. Once identified, if the obstacles cannot be resolved at the JFO level, they must immediately be elevated for expeditious resolution. • Gaps, Seams, and Overlaps. While there is absolutely no authority within the NRP to force or coerce any member agency in the JFO to change or adapt its priorities or objectives, agencies typically adapt willingly when clear gaps in the overall objectives are identified, when seams (i.e., transitions in responsibility) are found problematic, and where overlapping objectives/priorities are apparent. This is the essential purpose of producing unified objectives within the coordination and support framework. Accordingly, the creation of JFO Coordination Group unified coordination and support objectives is more than a cataloging of various agency 32 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 priorities: it is also a substantive analysis (and correction) of gaps, seams, and overlaps in objectives and priorities to produce the best and most agile and effective national response possible. • Continuity of Operations, Transition of Responsibilities, and “Exit Strategy.” The safety, security, continuity of operations, and (eventual) transition of responsibilities and demobilization of the JFO should be an immediate concern of the JFO Coordination Group. During massive response operations, such priorities will often appear to be secondary, but excessive delay in tasking the Section Chiefs with specific objectives in these areas may place the continuity of the national response in jeopardy and/or unnecessarily tax national resources with inefficient operations. • Interagency Information Management. Nongovernmental, private-sector, and regional and international organizations may possess considerable information that may be essential to the success of the coordination and support operation. Relief workers have a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the population and can offer effective assistance to disabled, non-English speaking, and “special needs” individuals. Working closely with local communities, they understand local culture and political organizations. As a consequence, nongovernmental and private-sector organizations are an important source of information regarding the following: . Historical perspective and insights into factors contributing to the situation at hand. . Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the role of key leaders. . Security situation. Handled properly, nongovernmental and private-sector organizations will be active participants in the interagency team seeking to resolve the crisis. Handled improperly, these organizations can be alienated by a perception that, contrary to their organization’s mission, they are considered no more than an information source by the Federal Government. 2.2.2 Prepare for the Strategy Meeting This period of time allows the staff to create and evaluate a series of strategy options (courses of action) for strategic deployment, operations, and support during the next coordination period. It is not a meeting. In preparation for the Strategy Meeting, the JFO Planning Section Chief and JFO Operations Section Chief review the unified JFO Coordination Group coordination and support objectives, the first stage of coordination and support operations and/or the current Coordination Plan situation status information as provided by the Situation Unit to assess work progress against the current coordination period’s objectives. At the strategic level (where the JFO functions), strategies will be implemented by being translated first into coordinated plans and then into tactical action. The translation into tactical action plans occurs at the IC level, and the JFO Coordination 33 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Group monitors strategic implementation. Following up on this two-step agency and/or Incident Commander implementing process is important to monitoring the implementation of JFO coordinated strategy. The JFO Operations Section Chief/Planning Section Chief will jointly develop primary and alternate strategies to meet coordination and support objectives for selection and development at the Strategy Meeting. To preclude organizational “group think,” the JFO Planning Section Chief’s primary role will be in developing “devil’s advocate” positions on the various strategies, including risk-based evaluations (operational risk management, probability of success, etc.). General Tasks JFO OSC: . Assemble various courses of action (COAs) from all agency components in Operations . Evaluate strategic difficulty and timeline to execute for COAs. . Consider unintended consequences of various agency COAs. . Select recommended strategy/COA. JFO PSC: . Through Situation Unit Leader, assemble status of various agencies in “operationalizing” agreed upon current period strategies. . Develop “devil’s advocate” positions on COAs. . Consider synchronization to and impact on on-scene resource needs. . Integrate resource provision strategies with wide-area operational strategies. Logistics Section Chief (LSC): . Normally no role. Finance/Admin . Normally no role. 2.2.3 Strategy Meeting This short meeting identifies the coordinated agency strategies; evaluates for additional gaps, seams, and overlaps; and creates the blueprint for “wide-area” strategic deployment and operations during the next coordination period. When: Prior to Planning Meeting Facilitator: JFO PSC 34 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Attendees: JFO PSC, JFO OSC, JFO LSC, JFO Resource Unit Leader (RUL), JFO FSC (and others, e.g., EAO) General Tasks JFO CG: . Provide guidance/clarification. JFO OSC: . Be prepared! . Brief current strategy status (don’t get tactical!). . Develop strategies and resource needs (use most effective support tracking tool available). . Document JFO resource needs using ICS-215. JFO PSC: . Facilitate meeting. . Determine support requirement and logistics tasks. . Determine JFO support requirements on ICS-215. . Consider alternative and “devil’s advocate” strategies. JFO LSC: . Participate /contribute logistics information as necessary. . Verify support requirements. JFO FSC: . Evaluate funding implications of each COA/strategy. • Agenda. . Review the support and coordination objectives for the next coordination period and develop strategies (primary and alternative). . Prepare support strategy resource needs (i.e., resources to field entities) and document on resource support tracking system for ordering through JFO Logistics. . Prepare a draft of ICS Form 215 (used in planning meeting) to identify JFO-internal resources that should be ordered through JFO Logistics. 2.2.4 Prepare for the Planning Meeting This is not a meeting but a period of time to prepare for the presentation of the Coordination Plan at the Planning Meeting. Each Section Chief is responsible for ensuring that his/her Planning Meeting responsibilities are met. The JFO Planning 35 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Unit, and current consolidated situation status displays prepared by the Situation Unit. After the meeting, ICS Form 215 (when used) and the support resource needs tracking summary are used by the JFO Logistics Section Chief to prepare the national-level logistical resource orders, and used by the JFO Planning Section Chief to develop Coordination Plan assignment lists. When: After the JFO Coordination Group Objectives and Strategy Meetings Facilitator: JFO PSC Attendees: Determined by JFO Coordination Group, generally JFO Coordination Group, JFO Coordination Staff, JFO Section Staff, Air Operations Branch Director, the JFO RUL, JFO Safety Coordinator, Worker Safety and Health Annex Coordinator, and Technical Specialists, as required. 