MITIGATION ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT
Hurricane Ivan in Alabama and Florida

Observations, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance
FEMA 489 /August 2005

Chapter 6: Performance of Critical and Essential Facilities

Critical and essential facilities are needed to lead and manage response and 
recovery operations during and/or after an event. Hurricane Ivan had a 
significant impact on critical and essential facilities. Though all of the 
buildings were subjected to winds that were below design conditions, the overall 
performance of the buildings the MAT observed was poor. The poor building 
performance placed additional burden on response and recovery personnel as they 
endeavored to provide assistance to their communities after the event. According 
to the 2003 IBC (Section 1604, Table 1604.5) and the 2001 FBC (Section 1606, 
Table 1606), critical and essential facilities include, but are not limited to, 
hospitals (and other medical facilities), fire and police stations, primary 
communication facilities, disaster (emergency) operations centers, and power 
stations and other utilities required in an emergency. Schools are also listed 
in the IBC, but not the FBC. Because of the poor performance and reported damage 
to these facilities, the MAT assessed numerous facilities to document the damage 
and loss of function.

Critical and essential facilities that were damaged include an EOC/police 
station, jails, hospitals, schools, and shelters. Most damage was to envelope 
systems, though a few structural failures did occur (see Chapter 5 for 
photographs and discussion of envelope damage). Most of the damage was to older 
facilities; however, some newer facilities also experienced failure. Except for 
occasional shuttering of glazed openings, the investigated buildings did not 
appear to have been designed and constructed with wind-resistance enhancements 
to the building envelope and rooftop equipment. 

The MAT observed minimal damages at several jail and fire station facilities. 
This consisted of minor damage to coping, edge flashing, and canopies, and loss 
of fan cowlings – none of which caused any significant functional disruption. 
Maintaining operation of the jails avoided transporting and housing inmates in 
other facilities and avoided placing additional burdens on law enforcement 
personnel. Maintaining operation of the fire stations avoided disruption of 
emergency response capability. However, all three of the fire stations that were 
observed by the MAT were older pre-engineered metal buildings. Had wind speeds 
been closer to a current design event, all three of these buildings would have 
likely suffered major damage to the sectional doors and/or the metal roof panels 
(see Mitigation Assessment Team Report, Hurricane Charley in Florida, FEMA 488 
for a discussion of fire station performance in Hurricane Charley). 

The MAT did not observe any critical or essential facilities located in areas 
affected by flooding. By being located outside of floodprone areas, these 
critical and essential facilities were able to provide community services 
without interruption due to flooding.

6.1	Emergency Operation Centers
EOCs are key buildings in preparing for and responding to an event from both 
local and state levels. The MAT observed only one EOC, which was located in the 
basement of the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office (in Pensacola). This facility 
experienced several building envelope problems. However, although rainwater 
entered the building, it did not disrupt the EOC operations.
6.1.1	General Damage
The original building had two floors above grade. A new two-story addition was 
joined to the original building. Construction of the addition was essentially 
complete when Hurricane Ivan struck. A large roof membrane blow-off was 
experienced in one area (Figure 6-1). The damaged membrane was a BUR with a 
field-applied mineral surfacing over light weight insulating concrete (LWIC). 
The LWIC was likely installed over a structural concrete deck. Although the 
rooftop equipment was inadequately attached on both the original and new 
portions of the building, the equipment was likely damaged by windborne roof 
debris rather than wind pressure. The modified bitumen roof membrane on the new 
addition was also damaged. The membrane lifted and tore at a roof drain and the 
base flashing at the parapet was displaced. A portion of the coping was also 
displaced. Some of the windows on the original building were shuttered, but some 
were not – at least one window was broken (likely by windborne debris). A 
portion of the LPS on the new addition was dislodged.

