INCIDENT ANNEXES: INTRODUCTION

The Incident Annexes address specific contingency or hazard situations or an element of an incident requiring specialized application of the National Response Framework. The annexes in the sections that follow address the following situations:

- Biological Incident
- Catastrophic Incident
- Cyber Incident
- Food and Agriculture Incident
- Mass Evacuation Incident
- Nuclear/Radiological Incident
- Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation

Incident Annexes are organized alphabetically and may be implemented independently or concurrently depending on the situation. For example, a large-scale natural disaster may require the implementation of both the Catastrophic Incident and the Mass Evacuation Incident Annexes.

Policies and procedures in the Catastrophic Incident Annex are overarching and applicable for all hazards. Similarly, the mechanisms in the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex apply when terrorism is associated with any incident. The Mass Evacuation Incident Annex supports the mass departure of individuals as a direct result of some other type of incident, hazard, or disaster.

Incident Annex Contents

The annexes describe the policies, situation, concept of operations, and responsibilities pertinent to the type of incident in question.

Policies: Each annex explains unique authorities pertinent to that incident, the special actions or declarations that may result, and any special policies that may apply.

Situation: Each annex describes the incident situation as well as the planning assumptions, and outlines the approach that will be used if key assumptions do not hold (for example, how authorities will operate if they lose communication with senior decisionmakers).

Concept of Operations: Each annex describes the concept of operations appropriate to the incident or supporting element of an incident, integration of operations with National Response Framework elements, unique aspects of the organizational approach, notification and activation processes, and specialized incident-related actions.

The annexes also detail the coordination structures and positions of authority that are unique to the type of incident, the specialized response teams or unique resources needed, and other special considerations.

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Responsibilities: Each Incident Annex identifies the coordinating and cooperating agencies involved in an incident-specific response. In some cases, this responsibility is held jointly by two or more departments.

The overarching nature of functions described in these annexes frequently involves either the support to, or the cooperation of, all departments and agencies involved in incident management efforts to ensure seamless integration of and transitions between preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, and mitigation activities.

Each annex is managed by one or more coordinating agencies and is supported by various cooperating agencies. The responsibilities of coordinating and cooperating agencies are identified below.

Coordinating Agencies

Coordinating agencies support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) incident management mission by providing the leadership, expertise, and authorities to implement critical and specific aspects of the response. In accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, DHS retains responsibility for overall domestic incident management. Federal agencies designated as coordinating agencies, in close coordination with DHS, are responsible for implementation of processes detailed in the Incident Annexes. Some of the Incident Annexes, such as Cyber, Nuclear/Radiological, and Oil and Hazardous Materials, list multiple coordinating agencies. In these annexes, the responsibilities of the coordinating agency may be shared or delegated based on the nature or the location of the incident.

The coordinating agency is responsible for:

- Orchestrating a coordinated delivery of those functions and procedures identified in the annex.
- Providing staff for operations functions at fixed and field facilities.
- Notifying and subtasking cooperating agencies.
- Managing tasks with cooperating agencies, as well as appropriate State, tribal, or local agencies.
- Working with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize use of available resources.
- Supporting and keeping ESFs and other organizational elements informed of annex activities.
- Planning for short-term and long-term support to incident management and recovery operations.
- Conducting preparedness activities, such as training and exercising, to maintain personnel who can provide appropriate support.

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Cooperating Agencies

Cooperating agencies are those entities that have specific expertise and capabilities to assist the coordinating agency in executing incident-related tasks or processes. The coordinating agency notifies cooperating agencies when their assistance is needed. Cooperating agencies are responsible for:

- Conducting operations, when requested by DHS or the coordinating agency, using their own authorities, subject-matter experts, capabilities, or resources.

- Participating in planning for incident management and recovery operations and development of supporting operational plans, standard operating procedures, checklists, or other tools.

- Furnishing available personnel, equipment, or other resource support as requested by DHS or the Incident Annex coordinator.

- Participating in training and exercises aimed at continuous improvement of prevention, response, and recovery capabilities.

When requested, and upon approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense (DOD) provides Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) during domestic incidents. Accordingly, DOD is considered a cooperating agency to the majority of Incident Annexes.

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Table 1. Designation of Incident Annex Coordinating and Cooperating Agencies

Cr = Coordinating Agency
Co = Cooperating Agency

Agency	Biological Incident	Catastrophic Incident	Cyber Incident	Food and Agriculture Incident	Mass Evacuation Incident	Nuclear/Radiological Incident	Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement Investigation
USDA	Co	Co		Cr	Co	Co	
DOC	Co	Co	Co	Co	Co	Co	
DOD	Co	Co	Cr/Co	Co	Co	Cr/Co	Co
DOD/USACE		Co			Co		
ED		Co					
DOE	Co	Co	Co	Co	Co	Cr/Co	Co
HHS	Cr	Co		Cr	Co	Co	Co
DHS	Co	Cr	Co	Co		Cr/Co	Co
DHS/FEMA		Co			Cr		
DHS/IP/NCSD		Co	Cr				
DHS/USCG					Co		
DHS/USSS		Co	Co				
HUD		Co				Co	
DOI	Co	Co		Co		Co	
DOJ	Co	Co	Cr/Co	Co	Co	Co	
DOJ/FBI		Co					Cr
DOL	Co	Co		Co		Co	
DOS	Co	Co	Co	Co		Co	Co
DOT	Co	Co	Co	Co	Co	Co	
TREAS		Co	Co				
VA	Co	Co		Co	Co	Co	
EPA	Co	Co		Co		Cr/Co	Co
FCC		Co					
GSA	Co	Co		Co	Co	Co	
NASA		Co				Cr	
NRC		Co				Cr/Co	
OPM		Co					
SBA		Co					
SSA		Co					
TVA		Co					
USAID	Co	Co		Co			
USPS	Co	Co		Co			
ARC	Co	Co		Co	Co	Co	
CNCS		Co			Co		
NVOAD		Co			Co		
IC		Co	Co				
OMB		Co	Co				
OSTP		Co	Co				

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Coordinating Agency:

Department of Health and Human Services

Cooperating Agencies:

Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of Veterans Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency
General Services Administration
U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Postal Service
American Red Cross

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of the Biological Incident Annex is to outline the actions, roles, and responsibilities associated with response to a disease outbreak of known or unknown origin requiring Federal assistance. A biological incident includes naturally occurring biological diseases (communicable and noncommunicable in humans and those biological agents diagnosed in animals having the potential for transmission to humans (zoonosis)) as well as terrorist events. Actions described in this annex take place with or without a Presidential Stafford Act declaration or a public health emergency declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). This annex outlines biological incident response actions including threat assessment notification procedures, laboratory testing, joint investigative/response procedures, and activities related to recovery.

Scope

The objectives of the Federal Government's response to a biological terrorism event, pandemic influenza, emerging infectious disease, or novel pathogen outbreak are to:

- Detect the event through disease surveillance and environmental monitoring.
- Identify and protect the population(s) at risk.
- Determine the source of the outbreak.
- Quickly frame the public health, law enforcement, and international implications.
- Control and contain any possible epidemic (including providing guidance to State, tribal, and local public health authorities).
- Augment and surge public health and medical services.

- Identify the cause and prevent the recurrence of any potential resurgence or additional outbreaks.

- Assess the extent of residual biological contamination and decontaminate as necessary.

The unique attributes of this response require separate planning considerations that are tailored to specific health concerns and effects of the disease (e.g., terrorism versus natural outbreaks, communicable versus noncommunicable, etc.).

Specific operational guidelines, developed by respective organizations to address the unique aspects of a particular biological agent or planning consideration, will supplement this annex and are intended as guidance to assist Federal, State, tribal, and local public health and medical planners.

In this document, the term "public health and medical" is inclusive of relevant terms, including veterinary medical.

Special Considerations

Detection of a bioterrorism act against the civilian population may occur in several different ways and involve several different modalities:

- An attack may be surreptitious, in which case the first evidence of dissemination of an agent may be the presentation of disease in humans or animals. This could manifest either in clinical case reports to domestic or international public health authorities or in unusual patterns of symptoms or encounters within domestic or international health surveillance systems.

- A terrorist-induced infectious disease outbreak initially may be indistinguishable from a naturally occurring outbreak; moreover, depending upon the particular agent and associated symptoms, several days could pass before public health and medical authorities even suspect that terrorism may be the cause. In such a case, criminal intent may not be apparent until some time after illnesses are recognized.

- Environmental surveillance systems, such as the BioWatch system, may detect the presence of a biological agent in the environment and trigger directed environmental sampling and intensified clinical surveillance to rule out or confirm an incident. If confirmed, the utilization of environmental surveillance systems may allow for mobilization of a public health, medical, and law enforcement response in advance of the appearance of the first clinical cases or a rapid response after the first clinical cases are identified.

- Other cooperating departments and agencies listed in this annex may detect acts of bioterrorism or biological incidents through their normal operations and surveillance efforts. Should this occur, notifications should be made according to approved interagency response protocols, consistent with the health and law enforcement assessment process described in this annex.

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Policies

This annex supports policies and procedures outlined in the National Response Framework, Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 – Public Health and Medical Services Annex, ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex, ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex, ESF #15 – External Affairs Annex, the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex, and the International Coordination Support Annex.

HHS serves as the Federal Government's primary agency for the public health and medical preparation and planning for and response to a biological terrorism attack or naturally occurring outbreak that results from either a known or novel pathogen, including an emerging infectious disease.

The Department of Agriculture (USDA) serves as the Government's primary agency for outbreaks and/or attacks which may occur in animals used in the commercial production of food. In the event of an animal event, HHS may provide additional public health and veterinary epidemiological assistance to USDA. Wildlife events will be placed under the purview of the Department of the Interior (DOI), while those involving marine animals will be managed and monitored by the Department of Commerce.

State, tribal, and local governments are primarily responsible for detecting and responding to disease outbreaks and implementing measures to minimize the health, social, and economic consequences of such an outbreak.

If any agency or government entity becomes aware of an overt threat involving biological agents or indications that instances of disease may not be the result of natural causes, the Department of Justice (DOJ) must be notified through DOJ/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)'s Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit (WMDOU). If the threat is deemed credible by DOJ/FBI in coordination with HHS or USDA, DOJ/FBI, in turn, immediately notifies the National Operations Center (NOC) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is used to test samples for the presence of biological threat agents. Decisions on where to perform additional tests on samples are made by DOJ/FBI, in coordination with HHS or USDA.

Once notified of a credible threat or natural disease outbreak, HHS convenes a meeting of ESF #8 partners to assess the situation and determine appropriate public health and medical actions. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinates overall nonmedical support and response actions across all Federal departments and agencies. HHS leads public health and medical emergency response efforts across all Federal departments and agencies.

DOJ/FBI coordinates the investigation of criminal activities if such activities are suspected.

HHS provides guidance to State, tribal, and local authorities and collaborates closely with DOJ/FBI in the proper handling of any materials that may have evidentiary implications (e.g., LRN samples, etc.) associated with disease outbreaks suspected of being terrorist or criminal in nature. If evidentiary materials are shared with or procured from foreign governments, HHS and DOJ/FBI will coordinate and share information with the Department of State (DOS) as appropriate.

Other Federal departments and agencies may be called upon to support HHS during the various stages of a disease outbreak response in the preparation, planning, and/or response processes.

If there is potential for environmental contamination, HHS collaborates with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in developing and implementing sampling strategies and sharing results.

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In the event of an outbreak of an agriculturally significant zoonotic disease, HHS collaborates with USDA during the preparation, planning, and/or response processes.

Given the dynamic nature of a disease outbreak, HHS, in collaboration with other departments and agencies, determines the thresholds for a comprehensive Federal Government public health and medical response. These thresholds are based on specific event information rather than predetermined risk levels.

Any Federal public announcement, statement, or press release related to a threat or actual bioterrorism event must be coordinated with the DHS Office of Public Affairs and ESF #15, if activated.

Planning Assumptions

In a large disease outbreak, Federal, State, tribal, and local officials require a highly coordinated response to public health and medical emergencies. The outbreak also may affect other countries, or be of international concern, and therefore involve extensive coordination with DOS and the international health community (e.g., the World Health Organization (WHO)).

Disease transmission can occur via an environmental contact such as atmospheric dispersion, person-to-person contact, animal-to-person contact, insect vector-to-person contact, or by way of contaminated food or water.

A biological incident may be distributed across multiple jurisdictions simultaneously, requiring a nontraditional incident management approach. This approach could require the simultaneous management of multiple "incident sites" from national and regional headquarters locations in coordination with multiple State, tribal, and local jurisdictions.

A response to noncontagious public health emergencies may require different planning assumptions or factors.

The introduction of biological agents, both natural and deliberate, are often first detected through clinical or hospital presentation. However, there are other methods of detection, including environmental surveillance technologies such as BioWatch and syndromic surveillance.

Routine fish and wildlife health and disease surveillance, including investigation of wildlife mortality events conducted on public lands and in public laboratories, provides the opportunity for early detection of biological agents and acts of bioterrorism.

No single entity possesses the authority, expertise, and resources to act unilaterally on the many complex issues that may arise in response to a disease outbreak and loss of containment affecting a multijurisdictional area. The national response requires close coordination between numerous agencies at all levels of government and with the private sector.

The Federal Government supports affected State, tribal, and local health jurisdictions as requested or required. The response by HHS and other Federal agencies is flexible and adapts as necessary as the outbreak evolves.

The LRN provides analytical support to inform public health assessment of the potential for human illness associated with exposure and the scope of this kind of risk. The LRN also provides for definitive testing of both environmental and clinical samples resulting in law enforcement notification for threat assessment of criminal intent while ensuring chain of custody. Early HHS, DOJ/FBI, USDA, and DHS coordination enhances the likelihood of successful preventative and investigative activities necessary to neutralize threats and attribute the source of the outbreak.

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Response to disease outbreaks suspected of being deliberate in origin requires consideration of special law enforcement and homeland security requirements as well as international legal obligations and requirements.

Test results from non-LRN facilities are considered a “first pass” or “screening” test (with the exception of the Legislative Branch, which has a separate lab system that is equivalent to LRN facilities).

Any agency or organization that identifies an unusual or suspicious test result should contact DOJ/FBI to ensure coordination of appropriate testing at an LRN laboratory.

HHS has identified specific Department of Defense laboratories that meet the standards and requirements for LRN membership.

All threat and public health assessments are provided to the NOC.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Biological Agent Response

The key elements of an effective biological response include (in nonsequential order):

- Rapid detection of the outbreak.
- Rapid dissemination of key safety information and necessary medical precautions.
- Swift agent identification and confirmation.
- Identification of the population at risk (to include animals and marine life).
- Determination of how the agent is transmitted, including an assessment of the efficiency of transmission.
- Determination of susceptibility to prophylaxis and treatment.
- Definition of the public health and medical services, human services, and mental health implications.
- Control and containment of the epidemic.
- Decontamination of individuals, if necessary.
- Identification of the law enforcement implications/assessment of the threat.
- Augmentation and surging of local health and medical resources.
- Protection of the population through appropriate public health and medical actions.
- Dissemination of information to enlist public support.

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- Response options may include assessment of environmental contamination and cleanup/decontamination of bioagents that persist in the environment; and providing consultation on the safety of food products that may be derived from directly or environmentally exposed animals or marine life.

- Tracking and preventing secondary or additional disease outbreak.

Primary Federal functions include supporting State, tribal, and local public health and medical capacities according to the policies and procedures detailed in the National Response Framework and its annexes (e.g., ESF #8).

Suspicious Substances

Since there is no definitive/reliable field test for biological agents, all potential bioterrorism samples are transported to an LRN laboratory, where expert analysis is conducted using established HHS protocols/reagents. A major component of this process is to establish and maintain the law enforcement chain of custody and arrange for transport.

The following actions occur if a positive result is obtained by an LRN on an environmental sample submitted by DOJ/FBI or other designated law enforcement personnel:

- The LRN immediately notifies the local DOJ/FBI of the positive test result.

- The DOJ/FBI Field Office makes local notifications and contacts the DOJ/FBI Headquarters WMDOU.

- DOJ/FBI Headquarters convenes an initial conference call with the local DOJ/FBI, HHS, and appropriate response officials to review the results, assess the preliminary information and test results, and arrange for additional testing.

- DOJ/FBI Headquarters immediately notifies DHS of the situation.

- Original samples may be sent to HHS/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for confirmation of LRN analyses.

- HHS provides guidance on protective measures such as prophylaxis, treatment, and continued facility operation.

- HHS, the EPA, and cooperating agencies support the determination of the contaminated area, decisions on whether to shelter in place or evacuate, and decontamination of people, animals, facilities, and outdoor areas.

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Outbreak Detection

Determination of a Disease Outbreak

The initial indication of a major disease outbreak, intentional or naturally occurring, may be the recognition by public health and medical authorities that a significantly increased number of people are becoming ill and presenting to local healthcare providers.

One tool to support this process is the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS). NBIS leverages the individual capabilities of multiple surveillance systems by integrating and analyzing domestic and international surveillance and monitoring data collected from human health, animal health, plant health, food and water and monitoring systems. This integrated cross-domain analysis allows for enhanced situational awareness and potentially reduced detection time, thus enabling more rapid and effective biological incident response decisionmaking.

As a result of the nature in which a disease outbreak may be recognized, critical decisionmaking support requires integrated surveillance information, identification of the causative biological agent, a determination of whether the observations are related to a naturally occurring outbreak, and identification of the population(s) at risk.

Laboratory Confirmation

During the evaluation of a suspected disease outbreak, laboratory samples are distributed to appropriate laboratories. During a suspected terrorist incident, sample information is provided to DOJ/FBI for investigative use and to public health and emergency response authorities for epidemiological use and agent characterization to facilitate and ensure timely public health and medical interventions. If the incident begins as an epidemic of unknown origin detected through Federal, State, tribal, or local health surveillance systems or networks, laboratory analysis is initiated through the routine public health laboratory system.

Identification (Analysis and Confirmation)

The samples collected and the analyses conducted must be sufficient to characterize the cause of the outbreak. LRN laboratories fulfill the Federal responsibility for rapid analysis of biological agents. In a suspected terrorism incident, sample collection activities and testing are coordinated with DOJ/FBI and LRN member(s).

Notification

Any disease outbreak suspected or identified by an agency within HHS or through another Federal public health partner is brought to the immediate attention of the HHS (as detailed in the ESF #8 Annex), in addition to the notification requirements contained in the National Response Framework.

Any potential biological agent, disease outbreak, or suspected bioterrorism act affecting or involving animals, plant health, or wildlife should involve notifications to USDA (animals and plant health) and DOI (wildlife).

Following these initial notifications, the procedures detailed in the ESF #8 Annex are followed. Instances of disease that raise the “index of suspicion” of terrorist or criminal involvement, as determined by HHS or USDA (for animal and plant diseases), are reported to DOJ/FBI Headquarters. In these instances, DOJ/FBI Headquarters, in conjunction with HHS and/or USDA, examines available law enforcement and intelligence information, as well as the

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technical characteristics and epidemiology of the disease, to determine if there is a possibility of criminal intent. If DOJ/FBI, in conjunction with HHS or USDA, determines that the information represents a potential credible terrorist threat, DOJ/FBI communicates the situation immediately to the NCTC and NOC, which notifies the White House, as appropriate. If warranted, DOJ/FBI, HHS, and/or USDA and respective State, tribal, and/or local health officials will conduct a joint law enforcement and epidemiological investigation to determine the cause of the disease outbreak, the extent of the threat to public health and public safety, and the individual(s) responsible.

In the event of an environmental detection of a biological threat agent above established agency-specific thresholds, the responsible agency should contact HHS, DOJ/FBI, and the NOC within 2 hours of laboratory confirmation. DOJ/FBI, in conjunction with HHS, will convene a threat assessment conference call to examine the potential threat and public health risk posed by the detection. Coordination of assessment and response activities will involve officials from the impacted State and local jurisdiction(s).

Activation

Once notified of a threat or disease outbreak that requires or potentially requires significant Federal public health and medical assistance, HHS convenes a meeting of its internal components and the ESF #8 partner organizations to assess the situation and determine the appropriate public health and medical actions. DHS coordinates all nonmedical support, discussions, and response actions.

The immediate task following any notification is to identify the population affected and vulnerable and the geographic scope of the incident. The initial public health and medical response includes some or all of the following actions:

- Targeted epidemiological investigation (e.g., contact tracing).
- Dissemination of key safety information and necessary medical precautions.
- Intensified surveillance within healthcare settings for patients with certain clinical signs and symptoms.
- Intensified collection and review of potentially related information (e.g., contacts with nurse call lines, laboratory test orders, school absences, over-the-counter pharmacy sales, unusual increase in sick animals, wildlife deaths, decreased commercial fish yields).
- Organization of Federal public health and medical response assets (in conjunction with State, tribal, and local officials) to include personnel, medical and veterinary supplies, and materiel (e.g., the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and Veterinary Stockpiles).

If there is suspicion that the outbreak may be deliberate, DOJ/FBI may establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC), which may be integrated into the Joint Field Office structure, if established, to coordinate investigative and intelligence activities among Federal, State, tribal, and local authorities. Within the JOC structure locally, and DOJ/FBI's Strategic Information and Operations Center in Washington, DC, responsible public health officials would be integrated into the command structure to coordinate the interaction between law enforcement and public health investigations.

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ACTIONS

Controlling the Epidemic

The following steps are required to contain and control an epidemic affecting large populations:

- HHS assists State, tribal, and local public health and medical authorities with epidemic surveillance and coordination.

- HHS assesses the need for increased surveillance in State, tribal, and local entities not initially involved in the outbreak and notifies the appropriate State and local public health officials with surveillance recommendations should increased surveillance in these localities be needed.

- DHS coordinates with HHS and State, tribal, and local officials on the messages released to the public to ensure that communications are consistent timely, consistent, accurate, and actionable. Messages should address anxieties, alleviate any unwarranted concerns or distress, and enlist cooperation with necessary control measures. Public health and medical messages to the public should be communicated by a recognized health authority (e.g., the U.S. Surgeon General). (See the Public Affairs Support Annex.)