37 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Agenda Item Primary Responsibility 1. State incident objectives and policy issues. JFO CG 2. Brief consolidated situation, critical and sensitive areas, weather/sea forecast, and resource status/availability. JFO Situation Unit Leader (SUL) 3. Brief consolidated agency and Incident Commander objectives and strategies, noting gaps, overlaps, and seams. JFO PSC 4. State primary and alternative strategies to meet objectives. JFO OSC 5. Designate branch and group boundaries and functions as appropriate, use maps, support resource needs summary, and ICS Form 215. JFO OSC 6. Specify strategies for each branch and division, note limitations. JFO OSC 7. Specify resource strategies by divisions/groups. JFO OSC 8. Specify operations facilities and reporting locations and plot on map. JFO OSC/ LSC 9. Develop resources, support, and overhead order(s), both internal and support. JFO LSC 10. Consider support: communications, traffic, safety, medical, etc. JFO LSC 11. Consider overall safety and health concerns of JFO personnel, responders, and workers regarding the Coordination Plan. JFO Safety Coordinator, safety officers reporting directly to each SFO 12. Consider media considerations regarding Coordination Plan. JFO Information Officer (IO) 13. Report on expenditures and claims. JFO FSC 14. Finalize and approve work plan for the next coordination period. JFO CG 2.2.6 Coordination Plan Preparation Attendees immediately prepare their assignments for the Coordination Plan to meet the JFO Planning Section Chief deadline for assembling the Coordination Plan components. The deadline will be early enough to permit timely JFO Coordination Group approval and duplication of sufficient copies for the Coordination Briefing and for overhead. Note that due to the potentially large number of coordinating agencies in the JFO Coordination Group, the Coordination Plan cover must allow for concurrent signatures, and management of the JFO Coordination Group must assure necessary signatories will be present. Whenever possible, the PFO/FCO/FRC must agree with the JFO Coordination Group early in the process on which members will be Coordination Plan signatories. When: Immediately following the Planning Meeting, the JFO PSC assigns the deadline. Facilitator: JFO PSC 38 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Common Components Primary Responsibility 1. Incident Objectives (ICS Form 202 or equivalent) JFO Resources Unit 2. Organization List/Chart (ICS Forms 203/207 or equivalent) JFO Resources Unit 3. Assignment List (ICS Form 204 or equivalent) JFO Operations Section 4. Information-Sharing Procedures JFO Situation Unit 5. Incident Map JFO Situation Unit 6. Safety Plan JFO Safety Coordinator, Worker Safety and Health Annex Coordinator 39 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 2.2.7 Coordination Meeting This short meeting presents the Coordination Plan to the oncoming shift of the JFO organization. After this meeting, off-going supervisors should be interviewed by their relief and by the JFO Operations Section Chief in order to further confirm or adjust the course of the oncoming shift's Coordination Plan. Branch/Group supervisors may initiate shifts in strategy regarding matters that fall within their respective purviews. Similarly, a supervisor may reallocate resources within that division to adapt to changing conditions. When: About an hour prior to each shift change Facilitator: JFO PSC Attendees: JFO Coordination Group, Coordination Staff, Branch Directors, Group Supervisors, Unit Leaders, others as appropriate. General Tasks JFO CG: . Provide guidance/clarification. . Provide leadership presence. JFO OSC: . Provide Coordination Briefing for next coordination period. . Ensure ICS-204 or equivalent tasking is clear. JFO PSC: . Facilitate Coordination Staff and attendees briefing responsibilities. . Resolve questions. JFO LSC: . Brief transportation, communication, and supply issues. JFO FSC: . Brief administrative issues and provide financial report. 40 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Agenda Item Primary Responsibility 1. Review JFO Coordination Group objectives and changes to Coordination Plan. JFO PSC 2. Discuss current strategy and last shift’s “operationalizing” progress. JFO OSC 3. Review forecast/expected situation in next period. JFO SUL 4. Branch/Group and Air Operations assignment. JFO OSC 5. Transport, communications, and supply updates. JFO LSC 6. Safety message. JFO SC, Worker Safety and Health Annex Coordinator 2.2.8 Assess Progress. Following the coordination brief, all Section Chiefs will review coordination and support strategy progress and make recommendations to the JFO Coordination Group in preparation for the next JFO Coordination Group Objective Meeting for the next coordination period. This feedback/information is gathered from various sources, including field observers, responder debriefs, stakeholders, etc. General Tasks JFO CG: . Monitor ongoing strategic implementation and support. . Measure progress against stated objectives. . Consider all national interest areas. JFO OSC: . Monitor ongoing strategic execution and make strategic changes as necessary. . Measure/ensure progress against stated objectives. JFO PSC: . Facilitate Coordination Staff’s effectiveness and efficiency as appropriate. . Provide response objectives recommendations to JFO CG. JFO LSC: . Verify resources, resolve logistical problems. JFO FSC: . Facilitate smooth administrative and financial reporting. 41 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 2.3 Special Purpose Meetings. The Special Purpose Meetings are most applicable to larger coordination and support efforts requiring a robust Coordination and Support Cycle, but may be useful during Initial Coordination, Support, and Assessment. 2.3.1 JFO Coordination Staff Meeting Coordinate JFO Coordination Staff functions, responsibilities, and objectives. It is held before the Strategy Meeting, and JFO Coordination Staff (JFO Coordination Group, Chief of Staff, External Affairs, Office of the Inspector General, Defense Coordinating Officer, JFO Section Chiefs, JFO Legal Affairs Officer, and JFO External Affairs Officer) attend. 2.3.2 Coordination and Section Staff Meeting This meeting provides an opportunity for the JFO Coordination and Section staffs (i.e., the Section Chiefs) to gather under informal conditions (breakfast/dinner) to discuss developing issues. 2.3.3 Business Management Meeting This short meeting develops and updates the strategic plan for JFO-internal finance and logistical support. The agenda could include: documentation issues, cost sharing, cost analysis, finance requirements, resource procurement, and financial summary data. Attendees include: JFO Finance/Administration Section Chief, JFO Cost Unit Leader, JFO Logistics Section Chief, JFO Situation Unit Leader, and JFO Documentation Unit Leader. 2.3.4 News Briefing This meeting briefs media and the public on the most current and accurate facts. It is set up by the External Affairs Officer, moderated by a JFO Coordination Group spokesperson (usually the External Affairs Officer), and features selected spokespersons. This briefing must be held away from the JFO. Spokespersons should be prepared by the External Affairs Officer to address anticipated issues. The briefing should be well planned, organized, and scheduled to meet the media’s needs. 