Figure 6-1. General view of the roof membrane and rooftop equipment damage at 
the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office/EOC. The roof at the upper right is on the 
new addition. The mineral surfaced BUR landed on an aggregate surfaced BUR. 
(Pensacola)

6.1.2	Functional Loss
Some rainwater was able to enter the building at damaged rooftop equipment, but 
it was apparent that the roof deck was preventing major roof leakage in areas 
where the roof membrane blew off. Although the cost to repair the envelope and 
rainwater damage on the original and new portions of the building is 
significant, the EOC was able to continue functioning during and after the 
hurricane. 

Six days after the hurricane struck, emergency repairs had not been made to the 
roof and open ductwork on this important facility. Demands for repair crews are 
enormous in the aftermath of a hurricane like Ivan. To ensure priority service, 
it is prudent for owners of critical and essential facilities to have pre-
established agreements with contractors to perform emergency inspection and 
repair if needed.

6.2	Hospitals
A hospital in Gulf Breeze and all four hospitals and a psychiatric-care hospital 
in Pensacola were observed. All experienced building envelope problems. Though 
none of the hospitals were taken out of service, the envelope damage placed 
significant burdens on several of the facilities.

6.2.1	General Damage
Buildings at four of the five hospital complexes experienced roof membrane 
damage – damage was significant at three of the facilities. Windows were broken 
at four of the complexes, with significant damage at one of them. EIFS blew off 
the walls at two complexes. At both complexes, the EIFS failures resulted in 
disruption of elevator service (see Figures 5-15 and 5-16). At one of the 
complexes, the EIFS failure resulted in significant glazing damage (see Figures 
5-16 and 6-2). Rooftop equipment and LPSs were damaged at four of the complexes. 
Communications towers and antennas were damaged at two complexes. A loading dock 
canopy was blown away and several tall parking lot light fixtures collapsed at 
one complex. Sewage backed up in a cancer treatment facility because of power 
loss to a lift station. Tree-fall caused roof damage to a materials management 
building (an ancillary building at one complex).

Figure 6-2. View of EIFS damage at hospital building (Pensacola)

6.2.2	Functional Loss
The damage described above placed burdens on hospital staffs and took portions 
of some of the facilities out of service. However, all six hospitals were able 
to continue to provide care. The following is a synopsis of the major 
disruptions:

--At the Pensacola Naval Hospital complex, two patient floors were taken out of 
service because of minor rainwater leakage due to roof membrane blow-off from a 
large portion of the roof (Figures 6-3 and 6-4). The concrete roof deck was 
effective in minimizing leakage. The modified bitumen membrane had been 
installed over polyisocyanurate insulation mopped to the concrete deck. The 
blow-off was initiated by lifting and peeling of the metal edge flashing, or 
lifting of the wood nailers that the edge flashing was attached to, or by 
debonding of an insulation board from the deck. Debris from the roof broke 
several of the second and third floor windows (including some glazed with 
tempered glass) (Figure 6-4). Roof debris also damaged several antennas (Figure 
5-80).

Figure 6-3. General view of upper roof of the Pensacola Naval Hospital. Note the 
missing insulation boards near the corner of the roof. (Pensacola)

Figure 6-4. View of a portion of the lowest floor roof showing broken 2nd and 
3rd floor windows and debris from the roof above shown in Figure 6-3

--At one hospital complex, a portion of the surgical suite and the intensive 
care unit was taken out of service during the hurricane due to rainwater 
infiltration. Sewage disposal was interrupted due to lack of power at a lift 
station – waste was bagged. This interruption was of short duration.
--At one hospital, elevator service at the MOB was interrupted due to rainwater 
infiltration at the elevator penthouse due to EIFS blow off (see Figure 5-15). 
The MOB was connected to the hospital. Sewage disposal was interrupted due to 
lack of power at a lift station. This interruption was of short duration. 
--At one hospital complex there were numerous disruptions. Communications were 
lost about an hour after arrival of high winds. EIFS failure caused extensive 
glazing damage and disruption of elevator service. Glass shards fell and 
punctured the roof membrane over a regional dialysis unit and urgent care 
facility. However, the roof deck (concrete topping over steel decking) minimized 
rainwater infiltration. Emergency repairs were made, and the unit was opened 
after being out of operation for only one day. Rainwater from a punctured roof 
membrane entered a portion of the surgical suite. Sewage back-up disrupted the 
cancer treatment facility for one day. Loss of the canopy at the loading dock 
hampered materials handling. Quick and aggressive emergency repairs were 
responsible for minimizing the impacts of the service interruptions at this 
facility.
--At one hospital complex, a very large piece of HVAC equipment blew off the MOB 
roof (see Figure 5-73). Extensive rainwater damage occurred on the floor below. 
An emergency generator was brought in to run fans to dry out the facility.