- Consistent with the International Health Regulations, if the outbreak first arises within the United States, HHS, in coordination with DOS, immediately notifies and coordinates with appropriate international health agencies. Given the nature of many disease outbreaks, this notification and coordination may have occurred earlier in the process according to internal operating procedures. HHS advises the NOC when notifications are made to international health agencies.

- The public health system, starting at the local level, is required to initiate appropriate protective and responsive measures for the affected population, including first responders and other workers engaged in incident-related activities. These measures include mass vaccination or prophylaxis for populations at risk and populations not already exposed, but who are at risk of exposure from secondary transmission or the environment. An overarching goal is to develop, as early as possible in the management of a biological incident, a dynamic, prioritized list of treatment recommendations based on epidemiologic risk assessment and the biology of the disease/microorganism in question, linked to the deployment of the SNS and communicated to the general public.

- HHS evaluates the incident with its partner organizations and makes recommendations to the appropriate public health and medical authorities regarding the need for isolation, quarantine, or shelter-in-place to prevent the spread of disease. HHS will also coordinate with volunteer personnel, such as the Medical Reserve Corps and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.

- The Governor of an affected State implements isolation and/or social-distancing requirements using State/local legal authorities. The tribal chief executive of a recognized tribe may also order a curfew, isolation, social distancing, and quarantine under tribal legal authorities. In order to prevent the import or interstate spread of disease, HHS may take appropriate Federal actions using the authorities granted by title 42 of the U.S. Code, 42 CFR parts 70 and 71, and 21 CFR part 1240. State, tribal, and local assistance with the implementation and enforcement of isolation and/or quarantine actions is utilized if Federal authorities are invoked.

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- Where the source of the disease outbreak has been identified as originating outside the United States, whether the result of terrorism or a natural outbreak, HHS works in a coordinated effort with DHS to identify and isolate persons, cargo, mail, or conveyances entering the United States that may be contaminated.

- The scope of the disease outbreak may require mass isolation or quarantine of affected or potentially affected persons. Depending on the type of event, food, animals, and other agricultural products may need to be quarantined to prevent further spread of disease. In this instance HHS and, as appropriate, USDA will work with State, tribal, and local health and legal authorities to recommend the most feasible, effective, and legally enforceable methods of isolation and quarantine. In the event that foreign nationals are subject to isolation and/or quarantine, HHS will work through DOS to notify affected foreign governments.

Decontamination

For certain types of biological incidents (e.g., anthrax), it may be necessary to assess the extent of contamination and decontaminate victims, responders, animals, equipment, buildings, critical infrastructure, and large outdoor areas. Such decontamination and related activities take place consistent with the roles and responsibilities, resources and capabilities, and procedures contained in the ESF #8, ESF #10, and ESF #11 Annexes, the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex, and the Catastrophic Incident Annex. (Note: Currently no decontamination chemicals are registered (under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act) for use on biological agents, and responders must request an emergency exemption from the EPA before chemicals can be used for biological decontamination.)

Special Issues

International Notification/Implications

A biological incident may involve internationally prescribed reportable diseases. In addition to case reporting, epidemics of disease with global public health significance must also be reported to international public health authorities. A biological incident may also have implications under the Biological Weapons Convention if it can be attributed to actions of a foreign party, in which case, DOS would manage the diplomatic aspects of any such case.

Consistent with the International Health Regulations, once a positive determination is made of an epidemic involving a contagious biological agent, HHS notifies DOS and DHS. HHS, in coordination with DOS, notifies the WHO and other international health agencies as appropriate.

Allocation and Rationing

If critical resources for protecting human life are insufficient to meet all domestic needs, the Secretary of HHS makes recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding the allocation of scarce Federal public health and medical resources.

RESPONSIBILITIES

The procedures in this annex are built on the core coordinating structures of the National Response Framework. The specific responsibilities of each department and agency are described in the respective ESF and Incident Annexes.

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Coordinating Agency:

Department of Homeland Security

Cooperating Agencies:

All Federal departments and agencies (and other organizations) with assigned primary or supporting Emergency Support Function (ESF) responsibilities

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The Catastrophic Incident Annex to the National Response Framework (NRF-CIA) establishes the context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident.

A more detailed and operationally specific National Response Framework Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRF-CIS) is published independently of the NRF and annexes.

Scope

A catastrophic incident, as defined by the NRF, is any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic incident could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, tribal, local, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. These factors drive the urgency for coordinated national planning to ensure accelerated Federal/national assistance.

Recognizing that Federal and/or national resources are required to augment overwhelmed State, tribal, and local response efforts, the NRF-CIA establishes protocols to preidentify and rapidly deploy key essential resources (e.g., medical teams, urban search and rescue teams, transportable shelters, medical and equipment caches, etc.) that are expected to be urgently needed/required to save lives and contain incidents.

Accordingly, upon designation by the Secretary of Homeland Security of a catastrophic incident, Federal resources, organized into incident-specific “packages,” deploy in accordance with the NRF-CIS and in coordination with the affected State and incident command structure.

Where State, tribal, or local authorities are unable to establish or maintain an effective incident command structure due to catastrophic conditions, the Federal Government, at the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security may establish a unified command structure to save lives, protect property, secure critical infrastructure/key resources, contain the event, and protect national security. The Federal Government shall transition to its normal role supporting incident command through State, tribal, or local authorities when their command is reestablished.

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The Catastrophic Incident Annex is primarily designed to address no-notice or short-notice incidents of catastrophic magnitude, where the need for Federal assistance is obvious and immediate, where anticipatory planning and resource pre-positioning were precluded, and where the exact nature of needed resources and assets is not known. Appropriately tailored assets and responses identified in the NRF-CIS, as well as other select Federal resources and assets, also may be deployed in support of a projected catastrophic event (e.g., a major hurricane) with advance warning in support of the anticipated requests of State, tribal, and local authorities.

Policies

If an event is catastrophic in nature, the Secretary of Homeland Security or a designee directs implementation of the NRF-CIA and execution of the NRF-CIS.

Only the Secretary of Homeland Security or designee may initiate implementation of the NRF-CIA.

All deploying Federal resources remain under the control of their respective Federal department or agency during mobilization and deployment.

Federal resources arriving at a Federal mobilization center or staging area remain there until requested by State/local incident command authorities, when they are integrated into the incident response effort.

Federal assets unilaterally deployed to the mobilization or staging site in accordance with the NRF-CIS do not require a State cost share. However, in accordance with the Stafford Act, State requests for use of deployed Federal assets may require cost-sharing.

For no-notice or short-notice catastrophic incidents, Federal resources identified in the execution matrix of the NRF-CIS will be mobilized and deployed, unless it can be credibly established that an action listed is not needed at the catastrophic incident venue.

If during an incident response, it is determined that the incident is catastrophic in nature, any remaining actions not originally initiated from the execution matrix will be initiated.

States are encouraged to conduct planning in collaboration with the Federal Government for catastrophic incidents as part of their steady-state preparedness activities.

The Federal Government, in collaboration with States and tribes, develops proactive plans for activation and implementation of the NRF-CIA, to include situations where State and local governments are incapable of responding and where the Federal Government may temporarily assume roles typically performed by State, tribal, and local governments.

The occurrence or threat of multiple or successive catastrophic incidents may significantly reduce the size, speed, and depth of the Federal response. If deemed necessary or prudent, the Federal Government may reduce the availability or allocation of finite resources when multiple venues are competing for the same resources, or hold certain resources in reserve in case of additional incidents.

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Situation

Continuity of Operations (COOP)/Continuity of Government (COG): Following a catastrophic event, segments of State, tribal, and local authorities as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector may be severely compromised. The Federal Government and its national partners must be prepared to fill potential gaps to ensure continuity of government and public and private sector operations. The incident may cause significant disruption of the impacted area's critical infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, telecommunications, law enforcement, and public health and medical systems.

Incident Condition: Normal procedures for certain ESFs may be expedited or streamlined to address the magnitude of urgent requirements of the incident. All ESFs must explore economies of scale to maximize utilization and efficiency of scarce resources. In the case of a catastrophic incident, it is expected that the Federal Government or other national entities provide expedited assistance in one or more of the following areas:

- **Mass Evacuations (ESFs #1 – Transportation and #5 – Emergency Management):** While primarily a State, tribal, and local responsibility, Federal support may be required as large-scale evacuations, organized or self-directed, may occur. There may also be a need for evacuation of large numbers of people out of the impacted area to safe areas in other States, requiring significant transportation and shelter coordination and resources. There is likely to be significant shortage of response and casualty/evacuee reception capabilities throughout the impacted area.

- **Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services (ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services):** The ability to support the provision of temporary shelter, food, emergency first aid, and other essential life support to people in the affected State may be complicated by contaminated resources or facilities and impact the ability to quickly transport resources into the area.

- **Search and Rescue (ESF #9 – Search and Rescue):** Resources and personnel to perform operational activities (e.g., locating, extricating, and providing onsite medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures) are limited. If search and rescue operations are required in areas of contamination, the limited availability of properly equipped resources supports or underscores the need for prompt Federal response.

- **Decontamination (ESFs #8 – Public Health and Medical Services and #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response):** Incidents involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) may require decontamination of casualties, evacuees, animals, equipment, buildings, critical infrastructure, and other areas. Given the potentially large numbers of casualties and evacuees, resulting decontamination requirements may quickly outstrip State, tribal, and local capabilities.

- **Public Health and Medical Support (ESF #8):** There is a significant need for public health and medical support, including mental health services. Medical support is required not only at medical facilities, but at casualty evacuation points, evacuee and refugee points and shelters, and other locations to support field operations. In addition, any contamination requirement increases the requirement for technical assistance/resources.

- **Medical Equipment and Supplies (ESF #8):** Shortages of available supplies of preventive and therapeutic pharmaceuticals and qualified medical personnel to administer available prophylaxis are likely. Timely distribution of prophylaxis may forestall additional illnesses, and reduce the impact of disease among those already exposed.

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- **Casualty and Fatality Management and Transportation (ESF #8):** Federal resources may be required to manage the transportation and storage of deceased, injured, and exposed victims if their numbers are extremely high. In addition, the immense numbers of casualties are likely to overwhelm the bed capacities of State, tribal, and local medical facilities.

- **Public Safety and Security (ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security):** Federal resources may be required to augment State, tribal, and local authorities to protect the public and secure the impacted area. Law enforcement and emergency management officials who normally respond to incidents may be among those affected and unable to perform their duties.

- **Public Information (ESF #15 – External Affairs):** When State, tribal, and local public communications channels are overwhelmed during a catastrophic incident, the Federal Government must immediately provide resources to assist in delivering clear and coherent public information guidance and consistent messages to the affected areas.

Planning Assumptions

A catastrophic incident may result in large numbers of casualties and/or displaced persons, possibly in the tens to hundreds of thousands. During an incident response, priority is given to human life-saving operations.

The nature and scope of a catastrophic incident may immediately overwhelm State, tribal, and local response capabilities and require immediate Federal support.

A detailed and credible common operating picture may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours (or longer) after the incident. As a result, response activities must begin without the benefit of a detailed or complete situation and critical needs assessment.

A catastrophic incident will trigger a Presidential disaster declaration, immediately or otherwise. The Secretary of Homeland Security or a designee implements the NRF-CIA/CIS.

The nature and scope of the catastrophic incident may include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive attacks, disease epidemics, cyber attacks, and major natural or manmade hazards.

A catastrophic incident has unique dimensions/characteristics requiring that response plans/strategies be flexible enough to effectively address emerging needs and requirements.

A catastrophic incident may occur with little or no warning. Some incidents, such as rapid disease outbreaks, may be well underway before detection.

Multiple incidents may occur simultaneously or sequentially in contiguous and/or noncontiguous areas. Some incidents, such as a biological WMD attack, may be dispersed over a large geographic area and lack a defined incident site.

A catastrophic incident may produce environmental impacts (e.g., persistent chemical, biological, or radiological contamination) that severely challenge the ability and capacity of governments and communities to achieve a timely recovery.

Federal support must be provided in a timely manner to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe damage. This may require mobilizing and deploying resources before they are requested via normal NRF protocols.

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Large-scale evacuations, organized or self-directed, may occur. More people initially are likely to flee and shelter outside of areas involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents than for natural events. The health related implications of these incidents may aggravate attempts to implement a coordinated evacuation management strategy.

Large numbers of people may be left temporarily or permanently homeless and may require prolonged temporary housing.

A catastrophic incident may have significant international dimensions. These include impacts on the health and welfare of border community populations, cross-border trade, transit, law enforcement coordination, and other areas.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

State, Tribal, and Local Response

State, tribal, and local response operations and responsibilities are covered in the NRF and the NRF-CIS. This annex addresses the proactive Federal response to be taken in anticipation of or following a catastrophic incident to rapidly provide critical resources to assist and augment State, tribal, and local response efforts.

Federal Response

In accordance with NRF provisions for a proactive Federal response to catastrophic incidents, the NRF-CIA employs an expedited approach to the provision of Federal resources to save lives and contain the incident.

Guiding principles for a proactive Federal catastrophic incident response include the following:

- The primary mission is to save lives, protect property and critical infrastructure, contain the event, and protect the national security.
- Standard procedures outlined in the NRF regarding requests for assistance may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances, temporarily suspended in the immediate aftermath of an incident of catastrophic magnitude, pursuant to existing law.
- Preidentified Federal response resources are mobilized and deployed, and, if required, begin emergency operations to commence life-safety activities.
- Notification and full coordination with States occur, but the coordination process should not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and deployment of critical Federal resources.
- Upon recognition that a catastrophic incident condition (e.g., involving mass casualties and/or mass evacuation) exists, the Secretary of Homeland Security immediately begins, potentially in advance of a formal Presidential disaster declaration, DHS implementation of the NRF-CIA. Upon notification from the National Operations Center (NOC) that the NRF-CIA has been implemented, Federal departments and agencies immediately:
    - Take actions to activate, mobilize, and deploy incident-specific resources in accordance with the NRF-CIS.
    - Take actions to protect life, property, and critical infrastructure under their jurisdiction, and provide assistance within the affected area.
    - Commence those hazard-specific activities established under the appropriate and applicable NRF Incident Annex(es), including the NRF-CIA.

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- Commence functional activities and responsibilities established under the NRF ESF Annexes.

NRF-CIA actions that the Federal Government takes in response to a catastrophic incident include:

- For no-notice or short-notice catastrophic events when there is little or no time to assess the requirements of the State, tribal, and local authorities, all Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross initiate actions to mobilize and deploy resources by scenario type as planned for in the NRF-CIS.

- For those potential catastrophic incidents where there is time to coordinate with State, tribal, local, and private-sector authorities, Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross will predeploy appropriately tailored elements of the NRF-CIS, as well as other Federal resources as required to meet the anticipated demands of the specific incident scenario.

All Federal departments and agencies and organizations (e.g., the American Red Cross) assigned primary or supporting ESF responsibilities immediately begin implementation of those responsibilities, as appropriate or when directed by the President.

Incident-specific resources and capabilities (e.g., medical teams, search and rescue teams, equipment, transportable shelters, preventive and therapeutic pharmaceutical caches, etc.) are activated and prepared for deployment to a Federal mobilization center or staging area near the incident site. The development of site-specific catastrophic incident response strategies (as detailed in the NRF-CIS) that include the preidentification of incident-specific critical resource requirements and corresponding deployment/employment strategies accelerate the timely provision of critically skilled resources and capabilities.

Regional Federal facilities (e.g., hospitals) are activated and prepared to receive and treat casualties from the incident area. Federal facilities are directed to reprioritize services (in some cases reducing or postponing certain customary services) until life-saving activities are concluded. The development of site-specific catastrophic incident response plans that include the preidentification of projected casualty and mass care support requirements and potentially available facilities expands the response architecture and accelerates the availability of such resources.

Supplementary support agreements with NGOs and the private sector are activated.

Given the projected high demand for Federal augmentation support, as well as the potential national security implications of a catastrophic incident, Federal departments and agencies may be asked to redirect efforts from their day-to-day responsibilities to support the response effort.

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RESPONSIBILITIES

This section summarizes Federal department and agency responsibilities under the NRF-CIA. For a complete listing of Federal department and agency responsibilities under the NRF-CIA, refer to the NRF-CIS, which is maintained as a separate document. For additional Federal department and agency responsibilities, refer to the individual ESF Annexes and hazard-specific Incident Annexes in the NRF.

Coordinating Agency: DHS

- Establishes that a catastrophic incident has occurred and implements the NRF-CIA.
- Notifies all Federal departments and agencies to implement the NRF-CIA and the NRF-CIS.
- Upon implementation of the NRF-CIA:
  - Activates and deploys (or prepares to deploy) DHS-managed teams, equipment caches, and other resources in accordance with the NRF-CIS.
  - Identifies, prepares, and operationalizes facilities critical to supporting the movement and reception of deploying Federal resources.
  - Activates national-level facilities and capabilities in accordance with the NRF-CIS and standard NRF protocols.
  - Establishes and maintains communications with incident command authorities to ensure a common and current operating picture regarding critical resource requirements. As specific resource requirements are identified, advises DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency to reprioritize and adjust accordingly the schedule of execution for resource flow in the NRF-CIS.
  - Makes every attempt to establish contact with the impacted State(s) to coordinate the employment of Federal resources in support of the State(s).

Cooperating Agencies

When notified by the NOC that the Secretary of Homeland Security has implemented the NRF-CIA, Federal departments and agencies (and the American Red Cross):

- Activate and deploy (or prepare to deploy) agency- or ESF-managed teams, equipment caches, and other resources in accordance with the NRF-CIS.
- Commence ESF responsibilities as appropriate.
- Commence assessments of the probable consequences of the incident and projected resource requirements.
- Commence development of shorter and longer term response and recovery strategies.

The NRF-CIS provides a list of the specific actions that are initiated upon activation of the NRF-CIA. The following Federal departments and agencies and other organizations are assigned specific responsibilities as cooperating agencies:

- Department of Agriculture
- Department of Defense
- Department of Energy
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of Transportation
- Department of Veterans Affairs
- Environmental Protection Agency

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Departments and agencies assigned primary responsibility for one or more functional response areas under the NRF-CIS appendixes are identified below.

- **Mass Care:** American Red Cross and Federal Emergency Management Agency
- **Search and Rescue:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Decontamination:** Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Protection Agency (critical infrastructure and the environment), and Department of Health and Human Services (patients, victims, casualties)
- **Public Health and Medical Support:** Department of Health and Human Services
- **Medical Equipment and Supplies:** Department of Health and Human Services
- **Patient Movement:** Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Defense
- **Mass Fatality:** Department of Health and Human Services
- **Housing:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Public and Incident Communications:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Transportation:** Department of Homeland Security and Department of Transportation
- **Private-Sector Support:** Department of Homeland Security
- **Logistics:** Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Defense (DOD) is the only Federal agency that supports all ESFs. To that end, DOD is prepared to provide capabilities in the following support categories: aviation, communication, defense coordinating officer/defense coordinating element, medical treatment, and patient evacuation, decontamination, and logistics.

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Coordinating Agency:

Department of Homeland Security/National Protection and Programs/Cyber Security and Communications/National Cyber Security Division

Cooperating Agencies:

Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Justice
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Office of Management and Budget

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of the Cyber Incident Annex is to outline the policies, organization, actions, and responsibilities for a coordinated, broad-based approach to incidents requiring coordinated Federal response that are induced by cyber means or have cyber effects. A physical attack on cyber infrastructure is covered by ESF #2 – Communications.

Scope

This annex describes the framework for Federal Cyber Incident response coordination among Federal departments, agencies, and upon request, State, local, tribal, and private-sector entities. The Cyber Incident Annex is built primarily upon the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The national cyberspace response system is a public-private architecture that provides mechanisms for rapid identification, information exchange, response, and remediation in order to mitigate the damage caused by malicious cyberspace activity.

This annex focuses on responding to and recovering from cyber incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response (hereafter referred to as a “Cyber Incident”) that impact mission-critical functions and/or threaten public health or safety, undermine public confidence, have a debilitating effect on the national economy, or diminish the security posture of the Nation. A cyber incident is induced directly through cyber means with cyber or physical results that:

- Cause, or are likely to cause, harm to mission-critical functions and services across the public and private sectors by impairing the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of electronic information, information systems, services, or networks; and/or

- Threaten public health or safety, undermine public confidence, have a negative effect on the national economy, or diminish the security posture of the Nation.

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Such an incident would likely affect communications and/or computing services in at least one and possibly several metropolitan areas and/or States. It would involve multiple communications service providers and/or IT products and applications, resulting in a significant degradation of the ability of other essential infrastructures to function. Such an outage would have an impact on the availability and integrity of communication and computing services for at least a significant portion of a business day or longer.

This annex describes the specialized application of the National Response Framework to a Cyber Incident. When a Cyber Incident occurs it could impact multiple infrastructure sectors or be targeted at a specific sector such as finance, energy, or communications. A Cyber Incident may result in the activation of all Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes under the National Response Framework, as appropriate. The National Communications System (NCS), as the primary agency for ESF #2, works closely with the Department of Homeland Security/National Cyber Security Division (DHS/NCSD) to coordinate ESF #2 during Cyber Incidents.

Policies

This annex:

- Supports the mission and construct of the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C).
- Involves the private sector as described in HSPD-7.
- Refers to the National Response Framework's International Coordination Support Annex for international support activities relating to a Cyber Incident.
- Refers to the National Response Framework's Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) Support Annex for coordination across multiple CI/KR sectors.
- Is implemented within the structure and operating principles of the National Response Framework and pursuant to the following authorities:
  - The enhancement of Non-Federal Cyber Security, the Homeland Security Act (Section 223, Public Law 107-276)
  - HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents
  - HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
  - The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
  - Executive Order 12472: The Assignment of National Security Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities for Telecommunications
  - Section 706, the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. 606)
  - The Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended
  - The National Security Act of 1947, as amended
  - National Security Directive 42: National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems
  - The National Strategy To Secure Cyberspace
  - The NIPP
  - Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638)
  - Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Act 108-177)

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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

General

A Cyber Incident may overwhelm government and/or private-sector resources by disrupting the Internet and/or taxing critical infrastructure information systems. Complications from a Cyber Incident may threaten public health or safety, undermine public confidence, have a debilitating effect on the national economy, or diminish the security posture of the nation. Rapid identification, information exchange, investigation, and coordinated response and remediation often can mitigate the damage that could be caused by this type of incident.