42 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 UNCLASSIFIED Tab 1 to Annex C: Decisionmaking Process STEPS DESCRIPTION REMARKS 1. Understanding the Situation • Identify and frame the mission • Incident/Issue/Threat • Scope of operation (e.g., number of people, geographic area) • Use of available time • Conduct initial rapid assessment • Determine if the threat is credible • Alert Department Leadership Team and Staff personnel • Develop mission statement • Issue initial guidance • Develop framing questions to do mission analysis or make assumptions • Here is what we know • Here is what we don’t know 2. Establishing Objectives • Analyze the initial guidance and intent • Analyze Information/Intelligence preparation of the situation • Develop Critical Success Factors (CSF) • Develop strategic objectives • Source and macro-level purpose of mission or task • Critical planning factors/information requirements • Key integration issues • Conduct detailed Situation Analysis • Desired end state/strategic intent • Specified-implied-essential tasks • Restraints/constraints • Available assets, their status, shortfalls • Assumptions • Conduct risk assessment • Develop Concept of the Operation (Macro) • Review facts and assumptions • OPSEC considerations • Interoperability – interagency collaboration and coordination • Determine Public Affairs/Perception Management Requirements • Finalize [leadership] mission statement, CSF and Objectives (intent on how to proceed) • Conduct mission objectives and analysis brief • Issue [leadership’s] guidance • What must we do to have a perceived successful response • What are those things we need to do to be successful • Identify mission gaps • Framing the mission to convey success • Setting objectives and strategies that drives resources and tactics 43 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 UNCLASSIFIED STEPS DESCRIPTION REMARKS 3. Develop and Generate Options • Generate and develop options • Must be: Suitable, Feasible, Acceptable, Distinguishable, and Complete • Describes: Who, What, When, Where, Why and How? • Array of initial resources • List friendly elements and capabilities • List assumptions, known critical events and decision points • Determine evaluation criteria • Provide pros and cons for each option • Analyze options and record the following • Actions—reactions—counteractions • Assets required • Timing of critical events/phasing • Critical Information Requirements • Control/direction measures • Synchronization/coordination/collaboration measures • Evaluation the advantages and disadvantages from each agency’s relevant perspective • Refine, modify, or eliminate options • Determine tasks for DHS and other elements • Rank order options in order of preference (minimum of two no more that three options available) and capture rational • Determine risk/mitigation measures • Prepare leadership brief on recommended options • Possible use of predetermined mission area groups (e.g., Law Enforcement, Public Health, Maritime Security, Border Security, Transportation Security) or sector objectives • COA meets collective incident objective addressing existing constraints • Maximizing agency objectives while meeting collective incident objectives • Consensus that best meets incident objectives • Prudent branches and sequels 4. Approval and Disseminate • Conduct the option comparison/decision brief for leadership • Leadership approves a recommended or modified option • Leadership approves a final intent statement and the Critical Information Requirements to support the selected options • Produce and disseminate direction/guidance as needed for plan refinement, orders preparation, rehearsal, and execution 44 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 UNCLASSIFIED STEPS DESCRIPTION REMARKS 5. Execute and Assess • Monitor situation, revise and update options as required NOTES: . Take the worst-case scenario in shortest amount of time (1 hour) to have a decision (COA) ready and then work backwards with more time – must work at national level with macro view as well as local (tactical) level. . Problem is getting a consensus of competing agendas among the different agencies. 45 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Interagency Integrated SOP UNCLASSIFIED Tab 2 to Annex C: CP Cover Sheet 1. Incident Name 2. Coordination Period covered by Plan (Date/Time) From: To: Coordination Plan COVER SHEET 3. Approved by the JFO Coordination Group: ORG NAME ORG NAME _____________________________ __________ _____________________________ _____________________________ __________ _____________________________ _____________________________ __________ _____________________________ _____________________________ __________ _____________________________ _____________________________ __________ _____________________________ _____________________________ __________ _____________________________ _____________________________ __________ _____________________________ _____________________________ __________ _____________________________ _____________________________ __________ _____________________________ COORDINATION PLAN The items checked below are included in this Coordination Plan: ICS 202-JFO (Coordination and Support Objectives) ICS 204-JFOs (Assignment Lists) One Copy each of any ICS 204-JFO attachments: ICS 205-JFO (Information Sharing Procedures) ICS 209-JFO (Situation Briefing) Other Attachments 4. Prepared by: Date/Time 46 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Interagency Integrated SOP UNCLASSIFIED Tab 3 to Annex C: Coordination Objectives 1. Incident Name 2. Coordination Period (Date/Time) From: To: COORDINATION OBJECTIVES ICS 202-JFO 3. Coordination and Support Objective(s) 4. Coordination Period Command Emphasis (Safety Message, Priorities, Key Decisions/Directions) Approved Site Safety Plan Located at: 5. Prepared by: (JFO Planning Section Chief) Date/Time 47 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Interagency Integrated SOP UNCLASSIFIED Tab 4 to Annex C: Assignment List 1. Incident Name 2. Coordination Period (Date/Time) From: To: Assignment List ICS 204-JFO 3. Branch 4. Group/Staging 5. Operations Personnel Name Affiliation Contact # (s) JFO Operations Section Chief: Branch Director: Group Supervisor: 6. Resources Assigned “X” indicates 204a attachment with additional instructions Resource Identifier Leader Contact Info. # # of Persons Reporting Info/Notes/Remarks 7. Work Assignments 8. Special Instructions 9. Communications (radio and/or phone contact numbers needed for this assignment) Name/Function Radio: Freq./System/Channel Phone Cell/Pager ________ _______________________ __________________ ___________________ _________ _______________________ __________________ ___________________ _________ _______________________ __________________ ___________________ _________ Emergency Communications Medical Evacuation Other 10. Prepared by Date/Time 11. Reviewed by (JFO PSC) Date/Time 12. Reviewed by (JFO OSC) Date/Time 48 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Interagency Integrated SOP UNCLASSIFIED Tab 5 to Annex C: Assignment List Attachment ASSIGNMENT LIST ATTACHMENT 1. Incident Name 2. Coordination Period (Date/Time) ICS 204a-JFO From: To: 3. Branch 4. Group 5. Specific Resource (if any) 6. Leader 7. Assignment Location 8. Work Assignment Special Instructions, Special Equipment/Supplies Needed for Assignment, Special Environmental Considerations, Special Site Specific Safety Considerations Approved Site Safety Plan Located at: 9. Other Attachments (as needed) Map/Chart Weather Forecast/Tides/Currents ____________________________ ____________________________ ____________________________ ____________________________ 11. Reviewed by (JFO PSC) Date/Time 12. Reviewed by (JFO OSC) Date/Time 10. Prepared by Date/Time 49 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 50 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 9. Safety Status/Personnel Casualty Summary Adjustments To Previous Since Last Report Coordination Period Incident Total Responder Injury Responder Death Public Missing (Active Search) Public Missing (Presumed Lost) Public Uninjured Public Injured Public Dead Total Public Involved Comments: 10. Evacuation Status Adjustments To Previous Since Last Report Coordination Period Incident Total Total to be Evacuated Number Evacuated Comments: 11. Property Damage Summary Property Type Damage Estimate $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ Comments: Classified or Sensitive Security Information