6.2.3	Best Practices – Hospitals 
Though all of the hospitals had to cope with building performance problems, 
there were observed successes and best practices that contributed to minimal 
damage, particularly in terms of operational actions:
--Shutters. Some of the buildings had shutters over lower-level windows. No 
shutter breaches were observed.  
--Relocation of patients. At one hospital, patients were moved into the 
corridors in case patient room windows were broken. This practice may have been 
employed at other hospitals, although at one of the hospitals, a patient was in 
a room when a window broke. If patient room windows are not impact resistant or 
protected by shutters, moving patients out of the rooms during a hurricane 
appears to be a prudent practice.
--Satellite dish. At one hospital, satellite dishes were removed from their 
support stands and placed inside a penthouse prior to the hurricane. Had this 
action not been taken, the dishes would likely have been blown away and perhaps 
caused damage to the facility. An antenna that was not needed during the 
hurricane was also taken down.
--Damage response. One hospital experienced significant building problems; 
however, the hospital quickly mobilized contractors and cleaning crews. Quick 
action brought the cancer therapy facility and regional dialysis back online 
within a day, so those vital services were only minimally impacted. The rapid 
damage response also likely minimized rainwater damage costs. Rapid response was 
also observed at some of the other hospitals.

6.3	Schools
The MAT observed 13 schools, including elementary, middle, and high schools. In 
addition to their traditional role as educational facilities, schools often play 
an important role in providing space for sheltering, emergency response, and 
recovery after a hurricane. Thus, their loss of use can greatly impact a 
community’s ability to rapidly respond to the needs of disaster victims. See 
Section 6.4 for additional discussion on schools used as shelters.

6.3.1	General Damage
A limited amount of structural damage was observed. It consisted of collapsed 
walkway canopies at a few schools (Figures 4-98 and 6-5), loss of a portion of 
wood joists and roof decking at one school, loss of roof decking at one school 
(Figure 6-6), loss of an auto shop roof structure and portion of a CMU load-
bearing wall (Figure 6-7), and loss of roof joists and collapse of CMU walls at 
an HVAC chiller enclosure. At three of the schools that experienced structural 
damage, portions of the schools were used as shelters. However, the structural 
damage did not occur where people were sheltered.

All of the observed schools experienced building envelope damage, with damage to 
roof coverings and rooftop equipment being the most common problem. Other 
observed damage included soffit damage, metal wall panel damage, and the 
collapse of a non-load bearing brick wall.

Figure 6-5. Walkway canopy collapse at Bellview Middle School. Stronger winds 
could have turned the debris into lethal missiles. (Pensacola)

Figure 6-6. Loss of cementitious wood-fiber roof deck panels at Workman Middle 
School (Pensacola)

Figure 6-7. Loss of the roof structure and rear portion of the CMU load-bearing 
wall at the George Stone Career Center auto shop (Pensacola)

6.3.2	Functional Loss
Many of the observed schools experienced widespread rainwater damage due to 
breached building envelopes, which resulted in disruption or loss of school 
operations. In some cases, such as that shown in Figure 5-71, the envelope 
damage was minor, but lack of quick emergency repairs allowed significant 
rainwater to subsequently enter the building.

6.4	Shelters
Shelters can be defined in many ways depending on their use. A shelter is a 
place where people go to take refuge during an event (often called storm 
shelters) or to recover when they cannot return to their homes immediately after 
an event due to widespread storm damage. For the purposes of this report, the 
term “shelters” refers to storm shelters or buildings where people went to take 
refuge from the winds and surge during Hurricane Ivan. The MAT assessed the 
performance of some of these storm shelters to document how these essential 
facilities performed.