As the focal point for the public and private sectors regarding cyber security issues[1], DHS/NCSD is responsible for the public-private coordination in response to a Cyber Incident, which includes:

- Coordinating national-level cyber response and recovery efforts.
- Providing alerts and notification of potential cyber threats, incidents, and attacks.
- Sharing information both inside the government and with the private sector, including best practices, incident response, and incident mitigation.
- Analyzing cyber vulnerabilities, exploits, and attack methods.
- Providing technical assistance.
- Defending against the attack.

These activities are the product of, and require, a concerted effort by Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, as well as nongovernmental entities, such as the private sector and academia. In order to support the objectives of this annex, ESF #2 may be activated to assist in providing an operational response structure, fiduciary mechanisms, and reporting capabilities to effectively respond to a Cyber Incident.

Additionally, it is essential that the Federal Government coordinate closely with the appropriate entities to ensure the most effective response to a Cyber Incident. DHS/NCSD's Private Sector Concept of Operations (ConOps) identifies the mechanisms necessary for coordinating actions between private-sector partners and the NCSD, United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), and National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) during a Cyber Incident.

ORGANIZATION

The following organizations play a role in responding to Cyber Incidents:

- **National Cyber Security Division (NCSD):** The NCSD is part of the Office of CS&C and serves as the national focal point for working collaboratively with public, private, and international entities regarding cyber security issues[2]. DHS/NCSD has two overarching objectives: (1) to build and maintain an effective national cyber response system, and (2) to implement a cyber risk management program for the protection of critical infrastructure. DHS/NCSD is responsible for identifying, analyzing, and reducing cyber risks and

[1] "Cyber security issues" refers to the technical aspects of cyber security, to include alert and warning. The Department of Justice is the focal point for law enforcement's response to cyber security issues.
[2] See footnote 1.

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vulnerabilities; disseminating threat warning information; coordinating incident response; and providing technical assistance in continuity of operations and recovery planning. DHS/NCSD will support the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other law enforcement agencies in their continuing missions to investigate and prosecute threats to and attacks against cyberspace, to the extent permitted by law.

- **The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT):** US-CERT, an operational component of DHS/NCSD, coordinates pertinent warnings among Federal departments and agencies. US-CERT also maintains a 24/7 operations center with connectivity to all major Federal cyber operations centers and private-sector Internet service providers, information-sharing mechanisms, and vendors. In addition, US-CERT, in concert with the National Operations Center (NOC), acts as a nexus for collecting and disseminating information received from public and private-sector sources to the appropriate audiences. Through the duration of a Cyber Incident, US-CERT provides technical and operational support to the NCRCG, and interacts with the private and public sectors on a continual basis.

- **National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG):** The NCRCG is the principal interagency body in which Federal organizations responsible for a wide range of activities, including technical response and short-term recovery, law enforcement, intelligence, and defensive measures, coordinate for the purposes of executing an efficient and effective response to cyber incidents and threats. In the event of a Cyber Incident, the NCRCG is convened to harmonize operational efforts and facilitate information sharing.

  The NCRCG performs the following functions:

  - Provides input to member agency and department heads and the NOC on cyber security issues, incidents, and threats.
  - Provides strategic situational awareness and decisionmaking support pertaining to Cyber Incidents.
  - Coordinates recommendations for key interagency leadership to include the DRG, and other appropriate officials.
  - Facilitates interagency decisionmaking pertaining to the response, including the allocation of Federal cyber-related resources.
  - Supports the Executive Office of the President, as necessary.

  During an actual or potential Cyber Incident, the NCRCG coordinates with the NOC in disseminating critical information to and from government and nongovernment sources, including the private-sector partners, academia, and the general public. The NCRCG leverages existing resources of US-CERT in this coordination and outreach activity. DHS/NCSD serves as the Executive Agent for the NCRCG.

- **Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT):** The IMPT, as part of the NOC planning element, supports the development of strategic guidance, concepts and plan development, and plan refinement leading to the publication of a series of plans for actual or potential domestic incidents.

- **Domestic Readiness Group (DRG):** In the event other interagency organizations, such as the IMPT and/or the NCRCG, are unable to reach a consensus on a recommendation/decision, the DRG is convened to finalize the recommendation/decision.

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- **Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI):** The ODNI operates the Intelligence Community – Incident Response Center (IC-IRC), a 24/7 operation that facilitates the sharing of cyber event information among IC members in order to protect the IC's ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence via its networks. The IC-IRC is the single focal point for requesting assistance from the IC in conjunction with a Cyber Incident, and as such is responsible for coordinating with other incident response organizations including US-CERT and the NOC, in order to best leverage the authorities and capabilities of the IC in responding to Cyber Incidents.

- **Department of Defense (DOD):** DOD entities responsible for computer security and computer network defense may exercise those duties in support of the national response effort in four primary roles: 1) Defense Support of Civil Authorities; 2) intelligence and information sharing; 3) law enforcement investigations; and 4) military operations to defend the homeland. DOD capabilities include Intelligence components (the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Organization, and military intelligence components), Defense criminal investigative organizations (law enforcement and counterintelligence), Network Operation Security Centers, and Computer Emergency Response Teams. These entities, in cooperation with other Federal entities, as appropriate, provide attack sensing and warning capabilities, gather and analyze information to characterize the attack and to gain attribution of the cyber threat, participate in information sharing, offer mitigation techniques, perform network intrusion diagnosis, and provide technical expertise. DOD capabilities also include military operational units, which defend the DOD global information grid. DOD can take action to deter or defend against cyber attacks which pose an imminent threat to national security, as authorized by applicable law and policy. The NSA/Central Security Service Threat Operations Center (NTOC) Ops Floor enhances NSA's ability to help defend the Nation's critical networks by providing the means for synchronization across multiple organizations involved with detecting and responding to cyber threats. The floor provides a collaborative space for members of the IC, DOD, law enforcement, and DHS to coordinate, control, and focus sensors and activities across networks of interest. Additionally, it offers an environment where all organizations can fuse information and analytic results to characterize, attribute, deconflict, and respond to cyber threats and attacks.

- **Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ/FBI):** DOJ/FBI, working with other law enforcement agencies, lead the national effort to investigate and prosecute cybercrime. The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the Federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States. DOJ, in cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect national security, also coordinates the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States. DOJ, working with other law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community, uses its authorities to attribute the source of a cyber attack. Among other things, DOJ works with the private sector in regard to the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of cybercrime. DOJ coordinates with DHS to provide domestic investigative information relevant to DHS analysis of the vulnerability of the cyber infrastructure to terrorist attack or to DHS analysis of terrorist threats against the cyber infrastructure.

- **Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Secret Service (DHS/USSS):** DHS/USSS works with DOJ/FBI and other law enforcement agencies in helping to lead the national effort to investigate and prosecute cybercrime. DHS/USSS coordinates with DOJ to assist in providing domestic investigative information used in DHS analysis of the vulnerability of the cyber infrastructure to terrorist attacks.

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- **Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs):** The sector-specific ISACs (i.e., Information Technology ISAC, Communications ISAC, Financial Services ISAC, etc.) are trusted communities of security specialists from companies within the various industries. The ISACs and their members identify, analyze, and share information, identify and collaborate on vulnerabilities, and share best practices to protect their respective industries from cyber and physical threats.

- **Joint Telecommunications Resource Board (JTRB):** The JTRB is an interagency coordination group chaired by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and staffed by senior Federal officials to assist in the exercise of assigned non-wartime emergency telecommunications functions. The JTRB may be convened for major disasters, major failures or disruptions, abnormal telecommunications patterns or congestion, known or suspected sabotage, service curtailment on Government networks, national level emergencies or at the direction of the Director. The JTRB resolves conflicts regarding National Security/Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) communications priorities and resources that cannot be resolved at lower levels.

ACTIONS

Preincident

Federal departments and agencies maintain computer incident response capabilities for daily situational awareness that can rapidly respond to cyber incidents on their networks, including events of prolonged duration. The NCSD and US-CERT can assemble the resources provided by law enforcement, the IC, DOD, and private-sector entities (e.g., ISACs) that also maintain mechanisms to improve the Nation's readiness capabilities in addressing Cyber Incidents. For example, DOJ has a network of prosecutors trained in handling cyber crime. DOJ/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS/U.S. Secret Service (USSS) also have agents that specialize in high-tech investigations. Law enforcement's international cyber crime network enables investigators to rapidly obtain electronic data and evidence from foreign countries.

Notification and Activation Procedures

The activities described in this section of the Cyber Incident Annex are implemented when a Cyber Incident is suspected, imminent, or already underway.

The NCRCG receives information about cyber threats through a variety of communications channels that exist between the Federal Government, nongovernmental entities, and the public. When it is believed that a Cyber Incident is suspected, imminent, or already underway, the NCRCG is convened and notifies the NOC and private-sector organizations, as appropriate.

The following communication channels are used for notification and activation:

- **The National Cyber Alert System:** This system provides an infrastructure, managed by US-CERT, for relaying timely and actionable computer security updates and warning information to all users.

- **National Operations Center:** This is the primary national-level hub for domestic incident management communications and operations.

- **DOD Global NetOps Center:** This is the primary DOD command center for directing operations and defense of the DOD Global Information Grid and coordinating with the US-CERT.

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- **Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) Critical Sector (CS):** This communications network provides States and critical infrastructure owners and operators with real-time interactive connectivity to the NOC on a Sensitive-but-Unclassified (SBU) level to all users. HSIN-CS is the NOC's primary suite of tools for information sharing, coordination, planning, mitigation, and response.

- **HSIN/US-CERT Portal:** This secure collaboration tool enables private and public sectors to actively share information about cyber security vulnerabilities, exploits, and incidents in a trusted and secure environment among members.

- **US-CERT Public Web Site:** www.uscert.gov provides the primary means for US-CERT to convey information to the public at large. The site includes relevant information on cyber security issues, cyber activity, and vulnerability resources.

- **Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CWIN):** This network provides out-of-band (e.g., not dependent on the Internet or public switched network) connectivity to government and industry participants. The network is engineered to provide a reliable and survivable network capability.

- **ISACs:** Through secure websites and secure e-mail, information on infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities is provided to the members.

Initial Actions

US-CERT tracks potential cyber incidents and, depending on severity level (severity levels 3 through 5), reports them to the NCRCG. US-CERT notifies the NOC of cyber-related incidents. The NCRCG, in coordination with the IMPT/DRG, makes recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

US-CERT uses a standardized, repeatable, and reliable method to assess the criticality or severity of a new or emerging cyber security event. The initial step after gathering information is to assess its "severity" using a scale from 1 to 5. The Cyber Federal severity ratings are as follows:

Severity	Rating	Description
Minimal	1	Poses negligible impact on the Federal Government
Low	2	Poses very low impact on the Federal Government
Medium	3	Poses a potential impact on the Federal Government
High	4	Has impacted the Federal Government
Crisis	5	Has had a severe impact on the operational capacity of the Federal Government

In addition to the Cyber Federal severity ratings, US-CERT receives incident reports and assessments from the private sector to develop recommendations on cyber severity ratings.

When a Cyber Incident occurs, DHS/NCSD and NCS, through the NCRCG, coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, DHS/NCSD provides subject-matter expertise and support to the JTRB when necessary.

In addition to participating in the NCRCG, some government agencies work individually under their own authorities to fulfill their Cyber Incident response missions. Particularly, law enforcement and the IC work to identify and deter those responsible for Cyber Incidents and attacks.

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DHS coordinates technical and other assistance with other Federal agencies and, upon request, for the State, tribal, and local governments and the private sector in response to a Cyber Incident.

Challenges and Considerations

The response to and recovery from a Cyber Incident must take into account existing challenges to the management of cyber incidents. In addition, entities involved in response and recovery efforts must consider the resulting effects that cyber and physical events have on one another. Such consideration allows resources to be appropriately channeled into resolving the identified challenges. Identifiable challenges include:

- **Management of Multiple Cyber Events:** The occurrence or threat of multiple Cyber Incidents may significantly hamper the ability of responders to manage these Cyber Incidents simultaneously. Strategic planning and exercises should be conducted to assist in addressing this problem and to identify potential solutions.

- **Availability and Security of Communications:** A debilitating infrastructure attack could impede communications needed for coordinating response and recovery efforts. A secure, reliable communications system is needed to enable public- and private-sector entities to coordinate efforts in the event that routine communications channels are inoperable.

- **Availability of Expertise and Surge Capacity:** Federal agencies must ensure that sufficient technical expertise is developed and maintained within the Government to address the wide range of ongoing cyber attacks and vulnerabilities. In addition, the ability to surge technical and analytical capabilities in response to Cyber Incidents that may occur over a prolonged period must be planned for, exercised, and maintained.

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Coordinating Agencies:

Department of Agriculture
Department of Health and Human Services

Cooperating Agencies:

Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of Veterans Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency
General Services Administration
U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Postal Service
American Red Cross

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The Food and Agriculture Incident Annex describes the roles and responsibilities associated with all incidents that require a coordinated Federal response involving the Nation's agriculture and food systems.

Scope

The protocols outlined in the annex apply to all actual or potential incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response. Actions described in this annex may take place with or without a Presidential Stafford Act declaration or a public health emergency declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services or an emergency declaration by the Secretary of Agriculture.

The objectives of a coordinated Federal response to an incident impacting food and agriculture are to:

- Detect the event through the reporting of illness, disease/pest surveillance, routine testing, consumer complaints and/or environmental monitoring.
- Determine the primary coordinating agency.
- Determine the source of the incident or outbreak.
- Control and contain the distribution of the affected source.
- Identify and protect the population at risk.
- Assess public health, food, agriculture, and law enforcement implications.
- Assess the extent of residual biological, chemical, or radiological contamination, then decontaminate and dispose as necessary.

A food and agriculture incident may threaten public health, animal nutrition, food production, aquaculture, livestock production, wildlife, soils, rangelands, and agricultural water supplies. Responding to the unique attributes of this type of incident requires separate planning considerations that are tailored to specific health and agriculture concerns and effects of the disease (e.g., deliberate contamination versus natural outbreaks, plant and animal versus processed food, etc.). Specific operational guidelines, developed by organizations with responsibility for the unique aspects of a particular disease or planning consideration, will supplement this annex and are intended as guidance to assist Federal, State, tribal, and local public health and agriculture authorities.

Special Considerations

Detection of an intentional or unintentional contamination/adulteration of food, animals, plants, or a pest outbreak may occur in several different ways and involve several different modalities:

A terrorist attack on food or agriculture may initially be indistinguishable from a naturally occurring event; moreover, depending upon the particular agent and associated symptoms, several days could pass before public health, food, agriculture and medical authorities even suspect that terrorism may be the cause. In such a case, criminal intent may not be apparent until some time after illnesses are recognized.

A devastating attack or the threat of an attack on the domestic animal population and plant crops through use of highly infective exotic diseases or pest infestation could result in severe economic loss. Early detection, allowing for early intervention, would come from agriculture expert authority reports as well as unusual patterns in surveillance systems.

A food or agricultural incident may involve international trade.

Policies

This annex supports policies and procedures outlined in the National Response Framework, the Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 – Public Health and Medical Services Annex; the ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex; the ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex; the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex; and the Federal Food and Agriculture Decontamination and Disposal Roles and Responsibilities document.

If an agency becomes aware of an overt threat involving biological, chemical, or radiological agents or indications that instances of disease may not be the result of natural causes, the Department of Justice (DOJ) must be notified through the DOJ/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit. The FBI, in turn, immediately notifies the National Operations Center (NOC) and the National Counterterrorism Center.

The Department of Agriculture (USDA) or the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), acting under their own authorities, will serve as the primary coordinating agency. For food and agricultural incidents that do not require Department of Homeland Security (DHS) management, USDA and/or HHS will be supported by other Federal agencies as appropriate. For incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response that have a food or agriculture component, USDA and HHS will perform the roles described in this annex in coordination with DHS and State partners. USDA and/or HHS will function as senior Federal officials within the Unified Coordination Group during a food or agriculture incident when the incident requires the appointment of a Principal Federal Official and/or a Federal Coordinating Officer.

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Participating Federal agencies may take appropriate independent emergency actions within the limits of their own statutory authority to protect the public, mitigate immediate hazards, and collect information concerning the emergency. This may require deploying assets before they are requested via normal National Response Framework protocols.

State, tribal, and local governments are primarily responsible for detecting and responding to food and agriculture incidents and implementing measures to minimize the health and economic consequences of such an incident or outbreak.

Planning Assumptions

The first evidence of dissemination of an agent may be the presentation of disease in humans, animals, or plants. This could manifest either in clinical case reports to domestic or international public health or agriculture authorities or in unusual patterns of symptoms or encounters within domestic or international human and animal health and crop production surveillance systems.

Food and agriculture surveillance systems may detect the presence of a radiological, chemical, or biological agent and trigger directed environmental sampling and intensified human and animal surveillance to rule out or confirm a case. If a case is confirmed, then these systems may allow for mobilization of a public health, medical, and law enforcement response in advance of the appearance of the first human and/or animal cases, or quick response after the first human and/or animal cases are identified.

A food and agriculture incident may be distributed across multiple jurisdictions simultaneously. Response to this incident could require the simultaneous management of multiple “incident sites” from national and regional headquarters locations in coordination with multiple State and local jurisdictions.

An act of food tampering or agro-terrorism, particularly an act directed against large sectors of the industry within the United States, will have major consequences that can overwhelm the capabilities of many State, tribal, and local governments to respond and may seriously challenge existing Federal response capabilities.

A food or agriculture incident may include biological, chemical, or radiological contaminants, which may require concurrent implementation of other Federal plans and procedures.

Food and agriculture incidents may not be immediately recognized as such until the biological, chemical, or radiological agent is detected or the effects of exposure on the public, animals, or plants are reported to appropriate authorities.

No single entity possesses the authority, expertise, and resources to act unilaterally on the many complex issues that may arise in response to a food or agricultural incident.

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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

General

The primary functions of the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex are to:

- Support effective and coordinated communication between Federal, State, and local responders to a potential or actual incident that require a coordinated Federal response impacting food and agriculture.
- Minimize public health and economic impacts of a food and agriculture-related incident.
- Provide transition from response to rapid recovery following a food and agriculture-related incident.

The key elements for an effective response to a food or agriculture incident include the following:

- Rapid identification, detection, and confirmation of the incident.
- Implementation of an integrated response to a food attack/adulteration, highly contagious animal/zoonotic, or exotic plant disease or plant pest infestation.
- Identification of the human and animal population, and/or plants at risk.
- Determination of how the agent involved was transmitted, including an assessment of the efficiency of transmission.
- Determination of the public health and economic implications.
- Control, containment, decontamination, and disposal.
- Protection of the population(s) and/or plants at risk through appropriate measures.
- Dissemination of information to advise the public of the incident.
- Communication with all relevant stakeholders.
- Assessment of environmental contamination and extent of cleanup, decontamination, and disposal of livestock carcasses, plants, or food products involved.
- Identification of the law enforcement implications/assessment of the threat.

Primary Federal functions include supporting State, tribal, and local public health, food, and agriculture entities according to the policies and procedures detailed in the National Response Framework.

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Incident Detection and Identification

Determination of Incident

State, tribal, or local authorities may be among the first to recognize the initial indication of intentional or naturally occurring contamination of food, of highly infective plant or animal disease, or of an economically devastating plant pest infestation or animal disease. Recognition may come from a significantly increased number of people reporting ill to public health care providers, increased reporting of sick animals to veterinarians or animal health officials, or numerous plant anomalies reported by State officials or the public. Other sources may include routine laboratory surveillance, inspection reports, consumer complaint systems, and hotlines. Therefore, the most critical decisionmaking support requires surveillance information, identification of the cause of the incident, a determination of whether the incident is intentional or naturally occurring, and the identification of the human or animal population and/or plants at risk.

Laboratory Testing

Identification and confirmation of contaminated food or the environment, highly infective animals and plants, or an economically devastating plant pest infestation may occur through routine surveillance and laboratory testing.

The DHS Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) assures that the U.S. homeland security infrastructure has a coordinated and operational system of laboratory networks that provide timely, high-quality, and interpretable results for early detection and effective consequence management of acts of terrorism and other events requiring an integrated laboratory response. The ICLN provides an interagency organizational structure for the Nation's advanced-capacity laboratories to detect, respond to, and recover from incidents involving human health, animal health, food, agriculture, and plants. The collective national laboratory testing capacity of the ICLN derives from utilization of established laboratory networks such as the Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), the National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN), and additional laboratory networks within the Federal agencies with responsibilities and authorities for laboratory preparedness and response.

Notification

A potential or actual incident requiring a coordinated Federal response involving contaminated food, infected animals or plants, or economically devastating plant pest infestation shall be brought to the immediate attention of the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. USDA and HHS then notify the Secretary of Homeland Security through the NOC. The Secretary of Health and Human Services then notifies the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness. This incident shall also be brought to the attention of designated officials according to the ESF #8 Annex and ESF #11 Annex, as well as departmental policies. If terrorist or other criminal activity is suspected in connection with the incident, procedures outlined in the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex will be followed.

A potential or actual incident requiring a coordinated Federal response involving food, animals, or plants shall be brought to the immediate attention of the appropriate industry segments by regulatory officials (HHS, USDA, or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)).

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International Notification

Once a positive determination is made that an identified contaminated/adulterated food or agricultural product has crossed the U.S. border, HHS and/or USDA notifies the Department of State and other international agencies as appropriate.

Activation

Once notified of a credible threat of contamination/adulteration or a natural or intentional disease outbreak in humans, plants, or animals, HHS and USDA coordinates with Federal, State, tribal, and local authorities and key industry entities to determine the extent to which resources are needed and can be provided. HHS and USDA will coordinate with ESF #8 and ESF #11 partners to assess the situation and determine appropriate public health, food, and agriculture actions. Some or all of the ensuing actions may include:

- Targeted epidemiologic investigation.
- Increased surveillance for patients and animals with certain clinical signs and symptoms.
- Increased surveillance of plants for signs of disease or other pest infestation.
- Targeted inspection of human food and animal feed manufacturing, distributing, retail, and other facilities, as appropriate.
- Increased inspection of plants and animals for contamination.