Statement: Comments: 13. Terrorism Nexus 14. General Population Status Summary Adjustments To Previous Since Last Report Coordination Period Incident Total Total Public Potentially Involved Public Currently At Risk Public Projected At Risk Public Isolated (safe) Total Public Currently Involved Public Missing Public Dead and Injured Public Under Treatment Public Safe Uninjured Comments: 15. Extent of Contamination Classified or Sensitive Security Information Statement: Comments: 17. On-Scene En-route to Scene (not assets) Adjustments To Previous Capability Since Last Report Coordination Period Incident Total Comments: 18. Requests for Additional On-Scene Support Tracking # Status Support Request Discussion Comments: Classified or Sensitive Security Information Statement: 19. Possible Cascading Effects of On-scene Situation 20. Possible WMD Effects from On-scene Situation 21. Indications On-scene of Possible Follow-on Incidents 22. Summary of Coordinating Federal, State, and Local OPCENS & Agencies Federal OPCENs / Agencies State OPCENs / Agencies Local OPCENs / Agencies Comments: Document Security Classification 23. Summary of Coordinated Wide-Area Objectives Coordinating Federal Agencies Coordinating State Agencies Coordinating Local Agencies Comments: 24. Summary of Coordinated Wide-Area Strategies Coordinating Federal Agencies Coordinating State Agencies Coordinating Local Agencies Comments: Classified or Sensitive Security Information Statement: Comments: Classified or Sensitive Security Information Statement: Document Security Classification 26. Federal/State/Local/International/Private Sector Contacts Made Date Contact Contact Notes 27. COOP/COG Actions Anticipated 28. National Capital Region Impacts Anticipated Classified or Sensitive Security Information Statement: Document Security Classification 29. International Impacts Anticipated 30. Special Notes and Other Considerations 31. Prepared by: Date/Time Prepared: Classified or Sensitive Security Information Statement: scenarios: 1) Type I (Major) Disaster, no security or investigative activation. 2) Type II Heightened Threat of Terrorism, no credible threat of WMD 3) Type I Heightened Threat of Terrorism, credible threat of WMD 4) Type I Federal-to-Federal Support (Spill of National Significance) 5) Type III Federal-to-Federal Support (Chemical Release Accident) 2.0 Scenario One: Type I (Major) Disaster [RESERVED] Activation Size Joint Field Office Component Size Requirements PFO Support Staff NONE JFO Coordination Group SMALL JFO Coordination Staff NONE JFO Joint Information Center (JIC) MEDIUM Operations Section LARGE Response and Recovery Branch . Human Services Group LARGE . Emergency Services Group LARGE . Infrastructure Support Group LARGE . Community Recovery and Mitigation Groups LARGE Law Enforcement Investigative Operations NONE Branch Security Operations Branch NONE Intelligence Operations Branch NONE Planning Section . Situation Unit LARGE . GIS Unit LARGE . Resources Unit LARGE . Documentation Unit MEDIUM . Intelligence Unit (if activated) NONE . Demobilization Unit SMALL . Scientific Unit SMALL Logistics Section . Coordination and Planning Branch LARGE . Resource Management Branch LARGE . Supply Branch LARGE . Information Services Branch LARGE Finance / Administration Section . Time Unit LARGE . Procurement Unit LARGE . Cost Unit LARGE . Compensation/Claims Unit MEDIUM X persons Total Logistical Footprint X ft2 3.0 Scenario Two: Type II Heightened Threat of Terrorism w/out WMD [RESERVED] 4.0 Scenario Three: Type I Heightened Threat of Terrorism w/ WMD [RESERVED] 5.0 Scenario Four: Type I Federal-to-Federal Support (Spill of National Significance) [RESERVED] 6.0 Scenario Five: Type III Federal-to-Federal Support (Chemical Release Accident) [RESERVED] 7.0 JFO Size Requirements Estimation Worksheet [RESERVED] Joint Field Office Component PFO Support Staff JFO Coordination Group JFO Coordination Staff JFO Joint Information Center (JIC) Operations Section Response and Recovery Branch . Forward presence (only) for FEMA ERT-A . Full onsite Human Services Group . Full onsite Emergency Services Group . Full onsite Infrastructure Support Group . Full onsite Community Recovery and Mitigation Group Law Enforcement Investigative Operations Branch (FBI JOC) . Forward presence (only) for FBI JOC . Full Branch onsite . SCIF Security Operations Branch (DHS/USSS MACC) . Forward presence (only) for USSS MACC . Full Branch onsite Intelligence Operations Branch Planning Section . Situation Unit . GIS Unit . Resource Unit . Documentation Unit . Intelligence Unit (if activated) . Demobilization Unit . Scientific Unit Logistics Section . Coordination and Planning Branch . Resource Management Branch . Supply Branch . Information Services Branch Finance / Administration Section . Time Unit . Procurement Unit . Cost Unit . Compensation / Claims Unit Total Logistical Footprint: (baseline estimate) Tab 1 to Annex D: Pre-deployment Conference Call Checklist The Pre-deployment Conference Call will be initiated by the Senior Disaster Logistics Official and conducted as soon as possible and should include at a minimum the following participants: • JFO Coordination Group • Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) or Representative • Logistics Section Chief • Information Technology Coordinator • Readiness, Response, and Recovery (RRR), Mobile Operations Branch RR (MOB) • Supporting Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) Detachment • RRR, Operations Center Branch • Information Technology Services Directorate, Engineering Division • Information Technology Services Directorate, Disaster Response Branch • ITSD, Program Management Group • National HELP Desk • Disaster Information Clearinghouse (DISC) • FEMA Logistics Center • OSD, Program Services Division (OS-PS)/Mail Management • OSD, Security Division • JFO Safety Coordinator, Safety Officers reporting directly to each SFO • NEMIS Ops Tab 2 to Annex D: PFO Go Kit Footprint The DHS Preparedness Directorate (IP) has assembled PFO support “go kits” that will be maintained in the National Capital Region (NCR). These kits afford instant connectivity once installed with appropriate security safeguards, without regard to agency firewalls and/or the operating location of the cell. IP will maintain and, when appropriate, move kits to the location of the PFO support staff. The NCR Go Kit can also be used as portable system for the IAC and/or the DHS/IP in the event that COOP locations, IAC, or IP facilities are not operational. The “kits” consist of the following: Quantity Item Description 12 Latitude D600 Notebooks Intel Pentium 4 M (1.8Ghz) 14" SXVGA+ Display; Windows XP Pro w/SP1; Office XP 1024Mb RAM; 40Gb Hard Drive MiniPCI Wireless Card; Dell Logitech, Mouse (USB); Internal 56K Modem; 8-24-24-24X; WDVD/CDRW Combo Drive 90W AC Adapter; Mouse Pad 6 Cell Primary Battery; 128Mb USB Flash Storage Drive (Thumb Drive); 3-Year Limited Warranty plus 3-Year Next Business Day Onsite Service 12 Network Cables Cat 5e 20 Feet 1 Switch Netgear JFS524 2 “16 port switch” 2 Printer Hewlett Packard 5510 All-in-one Printer 16 Power Strips 6 Outlet w/ 15ft Cord 10 Secure Cell Phones PFO, Deputy PFO, COS, OSC Officer, PAO, NOC Rep 12 JRIES JRIES Software (Gov't owned) 1 SIPRNET HSIN/HSDN (SECRET) hardware for portable connectivity. There are 16 of these available at DHS HQS. One of these must be reserved for each PFO support staff in the inte`rim. 1 Shredder Cross cut 2 Copy machines Capable of unclassified and classified photocopying 2 STEs Secret Level 1 FAX Secure with copy capability 12 Protective Masks Quick2000 short-term protective mask with hood; Quick2000 training mask with hood; soft carrying case item 600665 N/A Admin Package Hard Side shipping lockers, admin supplies (pens, paper, files), flashlights, printer supplies, etc. 2 Power Generators Tab 3 to Annex D: DHS/NOC Go Kit Footprint The DHS/IP