Further, because portions of several school buildings evaluated by the MAT were 
designated as storm shelters, damages to schools in some communities led to loss 
of use of shelters that could protect residents from injury during subsequent 
hurricanes. The loss of use of schools that function as storm shelters is 
particularly difficult for smaller communities where they often serve as 
convenient places to provide recovery assistance to residents in the days and 
weeks immediately after a disaster event.

For a discussion of the Florida Statewide Emergency Shelter Plan (SESP), see 
Chapter 6 in Mitigation Assessment Team Report, Hurricane Charley in Florida, 
FEMA 488.

6.4.1	General Damage
The MAT observed six shelters, five of which were schools. The other shelter was 
the Pensacola Civic Center (a large arena). Structural damage consisted of 
collapse of canopies at three of the schools (Figure 6-5), blow off of roof deck 
panels at one school (Figure 6-6), and damage to a stand-alone auto shop at the 
backside of one school (Figure 6-7). All five of the schools had roof covering 
damage, with the damage being significant at three of the buildings. One of the 
schools had an aggregate surfaced BUR. A substantial amount of aggregate was 
blown off and, subsequently, broke windows in one or more vehicles. Metal wall 
panels were blown off one of the schools and the Civic Center. Rooftop equipment 
was blown off of two schools and the Civic Center; a large fan from the Civic 
Center crushed an unoccupied car. 

6.4.2	Functional Loss
Pensacola Civic Center had an occupant load of approximately 1,600 to 2,000 
people at the time Hurricane Ivan struck. Five pieces of rooftop equipment over 
the arena floor were blown off. (For information on the roof membrane damage 
caused by the equipment blow off, see “Withstanding Hurricane Ivan” in the 
February 2005 issue of Interface (published by the Roof Consultants Institute). 

However, the wind speeds quoted in the article are incorrect. As an added safety 
measure, people were moved out of the arena into peripheral areas of the 
facility before the high winds arrived. Thus, although rainwater entered the 
arena, people were not left exposed. Portable toilets were placed within the 
arena area prior to the hurricane. That proved to be prudent, for the center 
lost sewage service due to lift station power failure.

The Jim C. Bailey Middle School (built in 1995) was used as a shelter. Rainwater 
entered the building in several different areas where asphalt shingles, 
underlayment, rooftop equipment, and metal wall panels were blown off (Figure 6-
8). The shingles were attached with only four nails instead of six, which the 
roofing industry recommends in high wind areas. The nails were incorrectly 
located (they were too high and at one of the shingles, an end nail was 2 ½ 
inches rather than 1 inch from the end). People were moved from one portion of 
the building to another to escape the rainwater leakage. 

Figure 6-8. Loss of asphalt shingles and underlayment at the Jim C. Bailey 
Middle School. Note the displaced wall panels at the upper left and the missing 
panel in the lower right. (Pensacola) 

The Workman Middle School sheltered approximately 25 people, including about 10 
police officers who came in from patrol shortly before arrival of the high 
winds. Although a portion of the school complex experienced structural damage 
(Figure 6-6), no injuries were reported. Occupants took shelter in a newer 
building on campus that did not experience structural failure. As shown in 
Figure 3-26, a substantial amount of windborne debris (primarily roofing and 
canopy components from the school) was airborne in this area.

All of the shelters observed by the MAT experienced blow-off of building 
components. When building components are blown off there is a risk that people 
arriving at a shelter during the hurricane may be injured or killed. For this 
reason, buildings selected for shelters should be designed and constructed to 
avoid loss of components. Items particularly susceptible to blow-off include 
aggregate roof surfacing. Roof coverings and rooftop equipment were also 
susceptible if adequate attention was not given to wind-resistant design and 
construction.

At the time of the MAT observations (six days after the hurricane), none of the 
five schools were being used. Some of the schools had too much rainwater damage 
to be of service. 

[End of Chapter 6]