ACTIONS

The following steps are required to contain and control a food or agricultural incident:

- HHS and USDA will assist State, local, and tribal authorities:
  - Ensure the safety and security of the food and agricultural infrastructure in the affected area, as needed.
  - Inspect food facilities that can continue to operate in the affected area, as needed.
  - Conduct laboratory tests to identify contaminated food, animals, or plants.
  - Conduct product traceback and trace forward investigations of identified food, animals, or plants.
  - Embargo, detain, seize, recall, or condemn affected food, animals, or plants.
- EPA will approve, as appropriate, requests from Federal and State authorities and industry for the use of pesticides to decontaminate plants, animal facilities, and food facilities from biological contaminants.
- HHS, USDA, and EPA will:
  - Provide technical assistance and guidance to State, tribal, and local authorities who are coordinating food facility cleaning and decontamination, depending on the nature of the contaminating agent.
  - Provide technical assistance and guidance to State, tribal, and local authorities who are coordinating the disposal of contaminated food, animal carcasses, or plants.
  - Coordinate with Federal, State, tribal, and local authorities as well as the food and agriculture industry during the investigation, response, decontamination, disposal and recovery efforts.

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- Coordinate with DHS, State, tribal, local, and other Federal agencies and ESF #15 – External Affairs, if activated, on public messaging to ensure that communications are consistent and accurate.

RESPONSIBILITIES

This section summarizes Federal coordinating agency responsibilities in response to a potential or actual incident requiring a coordinated Federal response that involves contaminated food or infected animals or plants. The procedures in this annex are built on the core coordinating structures of the National Response Framework. The specific responsibilities of each department and agency are described in greater detail in the respective ESFs.

Coordinating Agencies

Department of Health and Human Services

HHS provides leadership by ensuring the safety and security of food, animal feed, food-producing animals, and animal therapeutics. HHS, through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and in coordination with the States, develops and implements surveillance systems to monitor the health of the human population. (Note: HHS, through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), has statutory authority for all domestic and imported food except meat, poultry, and egg products, which are under the authority of the USDA/Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). FDA also has statutory authority for animal feed and for the approval of animal drugs intended for both therapeutic and nontherapeutic use in food animals as well as companion animals.)

Department of Agriculture

USDA provides leadership by assuring the safety and security of processed meat, poultry and egg products through the FSIS; coordinating animal and plant disease and pest response through the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS); and providing nutritional assistance through the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). (Note: USDA, through FSIS, has statutory authority for meat, poultry, and egg products.)

Additional roles and responsibilities of cooperating agencies are provided in Table 1 on the following page.

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Table 1. Agency Roles and Responsibilities Matrix

Function	ARC	DHS	DOC	DOD	DOE	DOI	DOJ	DOL	DOS	DOT	EPA	GSA	HHS	USAID	USDA	USPS	VA
Coordination		■											■		■		
National Defense and Security				■													
Rapid ID of Agent		■											■		■		
Laboratory Confirmation					■								■		■		
Outbreak Transmission Information						■							■		■		
Control and Contain Outbreak													■		■		
Decontamination and Disposal											■		■		■		
Food Safety and Food Defense													■		■		
Public Health													■		■		
Public Information													■		■		
Law Enforcement Issues		■					■						■		■		
Economic/ Market Issues			■					■	■						■		
Support Services (Feeding, Facilities, Counseling, Transport)	■			■	■					■			■		■	■	■
International Coordination									■					■			

*Additional information may be found in ESFs #8 and #11.

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Coordinating Agencies:

Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency

Cooperating Agencies:

Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Justice
Department of Transportation
Department of Veterans Affairs
General Services Administration
American Red Cross
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
Corporation for National and Community Service

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The Mass Evacuation Incident Annex provides an overview of evacuation functions and agency roles and responsibilities, and provides overall guidelines to enable evacuation of large numbers of people in incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response. This annex also describes the integration of Federal, State, tribal, and local mass evacuation support.

Scope

This annex:

- Identifies the agencies and organizations involved in a federally supported mass evacuation operation.
- Defines the roles and responsibilities of Federal entities in planning, preparing for, and conducting mass evacuations in support of State, tribal, and local authorities.
- Establishes the criteria under which Federal support to mass evacuations is provided.
- Provides a concept of operations for Federal mass evacuation support.
- Identifies guidelines to improve coordination among Federal, State, tribal, and local authorities when Federal evacuation support is required.

Authorities

- Homeland Security Act of 2002
- Stafford Act
- Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic Incidents
- Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
- Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006
- Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)

Policies

The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 authorizes the use of Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) or Homeland Security Grant Program funds for States to develop catastrophic mass evacuation plans. The Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA) should primarily augment State, tribal, and local government plans and operations and secondarily be capable of implementing a federalized evacuation when requested or required.

According to the Americans With Disabilities Act, service animals are extensions of their owners and have the same access to public transportation as their owners at all times.

DHS/FEMA recognizes and commits to a government-to-government relationship with American Indian and Alaska Native tribal governments.

Planning Assumptions

Federal evacuation measures will be taken:

- When State, tribal, or local authorities indicate that their resources may or have become overwhelmed and the Governor(s) or tribal official(s) request Federal assistance; or

- In catastrophic incidents when State and local governments are incapacitated, and the President directs that Federal mass evacuation support is required.

State authorities in affected areas, in conjunction with authorities in other States, will decide on the destinations for evacuees, and will regulate the flow of transportation assets accordingly.

State, tribal, and local authorities recognize there is a substantial need to coordinate with Federal support agencies on population movement to avoid loss of life.

Federal resource requirements for a precautionary evacuation are based on the expected magnitude of the event and request of the Governor(s) of the potentially impacted State(s).

Federal agencies, working with State, tribal, and tribal, and local authorities, ensure the Governor(s) of State(s) receiving evacuees from an impacted area agree to accept these individuals prior to evacuation.

Federal assistance is supplied in conjunction with a State- or locally mandated mass evacuation.

Federal agencies coordinate with State, tribal, and tribal, and local authorities to ensure synchronization between Federal actions and State, tribal, and local emergency evacuation plans and requirements.

State policies and guidelines governing companion animal evacuations are utilized when incorporating companion animal issues into evacuations. State, tribal, and local planners are aware that individuals may choose not to evacuate if forced to leave their animals behind.

Residents of the evacuated area will need to return to the area postevent.

The incident may cause significant disruption of the area's critical transportation infrastructure, hampering evacuation operations.

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Key Considerations

- **Lead Time Required To Conduct Mass Evacuations:** It may be necessary to activate plans as much as 48 hours prior to the time an evacuation is likely to be ordered. Resources may need to be mobilized as much as 24 hours prior to the start of evacuations to have sufficient capacity in place once the evacuation order is given.

- **Limits in Weather Forecasting:** The variables in forecasting track, intensity, and forward speed of tropical weather systems (the most likely and frequent reason for evacuations) make it extremely difficult for decisionmakers to commit costly resources as much as 5 days before the onset of tropical storm-force winds. In some cases, storms at this stage are not sufficiently well formed to require evacuation.

- **Interdependencies Between Shelters and Transportation:** The transportation solution to a mass evacuation is based on the numbers of people needing evacuation, the time available to conduct operations, and the distance to (and availability of) shelters. If shelters are located too far from embarkation points, transportation assets (buses, trains, and aircraft) cannot be recycled and may only make one trip during the operation. Because of this, the distance traveled can reduce capacity to evacuate exponentially. It is critical to identify and predesignate general population shelters as close to the embarkation points as safely possible. The designation and distance to companion animal shelters is equally important to the success of an evacuation.

- **Special Needs Populations:** Consideration must be given to the special needs of the citizens of the affected area. These needs may include medical requirements, special language assistance, accommodations for physical disabilities, or the supply of transportation.

- **Animals:** The requirements for transporting and arranging for shelter and care of animals when they need to be relocated from their homes are of significant importance. There are special evacuation requirements for each category of animals within the National Response Framework:

  - **Service Animals:** Under the ADA regulations, service animals have access to the same facilities as the humans they serve.

  - **Companion Animals:** Planning for and accommodating companion animals as a component of mass evacuations is critical. History has proven that many residents will refuse to evacuate or resist rescue if they are forced to leave their companion animals behind. Therefore, without advance planning, the tracking, embarkation, transportation, care, feeding, and sheltering of companion animals can significantly impact the ability to safely evacuate the general population.

    Through its contracts with bus and air carriers, DHS/FEMA will evacuate companion animals in carriers that are sufficiently small to place underneath a bus, train, or airplane seat when accompanying their owner/keeper, consistent with Federal laws and with the terms and conditions of the relevant transportation contracts.

    DHS/FEMA, in coordination with State, tribal, and local governments, will assist in identifying and providing locations to which companion animals may be evacuated; providing logistical support for the care, immunization, and quarantine of companion animals; providing specifications for vehicles that can be used to evacuate companion animals; and coordinating with private industry for companion animal evacuations.

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Emergency Support Function (ESF) #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services will encourage State, tribal, and local entities to plan for the collocation of pet shelters near general populations when possible during Federal evacuations to receiving cities/States. ESF #6 will provide coordination of animal owner identification, tracking, reunification, and social support. ESF #6 will also coordinate pet issues related to their evacuation, care, and sheltering who will coordinate with the appropriate government and nongovernment support agencies.

ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services will provide emergency veterinary care for sheltered and rescued animals, epidemiological monitoring and reporting of emergency-related animal health issues, and management of human bite/injury cases.

ESF #15 – External Affairs will work with State, tribal, and local authorities to ensure that animal evacuation and response instructions and status updates are communicated appropriately and in a timely manner.

- **Livestock, Captive Animals (Zoological/Laboratory), and Wildlife Agricultural Animals:** See ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources.

- **Contamination:** Neighboring States/jurisdictions may resist accepting evacuees/patients that are contaminated or infectious.

- **Events With and Without Warning:** The Concept of Operations applies to events for which there are warnings (e.g., hurricanes, flooding) as well as events for which there are no warnings (e.g., industrial accident, terrorist attack).

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Situation

The conduct of evacuation operations is generally a State and tribal responsibility. However, there are circumstances that exceed the capabilities of these jurisdictions to support mass evacuations. Precautionary mass evacuation support is provided before an event to move citizens away from a potential incident when warning is available and after an event when conditions are such that it is unsafe for citizens to remain in the area. In instances where Federal support is required, DHS/FEMA will lead the effort in coordinating this support.

General

Federal support to mass evacuation operations will be provided at the lowest possible level and scaled to the incident. Evacuation from a single State may be supported from the State emergency operations center, Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) or a Joint Field Office (JFO). Multistate incidents could be coordinated from an RRCC. Large-scale evacuations resulting from a catastrophic event will require national-level coordination. Regardless of the scale of the incident, coordination among numerous JFO or Area Command entities will be required to carry out the major functions of evacuation operations.

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Functions

Federal mass evacuation support will require the cooperation of many different ESFs. ESF #1 – Transportation provides transportation support and coordination for evacuation operations. ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering ensures debris removal and clearance of evacuation routes. ESF #5 – Emergency Management provides situational awareness of evacuation route conditions. ESF #6 provides information and coordination in the nonmedical mass care aspects required for mass evacuations, including housing and human services. ESF #7 – Resource Support provides goods and services to support evacuation efforts. ESF #8 provides supplemental assistance to State, tribal, and local governments in identifying and meeting the public health and medical needs of victims, to include patient evacuation. ESF #11 provides information and coordination for the evacuation of companion animals. ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security provides support of State, tribal, and local public safety and security measures (e.g., crowd control, traffic direction, and control of contra flow lanes used in evacuations). Mass evacuation efforts must also be coordinated with other ESFs.

Coordination and Communications

A mass evacuation, by its scope, will result in evacuees crossing jurisdictional lines. When Federal evacuation support is required, the existing Federal coordinating structures will be used to provide coordination of the operation (e.g., National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), RRCC, and JFO).

All facilities and related support necessary for operations are sourced through the following ESFs when they are activated and requested to do so. However, certain Federal agencies have independent authority to respond to an incident site directly after notification of the incident. Once the ESFs are activated, those resources are provided in accordance with this annex.

- DHS/FEMA is responsible for ensuring that evacuation efforts are adequately coordinated with ESF #6 so that adequate shelter and food resources are available at evacuation destinations.
- DHS/FEMA is responsible for ensuring that State and local plans for evacuation are shared with relevant ESFs.
- DHS/FEMA, in support of and coordination with State, tribal, and local governments, is responsible for ensuring coordination with ESF #15 so that adequate information on mass evacuation operations is relayed to the public in an appropriate and timely manner.
- DHS/FEMA will coordinate with ESF #9 – Search and Rescue to ensure rescuees are provided evacuation opportunities.

Transportation

The transportation function is responsible for ensuring the evacuation of all affected populations by providing resources to transport those individuals that do not have the means to self-evacuate, and ensuring sufficient transportation assets are available.

- DHS/FEMA maintains contracts capable of providing bus and aviation evacuation support. If necessary, DHS/FEMA has the capability to contract additional resources. If commercial transportation is not available, DHS/FEMA requests Department of Defense (DOD) support. DOD may provide air transportation capabilities and ground support capabilities for air transportation efforts for patient movement on an as-requested/as-available basis when approved by the Secretary of Defense.

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- DHS/FEMA is responsible for ensuring that adequate materiel is available for evacuation efforts, including but not limited to ensuring fuel and basic vehicle service are available along evacuation routes and vehicle location devices are available for Federal evacuation vehicles.

- DHS/FEMA, in conjunction with ESF #1, is responsible for coordinating evacuation routes with State, tribal, and local agencies and, in particular, determining the status of transportation infrastructure to be used for evacuation.

- ESF #1 will facilitate coordination between State, tribal, and local authorities and Federal responders regarding the impact of outflow of persons and traffic on the entry of response teams and supplies into the affected area.

- ESF #1 supports mass evacuations through several activities, including processing and coordinating requests for the movement of goods, equipment, and responders. (This activity will transition to DHS/FEMA prior to 31 December, 2007.)

- During mass evacuations, ESF #1 provides regional support to the Evacuation Liaison Team to assist in coordination of large-scale highway evacuations, especially when involving more than one State.

- The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), under ESF #8, is the primary transportation coordinator for evacuation of patients. DOD, under the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), may provide patient movement capabilities.

- DHS/U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) will coordinate planning and executing of evacuations across bodies of water.

Fuels

The fuels function is responsible for ensuring that adequate fuel supplies (primarily gasoline and diesel fuels) are available in an evacuation. Considerations include availability of fuel for individuals who are self-evacuating, availability of fuels for government-supplied transportation vehicles, and provision of fuel to emergency response vehicles along evacuation routes.

DHS/FEMA will coordinate with:

- State, tribal, and local authorities and ESF #12 – Energy to ensure that adequate supplies of fuels (gasoline and diesel) are pre-positioned along evacuation routes.

- ESF #12 and State, tribal, and local authorities to ensure that special arrangements are made to permit fuel deliveries along evacuation routes when fuel supplies are inadequate.

- ESF #12 and ESF #13 to set up and regulate the use of separate refueling sites for the use of emergency responders during an evacuation.

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The Department of Energy (DOE) or ESF #12 may initiate various waiver requests or actions by other Federal agencies to facilitate evacuation, including:

- Driver-hour waivers from the Department of Transportation (DOT).
- Truck weight-limit waivers from DOT.
- Jones Act waivers from the Department of Commerce (DOC) or DHS.
- Fuel-quality waivers from the Environmental Protection Agency.

Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services (ESF #6)

The ESF #6 mission is to provide sheltering/housing, feeding, bulk distribution of essential items, and family reunification support and resources to individuals and families that do not have personal resources to meet these needs. In an evacuation, this function must be carefully coordinated with agencies providing evacuation services.

- DHS/FEMA coordinates with State, tribal, and local entities, as well as the support agencies under ESF #6, to ensure adequate shelter and care facilities are available for receiving evacuees.
- ESF #6 will provide support to State, tribal, and local evacuation efforts by facilitating requests for food and shelter supplies, and security in support of mass evacuations.
- ESF #6 will work with State lead agencies for mass care prior to, during, and after an incident to identify potential host States.
- DHS/FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons (VALs) will coordinate with voluntary agencies affiliated with National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) and other NGOs and private-sector entities for federally supported evacuation in affected and receiving States.

Medical Care

The medical care requirements and special needs of evacuees must be identified and appropriate support provided. This support includes oversight of specialized transportation for evacuees with medical and functional needs; care for evacuees whose needs cannot be accommodated in general population shelters; and monitoring support for individuals at pickup points.

- ESF #8 supports State, tribal, and local requirements for medical support at designated staging areas, pickup points, and other locations to perform triage of citizens prior to evacuation.
- ESF #8 will coordinate medical support with special needs shelters as requested by State, tribal, and local agencies.
- ESF #8 is responsible for the evacuation of patients, including those in hospitals, hospices, and nursing homes as well as individuals that are identified at evacuation centers as having medical problems, or those who are treated within the NDMS en route to, or from, or at field facilities.

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- ESFs #6 and #8 will coordinate with State, tribal, and local agencies to ensure emergency first aid and medical care, respectively, are available at staging areas and pickup points used in evacuations, on evacuation vehicles, and along evacuation routes when required.

Public Safety and Security

State and local law enforcement agencies have primary responsibility for providing for public safety and security during an incident that requires a mass evacuation. During a mass evacuation, State, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies will be conducting operations in accordance with their State, tribal, and local plans and protocols. However, State, tribal, and local public safety and security agencies and private-sector entities could rapidly become overwhelmed and require logistics or operational support from within their States, from other States pursuant to mutual-aid compacts, or from the Federal Government through ESF #13.

ESF #13 may involve assisting State, tribal, and local authorities with the following evacuation-related functions:

- Security assessments of preidentified transportation facilities.
- Site security at designated evacuation locations.
- Traffic control and/or transportation security duties.
- Screening of evacuees for prohibited weapons.
- Force protection.
- General planning and technical assistance.

In addition:

- ESF #13 coordinates with State, tribal, and local authorities to ensure security and traffic/crowd control are provided at staging areas and pickup points and onboard evacuation vehicles if requested by the State, tribal, or local government. It may also require support in such areas as public safety and security assessment, access control, and specialized security resources.
- On Federal property, ESF #13 is responsible for coordinating with Federal agencies to provide security for shelter facilities for evacuees.

REQUIRED ACTIONS

Preresponse/Initial Actions

DHS/FEMA works with the Governor of the impacted State(s) to determine the support State, tribal, and local governments require, to include the possible need for a Federal evacuation of citizens. State, tribal, and local governments provide their evacuation plans and information and any actions already taken to facilitate evacuation. Coordination should include consideration for special needs populations identified by State, tribal, and local governments, individuals who are transportation disadvantaged, and companion animals.

DHS/FEMA works with the Governors of potential receiving States to ensure mass care services are available to support receipt of evacuees.

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DHS/FEMA will work with State, tribal, and local authorities to support contra flow planning and execution, when feasible.

Operations and Planning personnel assigned to the NRCC, RRCC, and JFO perform the following functions:

- Determine and prioritize operational requirements.
- Coordinate with the JFO Logistics Section as well as ESFs #1 and #7, if required, to obtain required supplies, equipment, and personnel for evacuation.
- Ensure tracking of resources. DHS/FEMA Logistics ensures that vehicle location devices, tracking software/systems, and communications equipment are in place for ensuring communication between key evacuation locations and with all evacuation vehicles.
- Coordinate with State, tribal, and local authorities and ESF #15 to ensure that the public is aware of the timeline, stages, and major routes and means of evacuation.
- Coordinate with State, tribal, and local authorities and ESF #13 to determine whether Federal public safety and security resources will be required.

Ongoing Actions

Operations personnel transition into operations management activities. They execute evacuation functions as follows:

- DHS/FEMA ensures that vehicles and vehicle operators are available and are dispatched to pickup points.
- DHS/FEMA ensures that transportation assets are available at reception sites to transport evacuees to general population or special needs shelters.
- The Federal response also coordinates with ESF #2 – Communications to tie in the local communications infrastructure.
- DHS/FEMA ensures that manifests are created for each Federal vehicle used in evacuation.
- ESF #6 ensures Federal resources are available to support feeding and sheltering along the evacuation route.
- ESF #6 works with NGOs and the State-designated lead agencies for mass care to provide mass care services, ensuring that resources are available to support Federal evacuation efforts in receiving States. The DHS/FEMA VALs support the State mass care efforts through information sharing, reporting, and possible identification of ad hoc agencies not yet included with the mass care operations.
- ESF #8 coordinates to provide medical staging and en route medical support to patients and to those with special medical needs.
- ESF #11 ensures that companion animal evacuation activities are coordinated between impacted and receiving States and are appropriately communicated to the public.
- ESF #12 coordinates with DHS/FEMA, other Federal agencies, States, and the energy industry to ensure fuel is available to responders and citizens along the evacuation route.

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- DHS/FEMA coordinates with State, tribal, and local law enforcement as well as ESF #13 to ensure the security of Federal transportation assets used for evacuation.

- ESF #15 will support State, tribal, and local efforts to ensure that citizens are aware of evacuation routes and resources available to them for the evacuation as well as for registration purposes. The Federal external affairs response will support the State, tribal, and local reach of evacuation orders, through broadcast uplink and public service announcement production and distribution; graphics and web support; and multilingual and special needs capabilities coordinated through ESF #15. ESF #15 will also reach out to the private sector in support of State, tribal, and local governments to assist with direction on evacuations and guidance to families on schools, nursing homes, and hospitals.

Reentry

DHS/FEMA:

- Coordinates with ESFs #3, #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response, #12, #13, and #14 – Long-Term Community Recovery to ensure that the affected area is safe for individuals to return and that the infrastructure can sustain a return of the population.

- Works in coordination with State, tribal, and local authorities in planning for return of evacuees to the affected area.

- In conjunction with State, tribal, and local governments, coordinates the transportation of evacuees back to the affected area, including provision of vehicles, personnel, and supplies.

- Determines housing options, to include return to affected areas, for evacuees temporarily displaced to locations away from their home of record.