maintains PFO support “go kits” with the following general capability footprint: (Number to be determined) computers with the following capabilities: • Microsoft Suite • Internet Browser • GIS Viewer (ArcView) • GIS Thick Client Applications • Java • Active X • CD/DVD Duplication software • HSIN/JRIES • LEO • I-MAP • Paging Software • Operations Center Management Tools (e.g., E-Team, WebEOC, EM2000, DMIS) • Commercial Imagery Production Application • NEMIS • IFMIS • Adobe Acrobat Professional Annex E: Communications and Information Sharing 1.0 Purpose and Scope This annex will describe procedures employed by the JFO for both intra-JFO information sharing and sharing between the JFO and other organizations. In keeping with the NRP and NIMS core concepts, all information flow processes will be structured to present the least amount of burden upon the local incident commander. To the greatest extent possible, ICS concepts will be applied. Information flow and communications involving classified material will be governed by standard DHS information and operations security procedures. Information flow and communications involving the Law Enforcement Investigative Operations Branch (FBI/JOC) will be governed by FBI information and operations security procedures. Public Information and Joint Information Center activities are outside the scope of this Annex. 2.0 Intra-JFO Communications 2.1 HSIN-JFOnet • The primary communication platform for JFO personnel to pass data, provide and obtain situational awareness, collaborate on report generation, and submit and receive RFIs will be the HSIN-JFOnet. JFOnet is a component of the DHS Homeland Security Information Network and is managed by the NOC. • HSIN-JFOnet is a web-based communications tool suite with Geospatial Intelligence Mapping, Real-Time Collaboration, Document Sharing, and Incident Tracking/Chronological Logging Tool. JFOnet operates at the sensitive but unclassified security classification level. • JFOnet can operate as a free-standing local area network (LAN) for exclusive use within the JFO in the event of loss of connectivity to the public Internet. • Provided external connectivity exists, other organizations such as NOC, IAC, State/local emergency management agencies, DHS components, and other appropriate Federal/State/local agencies may access JFOnet for passive situational awareness monitoring or active collaboration as needed. • To optimize internal and external situational awareness, to the greatest extent possible, the JFO personnel will refrain from point-to-point e-mails and utilize the web-based JFOnet. • The JFO’s Logistics Section, Communications Unit, in tandem with IP/CIO personnel assigned to the JFO, shall manage JFOnet, including providing onsite assistance. • Personnel assigned to the JFO will, upon check-in, be assigned account names and passwords and provided with user-friendly instruction cards describing how to use the system. 2.2 Information Flow • ICS information management principles will be followed to the greatest extent possible. A basic ICS tenet is that information flows freely, but tasks and directions follow formal chains of command. The collaboration and posting functions of JFOnet facilitate adherence to this concept. • When established within the JFO structure, the situation unit or documentation unit, at the Planning Section Chief’s discretion, is responsible for receiving, consolidating, and preparing situation reports (SITREPs). (See Tabs 2 and 3 to Annex E for a sample.) • All entities within the JFO, for SITREP inputs, will place their respective inputs onto the JFOnet for construction of the distributed SITREP. • All JFO entities have a responsibility for posting spot reports (SPOTREPs) on JFOnet as information is received from their areas of responsibility as defined by ICS. (See Annex E for a sample.) • The report cycle of issuance of SITREPs will be determined by the JFO Coordination Group, generally following the standard ICS practice of one SITREP being issued per operating period. 2.2.1 Information Intake Information flows into the JFO at many points. This information will generally be routed as follows: • General unclassified information. The JFO Situation Unit is the primary intake and assessment point for general unclassified information. Information may be routed in hard copy or by posting to the “Situation Unit Incoming” folder in JFO-net. In the case of a JFO established for a NSSE, the Security Operations Branch (MACC) will perform this function unless an Incident of National Significance, or other incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, occurs during the NSSE. Following assessment, the JFO Situation Unit or MACC (depending on the circumstance) posts the information to the information management system and will route the information to internal and external customers (including the JOC Intelligence Unit, Intelligence Operations Center or JFO Intelligence Section, and JFO Information and Intelligence Unit). • Unclassified event-related security information. The MACC is the primary intake and assessment point for event-related security information. Where the MACC has not been established, the JFO Situation Unit becomes the primary point of entry for security or event-related unclassified information. • Law enforcement restricted information. The JOC Intelligence Unit is the primary intake and assessment point for Law Enforcement Restricted Information. Information may be routed to the JOC Intelligence Unit in hard copy, by phone, or other method identified by the FBI. Where the JOC has not been established, the FBI Field Office becomes the primary intake and assessment point for Law Enforcement Restricted information. Information may be routed to the JFO Information and Intelligence Unit by hard copy or by posting to the “LE Information Incoming” folder in HSIN. • Classified intelligence information. The Intelligence Operations Center or JFO Intelligence Branch (depending on the circumstance) is the primary intake and assessment point for classified intelligence information. Information may be routed to the Intelligence Operations Center /JFO Intelligence Branch by hard copy, fax, phone, or by SIPRNET or JWICS. Where the Intelligence Operations Center /JFO Intelligence Branch has not been established, the JOC Intelligence Unit becomes the primary intake and assessment point for classified intelligence information. Where neither the Intelligence Operations Center /JFO Intelligence Branch nor the JOC Intelligence Unit has been established, the JFO Information and Intelligence Unit becomes the primary intake and assessment point. For further information on passing clearances, see Tab 2 to Annex F. 2.2.2 Internal Information Exchange • Based on the JFO Information-Sharing Procedures developed by the JFO Situation Unit (see Section 4.4.1 of the SOP), staff in the JFO Situation Unit, JFO Information and Intelligence Unit, JOC Intelligence Unit, MACC, and Intelligence Operations Center/JFO Intelligence Branch will forward information they believe relevant to another unit to that unit for review. This process is generally known as “cross-posting.” • Once information has been cross-posted, it will be treated as new information by the receiving customer (i.e., units will not be empowered to bypass another unit’s information intake, tracking, and assessment processes). For this reason, originator information (including sources, POCs, date/time stamp, information confidence, and so on) should be included to the extent permissible by information security protocols. 