RESPONSIBILITIES

State, Tribal, and Local Responsibilities

While State, tribal, and local entities have primary responsibility evacuation planning and for the public safety and security of persons and non-Federal property within their jurisdictions during a mass evacuation, the unique challenges that might confront State, tribal, local, and private-sector entities during a mass evacuation could require them to request additional assistance, either of a logistical or operational nature, from within their States, from other States pursuant to a mutual-aid compact, or from the Federal Government.

Consistent with the National Response Framework, the responsibilities and authorities of State, tribal, and local officials are also applicable to a mass evacuation. State, tribal, and local governments are the first line of emergency response in disasters, including for evacuation and sheltering of their citizens.

State and local transportation agencies play a significant role in evacuation planning and operations. The State department of transportation, in coordination with the highway patrol or State police, may institute measures to limit or control the flow of traffic on Federal and State highways to expedite the evacuation from the affected area. Operators of buses from transit agencies and school districts may be used to transport evacuees who are without access to personal vehicles. Depending on conditions and backup power sources, Intelligent Transportation Systems technologies, portable cameras, and traffic count detectors can provide critical feedback on evacuation operations. Variable message signs can be deployed quickly to

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guide evacuees, and through emergency radio broadcasts State and local transportation agencies can provide real-time information to evacuees and officials to facilitate the evacuation.

The specific roles of State governments in evacuations vary from State to State. In general, State laws provide the Governor authority to declare an emergency and assume extra powers and responsibilities to protect the health and safety of the citizens of the State. Specific powers relating to an evacuation include:

- Create, amend, or rescind rules or directives to provide the necessities of life or supplies and equipment.
- Direct State and local law enforcement officers.
- Prescribe evacuation routes, transportation modes, and destinations.
- Control ingress and egress to the disaster area and the occupancy of premises in the disaster area.
- Order, direct, compel, or recommend an evacuation.

Municipalities, counties, and parishes are given responsibilities to protect the health and safety of their citizens including the authority to order an evacuation of their jurisdiction and to provide first responders.

Coordinating Agency: DHS/FEMA

DHS/FEMA regions and Headquarters provide guidance and technical assistance to State, tribal, and local governments for the development of mass evacuation plans, including possible multistate coordination. State, tribal, and local plans should:

- Be built on worst-case, but realistic, scenarios.
- Identify planning gaps and capability shortfalls.
- Be built upon internal State structure and emergency operation plans.
- Address the integration of Federal or other State support for the previously identified gaps.
- Identify Federal support requirements.
- Identify special needs and animal evacuation considerations.
- Create operational plans for embarkation/disembarkation, including all necessary resources and staffing, and define roles and responsibilities. Multistate plans must address the coordination of these resources.

DHS/FEMA:

- Processes and coordinates requests for Federal and civil transportation support for the movement of goods, equipment, and responders as directed under the National Response Framework (after 31 December, 2007; prior to this date, this responsibility will rest with the Department of Transportation).
- Establishes protocols for communicating with host States.

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DHS/FEMA Logistics establishes a Transportation Management Unit; activities are integrated with the Medical Management Unit (ESF #8) and Mass Care Management Unit (ESF #6).

COOPERATING AGENCIES

Agency	Functions
Department of Agriculture	Through ESF #7, provides staff for and support to mobilization centers when authorized by a DHS/FEMA mission assignment. Provides assistance for transportation tracking and supply accountability.
Department of Commerce/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	• Provides data on weather and other related environmental conditions for operational area in an evacuation. • Through the Emergency Alert System (EAS), may help with communication of evacuation information to the public.
Department of Defense	Provides evacuation support for patient movement under NDMS.
	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) • Provides logistics resources to support the preparation and execution of ESF #3 activities. • USACE may also provide staff for the mobilization centers when a mission is assigned by DHS/FEMA.
Department of Energy	Through ESF #12, provides coordination and resources to provide fuel along evacuation routes and for emergency vehicles used in evacuation operations.
Department of Health and Human Services	• Provides information on special needs shelter locations. • Provides staff at staging areas, pickup points, and onboard evacuation vehicles to provide minor medical and mental health services. • Provides information on the transportation assets required to return medical patients and their caregivers/family members back to the affected area once deemed safe.
Department of Homeland Security	**Transportation Security Administration** Through ESF #1 and ESF #13, provides mass evacuation transportation security and law enforcement technical assistance and resources to Federal, State, and local mass evacuation planners, airports, and transportation providers consistent with and to ensure compliance with Federal transportation security guidelines and directives.
	USCG Provides technical assistance, resources, and coordination support for evacuations that require transportation over bodies of water.
Department of Justice	Through ESF #13, provides liaison with State,, tribal, and local law enforcement resources and guidance as to the level and types of Federal support required to ensure safety and security of evacuation operations.
Department of Transportation	Through ESF #1: • Monitors and reports damage to the transportation system and infrastructure. • Processes and coordinates requests for Federal and civil transportation support for the movement of goods, equipment, and responders as directed under the NRF (prior to 31 December, 2007). • Issues regulatory waivers and exemptions.
Department of Veterans Affairs	When requested, designates and deploys available medical, surgical, mental health, and other health service support assets.
General Services Administration	Contracts telecommunications support, arranges for the facilities needed by the Federal evacuation teams, and requisitions or contracts for supplies and equipment as part of its ESF #7 responsibilities.

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Agency	Functions
American Red Cross	Provides ESF #6 Mass Care liaison staff to work at DHS/FEMA locations to work with State lead agencies for mass care and DHS/FEMA in order to facilitate resource requests of the Federal Government and provides information on mass care.
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster	Provides support to mass care operations in affected States through information sharing and communication with the State/local voluntary agency counterparts.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix A. Evacuation Functions of Federal and National Agencies

National Partner	ESF Coordinator	Mass Evacuation Functions										Comments
		Coordination (Federal)	Coordination (non-Federal)	Transportation	Security	Mass Care	Manifests/Registration	Fuel	Special Needs	Companion Animals	Public Information	
DHS/ FEMA	ESF #1	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■	Though DHS/FEMA may not provide each of these directly, it is responsible for ensuring that each of these functions is adequately met.
DHS/ USCG	N/A			■					■			Coordinates evacuations across bodies of water. Also responsible for coordinating the disposition of those assisted by search and rescue teams to appropriate evacuation locations.
DHS/ TSA	N/A			■	■							Through ESFs #1 and #13, assists Federal, State, tribal, and local planners to assess and validate multimodal transportation security needs for mass evacuation. Assists airport operators in the development of airport security plans; provide regulatory oversight; and coordinates Federal aviation security activities. Notifies airport operators and transportation stakeholders of threats to the transportation sector.
USDA	ESF #11									■		Coordinates with DHS/FEMA and provides guidance for the evacuation and collocation of companion animals.
DOC/ NOAA											■	Provides weather-related information for the area being evacuated and along evacuation routes. Assists with public communication through use of EAS.
DOE	ESF #12							■				Coordinates with DHS/FEMA, other Federal agencies, the States, and the energy industry to provide fuel along evacuation routes and for emergency response vehicles during evacuation.

National Partner	ESF Coordinator	Mass Evacuation Functions										Comments
		Coordination (Federal)	Coordination (non-Federal)	Transportation	Security	Mass Care	Manifests/Registration	Fuel	Special Needs	Companion Animals	Public Information	
DOT	ESF #1	■	■	■			■		■	■		Coordinates with airlines and airports to determine when air operations are likely to be suspended and prioritizing which airports are critical for evacuations, ensuring these airports are operational for as long as possible (applies only to functions for which DOT is responsible). Coordinates with public transit agencies to obtain assistance for evacuations. Coordinates with DHS/FEMA and Amtrak and freight railroads facilitate passenger rail evacuations when needed and feasible.
DOD	ESF #8			■					■			Responsible for the transportation of patients (those with specific medical needs); may also provide some airlift support for general evacuation.
DOD/ USACE	ESF #3											Provides support to repair damages to roads, bridges, and other structures along evacuation routes.
HHS	ESF #8					■			■	■		Ensures that medical treatment is provided at evacuation pickup and disposition sites as well as on-board evacuation vehicles when required; ensures medical support is provided to special needs populations and medical victims.
DOJ	ESF #13				■	■						Provides support to State, tribal, and local law enforcement entities for securing and protecting evacuees at pickup points, in transit, and at mass care sites as needed.
ARC	N/A					■						Responsible for coordinating with DHS/FEMA to ensure that adequate information is available about shelters and for coordinating the receipt of evacuees at various shelter locations.
NVOAD	N/A					■						Provides support to mass care operations in affected States.

Appendix B. Mass Evacuation Process

The ordering, sourcing, transportation, issuing, and movement of Federal resources generally follows the procedural steps outlined below (also see Figure 1):

- Mass evacuation resources are identified. Resources can involve supplying equipment or services.

- The local jurisdiction attempts to fill the need from existing resources. If they do not have the resource, they pass the requirement on to the State government.

- When the State receives the requirement, it attempts to fill the need. This may be done from existing resources, through commercial sources, or through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts or mutual-aid agreements, if such compacts or agreements exist. If the State cannot fill the need, it requests Federal assistance.

- If a JFO has not been established, the NRCC receives the validated request for Federal assistance and determines how and if the requirement can be fulfilled.

- If a JFO has been established, the request is submitted to the JFO Operations Section, which determines if the resource is available in staging areas to fill the requirement. If the resource is not immediately available, the requirement is passed to the Logistics Section.

- The JFO Logistics Section Chief may:

  - Fill the requirement from the resources located at the logistics base;
  -
  - Fill the requirement by direct mission assignment to another Federal agency; or
  -
  - Prepare a requisition and recommend commercial sources for goods and services to the Finance/Administration Section as applicable.

- If the JFO cannot provide the resources, the Logistics Section Chief passes the requirement to the NRCC.

- The NRCC receives the request and determines how to meet the requirement.

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Figure 1. Mass Evacuation Process Flow



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Coordinating Agencies:

Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security/
U.S. Coast Guard
Environmental Protection Agency
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Cooperating Agencies:

Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of Veterans Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex provides an organized and integrated capability for a timely, coordinated response by Federal agencies to incidents involving nuclear or radioactive materials, including acts of terrorism. These incidents may vary in severity from the simple to those of such severity, magnitude, and/or complexity that a coordinated Federal response is needed to supplement the State, tribal, or local response.

This annex describes how Federal agencies respond to nuclear/radiological incidents. Some of these agencies bring unique authorities, technical expertise, and assets for responding to nuclear/radiological incidents that are not otherwise described in the *National Response Framework (NRF)*. In addition, this annex describes how these Federal agencies support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when it is coordinating the overall multiagency Federal response to nuclear/radiological incidents.

Scope

This annex applies to nuclear/radiological incidents, including sabotage and terrorist incidents, involving the release or potential release of radioactive material that poses an actual or perceived hazard to public health, safety, national security, and/or the environment. This includes terrorist use of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or improvised nuclear devices (INDs) as well as nuclear facility accidents (commercial or weapons production facilities), lost radioactive material sources, transportation accidents involving nuclear/radioactive material, domestic nuclear weapons accidents, and foreign accidents involving nuclear or radioactive material that impact the United States or its territories, possessions, or territorial waters.

The level of Federal response to a specific incident is based on numerous factors, including the ability of State, tribal, and local officials to respond; the type, amount, and custody of radioactive material involved; the extent of the impact or potential impact on the public and environment; and the size of the affected area.

In situations where threat analysis includes indications that a terrorist incident involving radiological materials could occur, actions are coordinated in accordance with the preincident

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prevention protocols set forth in the *NRF* and the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.

This annex:

- Provides planning guidance and outlines operational concepts for the Federal response to any nuclear/radiological incident, including a terrorist incident, that has actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences within the United States or its territories, possessions, or territorial waters, and that requires a coordinated response by the Federal Government.
- Acknowledges the unique nature of a variety of nuclear/radiological incidents and the responsibilities of Federal, State, tribal, and local governments to respond to them.
- Describes Federal policies and planning considerations on which this annex and Federal agency-specific nuclear/radiological response plans are based.
- Specifies the roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies for preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from nuclear/radiological incidents.
- Includes guidelines for notification, coordination, and leadership of Federal activities.
- Describes Federal Government capabilities including the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC), the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), and the Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health (known as "the Advisory Team"). More information on these capabilities is included in subsequent sections of this annex.

Policies

The concept of operations described in this annex recognizes and addresses the unique challenges associated with and the need for specialized technical expertise/actions when responding to nuclear/radiological incidents (including RDD/INDs).

DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for maintaining and updating this annex. DHS/FEMA accomplishes this responsibility through the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC).

When DHS initiates the response mechanisms of the *NRF*, including the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and this annex, existing interagency plans that address nuclear/radiological incident management (e.g., the National Oil and Hazardous Materials Contingency Plan (NCP)) are incorporated as supporting plans and/or operational supplements to the *NRF*. For incidents of lesser severity, other Federal agency response plans provide the primary Federal response protocols.

Certain Federal agencies are authorized to respond directly to specific nuclear/radiological incidents. In these cases, procedures outlined in this annex may be used in accordance with National Incident Management System (NIMS) to coordinate the delivery of Federal resources to State, tribal, and local governments, and to coordinate assistance among Federal agencies for incidents requiring Federal coordination.

Nothing in this annex alters or impedes the ability of Federal departments and agencies to carry out their specific authorities and perform their responsibilities under law. This annex does not create any new authorities nor change any existing ones.

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Federal response actions will be carried out commensurate with the appropriate health and safety laws and guidelines. For example, if appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities are not available and the area is contaminated by radioactive material, response actions may be delayed until the material has dissipated to a safe level for emergency response personnel or until appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities arrive.

Departments and agencies are not reimbursed for activities conducted under their own authorities unless other agreements or reimbursement mechanisms exist (e.g., Stafford Act, Federal-to-Federal assistance). Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS will provide funds to the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as appropriate, for planning, exercises and training, and equipment for the Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT).

Federal coordination centers and agency teams provide their own logistical support consistent with agreed upon interagency execution plans. State, tribal, and local governments are encouraged to coordinate their efforts with the Federal effort, but maintain their own logistical support, consistent with applicable authorities and requirements.

Response to nuclear/radiological incidents affecting land owned by the Federal Government is coordinated with the agency responsible for managing that land to ensure that incident management activities are consistent with Federal statutes governing use and occupancy. In the case of tribal lands, tribal governments have a special relationship with the U.S. Government, and Federal, State, and local governments may have limited or no authority on specific tribal reservations. Further guidance is provided in the Tribal Relations Support Annex.

Planning Assumptions

Radiological incidents may not be immediately recognized as such until the radioactive material is detected or the effects of radiation exposure are manifested in the population.

An act of radiological terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center within the United States, can have major consequences that can overwhelm the capabilities of many local, tribal, and/or State governments to respond and may seriously challenge existing Federal response capabilities.

An act of nuclear or radiological terrorism will trigger concurrent activation of the Terrorism Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.

A radiological incident may require concurrent implement of the NCP to address radiological, as well as chemical or biological, releases into the environment.

An incident involving the potential release of radioactivity may require implementation of protective measures.

An expeditious Federal response is required to mitigate the consequences of the nuclear/radiological incident. Radiological incidents that result in significant impacts likely will trigger implementation of the *NRF* Catastrophic Incident Annex. The Federal Government response to radiological terrorist threats/incidents also includes the following assumptions:

- The response to a radiological threat or actual incident requires an integrated Federal Government response.

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- In the case of a radiological terrorist attack, the effect may be temporally and geographically dispersed, requiring response operations to be conducted over a multijurisdictional, multistate region.

- A radiological terrorist incident may affect a single location, or multiple locations, each of which may require an incident response and a crime scene investigation simultaneously.

HAZARD-SPECIFIC PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

Headquarters Planning and Preparedness

The Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee provides a national-level forum for the development and coordination of radiological prevention and preparedness policies and procedures. It also provides policy guidance for Federal radiological incident management activities in support of State, tribal, and local government radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities. The FRPCC is an interagency body consisting of the coordinating and cooperating agencies discussed in this annex, chaired by DHS/FEMA. The FRPCC establishes subcommittees, as necessary.

The FRPCC also coordinates research-study efforts of its member agencies related to State, tribal, and local government radiological emergency preparedness to ensure minimum duplication and maximum benefits to State and local governments. The FRPCC coordinates planning and validating requirements of each agency, reviewing integration requirements and incorporating agency-specific plans, procedures, and equipment into the response system.

As part of their preparedness for nuclear/radiological emergencies, Federal agencies participate in exercises to test and evaluate response plans.

Regional Planning and Preparedness

Coordinating agencies may have regional offices or field structures that provide a forum for information-sharing, consultation, and coordination of Federal agency regional awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. These regional offices may also assist in providing technical assistance to State and local governments and evaluating radiological plans and exercises.

Regional Assistance Committees (RACs) in the DHS/FEMA regions serve as the primary coordinating structure at the Federal regional level. RAC membership mirrors that of the FRPCC, and RACs are chaired by a DHS/FEMA regional representative. Additionally, State emergency management agencies send representatives to RAC meetings and participate in regional exercise and training activities. The RACs provide a forum for information-sharing, consultation, and coordination of Federal regional awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. The RACs also assist in providing technical assistance to State and local governments and evaluating radiological plans and exercises.

RESPONSIBILITIES

General

DHS is responsible for overall coordination of the Federal Government response to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies defined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5. When exercising this role, DHS is supported by other coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies. For incidents of lesser severity, however, the coordinating agencies

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may be responsible for overall coordination of the Federal response. Incidents will be managed at the lowest possible level; as incidents change in size, scope, and complexity, the response will adapt to meet requirements, as described in the *NRF*.

- For this annex, the coordinating agencies are those Federal agencies with specific nuclear/radiological authorities, technical expertise, and assets for responding to the unique characteristics of nuclear/radiological incidents. Coordinating agencies are listed in Table 1. The specific role of each coordinating agency will be determined by the scope of its particular authorities over relevant aspects of the incident, as described in more detail in this annex.

- Cooperating agencies include other Federal agencies that provide additional technical and resource support to DHS and the coordinating agencies.

In all cases, the Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) manages and directs the law enforcement and domestic intelligence aspects of the response, while coordinating its activities with appropriate Federal, State, tribal, and local governments within the framework of this annex, and/or as provided for in established interagency agreements or plans. For these criminal investigations, the coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies perform the functions delineated in this annex and provide technical support and assistance to the DOJ/FBI in the performance of its law enforcement and criminal investigative mission. Further details regarding the DOJ/FBI response are outlined in the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.

Coordinating Agencies

For nuclear/radiological incidents, the coordinating agencies will be the Federal agencies that own, have custody of, authorize, regulate, or are otherwise assigned responsibility for the nuclear/radioactive material, facility, or activity involved in the incident. These Federal agencies are:

- The Department of Defense (DOD) or DOE, as appropriate, for incidents involving nuclear/radiological materials or facilities owned or operated by DOD or DOE.

- DOD and DOE, as appropriate, for incidents involving a nuclear weapon and/or classified components under the custody of the Federal agency.

- DOD, DOE, or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as appropriate, for special nuclear material under the custody of the Federal agency.

- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for incidents involving materials or facilities licensed by the NRC or Agreement States.

- DHS (through Customs and Border Protection) for incidents involving inadvertent import of radioactive materials.

- EPA or DHS/U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), as appropriate, for environmental response and cleanup for incidents not otherwise covered above.

By their very nature, RDDs and INDs do not have a Federal agency that owns/has custody of, authorizes, regulates, or is otherwise assigned responsibility for the material. However, as the agency with overall responsibility for domestic incident management, DHS will assume coordinating agency responsibilities with much support from various cooperating agencies.

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Table 1 provides an overview of the coordinating agencies and the types of nuclear/radiological incidents in which they will be involved. The specific responsibilities of coordinating agencies are further described in Table 2.

Table 1: Coordinating Agencies for Nuclear/Radiological Incidents

NOTE: The coordinating agency will lead all or a portion or the Federal response, as specified by their particular authorities. They will support DHS when it is coordinating an overall multiagency Federal response to nuclear/radiological incidents.

Nuclear/Radiological Facilities or Materials Involved in Incident	Coordinating Agency
Nuclear facilities:	
(1) Owned or operated by DOD or DOE	(1) DOD or DOE
(2) Licensed by NRC or Agreement State	(2) NRC
(3) Not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State, or currently or formerly licensed facilities for which the owner/operator is not financially viable or is otherwise unable to respond	(3) EPA
Radioactive materials being transported:	
(1) Materials shipped by or for DOD or DOE	(1) DOD or DOE
(2) Shipment of NRC or Agreement State-licensed materials	(2) NRC
(3) Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are not licensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State (see DHS/USCG list of responsibilities for further explanation of "certain areas")	(3) DHS/USCG
(4) All others	(4) EPA
Radioactive materials in space vehicles impacting within the United States:	
(1) Managed by NASA or DOD	(1) NASA or DOD
(2) Not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone	(2) DHS/USCG
(3) All others	(3) EPA
Foreign, unknown or unlicensed material:	
(1) Incidents involving inadvertent import of radioactive materials	(1) DHS
(2) Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material in certain areas of the coastal zone	(2) DHS/USCG
(3) All others not otherwise assigned to DHS/CBP or DHS/USCG	(3) EPA
Nuclear weapons	DOD or DOE (based on custody at time of incident)
Radiological dispersion device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND)	DHS

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Coordinating agencies provide the leadership, expertise, and authorities to implement critical and specific aspects of a Federal nuclear/incident response. Some of these are unique authorities, technical expertise, and assets for responding to nuclear/radiological incidents that are not otherwise described in the *NRF*.

The coordinating agencies may also take appropriate independent emergency actions within the limits of their own statutory authority to protect the public, mitigate immediate hazards, and gather information concerning the emergency to avoid delay. These authorities include the following:

- **Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA):** CERCLA gives the Federal Government the authority to respond to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances (including radionuclides) that may endanger public health or the environment. CERCLA also gives the Federal Government the authority to compel responsible parties to respond to releases of hazardous substances. The definition of "release" under CERCLA excludes releases of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident at certain facilities licensed by the NRC—most notably, commercial nuclear power plants and fuels associated with these plants.

- **National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan (NCP):** CERCLA is implemented through the NCP, a regulation found in 40 CFR Part 300. At the on-scene level, this response authority is implemented by Federal On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs). OSCs may assist State and local governments in responding to releases, but also have the authority to direct the response when needed to ensure protection of public health and the environment. Typical response actions include: air monitoring; assessment of the extent of the contamination; stabilization of the release; decontamination; and waste treatment, storage, and disposal. Four Federal agencies have OSC authority for hazardous substance emergencies: EPA, DHS/USCG, DOD, and DOE.

- **Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (as amended):** Under the AEA, DOE will be responsible for managing the Federal response to a nuclear/radiological release at a DOE facility or involving DOE materials. DOD will manage the on-site response for incidents involving a DOD facility and the overall response for nuclear weapons or other radioactive material in DOD custody. For incidents involving NRC or Agreement State-regulated facilities, activities, or material, the NRC is responsible for performing an independent assessment of the safety of the facility or material; evaluating licensee protective action recommendations; performing oversight of the licensee (monitoring, advising, assisting, and/or directing); and reporting information, as appropriate, to media and public entities. The AEA also charges EPA with additional responsibilities regarding radiation matters that directly or indirectly affect public health.

- **National Security Act:** The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense, headed by a Secretary of Defense. Title 50, U.S.C. Sec. 797 makes it a crime to willfully violate a regulation or order promulgated by the Secretary of Defense or his representative, for the protection or security of military equipment or other property or places subject to the jurisdiction, administration, or custody of DOD. This statute is executed within the Department by DOD Directive (DODD) 5200.8, Security of DOD Installations and Resources. DODD 5200.8 is the natural, legal extension of statutory authority found in 50 U.S.C. Sec. 797.

- **Immediate Response Authority:** Although not rooted in statutory law, DOD doctrine allows commanders to provide resources and assistance to civil authorities when a disaster overwhelms the capabilities of local authorities and necessitates immediate action to prevent human suffering, save lives, or mitigate great property damage. Immediate

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response actions can include the types of activities authorized under the Stafford Act, including, at the request of civil authorities, rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment, restoration of essential public services, debris removal, controlling contaminated areas, safeguarding and distributing food and essential supplies, and supplying interim emergency communications. The immediate response authority may also include law enforcement activities ordinarily prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act. The controlling DOD directive does not require a request from State or local officials, but states that DOD Components shall not perform any function of civil government unless absolutely necessary on a temporary basis under conditions of Immediate Response.

- **Public Health Service Act (PHSA):** The PHSA directs EPA to support State and local authorities in their preparedness and response activities regarding public health emergencies. This support may include providing training, technical advice, and direct assistance.

Table 2 below presents the specific responsibilities of each coordinating agency, as specified by statutory authorities or other mandating doctrine.

Table 2. Coordinating Agency-Specific Key Responsibilities for a Nuclear/Radiological Incident

Agency	Responsibilities
Department of Defense	As indicated in Table 1, DOD is the coordinating agency for Federal actions for radiological incidents involving DOD facilities, including U.S. nuclear-powered ships, or material otherwise under their jurisdiction (e.g., transportation of material shipped by or for DOD). Under CERCLA and the NCP, DOD is responsible for hazardous substance emergencies involving DOD facilities, vessels, and materials, including transportation-related incidents. DOD provides a Federal OSC responsible for taking all CERCLA response actions, which includes on-site and off-site response actions (40 CFR 120(c)). For incidents at nuclear/radiological facilities that it owns or operates, or incidents involving transportation of DOD nuclear/radiological materials, DOD is responsible for: • Mitigating the consequences of an incident. • Providing notification and appropriate protective action recommendations to State, tribal, and/or local government officials. • Minimizing the radiological hazard to the public. For radiological incidents involving a nuclear weapon, special nuclear material, and/or classified components that are in DOD custody, DOD may establish a National Defense Area (NDA). • DOD will coordinate with State and local officials to ensure appropriate public health and safety actions are taken outside the NDA. • DOD will lead the overall response to safeguard national security information and/or restricted data, or equipment and material. • DOD may also place lands normally not under DOD control under their temporary control for the duration of the incident. DOD coordinates the Federal response for incidents involving the release of nuclear/radioactive materials from DOD space vehicles or joint space vehicles with significant DOD involvement. A joint venture is an activity in which the U.S. Government has provided extensive design/financial input; has provided and maintains ownership of instruments, spacecraft, or the launch vehicle; or is intimately involved in mission operations. A joint venture is not created by simply selling or supplying material to a foreign country for use in its spacecraft.

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Agency	Responsibilities
Department of Energy	As indicated in Table 1, DOE is the coordinating agency for the Federal response to a nuclear/radiological release at a DOE facility or involving DOE materials (e.g., during the use, storage, and shipment of a variety of radioactive materials; the shipment of spent reactor fuel; the production, assembly, and shipment of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials; the production and shipment of radioactive sources for space ventures; and the storage and shipment of radioactive and mixed waste). Under CERCLA and the NCP, DOE is responsible for hazardous substance emergencies involving DOE facilities, vessels, and materials, including transportation-related incidents. DOE provides a Federal OSC responsible for taking all CERCLA response actions, which includes on-site and off-site response actions (40 CFR 120(c)). For incidents at nuclear/radiological facilities that it owns or operates, or incidents involving transportation of DOE nuclear/radiological materials, DOE is responsible for: • Mitigating the consequences of an incident. • Providing notification and appropriate protective action recommendations to State, tribal, and/or local government officials. • Minimizing the radiological hazard to the public. For radiological incidents involving a nuclear weapon, special nuclear material, and/or classified components that are in DOE custody, DOE may establish a National Security Area (NSA) and will coordinate with State and local officials to ensure appropriate public health and safety actions are taken outside the NDA or NSA. DOE Accident Response Group (ARG) teams will deploy to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear weapon accident in conjunction with specialized assets from DOD regardless of whether DOE or DOD has custody of the weapon or special nuclear material. DOE coordinates Federal offsite radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities as lead technical organization in FRMAC (emergency phase), and the provider of regional Radiation Assistance Program (RAP) teams, the Aerial Measuring System (AMS) and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), regardless of who is designated the coordinating agency. DOE provides atmospheric modeling predictions from the DOE National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (NARAC) to the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Capability (IMAAC). DOE works closely with the Senior EPA representative to facilitate a smooth transition of the Federal radiological monitoring and assessment coordination responsibility to EPA at a mutually agreeable time and after consultation with the States and coordinating agency.

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Agency	Responsibilities
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	Under HSPD-5, DHS is the principal Federal agency for domestic incident management and coordinates the Federal Government's resources for responding to terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. For purposes of leading activities under this annex, the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the overall Federal response to RDD/INDs, while the DOJ/FBI is responsible for actions which are further described in the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex. Cooperating agencies will provide support as appropriate. As determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Catastrophic Incident Annex and the Catastrophic Incident Supplement may also be implemented. Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS has control of the NIRT. DHS/CBP coordinates the Federal response for incidents involving the inadvertent import of radioactive material. For incidents at the border, DHS/CBP maintains radiation detection equipment and nonintrusive inspection technology at ports of entry and Border Patrol checkpoints to detect the presence of radiological substances transported by persons, cargo, mail, or conveyance arriving from foreign countries.
DHS/U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)	As indicated in Table 1, DHS/USCG is the coordinating agency for the Federal response for incidents involving the release of nuclear/radioactive materials that occur in certain areas of the coastal zone (as defined by the NCP), including: • Release from transportation incidents involving the release of nuclear/radioactive materials that are not licensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State. • Incidents involving space vehicles not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone. • Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material. EPA coordinates responses in areas of the coastal zone other than those defined above as certain areas of the coastal zone. For incidents that have cross-boundary impacts, DHS/USCG works with the other affected agency to determine how best to cooperatively respond consistent with the NCP model. DHS/USCG coordinates response for these incidents only during the prevention and emergency response phase, and transfers responsibility for later response phases to the appropriate agency, consistent with the NCP.

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Agency	Responsibilities
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	As indicated in Table 1, EPA is the coordinating agency for the Federal environmental response for incidents that occur at facilities not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State, or currently or formerly licensed facilities for which the owner/operator is not financially viable or is otherwise unable to respond. EPA is also the coordinating agency for the Federal environmental response for incidents involving the release of nuclear/radioactive materials that occur in the inland zone and in areas of the coastal zone not addressed by DHS/USCG, including: • Transportation incidents involving the release of nuclear/radioactive materials that are not licensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State. • Incidents involving space vehicles not managed by DOD or NASA or addressed by DHS/USCG. • Incidents involving foreign, unknown, or unlicensed radiological sources that have actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences in the United States or its territories, possessions, or territorial waters, and that are not addressed by DHS/CBP, DHS/USCG, or the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). When acting as the coordinating agency, EPA coordinates the Federal environmental response. For a DHS-led Federal response, EPA will generally be providing that response coordination support to DHS through ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response. For an EPA-led Federal response, EPA will generally be responding under the NCP (which is an operational supplement to the *NRF*). For some incidents, EPA may also be relying upon its Public Health Service Act authorities.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	As indicated in Table 1, NASA is the coordinating agency for the Federal response for incidents involving the release of nuclear/radioactive materials from NASA space vehicles or joint space vehicles with significant NASA involvement. For radiological incidents involving a nuclear weapon, special nuclear material, and/or classified components that are in NASA custody, NASA may establish a National Defense Area (NDA), and will coordinate with State and local officials to ensure appropriate public health and safety actions are taken outside the NDA.

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Agency	Responsibilities
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)	As indicated in Table 1, the NRC is the coordinating agency for incidents at or caused by a facility or an activity that is licensed by the NRC or an Agreement State. These facilities include but are not limited to, commercial nuclear power plants, fuel cycle facilities, DOE-owned gaseous diffusion facilities operating under NRC regulatory oversight, independent spent fuel storage installations, radiopharmaceutical manufacturers, and research reactors. The NRC licensee primarily is responsible for taking action to mitigate the consequences of an incident and providing appropriate protective action recommendations to State, tribal, and/or local government officials. The NRC: • Performs an independent assessment of the incident and potential offsite consequences and, as appropriate, provides recommendations concerning any protective measures. • Performs oversight of the licensee, to include monitoring, evaluation of protective action recommendations, advice, assistance, and, as appropriate, direction. • Dispatches, if appropriate, an NRC site team of technical experts to the licensee's facility. • Under certain situations involving the protection of public health/safety or national security, may take possession of special nuclear materials and/or operate certain facilities regulated by the NRC. • Closely coordinates its actions with State and local government officials during an incident by providing advice, guidance, and support as needed.

OTHER KEY FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL RESOURCES/ASSETS

In carrying out their responsibilities, DHS and the coordinating agencies may request specialized assets for nuclear/radiological response. Some of the assets are provided by individual cooperating agencies (through ESF activations or their own authorities) while others may be interagency.

Key specialized Federal nuclear/radiological assets/teams are highlighted below, while additional agency-specific support is described in "Incident Actions" section below.

- **Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT):** Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS has authority to activate the NIRT. When activated, DHS has control of the NIRT, which consists of (1) DOE entities that perform nuclear and/or radiological emergency support and assistance functions, and (2) EPA entities that perform such support functions (including radiological emergency response functions) and related functions. The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center is a NIRT asset maintained by DOE that is available on request to respond to nuclear/radiological incidents. The purpose of the FRMAC is to provide a clear operating picture of radiological conditions in the field to responders for decisionmaking and incident action planning; it provides radiation measurements, interpretations of radiation distributions, and overall characterization of the radiological conditions (protective action recommendations are provided by the A-Team, as discussed below). The FRMAC is established at or near the incident location in coordination with DHS, the coordinating agency, other Federal agencies, and State, tribal, and local authorities. A

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FRMAC normally includes representation from DOE, EPA, the Department of Commerce, the National Communications System (DHS/NPPD/NCS), DOD/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and other Federal agencies as needed. Regardless of who is designated as the coordinating agency, when the FRMAC is activated, DOE, through the FRMAC or DOE Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) or the Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT), coordinates all Federal environmental and agricultural radiological monitoring and assessment activities for the initial phases of the response. When the FRMAC is transferred to EPA, it assumes responsibility for coordination of radiological monitoring and assessment activities.

- **Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health (A-Team):** The Advisory Team includes representatives from DHS, EPA, the Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other Federal agencies. The Advisory Team develops coordinated advice and recommendations for Incident Command/Unified Command, DHS, the Unified Coordination Group, the coordinating agency, and State, tribal, and local governments concerning environmental, food health, and animal health matters. The Advisory Team provides Federal advice in matters related to the following:
  - Environmental assessments (field monitoring) required for developing recommendations with advice from State, tribal, and local governments and/or the FRMAC.
  - Protective Action Guides and their application to the emergency.
  - Protective Action Recommendations using data and assessment from the FRMAC.
  - Protective actions to prevent or minimize contamination of milk, food, and water, and to prevent or minimize exposure through ingestion.
  - Recommendations for minimizing losses of agricultural resources from radiation effects.
  - Availability of food, animal feed, and water supply inspection programs to assure wholesomeness.
  - Relocation, reentry, and other radiation protection measures prior to recovery.
  - Recommendations for recovery, return, and cleanup issues.
  - Health and safety advice or information for the public and for workers.
  - Estimated effects of radioactive releases on human health and the environment.
  - Other matters, as requested by the coordinating agency.
- **DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Team:** RAP teams are located at DOE operations offices, national laboratories, and some area offices. They can be dispatched to a radiological incident by the DOE regional coordinating offices responding to a radiological incident.
- **The Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC):** The IMAAC is an interagency center responsible for production, coordination, and dissemination of consequence predictions for an airborne hazardous material release.
- **Interagency Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN):** The ICLN is a coordinated and operational system of all-hazards laboratory networks that provide timely, high-quality, and interpretable results for early detection and effective consequence management of acts of terrorism and other events requiring an integrated laboratory response. The ICLN comprises major laboratory networks as well as the Federal systems specifically responsible for laboratory preparedness and response. Access to the appropriate network is conducted through the network lead.

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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

This concept of operations is applicable to potential and actual radiological/nuclear incidents requiring Federal coordination as delineated in this annex.

General

The owner/operator of a nuclear/radiological facility (DOE, DOD, or NRC licensee) primarily is responsible for mitigating the consequences of an incident, providing notification and appropriate protective action recommendations to State, tribal, and/or local government officials, and minimizing the radiological hazard to the public.

The owner/operator has primary responsibility for actions within the facility boundary and may also have responsibilities for response and recovery activities outside the facility boundary under applicable legal obligations (e.g., contractual; licensee; CERCLA).

State, tribal, and local governments primarily have primary responsibility for protecting life, property, and the environment in those areas outside the facility boundary or incident location. This does not, however, relieve nuclear/radiological facility or material owners/operators from any applicable legal obligations.

State, tribal, and local governments and owners/operators of nuclear/radiological facilities or activities should request assistance through established regulatory communication and response protocols. However, they may request assistance directly from DHS, other Federal agencies, and/or State governments with which they have preexisting arrangements or relationships providing that agency with regulatory authority is also notified.

Notification

The owner/operator of a nuclear/radiological facility or owner/transporter of nuclear/radiological material is generally the first to become aware of an incident and notifies State, tribal, and local authorities and the coordinating agency.

Federal, State, tribal, and local governments that become aware of a radiological incident from any source other than the coordinating agency notify that agency and the DHS National Operations Center.

The coordinating agency provides notification of a radiological incident to the NOC and other Federal agencies, as appropriate.

Releases of reportable quantities or any listed hazardous materials as described within 40 CFR Part 302 are reported to the National Response Center.

Activation

As set forth in the *NRF*, coordinating agencies (and cooperating agencies where appropriate) will provide representatives, as appropriate, to the *NRF* elements activated, including the:

- Domestic Readiness Group (DRG).
- National Operations Center (NOC), to report information and intelligence relative to situational awareness and incident management to the NOC.
- National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), to provide interagency coordination and Federal resource tracking, if needed.

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- Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT).
- Unified Coordination Group.
- Unified Incident Command/Unified Area Command. The coordinating agency will be represented in an appropriate position in the Unified Command structure (as defined by the NIMS), and coordinates Federal radiological response activities at appropriate field facilities.[1]

The coordinating agency may establish a field facility; assist State, tribal, and local response organizations; monitor and support owner/operator activities (when there is an owner or operator); provide technical support to the owner/operator, if requested; and serve as a primary Federal source of information about incident conditions.

For regional incidents, the coordinating agency provides representation to the Joint Field Office (JFO) to serve as a senior Federal official within the Unified Coordination Group when a JFO is activated. Cooperating agencies may also be represented, as needed.

NIMS/ICS Implementation

HSPD-5, "Management of Domestic Incidents," requires that Federal preparedness assistance funding for States, territories, local jurisdictions, and tribal entities be dependent on NIMS compliance; it is expected that all jurisdictions will respond to a nuclear/radiological incident in a manner consistent with the principles of NIMS and the Incident Command System (ICS).

Large-scale nuclear and radiological emergencies may present particular challenges for the traditional ICS structure, requiring extraordinary coordination between Federal, State, tribal, and local governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations. Whether it is a single agency/jurisdiction response or a more complex incident with national implications requiring a multiagency/multijurisdictional response, ICS provides a flexible core mechanism for coordinated and collaborated incident management.

The initial response to domestic incidents is typically handled at the local level. In accordance with NIMS, local responders are responsible for implementing ICS to manage the incident response. Federal agencies will integrate into the Incident Command in support of the local jurisdictions.

Most incidents under this annex will be multiagency/multijurisdictional responses, and the ICS Command function will be managed by a Unified Command.

The coordinating agency is expected to participate in the Unified Command at the highest level (i.e., at the Area Command level if established). Other agencies may also participate in the Unified Command when consistent with ICS principles.

The primary function of the FRMAC is to provide information for planning incident response operations; planning for FRMAC activities is expected to incorporate into Unified Command in the Planning Section consistent with ICS principles. FRMAC personnel will work within the ICS to develop the Monitoring and Sampling Plan and ensure that it is reflected in and consistent with the Incident Action Plan. The FRMAC structure will remain flexible and will be tailored to specific incident requirements.

[1] Appropriate field facilities may include an Incident/Area Command Post, Emergency Operations Center, Emergency Operations Facility, Emergency Control Center, etc.

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During the initial phases of the incident, when is DOE is responsible for the FRMAC, it will be established organizationally as a discrete unit within the Incident Command structure to coordinate all radiological monitoring and assessment activities in support of State, tribal, and local authorities, the Federal coordinating agency, and DHS. The FRMAC Director will normally serve as a Deputy Planning Section Chief overseeing all of the FRMAC.

The Advisory Team will integrate into the Planning Section to provide technical expertise to the Unified Command and the coordinating agency.

RESPONSE ACTIVITIES

Table 3 presents the specific capabilities and responsibilities carried out by coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies to support State, tribal, and local activities during the response.

Table 3: Nuclear/Radiological Incident Response Activities

Response Activity	Federal Agency Capabilities/Responsibilities
Incident Security	• DOD, DOE, or NASA may establish NDAs or NSAs for special nuclear materials under their control, to safeguard classified information and/or restricted data, or equipment and material, and place non-Federal lands under Federal control for the duration of the incident. DOD, DOE, or NASA, as appropriate, coordinates security in and around these locations, as necessary. • For incidents at other Federal or private facilities, the owner/operator provides security within the facility boundaries. If a release of radioactive material occurs beyond the facility boundaries, State, tribal, or local governments provide security for the release area. • State, tribal, and local governments provide security for radiological incidents occurring on public lands (e.g., a transportation incident) other than within NDAs or NSAs. • ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security may be activated to provide additional security resources and capabilities (e.g., for an RDD/IND).
General Technical Operations	• The DRG determines whether the severity of an incident warrants a request for NIRT assets. • DOE learns of an emergency when it is alerted to a possible problem or receive a request for radiological assistance. DOE maintains national and regional coordination offices as points of access to Federal radiological emergency assistance. Requests for RAP teams are generally directed to the appropriate DOE Regional Coordinating Office. All other requests for Federal radiological monitoring and assessment go directly to DOE's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Washington, DC. When other agencies receive requests for Federal radiological monitoring and assessment assistance, they notify the DOE EOC.

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Response Activity	Federal Agency Capabilities/Responsibilities
General Technical Operations (Continued)	• DOE may respond to a State or coordinating agency request for assistance by dispatching a RAP team. If the situation requires more assistance than a RAP team can provide, DOE alerts or activates additional resources. These resources can include the establishment of a FRMAC as the coordination center for Federal radiological assessment activities. DOE may respond with additional resources including the Aerial Measurement System (AMS) to provide wide-area radiation monitoring, Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) medical advisory teams, National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) support, or if the accident involves a U.S. nuclear weapon, the Accident Response Group (ARG). State agencies are encouraged to collocate their radiological monitoring and assessment activities. Some participating Federal agencies have radiological planning and emergency responsibilities as part of their statutory authority, as well as established working relationships with State counterpart agencies. The monitoring and assessment activity coordinated by the FRMAC does not alter these responsibilities but complements them by providing for coordination of the Federal radiological monitoring and assessment response activities.
Environmental Plume Modeling	• When DHS coordinates the overall Federal response, the IMAAC generates the single and interagency coordinated Federal prediction of atmospheric dispersions and their consequences. The IMAAC may also generate predictions for other incidents requiring Federal coordination. • The coordinating agency is responsible for ensuring the sharing of all outputs from the IMAAC with all appropriate response organizations.
Environmental Monitoring	• The FRMAC coordinates Federal monitoring and assessment activities with State, tribal, and local governments when requested. If the FRMAC is not stood up, the coordinating agency assumes responsibility for coordinating the Federal monitoring and assessment activities with State, tribal, and local governments. • Federal first responders may provide radiological monitoring and assessment data directly to State, tribal, and local governments as requested in support of protective action decisionmaking. If a FRMAC is established, DOE will provide a mechanism for transmitting data to and from the FRMAC within NIMS/ICS protocols. Prior to the initiation of FRMAC operations, Federal first responders coordinate radiological monitoring and assessment data with the DOE Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) or the Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT). • When a FRMAC is established, responsibility for coordinating radiological monitoring and assessment activities will transition to EPA at a mutually agreeable time, and after consultation with State, tribal, and local governments, the coordinating agency, and the Unified Coordination Group. • The coordinating agency is responsible for ensuring the sharing of all outputs from the FRMAC with all appropriate response organizations.
Emergency Worker Monitoring	• Each response agency has the responsibility to monitor the safety of its own workers. OSHA provides support and regulatory oversight, as necessary.