2.2.3 Situation Report Development • While the JFO Planning Section Chief may arrange duties within the Section as necessary for efficient functioning, the JFO Documentation Unit will normally distill information from the JFO Information Management System to comprise the “base” information for the many and various SITREPs required by any member of the JFO Coordination Group (see Annex E for a sample). • All entities within the JFO will provide their respective inputs via JFOnet for construction of the distributed SITREP. • All JFO entities have a responsibility for posting spot reports (SPOTREPs) on JFOnet as information is received from their areas of responsibility as defined by ICS (See Annex E for a sample). • The report cycle of issuance of SITREPs will be determined by the JFO Coordination Group, generally following the standard ICS practice of one SITREP being issued per operating period. 2.3 Requests for Information (RFIs) Management (Exclusive of Intelligence-Related RFIs) • RFIs made to the JFO from other organizations and internal RFIs will be routed to the JFO Planning Section Chief (PSC). The JFO PSC will ensure that the RFI is posted onto JFOnet. Specific desks within the JFO may be tasked by the JFO PSC to provide information in response to the RFI. • The JFO Situation Unit or Documentation Unit, at the JFO PSC’s discretion, will coordinate RFI responses with the JFO Coordination Group. • The JFO Situation Unit will maintain an RFI tracking log to eliminate duplicate taskings and track responses. 2.4 Specialized Management of Intelligence-Related RFIs • Management and flow of intelligence-related RFIs will be dependent upon the organizational location of the Intelligence Component within the JFO structure. If a Law Enforcement Investigative Operations Branch (FBI/JOC) is activated and the component is integrated into it, RFIs will be managed in accordance with the instructions of the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO) as part of the JFO Coordination Group. If Intelligence is integrated into the Planning Section, the Section Chief, in coordination with the JFO Coordination Group, shall establish procedures and communicate them via JFOnet. If Intelligence is a separate section, the Intelligence Section Chief, in coordination with the JFO Coordination Group, shall establish procedures and communicate them via JFOnet. • This specialized management shall apply to all intelligence-related RFIs regardless of the classification level. • Handling procedures shall include appropriate information, communications, and operational security provisions based upon the classification of the material. 2.5 Resource Status Reporting • [FEMA Disaster Resource Tracking Systems] • The HSIN Tech to the Resource Unit will cross-post relevant data from the DHS/FEMA Resource Tracking System to HSIN-JFOnet in order to optimize the sharing of situational awareness related to resource requirements. 2.6 Coordination Plans and Briefings • Briefings and Coordination Plans will be posted by the NOC representative to the Situation Unit. 3.0 External Communications • The aggressive use of JFOnet to distribute information, including scheduled SITREPs and SPOTREPs, permits authorized external users and organizations, such as the NOC, IAC, State/local emergency management agencies, DHS components, and other appropriate Federal/State/local agencies, to engage in passive situational awareness monitoring or active collaboration as needed with the JFO. • Agencies providing representatives to the JFO may elect to use intra-agency communications systems to exchange information with their JFO representative. Under such circumstances the agency’s JFO representative will be responsible, to the extent permissible by agency policy and security practices, to post that information on JFOnet. • The JFO’s Logistics Section, Communications Unit, in tandem with IP/CIO personnel assigned to the JFO, shall coordinate communicating to all appropriate parties and organizations the instructions for accessing JFOnet. • RFIs posed to the JFO from DHS headquarters’ organizations or appropriate other agencies, to the greatest extent possible, shall be processed in accordance with the direction in sections 2.2 and 2.3 above. 4.0 Threat Monitoring and Initial Incident Assessment The JFO’s daily threat monitoring mission is to identify threats inside, at, or approaching the borders of the United States and pass that information to the NOC as well as pertinent local Federal, State, and Local intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This process continues regardless of other incidents being addressed by the JFO Coordination Group. JFO incident assessment focuses on evaluating information received and making notifications and reports based on that evaluation. Additional emphasis is applied in trying to determine subsequent threats and whether the incident is terrorist related. The JFO also provides situational awareness and facilitates coordination of local DHS assets and Incidents of National Significance as defined by the NRP. HSPD-5 designates the NOC as the “primary national-level hub for operational communications and information pertaining to domestic incident management.” Timely incident reporting is required to enable the NOC to accomplish its situational awareness mission for the national leadership (White House) and the Secretary of Homeland Security. It is critical that reports of possible terrorist activity or reports of potential significant disasters reach the NOC as quickly as possible through the JFO from Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities as well as the private sector and NGOs. Only by rapidly sharing this information with the NOC will DHS be ready to effectively coordinate any Federal response required or requested. In most cases, this occurs naturally through routine communications paths through department and agency operations centers. 5.0 Daily Production On a daily basis, a number of products are generated by the JFO, each with its own production schedule, development team, and distribution. 5.1 JFO Input to the Secretary's Morning Brief (SMB) The Secretary’s Morning Brief is provided to the Secretary daily and is intended to provide the Secretary with his first briefing of the day. The report identifies the key incidents of the previous 24 hours, focusing on events of major significance, items that may solicit media attention, and items of unique interest to DHS. The production of this report is overseen by the Secretary’s Briefing Team, but it is the responsibility of the NOC Senior Watch Officer and Senior Intelligence Analyst to ensure that all items that should be brought to the Secretary’s attention have been passed to the production team, that the content of the report is accurate, and that the report is provided on time to meet the Secretary’s schedule. A copy of the SMB is distributed to the White House Homeland Security Council Staff and to the Director of Central Intelligence. The SMB contains information at the highest levels of classification. 5.2 JFO Input to the Homeland Security Operations Morning Brief (HSOMB) The HSOMB is prepared for the Secretary of Homeland Security and summarizes reports of suspicious activities received from DHS components, Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and the private sector, during the previous 24 hours. The information provided has not been vetted or analyzed. Material in the HSOMB consists of data that have been subjected to that day’s review process to determine whether any of these activities poses a threat to the United States. Those activities that are suspicious or may pose a potential threat are passed to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (IA) and appropriate intelligence and law enforcement agencies for further analysis and action. 5.3 Reporting Reports fall into three basic categories: SITREPs, Homeland Security Intelligence Reports (HSIR), and SPOTREPs. SITREPs can be used in any type of reporting format and usually list pertinent information covering specific periods of time. Intelligence reports are usually in two formats: those without access restrictions, HSIR, and ones with restricted access, HSIR-R. SPOTREPs are reports issued as incidents of such significance occur that immediate notification to the NOC is warranted. Information in SPOTREPs is incorporated into SITREPs for the relevant time period. Reporting formats are included in Annex D. 6.0 Secure Video Teleconferences (SVTCs) Twice daily (and on an as-needed basis dictated by a particular situation), a Secure Video Teleconference is held with the White House, members of the Intelligence Community, and key Federal law enforcement and response agencies. The purpose of the SVTC is to share information with the entire community and afford the opportunity for real-time reaction and response. SVTCs are normally held at 0900 and 1500 Monday through Friday. The morning conference is restricted to a limited number of agencies, and will normally include the PFO. The NOC has a seat in the DHS SVTC group. In addition to the sharing of information, this session is designed to focus on cooperative efforts between the participating organizations. A weekend SVTC is frequently held at 1000 on Saturday. The schedule for weekend sessions is established at the Friday 1500 session. Afternoon and Saturday morning sessions also focus on information sharing, but encompass a larger viewing audience. The Senior Watch Officer is responsible for attending these meetings. Information sharing on the part of DHS is typically focused on events at the borders, such as individuals with a questionable background interdicted at one of the ports of entry or border crossings, and on reports of suspicious activity. The PFO will report on new items, or provide supplemental information about an ongoing event at the JFO. 7.0 Situation Unit Watch Rotations Watch rotations at the JFO Situation Unit are normally 12 hours in duration: 0700-1900 and 1900-0700. The relieving watch is expected to report for duty 30 minutes before their watch is scheduled to begin to allow for a proper turnover. When the relieving watch has not stood watch for a number of days, to establish situational awareness, they normally report to the JFO in excess of 30 minutes before their watch. Whenever possible, integrity of watch teams is maintained throughout the cycle. This maximizes the cohesive bond between team members and optimizes team response in critical situations. 8.0 Logs The JFO Watch Log is an official document. While it is the ultimate responsibility of the PFO, maintenance of the log may be delegated to personnel on watch. The log, equivalent to an ICS Unit Log, is intended to be a thorough documentation of the events that occurred during a particular watch, and identifies the JFO Coordination Group personnel present during the period covered. Logs are reviewed on a daily basis by all members of the JFO Coordination Group. As an official record, under no circumstances are log entries changed after the log for a particular shift is closed out or there has been a turnover of watch personnel. If updated or corrected information becomes available, a new log entry is made, referencing the initial entry and providing the updated/corrected information. When this is done, adding a post-watch note at the place where the initial information was provided is acceptable, with the note directing the reader to the place in the log where the updated/corrected information may be found. Watch relief is not effected until all log entries from the watch being relieved are completed. While it is the responsibility of the off-going watch to complete their logs, the incoming SWO does not accept turnover until he/she has read and understood all entries, and acknowledges them to be complete. The daily log is closed at 2400 local time. All outstanding actionable entries are carried over and annotated at the beginning of the new log entry. Tab 1 to Annex E: JFO “Battle Rhythm” Timeline +0:05 • State/Local Connectivity Established/Confirmed +0:10 • Notification to JFO Coordination Group • JFO Coordination Group Members Notified/Recall +0:15 Initiated (JFO) • Initial SITREP 1 to NOC • Initial Brief to NOC/IAC/Secretary (PFO/JFO Coordination Group) • Initial Press Release Decision • All JFO Coordination Group members assembled at JFO • Initial In-Brief/Assignments to JFO Coordination Group (PFO/Watch) • Initial White House VTC/HSC Principals Meeting (PFO/Secretary/IAC Director) +3:00 • VTC Briefback to NOC/IAC (PFO/IAC Director) • Initial IAC COA Brief to Secretary (IAC Director) • SITREP 2 to NOC / White House Situation Room (JFO/NOC/IAC Chief) – NLT 6 Hours from Initial SITREP • SITREPs daily at 0600, 1200, 1800 to the NOC and White House (PFO/JFO Coordination Group/NOC /IAC Director). • The PFO, NOC Director, and the IAC Director will decide when this reporting sequence begins, after the initial SITREP has gone out. • Within 48 hours of the incident, the NOC Director and the IAC Director may decide to reduce the reporting period to 0600 and 1800. • Follow-on briefings to the Secretary as required. Tab 2 to Annex E: Initial Situation Report (SITREP) Serves as information/intelligence in-brief to IAC members upon activation, as well as initial written communication to the White House. Homeland Security Domestic Incident Management Initial SITREP 1. SITREP Number 2. Date/Time 3. Incident Type (CBRNE, Mass Migration, Natural Disaster, etc.) 4. Location 5. Time of Incident 6. Weather Conditions 7. Threat/Causal factors 8. Initial On-Scene Status/Capabilities Assessment . Casualties (# of dead; # of hospitalized) . Property Damage . Infrastructure Affected . Terrorism Nexus . General Population Status . Weather Effects . Extent of Contamination . On-Scene/En Route Capabilities . Requests for Additional Support . Possible Cascading Effects . WMD Effects . Indications of Follow-On Incidents 9. Initial Response (on-scene assets, emergency operations centers activated, local/regional response/recovery capability, etc.) . Local . State . Federal 10. Federal/State/Local/International/Private Sector Contacts Made 11. COOP/COG Actions Anticipated 12. NCR Impact 13. International Impact 14. DHS Initial Actions/Intentions (warning/bulletin issuance, press release issuance, IAC activation, White House notification, etc.) 15. Additional Comments/Considerations Tab 3 to Annex E: Situation Reports Provided to DHS/Interagency senior leadership and the White House on a pre-determined basis. NAME of EVENT DHS SITREP Date/Time(EST): Incident Type: Location of Incident: Time of Incident (EST): Incident Site Weather Conditions: Location Current Next 24-48 Hours Next 72 Hours Significant Weather that May Impact on Operations Weather Location Discussion Current Situation On-Scene Update Official Casualties/Relief Effort Fatalities Total: Total: 0 Hospitalized Total: Total: 0 Injured Total: Total: 0 Sheltered (See ESF #6) Extent of Damage Destroyed Major Damage Minor Damage Power Outages Federal and National Guard Personnel Deployed (Combined) Organization Total USCG FEMA Responders Federal Law Enforcement National Guard US Active Military Duty Health & Human Services Total Federal Assets Deployed (Combined) Asset Total DOD Rotary Wing USCG Rotary Wing CBP Total Rotary Wing DOD Fixed Wing USCG Fixed Wing CBP Fixed Wing Total Fixed Wing DOD Ships USCG Ships Total Ships Requests For Assistance /Emergency, Disaster, and Presidential Declarations Status of Event Related Declarations Date Declaration Remarks Law Enforcement Security Issues Borders and Coastal Waters • Transportation • Law Enforcement Federal Regional Local Critical Infrastructure Issues/Operational Activities Sector Impacts Banking & Finance Chemical Industry & Hazardous Materials . Defense Industrial Base Emergency Services Energy Electric: Oil & Gas: Pipeline: Nuclear: Food & Agriculture Government Health & Medical Postal & Shipping Information & Telecommunications Real Estate Transportation Aviation: Maritime: Highway: Rail: Public Transit: Water & Domestic Waste Tourism & Entertainment