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Response Activity	Federal Agency Capabilities/Responsibilities
Development and Dissemination of PARs	• Data in support of health and safety will be shared among response agencies prior to development of formal Protective Action Recommendations (PARs). • Federal PARs are developed by the coordinating agency and the Advisory Team, as appropriate. • Federal PARs may include advice and assistance on measures to avoid or reduce exposure of the public to radiation from a release of radioactive material. This includes advice on emergency actions such as sheltering, evacuation, and prophylactic use of potassium iodide and administration of other pharmaceutical countermeasures. It also includes advice on long-term measures, such as restriction of food, temporary relocation, or permanent resettlement, to avoid or minimize exposure to residual radiation or exposure through the ingestion pathway. • All Federal PARs are coordinated through the Incident Command or Unified Command/Area Command (which will include the coordinating agency) consistent with the NIMS process. The coordinating agency is responsible for ensuring the sharing of all outputs from the Advisory Team with appropriate response organizations. • State, tribal, and local governments are responsible for implementing protective actions as they deem appropriate.
Population Monitoring	• The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), through ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services and in consultation with the coordinating agency, coordinates Federal support for external monitoring of people • HHS assists local and State health departments in establishing a registry of potentially exposed individuals, performs dose reconstruction, and conducts long-term monitoring of this population for potential long-term health effects.
Laboratory Analysis	• The Interagency Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) and National Labs coordinate planning for laboratory analyses for nuclear/radiological events. • Under the ICLN, different Federal agencies have been designated the lead for different types of analyses: (1) the Food and Drug Administration (HHS) for food and agriculture; (2) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS) for bioassays; and (3) EPA and DOE for environmental samples.
Environmental Monitoring and Sampling for Characterization and Reentry	• This operation will be carried out by the FRMAC when activated. When the FRMAC is not activated, support may be provided by an ESF #10 activation. • DOE initially has the FRMAC lead, but the FRMAC lead will transition to EPA for recovery/remediation. • When requested, DOE and other Federal agencies may provide radiation safety support for reentry to critical infrastructure and for other critical activities.
Environmental Monitoring and Sampling for Cleanup Verification	• EPA provides support under ESF #10 except for incidents where DOD or DOE provides the OSC. In such cases, DOE or DOE is primarily responsible for this activity, both on-site and off-site. CERCLA funds also may not be available to support response to nuclear incidents at certain facilities licensed by the NRC.
Release of Public Information	• DHS/ESF #15 – External Affairs will release public information regarding the incident. • For incidents involving terrorism, any participating Federal agency may raise issues regarding the sharing of sensitive information for responder and public safety that cannot be resolved at the incident command level to the Unified Coordination Group for resolution.

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Response Activity	Federal Agency Capabilities/Responsibilities
Population Decontamination	• Decontamination of possibly affected victims is accomplished locally and is the responsibility of State, tribal, and local governments. • Federal resources are provided at the request of, and in support of, the affected State(s). HHS, through ESF #8 and in consultation with the coordinating agency, coordinates Federal support for population decontamination. • HHS assists and supports State, tribal, and local governments in performing monitoring for internal contamination and administering available pharmaceuticals for internal decontamination, as deemed necessary by State health officials. • USDA provides support for animal decontamination under ESF #11 –Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Emergency Worker Decontamination	• The FRMAC provides support for decontamination of Federal, State, and local emergency responders integrating into the FRMAC. • Agencies are responsible for decontamination of their own workers not integrated in the FRMAC.
Response Equipment Decontamination	• The FRMAC provides support for decontamination of Federal, State, and local equipment integrating into the FRMAC. • Agencies are responsible for decontamination of their own equipment that is not integrated in the FRMAC.
Mortuary Affairs	• Support primarily provided by HHS under ESF #8.
Contaminated Animal Management	• USDA provides support for assessment and decontamination of contaminated animals, including companion animals, livestock, poultry, and wildlife. • USDA provides support for stabilization and disposition of contaminated animal carcasses, with additional support from ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering and ESF #10.
Contaminated Agricultural Product Management	• USDA provides support under ESF #11, with additional support from ESF #3 and ESF #10, for the assessment, stabilization, and disposal of contaminated plant materials including food, feed, fiber, and crops.
Radioactive Waste Storage and Disposal	• EPA provides support under ESF #10 except for incidents where DOD or DOE provides the OSC. In such cases, DOE or DOE is primarily responsible for this activity, both on-site and off-site. CERCLA funds also may not be available to support response to nuclear incidents at certain facilities licensed by the NRC. • Support provided by DOD/USACE and other Federal agencies, as needed for RDD/IND.
Contaminated Debris Removal	• DOD/USACE provides support under ESF #3.
Environmental Remediation	• EPA provides support under ESF #10 except for incidents where DOD or DOE provides the OSC. In such cases, DOE or DOE is primarily responsible for this activity, both onsite and offsite. CERCLA funds also may not be available to support response to nuclear incidents at certain facilities licensed by the NRC. • Support provided by USACE and other Federal agencies, as needed for RDD/IND.

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RECOVERY

For an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, DHS coordinates overall Federal recovery activities, while the coordinating agency maintains responsibility for managing the Federal technical radiological cleanup activities in accordance with **its statutory authorities, responsibilities, and *NRF* mechanisms**.

For all **other** radiological incidents, the coordinating agency coordinates environmental remediation/cleanup in concert with cognizant State, tribal, and local governments, and owners/operators, as applicable. While retaining technical lead for these activities, the coordinating agency may **request** support from a cooperating agency that has cleanup/recovery experience and capabilities (e.g., EPA, USACE).

State, tribal, and local governments primarily are responsible for planning the recovery of the affected area (the term "recovery," as used here, encompasses any action dedicated to the continued protection of the public and resumption of normal activities in the affected area). Recovery planning is initiated at the request of the State, tribal, or local governments, and generally does not take place until the initiating conditions of the incident have stabilized and immediate actions to protect public health, safety, and property are accomplished. Upon request, the Federal Government assists State, tribal, and local governments to develop and execute recovery plans.

Private owners/operators have primary responsibility for recovery planning activities and eventual cleanup within their facility boundaries and may have responsibilities for recovery activities outside their facility under applicable legal obligations (e.g., contractual, licensee, CERCLA).

The DOE FRMAC Director works closely with the FRMAC's Senior EPA representative to facilitate a smooth transition of the Federal radiological monitoring and assessment coordination responsibility to EPA at a mutually agreeable time, and after consultation with DHS, the Unified Coordination Group, and State, tribal, and local governments. The following conditions are intended to be met prior to transfer:

- The immediate emergency condition is stabilized;
- Offsite releases of radioactive material have ceased, and there is little or no potential for further unintentional offsite releases;
- The offsite radiological conditions are characterized and the immediate consequences are assessed;
- An initial long-range monitoring plan has been developed in conjunction with the affected State, tribal, and local governments and appropriate Federal agencies; and
- EPA has received adequate assurances from the other Federal agencies that they are committing the required resources, personnel, and funds for the duration of the Federal response.

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Radiological monitoring and assessment activities are normally terminated when the coordinating agency, in consultation with other participating agencies and State, tribal, and local governments, determines that:

- There is no longer a threat to public health and safety or the environment;
- State, tribal, and local resources are adequate for the situation; and
- There is mutual agreement among the agencies involved to terminate monitoring and assessment.

ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

In addition to leading specific portions of a response, coordinating agencies, along with other Federal agencies, may bring specific expertise pertinent to nuclear/radiological incidents. Table 4 below identifies the specific support that these agencies may provide.

Table 4: Additional Federal Agency Capabilities for a Nuclear/Radiological Incident

Agency	Additional Responsibilities
Department of Agriculture (USDA)	(See the ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex for additional information.) • Collects agricultural samples within the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (through the FRMAC). Assists in the evaluation and assessment of data to determine the impact of the incident on agriculture. • Assesses damage to crops, soil, livestock, poultry, and processing facilities and incorporates findings in a damage assessment report. • Supports/advises on decontamination and screening of pets and farm animals that may be exposed to radioactive material.
Department of Commerce (DOC)	• Provides operational weather observations and prepares forecasts tailored to support emergency incident management activities. • Provides plume dispersion assessment and forecasts to the IMAAC and/or coordinating agency, in accordance with established procedures. • Archives, as a special collection, the meteorological data from national observing and numerical weather analysis and prediction systems applicable to the monitoring and assessment of the response. • Ensures that marine fishery products available to the public are not contaminated. • Provides assistance and reference material for calibrating radiological instruments. • Provides radiation shielding materials. • In the event of materials potentially crossing international boundaries, serves as the agent for informing international hydrometeorological services and associated agencies through the mechanisms afforded by the World Meteorological Organization. • Provides radioanalytical measurement support and instrumentation.

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Agency	Additional Responsibilities
Department of Defense (DOD)	• Provides Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents. With the exception for support provided under Immediate Response Authority, the obligation of DOD resources to support requests for assistance is subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Details regarding DSCA are provided in the *NRF*. • Provides Immediate Response Authority under imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency that may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from DOD components and agencies are authorized by DOD directive, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DOD component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities. All such necessary action is referred to as "Immediate Response."

Department of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)	(See the ESF #3 Annex for additional information.)
	• For RDD/IND incidents, provides response and cleanup support as a cooperating agency.
	• Integrates and coordinates with other agencies, as requested, to perform any or all of the following:
	  • Radiological survey functions
	  • Gross decontamination
	  • Site characterization
	  • Contaminated water management
	  • Site remediation.

Department of Energy (DOE)	• Develops and maintains FRMAC policies and procedures, determines FRMAC composition, and maintains FRMAC operational readiness. • Coordinates Federal offsite radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities as lead technical organization in FRMAC (emergency phase), regardless of who is designated the coordinating agency. • Maintains technical liaison with State and local agencies with monitoring and assessment responsibilities. • Maintains a common set of all offsite radiological monitoring data in an accountable, secure, and retrievable form and ensures the technical integrity of FRMAC data. • Provides monitoring data and interpretations, including exposure rate contours, dose projections, and any other requested radiological assessments, to the coordinating agency and to the States. • Provides, in cooperation with other Federal agencies, the personnel and equipment to perform radiological monitoring and assessment activities, and provides on-scene analytical capability supporting assessments. • Requests supplemental assistance and technical support from other Federal agencies as needed. • Arranges consultation and support services through appropriate Federal agencies to all other entities (e.g., private contractors) with radiological monitoring functions and capabilities and technical and medical expertise for handling radiological contamination and population monitoring.

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Agency	Additional Responsibilities
DOE (Continued)	• Works closely with the Senior EPA representative to facilitate a smooth transition of the Federal radiological monitoring and assessment coordination responsibility to EPA at a mutually agreeable time and after consultation with the States and coordinating agency. • Provides, in cooperation with other Federal and State agencies, personnel and equipment, including portal monitors, to support initial external screening and provides advice and assistance to State and local personnel conducting screening/decontamination of persons leaving a contaminated zone. • Provides plume trajectories and deposition projections for emergency response planning assessments including source term estimates where limited or no information is available, including INDs and RDDs, to the IMAAC and/or coordinating agency, in accordance with established procedures. • Upgrades, maintains, coordinates, and publishes documentation needed for the administration, implementation, operation, and standardization of the FRMAC. • Maintains and improves the ability to provide wide-area radiation monitoring now resident in the AMS. • Maintains and improves the ability to provide medical assistance, advisory teams, and training related to nuclear/radiological accidents and incidents now resident in the REAC/TS. • Maintains and improves the ability to provide correct modeled results through integration of actual radiation measurements obtained from both airborne and ground sources, resident in the NARAC. The NARAC also maintains and improves their ability to model the direct results (blast, thermal, radiation, EMP) of a nuclear detonation. • Maintains and improves the first-response ability to assess an emergency situation and to advise decisionmakers on what further steps can be taken to evaluate and minimize the hazards of a radiological emergency resident in the RAP. • Maintains and improves the ability to respond to an emergency involving U.S. nuclear weapons resident in the ARG. • Maintains and improves the ability of the Consequence Management Planning Team, CMHT, and CMRTs to provide initial planning, coordination, and data collection and assessment prior to or in lieu of establishment of a FRMAC. • Maintains and improves the ability of the Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team to provide advice and limited technical assistance, including search, diagnostics, and effects prediction, as part of a Domestic Emergency Support Team. • Maintains and improves the ability of the Search Response Teams to provide covert search capability using local support for initial nuclear search activities. • Maintains and improves the ability of the Joint Technical Operations Team to provide technical operations advisory support and advanced technical assistance to the Federal primary or coordinating agency, provide extended technical support to other deployed operations through an emergency response home team; perform nuclear safety reviews to determine safe-to-ship status before moving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to an appropriate disposal location; and accept custody of nuclear or radiological WMD on behalf of DOE and provide for the final disposition of these devices. • Maintains and improves the ability of Radiological Triage to determine through remote analysis of nuclear spectra collected on-scene if a radioactive object contains special nuclear materials.

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Agency	Additional Responsibilities
DOE (Continued)	• Assigns a Senior Energy Official (SEO) for any response involving the deployment of the DOE/NNSA emergency response assets. The SEO will integrate into an appropriate position in the Unified Command structure, and is responsible for the coordination and employment of these assets at the scene of a radiological event. The deployed assets will work in support of and under the direction of the SEO.
Department of Health and Human Services (HSS)	(See the ESF #8 Annex for additional information.) • Collects samples of agricultural products to monitor and assess the extent of contamination as a basis for recommending or implementing protective actions (through the FRMAC). • Provides advice on proper medical treatment of the general population and response workers exposed to or contaminated by radioactive materials. • Provides available medical countermeasures through deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile. • Provides assessment and treatment teams for those exposed to or contaminated by radiation. • Provides advice and guidance in assessing the impact of the effects of radiological incidents on the health of persons in the affected area. • Manages long-term public monitoring and supports follow-on personal data collection, collecting and processing of blood samples and bodily fluids/matter samples, and advice concerning medical assessment and triage of victims. Tracks victim treatment and long-term health effects.
Department of Homeland Security/Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)	• Supports the deployment of an enhanced global nuclear detection system to detect and report on attempts to import, possess, store, transport, develop, or use an unauthorized nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological material in the United States. • Through the DNDO Joint Analysis Center, provides a coordinated technical adjudication of a nuclear/radiation detection alarm, and recommends Federal asset responses as required. • Coordinates the national technical nuclear forensics laboratory
Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	• Serves as the annex coordinator for this annex.

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Agency	Additional Responsibilities
Department of Homeland Security/Customs and Border Protection (DHS/CBP)	• For incidents at the border, maintains radiation detection equipment and nonintrusive inspection technology at ports of entry and Border Patrol checkpoints to detect the presence of radiological substances transported by persons, cargo, mail, or conveyance arriving from foreign countries. • Through its National Targeting Center, provides extensive analytical and targeting capabilities to identify and interdict terrorists and WMD. • The CBP Weapons of Mass Destruction Teleforensic Center provides 24/7 support to DHS/CBP and other Federal law enforcement personnel in the identification of interdicted suspect hazardous material. • The CBP Laboratory and Scientific Services staffs WMD Response Teams in strategic locations nationwide. • Through the Container Security Initiative, DHS/CBP personnel are stationed at major foreign seaports in order to detect and prevent the transport of WMD on container vessels destined to the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)	• Because of its unique maritime jurisdiction and capabilities, is prepared to provide appropriate security, command and control, transportation, and support to other agencies that need to operate in the maritime domain.
Department of the Interior (DOI)	• Advises and assists in evaluating processes affecting radioisotopes in soils, including personnel, equipment, and laboratory support. • Advises and assists in the development of geographic information systems databases to be used in the analysis and assessment of contaminated areas, including personnel and equipment. • Provides liaison between federally recognized tribal governments and Federal, State, and local agencies for coordination of response activities. Additionally, advises and assists DHS on economic, social, and political matters in the U.S. insular areas should a radiological incident occur in these areas.
Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)	• Provides advice and technical assistance to DHS, the coordinating agency, and State, tribal, and local governments concerning the health and safety of response workers implementing the policies and concepts in this annex.
Department of State (DOS)	• Serves as the U.S. Government lead in notification of the IAEA in accordance with the Convention on Early Notification in the Case of a Nuclear Accident. • Serves as the U.S. Government lead in requesting or accepting assistance in accordance with the IAEA Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or a Radiological Emergency.
Department of Transportation (DOT)	(See the ESF #1 – Transportation Annex for further information.) • Provides technical advice and assistance on the transportation of radiological materials and the impact of the incident on the transportation infrastructure.
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)	• Provides medical assistance using the Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team, which provides direct patient treatment; assists and trains local health care providers in managing, handling, and treatment of radiation exposed and contaminated casualties; assesses the impact on human health; and provides consultation and technical advice to local, State, and Federal authorities.

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Agency	Additional Responsibilities
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	(See ESF #10 Annex for additional information.) • Provides resources, including personnel, equipment, and laboratory support (including mobile laboratories) to assist DOE in monitoring radioactivity levels in the environment. • Assists in the development and implementation of a long-term monitoring plan and long-term recovery plan. • Provides nationwide environmental monitoring data from the RadNet for assessing the national impact of the incident. • Develops Protective Action Guidance manuals in coordination with the FRPCC. • Recommends acceptable emergency levels of radioactivity and radiation in the environment. • Prepares health and safety advice and information for the public. • Estimates effects of radioactive releases on human health and the environment. • Provides, in cooperation with other Federal agencies, the law enforcement personnel and equipment to conduct law enforcement operations and investigations for nuclear/radiological incidents involving criminal activity that are not terrorism related.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)	• Provides technical assistance to include source term estimation, plume dispersion, and dose assessment calculations. • Provides assistance in Federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities.

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Coordinating Agencies:

Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation

Cooperating Agencies:

Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of State
Environmental Protection Agency

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of this annex is to facilitate an effective Federal law enforcement and investigative response to all threats or acts of terrorism within the United States, regardless of whether they are deemed credible. To accomplish this, the annex establishes a structure for a systematic, coordinated, unified, timely, and effective national law enforcement and investigative response to threats or acts of terrorism within the United States.

Scope

This annex is a strategic document that:

- Provides planning guidance and outlines operational concepts for the Federal law enforcement and investigative response to a threatened or actual terrorist incident within the United States.

- Acknowledges and outlines the unique nature of each threat or incident, the capabilities and responsibilities of the local jurisdictions, and the law enforcement and investigative activities necessary to prevent or mitigate a specific threat or incident.

Policies

The United States regards terrorism as a potential threat to national security, as well as a violent criminal act, and applies all appropriate means to combat this danger. In doing so, the United States vigorously pursues efforts to deter and preempt these crimes and to apprehend and prosecute directly, or assist other governments in prosecuting, individuals who perpetrate or plan terrorist attacks.

To ensure the policies established in applicable Presidential directives are implemented in a coordinated manner, this annex provides overall guidance to Federal, State, tribal, and local agencies concerning the Federal Government's law enforcement and investigative response to potential or actual terrorist threats or incidents that occur in the United States, particularly those involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explosive (CBRNE) material.

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Federal Agencies

The law enforcement and investigative response to a terrorist threat or incident within the United States is a highly coordinated, multiagency State, tribal, and local and Federal responsibility. In support of this mission, the following Federal agencies have primary responsibility for certain aspects of the overall law enforcement and investigative response:

- Department of Defense (DOD)
- Department of Energy (DOE)
- Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ/FBI)
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, "The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the Federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States, as well as for related intelligence collection activities within the United States, subject to the National Security Act of 1947 and other applicable law, Executive Order 12333, and Attorney General approved procedures pursuant to that Executive order. Generally acting through the FBI, the Attorney General, in cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall also coordinate the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States. Following a terrorist threat or an actual incident that falls within the criminal jurisdiction of the United States, the full capabilities of the United States shall be dedicated, consistent with U.S. law and with activities of other Federal departments and agencies to protect our national security, to assisting the Attorney General to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice. The Attorney General and the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two departments."

Although not formally designated under this annex, other Federal departments and agencies may have authorities, resources, capabilities, or expertise required to support terrorism-related law enforcement and investigation operations. Agencies may be requested to participate in Federal planning and response operations, and may be requested to designate liaison officers and provide other support as required.

Deployment/Employment Priorities

In addition to the priorities identified in the National Response Framework, the law enforcement and investigative response to terrorist threats or incidents is based on the following priorities:

- Preserving life or minimizing risk to health, which constitutes the first priority of operations.

- Preventing a threatened act from being carried out or an existing terrorist act from being expanded or aggravated.

- Locating, accessing, rendering safe, controlling, containing, recovering, or disposing of a WMD that has not yet functioned, and disposing of CBRNE material in coordination with appropriate departments and agencies (e.g., DOD, DOE, EPA).

- Apprehending and successfully prosecuting perpetrators of terrorist threats or incidents.

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Planning Assumptions and Considerations

In addition to the planning assumptions and considerations identified in the National Response Framework, the law enforcement and investigative response to terrorist threats or incidents, particularly those involving WMD and CBRNE material, are based on the following assumptions and considerations:

- A terrorist threat or incident may occur at any time of day with little or no warning, may involve single or multiple geographic areas, and may result in mass casualties.

- The suspected or actual involvement of terrorists adds a complicating dimension to incident management.

- The response to a threat or actual incident involves FBI law enforcement and investigative activity as an integrated element.

- In the case of a threat, there may be no incident site and no external consequences, and, therefore, there may be no need for establishment of traditional Incident Command System (ICS) elements such as an Incident Command Post (ICP) or a Joint Field Office (JFO).

- An act of terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center within the United States involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical materials, will have major consequences that can overwhelm the capabilities of many State, tribal, and/or local governments to respond and may seriously challenge existing Federal response capabilities.

- In the case of a biological attack, the effect may be temporally and geographically dispersed, with no determined or defined "incident site." Response operations may be conducted over a multijurisdictional, multistate region.

- A biological attack employing a contagious agent may require quarantine by Federal, State, tribal, and local health officials to contain the disease outbreak.