Other Sectors Cross-Sector Impacts Emergency Response Issues Emergency Support Functions (ESF) #1-15 ESF #1 Transportation Status: Activated ESF #2 Communications Status: Activated ESF #3 Public Works and Engineering Status: Activated ESF #4 Firefighting Status: Activated ESF #5 Emergency Management Status: Activated ESF #6 Mass Care, Housing and Human Services Status: Activated Shelter Numbers State Number of Shelters Shelter Population Total ESF #7 Resource Support Status: Activated Logistics Resource Center (LRC): ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Services Status: Activated DMAT: Disaster Medical Assistance Team; DMORT: Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team; DPMU: Disaster/Deployable Portable Morgue Unit; FAC: Family Assistance Center; NMRT: National Medical Response Team; MHAT: Medical Health Advisory Team; MNAT: Medical Needs Assessment Team; MST: Management Support Team; IMSURT: International Medical Surgical Response Team; RNA: Rapid Needs Assessment; VMAT: Veterinary Medical Assistance Team; NVRT: National Veterinary Response Team. NOTE: The symbol (-) behind a DMAT team name indicates a less-than 35-person roster. M.D. after a team indicates that only a Medical Doctor from that team is present. ESF #9 Urban Search and Rescue Status: De-Activated ESF #10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Status: Activated Response ESF #11 Agriculture and Natural Resources Status: Activated ESF #12 Energy Status: Activated ESF #13 Public Safety and Security Status: Activated ESF #14 Long-Term Community Recovery Status: Activated ESF #15 External Affairs Status: Activated • Situation reports (SITREPs) continue to be combined and published at 1800 hours each day. • Next combined SITREP will be published at 1800 hours, XXX. Tab 4 to Annex E: Urgent Situation (Spot) Reports FROM: (JFO, INCIDENT NAME) TO: DHS/NOC INFO: OPERATIONAL CHAIN C L A S S I F I C A T I O N L E V E L (UNCLAS, SBU, SSI, FOUO, C, S, TS, TS/SCI) SUBJECT: URGENT JFO SPOT REPORT 1. OCCURRENCE// • DATE OF URGENT OCCURRENCE/(Date in MMDDYY Format)// • TIME OF OCCURRENCE/(Time in HHMM Format)// • LOCATION/(location in clearest possible short description)// 2. TYPE OF OCCURRENCE/ (In short, plain language, what happened?)// • RELATED TO JFO MISSIONS?/(Yes or No—is this directly related to the Incident of National Significance for which the JFO was established?)// • NARRATIVE/(Describe what happened.)// 3. IMMEDIATE JFO ACTION/(Action being taken immediately by the JFO – don’t wait, follow up with a detailed SITREP later containing full details of plan of action.)// 4. APPARENT TERRORISM NEXUS// (Yes or No – does the occurrence appear to have a terrorism nexus?) 5. THREATS AND CAUSAL FACTORS//(Short narrative text) 6. SPOTREP CONTACT/NAME/Name of best POC in the JFO regarding the urgent occurrence)/(Phone number of POC)/(E-mail address of mishap POC)// ### Tab 5 to Annex E: Threat Situation Report SITREP No.(FOUO) FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC)/FCO (NRP operations focus) . FBI On-Scene Commander: (Law Enforcement focus): . PROTOCOL OFFICER . PUBLIC AFFAIRS INFORMATION Media . Upcoming . DHS OPERATIONS Office of Intelligence . & Analysis Preparedness . Directorate NOC . Science & . Technology FEMA . MACC . United States Coast . Guard State & Local Desk . Transportation Security . Administration Immigration & Customs . Enforcement SITREP No. Customs & Border (FOUO) . Protection Office of Private . Sector Liaison Department of Health and Human . Services LOGISTICS . N/A STATUS OF SUPPORT FACILITIES . N/A ASSESSMENT/LIMITING FACTORS . None Tab 6 to Annex E: HSIN-JFOnet Technical Data [RESERVED] Tab 7 to Annex E: Template JFO Information-Sharing Plan Boundaries of Disaster Area Geographic locations sustaining damage Description of extent of damage sustained Boundaries of areas evacuated Estimated % of population evacuated Estimated % of population unable to return Predictive modeling Geographic Information System (GIS) HAZUS, CATS, USGS Remote Sensing/Aerial Reconnaissance (NIMA) Assessment Teams Community Relations & ARC Reports State Liaison/ERT-A/FCO Reports News Media and other open sources State EM Office JFO Planning Section Summary of Impacts Map Situation Report Situation Briefing Daily Intelligence Summary Modeling data as soon as available. Initial estimate NLT 12 hours following event Updated as new information becomes available or at least daily. NOC FEMA Ops Center ERT-A Leadership Assessment Teams PFO/FCO SCO JFO/JOC JFO/MACC Access Points to Disaster Area Traffic control points Best routes to reach local EOCs, Mobilization Points, Command Posts and other critical locations. Best airports for arriving staff to use Special permits or identification required to access disaster area. State Emergency Management Office State Liaisons State Highway Department Reports State Patrol and Law Enforcement Reports Transportation Reports Operations JFO Operations Section/Response & Recovery Branch/ESF #1 GIS Products Situation Briefing Situation Reporting Special Briefings NLT 8 hours post event. Updated at least daily. NOC FEMA Ops Center ERT-A Leadership Assessment Teams PFO/FCO SCO JFO/JOC JFO/MACC Jurisdictional Boundaries List of jurisdictions (cities, counties) affected, with maps Political and congressional jurisdictions affected State Liaison/ERT-A/FCO Reports News Media/Open Sources GIS Assessment teams Community Relations Reports Remote Sensing/Aerial Reconnaissance JFO Planning Section/Situation Unit GIS map with political jurisdiction boundaries GIS map with congressional districts Jurisdictional profiles NLT 12 hours following event NOC FEMA Ops Center Assessment Teams PFO/FCO SCO & FCOs JFO/JOC JFO/MACC External Affairs 95 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Socio-economic Impacts Number of homes affected Potential/estimated population affected Number of shelters open/population Potential shelter requirements Predictive modeling Geographic Information System (GIS) Remote Sensing/Aerial Reconnaissance Assessment Teams Community Relations Reports State Liaison/ERT-A/FCO Reports JFO Planning Section/XXX Unit Situation Report Status Briefing Summary of Impacts Maps Daily Intelligence Summary Jurisdictional Profile Initial estimate NLT 12 hours following event Updated as new information becomes available or at least daily. NOC FEMA Ops Center Assessment Teams PFO/FCO SCO & FCOs JFO/JOC JFO/MACC External Affairs Socio-economic Impacts Number and type of businesses affected Predictive modeling GIS Remote Sensing/Aerial Reconnaissance Assessment Teams News Medial and other open sources JFO Operations Section Situation Report Inputs SBA Reports and Text Items Summary of Impacts Maps Initial estimate NLT 12 hours following event Updated as new information becomes available or at least daily. NOC FEMA Ops Center Assessment Teams PFO/FCO SCO & FCOs JFO/JOC JFO/MACC External Affairs NOC FEMA Ops Center Assessment Teams Congressional Liaison Impacts Congressional Districts Impacted GIS Database Congressional Liaison Officer JFO Planning Section/XXX Unit Congressional Boundaries Map overlaid with disaster boundaries NLT 12 hours following event PFO/FCO SCO & FCOs JFO/JOC JFO/MACC Congressional Liaison Officer 96 Version 8.3 Interim Approval April 28, 2006 Hazard Specific Information What are the characteristics of the disaster What are the special hazards associated with the event What are the short and long term impacts of the event Is this a short term or long term event NOAA Reports USGS Reports Other sources as appropriate JFO Planning Section Situation Briefings Situation Reports Special reports and presentations NLT 4 hour after event. Updated as needed NOC FEMA Ops Center Assessment Teams PFO/FCO SCO & FCOs JFO/JOC JFO/MACC Seismic and/or Other Geophysical Information Weather Conditions/ Forecasts Historical and Demographic Information Are there