- If appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities are not available and the area is contaminated with CBRNE or other hazardous materials, it is possible that response actions into a contaminated area may be delayed until the material has dissipated to a level that is safe for emergency response personnel to operate or until appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities arrive, whichever is sooner.

Situation

The complexity, scope, and potential consequences of a terrorist threat or incident require that there be a rapid and decisive capability to resolve the situation. The resolution to an act of terrorism demands an extraordinary level of coordination of law enforcement, criminal investigation, protective activities, emergency management functions, and technical expertise across all levels of government. The incident may affect a single location or multiple locations, each of which may be an incident scene, a hazardous scene, and/or a crime scene simultaneously.

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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Command and Control

The FBI is the lead agency for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats and intelligence collection activities within the United States. Investigative and intelligence activities are managed by the FBI from an FBI command post or Joint Operations Center (JOC). The command post or JOC coordinates the necessary Federal law enforcement assets required to respond to and resolve the threat or incident with other Federal, State, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies.

The FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the local Field Office establishes a command post to manage the threat based upon a graduated and flexible response. This command post structure generally consists of three functional groups: Command, Operations, and Operations Support, and is designed to accommodate participation of other agencies, as appropriate (see Figure 1).

When the threat or incident exceeds the capabilities and resources of the local FBI Field Office, the SAC can request additional assistance from regional and national assets to augment existing capabilities. In a terrorist threat or incident that may involve a WMD or CBRNE material, the traditional FBI command post will transition to a JOC, which may temporarily incorporate a fourth functional entity, the Consequence Management Group (see Figure 2), in the absence of an activated JFO.

When, in the determination of the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General, the incident requires Federal coordination and a JFO is established, the JOC becomes a section of the JFO and a senior FBI official is appointed as the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO) and participates as a representative in the Unified Coordination Group. The SFLEO may or may not be the SAC of the local Field Office. In this situation, the JOC Consequence Management Group is incorporated into the appropriate sections of the JFO.

Figure 1. FBI Command Post



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The JOC structure may also be used to coordinate law enforcement, investigative, and intelligence activities for the numerous special events, threats, or incidents that occur each year that do not escalate to incidents requiring DHS to coordinate the overall Federal response.

Joint Operations Center

The JOC is an interagency command and control center for managing multiagency preparation for, and the law enforcement and investigative response to, a credible terrorist threat or incident. For example, in the event of a suspected bioterrorism incident, joint law enforcement and epidemiologic investigations will be coordinated within the JOC. This coordination would entail the sharing and analysis of victim interviews, contact tracing, disease reporting, and laboratory test results, along with available law enforcement and intelligence information, to determine the cause(s) of the outbreak and/or potential perpetrators.

Similar to the Area Command concept within ICS, the JOC also may be established to coordinate and organize multiple agencies and jurisdictions during critical incidents. Following the basic principles established in the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the JOC is modular and scalable and may be tailored to meet the specific operational requirements needed to manage a threat or incident or support special events.

A JOC may be established and staffed in a preincident, preemptive role in support of a significant special event. This “watch mode” allows for rapid expansion to full operations if a critical incident occurs during the special event. The JOC is a strategic management tool that effectively coordinates law enforcement investigative, intelligence, and operational activities at multiple sites from a single location. The JOC may be the only management structure related to a threat, critical incident, or special event, or it may integrate into other management structures in accordance with the National Response Framework.

Law enforcement public safety functions, such as proactive patrol and traffic control, historically are managed through the Operations Section of the ICS. Criminal investigation and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence are sensitive law enforcement operations that require a secure environment and well-defined organizational management structure. The JOC is designed to coordinate this specialized law enforcement investigative and intelligence activity. It provides mechanisms for controlling access to and dissemination of sensitive or classified information. Management of crisis information and intelligence is recognized under the NIMS as a sixth functional area within ICS. The structure of the JOC supports this functional area and enhances the overall management of critical incidents and special events.

The NIMS provides the framework within which the ICS and JOC structures operate for a unified approach to domestic incident management.

The JOC is composed of four main groups: the Command Group, the Operations Group, the Operations Support Group, and the Consequence Management Group.

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Figure 2. Joint Operations Center



* While the Operations Group and Operations Support Group remain components of the JOC when it is incorporated into the JFO, the JIC and Consequence Management Group will be merged into the appropriate JFO staff components, if established.

Command Group

The Command Group of the JOC provides recommendations and advice to the FBI SAC regarding the development and implementation of strategic decisions to resolve the situation. It is responsible for approving the deployment and employment of law enforcement investigative and intelligence resources. The Command Group maintains its advisory role to the FBI SAC when the JOC becomes a section of the JFO for incidents requiring Federal coordination. When a JFO is established in this situation, a senior FBI official is appointed as the SFLEO and participates as a representative in the Unified Coordination Group. The SFLEO may or may not be the SAC of the local Field Office. If a local SAC transitions to the JFO, an Assistant SAC or an alternate senior FBI official leads the JOC Command Group.

The FBI representatives in the Command Group include the SAC, the Assistant SAC, and an executive-officer position known as the Crisis Management Coordinator (CMC). The SAC of the FBI Field Office in which the incident occurs is responsible for developing the overall strategy for managing Federal investigative law enforcement activities at the critical incident or special event and coordinating the implementation of that strategy with other agency decisionmakers and FBI Headquarters. The FBI SAC also is responsible for coordinating Federal law enforcement activities with other Federal incident management personnel during domestic critical incidents and special events. The CMC ensures that the strategy of the SAC is communicated to everyone in the JOC and that the JOC is staffed and equipped to effectively implement the strategy of the SAC. The CMC also ensures that information flows efficiently within the JOC and between the JOC and other command and control centers.

The JOC Command Group includes senior officials with decisionmaking authority from local, State, and Federal agencies, as appropriate, based upon the circumstances of the threat or incident. Consistent with the Unified Command concept, law enforcement investigative and intelligence strategies, tactics, and priorities are determined jointly within the JOC Command Group. Federal law enforcement investigative, intelligence, and operational decisions are made cooperatively to the extent possible, but the responsibility to make these decisions rests ultimately with the FBI SAC.

Three specialized teams provide guidance and expertise directly to the Command Group. These teams are the Strategic Legal Team, the Joint Information Center Team, and the Domestic Emergency Support Team.

- The Strategic Legal Team is composed of legal counsel from the FBI, U.S. Attorney's Office, and the District or State's Attorney's Office. This team provides legal guidance to the Command Group concerning the strategies under consideration for resolution of the crisis.

- The Joint Information Center (JIC) Team is integrated into the JFO when established. It is composed of the public affairs (media) officers from the participating local, State, and Federal public safety agencies. It manages information released to the public through a coordinated, unified approach. A separate media unit within the JOC Operations Support Group provides FBI-specific guidance and expertise to the FBI SAC and coordinates with the JIC to ensure the media strategy is consistent with the overall investigative strategy.

- The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) is a specialized interagency team composed of subject-matter experts from the FBI, DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency, DOD, DOE, HHS, and EPA. It provides guidance to the FBI SAC concerning WMD threats and actual incidents.

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Operations Group

The Operations Group handles all investigative, intelligence, and operational functions related to the threat, critical incident, or special event.

Each unit within the Operations Group provides expertise in a specific functional area that is important to the overall resolution of the incident.

The units within the Operations Group are scalable and modular, and may be tailored to the specific threat, critical incident, or special event.

The Operations Group normally consists of the Information Control Unit, the Intelligence Unit, the Investigations Unit, and Field Operations Units.

Information Control

Information Control is the central point for receiving all information that comes into the JOC. The purpose of Information Control is to ensure telephone calls, e-mail messages, fax reports, and other incoming information are assessed for relevance to the threat, critical incident, or special event. The information is checked to determine if it has been previously reported. It is prioritized and entered into the information management system. Through this filtering mechanism the Information Control Unit ensures that only current and relevant information is disseminated to the JOC.

The Information Control Coordinator is responsible for providing guidance and direction to all personnel within the Information Control Unit and coordinating the activities of the unit with all other units within the JOC. Personnel within the Information Control Unit are responsible for receiving incoming information, processing new information, routing followup information appropriately, and implementing procedures for tracking evidentiary material that is introduced into the command post.

Intelligence

The Intelligence Unit manages the collection, analysis, archiving, and dissemination of relevant and valid investigative and strategic intelligence. It fuses historical intelligence from a variety of sources with new intelligence specific to the threat, critical incident, or special event. The Intelligence Unit also disseminates intelligence products and situation reports to all JOC units, FBI Headquarters Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), and the Unified Coordination Group. This information is shared with the DHS National Operations Center (NOC), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and, as appropriate, other government agencies, consistent with operational security considerations.

The Intelligence Unit is usually divided into teams based on functional responsibility. Teams manage intelligence related to the crisis site or target, build intelligence portfolios and databases on significant elements related to the investigation (subjects, vehicles, and organizations), analyze and identify trends in activities related to the investigation (predictive and strategic intelligence), conduct liaison with members of the Intelligence Community and other sources of intelligence, and prepare periodic briefings and reports concerning the status of the crisis or investigation. The Intelligence Unit is responsible for collecting and reviewing all intelligence related to the threat, crisis, or special event to enable the SAC to further develop and refine strategic objectives.

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Investigations

The Investigations Unit provides oversight and direction to all investigative activity related to the threat, critical incident, or special event. The Investigations Unit implements the strategy of the SAC by directing the collection and management of investigative information. It is composed of investigative personnel from the agencies with specific jurisdiction or authority for investigating crimes related to the threat, critical incident, or special event. The Investigations Unit Coordinator is usually an FBI Supervisor who has responsibility for investigating the most significant substantive law violation.

Teams within the Investigations Unit review all incoming information to determine its investigative value. The Investigations Unit assigns, tracks, and reviews all investigative leads and documents the investigation in the appropriate case file(s). The case agents or primary investigators within the Investigations Unit manage all evidence and information, and prepare it for court presentation, if appropriate. The case agents or primary investigators are assisted by analytical personnel to ensure that all investigative information is pursued to its logical conclusion. The Investigations Unit is responsible for collecting and reviewing all reports of investigative activity to enable the SAC to further develop and refine strategic objectives.

Field Operations

The Field Operations units are based upon the specific needs of the threat, critical incident, or special event. The personnel staffing these units are subject-matter experts in a number of specialized skill areas. Field Operations unit coordinators are responsible for ensuring the activities of the specialized units are consistent with and in support of the strategy of the SAC.

Field Operations units may include representatives of tactical, negotiations, WMD/CBRNE, evidence response, surveillance, technical, or any other specialized unit deployed to the crisis site(s) or staged in readiness. The mission of these units is to provide the SAC with current information and specialized assistance in dealing with the threat, critical incident, or special event. Information is communicated between the JOC and the crisis site(s) through the Field Operations unit representatives in the JOC. This ensures that decisionmakers both in the JOC and in the forward areas maintain full situational awareness. The Field Operations units coordinate their activities within the JOC to ensure each is aware of the impact of their activities on the other field units.

Local, State, and Federal law enforcement specialty units assigned to assist with field operations during the threat, incident, or special event coordinate their activities with the appropriate FBI Field Operations units through the JOC. Federal Government mission-specific units designated to help the FBI, maintain their respective chains of command and coordinate their activities through representation in the JOC. The JOC manages the activities of the specialized units at a strategic level. Activities at the individual or “tactical” level are managed at the crisis site(s) through forward command structures such as the Tactical Operations Center, Negotiations Operations Center, and Evidence Response Team Operations Center.

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Operations Support Group

The Operations Support Group units designated within the JOC are based upon the specific needs of the threat, critical incident, or special event. The personnel who staff these units are subject-matter experts in a number of specialized areas. Operations Support Group unit coordinators are responsible for ensuring the activity of their units is consistent with and in support of the strategy of the SAC.

Operations Support Group units can include administrative, logistics, legal, media, medical, liaison, communications, and information management. The mission of these units is to support the investigative, intelligence, and operational functions of the JOC.

The Administrative and Logistics units have responsibilities that are similar to the Finance and Logistics Sections in ICS. However, they are tasked with managing only the activities related to the law enforcement investigative, intelligence, and operational functions; they do not manage the administrative and logistics functions associated with the overall incident. If a JFO is established, representatives of the JOC Administrative and Logistics Units are responsible for establishing liaison with the corresponding sections of the JFO to support effective tracking and coordination of these functions for the overall incident.

The Legal and Media units support the investigative and intelligence operations of the JOC through the preparation of specific legal processes and management of media affairs. These units focus on specific objectives related to the investigation such as search warrants and press releases, and not the strategic overall objectives handled by the Strategic Legal Team and JIC that are attached to the Command Group.

The Liaison Unit is composed of representatives from outside agencies who assist the FBI with resolution of the threat, critical incident, or special event. The Liaison Unit may include agencies without clear authority or jurisdiction over the threat, critical incident, or special event if they have a potential investigative interest. For example, law enforcement agencies that border affected jurisdictions may be represented in the JOC to maintain situational awareness of potential threats. Additional Liaison Unit representatives may include non-law enforcement personnel such as firefighters, utility company workers, or engineering specialists.

The Communications Unit is responsible for radio and telephone communications to support JOC operations. The Communications Unit establishes communications networks within the JOC. It also establishes networks to facilitate timely and reliable information-sharing between the JOC and other command and control centers.

The Information Technology Unit is responsible for the JOC information technology system within each unit and between units. Information technology specialists and facilitators assigned to this unit are responsible for ensuring the uninterrupted operation of the information management system used during JOC operations.

Consequence Management Group

The JOC Consequence Management Group consists of representatives of agencies that provide consequence-focused expertise in support of law enforcement activities. The JOC Consequence Management Group does not manage consequence functions; rather, it ensures that law enforcement activities with emergency management implications are communicated and coordinated to appropriate personnel in a complete and timely manner.

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A DHS representative coordinates the actions of the JOC Consequence Management Group, and expedites activation of a Federal incident management response should it become necessary. FBI and DHS representatives screen threat/incident intelligence for the Consequence Management Group. Representatives of the JOC Consequence Management Group monitor the law enforcement criminal investigation and may provide advice regarding decisions that impact the general public or critical infrastructure. This integration provides continuity should a Federal incident management response become necessary.

Agencies comprising the Consequence Management Group may also have personnel assigned to other units within the JOC structure. Depending on the nature of the incident and required assets, additional teams assigned to support the FBI may be included under Other Specialized Units.

Should the threat of a terrorist incident become imminent, the JOC Consequence Management Group may forward recommendations to the National Response Coordination Center or Regional Response Coordination Center Director to initiate limited predeployment of assets under the Stafford Act or other appropriate authorities.

Requests for DOD assistance for law enforcement and criminal investigation during the incident come from the Attorney General to the Secretary of Defense through the DOD Executive Secretary. Once the Secretary approves the request, the order is transmitted either directly to the unit involved or through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FBI will notify the NOC when requesting DOD assistance.

An FBI command post becomes a JOC when a Consequence Management Group has been established.

Representatives in this group may move to appropriate positions in other sections of the JFO when one is established.

The Response

Receipt of a terrorist threat may be through any source or medium and may be articulated or developed through intelligence sources. It is the responsibility of all local, State, and Federal agencies and departments to notify the FBI when such a threat is received. As explained below, the FBI evaluates the credibility of the terrorist threat and notifies the NOC, NCTC, and other departments and agencies, as appropriate.

Upon receipt of a threat of terrorism within the United States, the FBI conducts a formal threat credibility assessment in support of operations with assistance from select interagency experts. For a WMD or CBRNE threat, this assessment includes three perspectives:

- Technical Feasibility: An assessment of the capacity of the threatening individual or organization to obtain or produce the material at issue.

- Operational Practicability: An assessment of the feasibility of delivering or employing the material in the manner threatened.

- Behavioral Resolve: A psychological assessment of the likelihood that the subject(s) will carry out the threat, including a review of any written or verbal statement by the subject(s).

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A threat assessment is conducted to determine whether the potential threat is credible, and confirm whether WMD or CBRNE materials are involved in the developing terrorist incident. Intelligence varies with each threat and impacts the level of the Federal response. If the threat is credible, the situation requires the tailoring of response actions to use Federal resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve the situation. The Federal law enforcement response focuses on law enforcement/investigative actions taken in the interest of public safety and welfare, and is predominantly concerned with preventing and resolving the threat. In addition, contingency planning focuses on the response to potential consequences and the pre-positioning of tailored resources, as required. The threat increases in significance when the presence of a CBRNE device or WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or loss, is confirmed or when intelligence and circumstances indicate a high probability that a device exists. In this case, the threat has developed into a WMD or CBRNE terrorist situation requiring an immediate process to identify, acquire, and plan the use of Federal resources to augment State, tribal, and local authorities in lessening or averting the potential consequence of terrorist use or employment of WMD or CBRNE material. It should be noted that a threat assessment would also be conducted if an incident occurs without warning. In this case, the assessment is focused on criminal intent, the extent of the threat, and the likelihood of secondary devices or locations.

The FBI manages a Terrorist Threat Warning System to ensure that vital information regarding terrorism reaches those in the U.S. counterterrorism and law enforcement community responsible for countering terrorist threats. This information is coordinated with DHS and the NCTC, and is transmitted via secure teletype. Each message transmitted under this system is an alert, an advisory, or an assessment—an alert if the terrorist threat is credible and specific, an advisory if the threat is credible but general in both timing and target, or an assessment to impart facts and/or threat analysis concerning terrorism.

Upon determination of a credible threat, FBI Headquarters may fully activate the SIOC to coordinate and manage the national-level support to a terrorism incident. The SIOC generally mirrors the JOC structure operating in the field. The SIOC is staffed by liaison officers from other Federal agencies who coordinate with and provide assistance to the FBI. The SIOC maintains direct connectivity with the NOC. The NOC is notified immediately by the SIOC once a threat has been determined to be credible. In turn, this notification may result in activation of National Response Framework components in coordination with the FBI.

The FBI leads the criminal investigation related to the incident, and the SIOC is the focal point for all intelligence related to the investigative law enforcement response to the incident. Consistent with the National Response Framework, affected Federal agencies operate headquarters-level emergency operations centers, as necessary. FBI Headquarters initiates appropriate liaison with other Federal agencies to activate their operations centers and provide liaison officers to the SIOC. In addition, FBI Headquarters initiates communications with the SAC of the responsible Field Office, apprising him/her of possible courses of action and discussing deployment of the DEST. The FBI SAC establishes initial operational priorities based upon the specific circumstances of the threat or incident. This information is then forwarded to FBI Headquarters to coordinate identification and deployment of appropriate resources.

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The JOC is established by the FBI under the operational control of the FBI SAC, and acts as the local coordination center for criminal investigation, law enforcement, and intelligence activities related to the threat or incident. When a JFO is established for a terrorism incident, the FBI SAC provides full and prompt cooperation, resources, and support to the FCO/FRC, and other members of the Unified Coordination Group, which may or may not include a PFO, as appropriate and consistent with applicable authorities. The JOC may serve as an initial operating facility for strategic management and identification of State, tribal, and local requirements and priorities, and coordination of the Federal response. The FBI SAC coordinates public communications strategies and messaging with the Unified Coordination Group and the ESF #15 External Affairs Officer, if one is appointed. It is recognized that in some cases it may be necessary for the FBI SAC to respond directly to media/public inquiries on investigative operations and matters affecting law enforcement operations, particularly during the early stages of the emergency response.

The local FBI Field Office activates a Crisis Management Team to establish the JOC in the affected area, possibly collocated with an existing emergency operations facility. In locating the JOC, consideration is given to the possibility that the facility may have to accommodate other Federal incident management field activities including the JFO, the JIC, and other supporting teams. Additionally, the JOC is augmented by outside agencies, including representatives from the DEST (if deployed), who provide interagency technical expertise as well as interagency continuity during the transition from an FBI command post structure to the JOC structure.

Based upon a credible threat assessment, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, will make a recommendation to the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council to deploy the DEST in support of the FBI On-Scene Commander. The DEST is a rapidly deployable, interagency group designed to provide expert advice, guidance, and support to the FBI On-Scene Commander during a domestic event, including a WMD incident or credible threat, or in the resolution of a terrorist incident requiring the integration of multiple Federal assets.

Upon arrival at the FBI command post or JOC, the DEST may act as a stand-alone advisory team to the SAC providing recommended courses of action. Although it would be unusual, the DEST may be tasked to deploy before a JOC is established. The DEST may handle some of the specialized interagency functions of the JOC until the JOC is fully staffed. The DEST emergency management component merges into the Consequence Management Group in the JOC structure.

Prior to an actual WMD or CBRNE incident, law enforcement, intelligence, and investigative activities generally have priority. When an incident results in the use of WMD or CBRNE material, rescue and life-safety activities generally have priority. Activities may overlap and/or run concurrently during the incident management, and are dependent on the threat and/or the strategies for responding to the incident.

Upon determination that applicable law enforcement/intelligence goals and objectives are met and no further immediate threat exists, the FBI SAC may deactivate the JOC and order a return to routine law enforcement/investigative operations in accordance with preevent protocols.

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When an incident occurs and an ICP is established on-scene, FBI personnel integrate into the ICP to enhance the ability of the FBI to carry out its mandated mission (see Figure 3). Three specific positions within an ICP are provided. The first FBI Special Agent (SA) or Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) member responding receives an initial briefing from the Incident Commander or his/her designee and works closely with the Incident Commander as a member of the Unified Command. The FBI representative then informs the local Field Office of the current situation and, if necessary, requests additional assets. When a more senior FBI SA arrives on the scene, he/she assumes the role of the FBI representative in the Unified Command.

An SA or JTTF member is assigned to the Operations Section as the Deputy Chief of Operations. This position is responsible for managing the deployment and coordination of Federal law enforcement and investigative assets in support of the Incident Action Plan. Additionally, an FBI SA assumes the position of Deputy Chief of Planning within the ICP. This position permits the FBI SA to remain updated on the situation and serve as a conduit for requests for additional law enforcement and investigative assets. The Agent also inputs Federal objectives into the developing incident action plan and performs other duties as appropriate. FBI assets may comprise one or more units in the Operations Section. The actions and activities of the Unified Command at the incident scene and the Command Group of the JOC (and the Unified Coordination Group if established) are continuously and completely coordinated throughout the incident.

Figure 3. On-Scene Coordination



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